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RESUMO 
 
A nossa dissertação tem como objetivo analisar os compromissos e as 
obrigações do procurador da Companhia de Jesus no Japão durante os anos em que 
Carlo Spinola foi escolhido para ocupar tal posição, a segunda em ordem de 
importância, conforme o jesuíta italiano Francesco Pasio.  
O ofício de procurador era uma das posições que levavam os missionários da 
Companhia a lidar diretamente com as autoridades japonesas em Nagasáqui, uma vez 
que cabia ao procurador receber, verificar e distribuir os bens pertencentes à missão e 
que eram carregados no navio português de Macau. Além disso, o procurador, 
juntamente com outros padres superiores, tinha também incumbidas tarefas políticas 
relativas ao capitão-mor e aos Portugueses no Japão. Spinola assumiu o cargo quando o 
bakufu começou a mudar a sua atitude em relação à Igreja de Roma, devido a várias 
causas que, em parte, envolviam também a Companhia de Jesus, com conseqüências 
negativas para a missão. 
Para fornecer uma compreensão profunda deste cargo, propomos uma 
comparação entre o procuradorado de Spinola e outros procuradores no Japão, tendo 
escolhido em particular o caso do Português João Rodrigues Tçuzu. Além disso, uma 
vez que o Japão era um caso particular dentro do Padroado Português, parece-nos 
pertinente efectuar outra comparação e apresentar também o caso - embora mais conciso 
- do procurador da província brasileira da Companhia de Jesus. 
 Através deste estudo de casos, tentaremos definir o procurador, tanto do ponto 
de vista prático - ou seja, os seus deveres, os seus compromissos e os seus recursos – 
como de uma perspectiva moral e filosófica – olhando para a literatura canônica 
produzida desde os primeiros tempos da Igreja Cristã. 
 Até agora, a históriografia sobre e de autoria jesuítica apenas aborda o cargo de 
procurador de forma marginal. O nosso trabalho vai preencher essa lacuna. Além disso, 
o estudo do papel do procurador permite-nos, inevitavelmente, uma melhor 
compreensão dos mecanismos de participação da Companhia de Jesus no comércio 
entre Macau e Nagasáqui, desde o seu início – selado por Alessandro Valignano – até ao 
seu fim – contemporâneo do término do procuradorado de Spínola. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Carlo Spinola, Japão, Macau 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Our dissertation aims to analyse the commitments and obligations of the 
procurator of the Society of Jesus in Japan during the years when Carlo Spinola (1564-
1622) was chosen to occupy such an important position, the second most important of 
the province, according to the Italian Jesuit Francesco Pasio.  
The office of procurator, in fact, was one of the positions which took the 
missionaries of the Society to deal directly with Japanese authorities in Nagasaki, for it 
was the procurator who was in charge of receiving, checking and distributing the share 
of goods belonging to the province loaded in the Portuguese ship from Macao. 
Furthermore, the procurator, along with other important fathers, had to deal also with 
political matters regarding the Capitão-Mór and the Portuguese in the Japanese country. 
Spinola assumed the office when the bakufu was changing its attitude towards the 
Roman Church, owing to several causes which partly involved also the Society of Jesus 
or which bore negative consequences for the mission.  
To provide a deep understanding of this office, we propose a comparison 
between Spinola’s procuratorship and how this office was handled by the most famous 
procurator in Japan: the Portuguese Father João Rodrigues Tçuzu. Furthermore, since 
Japan represented a unicum within the Portuguese Padroado, we deemed necessary to 
offer a further example and present also a sketch – although more concise – of the 
procurator in the Brazilian Province of the Society.  
Through this case study, we will try to define the procurator both from a 
practical point of view – i.e. his duties, his commitments, and his resources – and from a 
moral and philosophical perspective – that is the canonical literature regarding the 
relationship between the men of the cloth and commerce, which had been producing 
since the early times of the Christian Church.  
So far, works about the Society of Jesus and written by the Jesuits themselves 
had been coping with the office of procurator only marginally. Our work will fill that 
gap. Moreover, a research about the procurator will inevitably lead us to a better 
understanding of the mechanics of the participation of the Society in the Macao-
Nagasaki trade from its beginning sealed by Alessandro Valignano to its end, which 
basically corresponded with the end of Spinola’s procuratorship. 
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Introduction 
 
 ‘Signori, è virtù politica sapere se si debbono ricercare i mezzi umani come se 
non esistessero quelli divini, e quelli divini come se non esistessero i mezzi umani’.1 
Thus spoke an anonymous abbot in Umberto Eco’s novel L’Isola del Giorno Prima. 
Although this novel begins in 1643, hence outside the temporal scope of the present 
work, it is a fair expression of a side of European early modern mentality. This quote, in 
fact, describes in sufficiently appropriate terms the theoretical justification upon which 
was founded the office of procurator of the Society of Jesus, namely the needs of the 
mission were more compelling than canon law and the statutes of the Ignatian Order. 
 The procurator of Japan in Nagasaki2 is an integral part of subjects that are at the 
same time intertwined and exponentially bigger. The procurator was in charge of the 
economy of the mission, a fundamental aspect for the continuation and proliferation of 
the evangelization of Japan; Japan belonged juridically to the Portuguese Padroado do 
Oriente, whose economy was the stage where the procurator interpreted his role. The 
concept can be represented also schematically: 
 
Despite the procurator’s undoubted importance, in the copious bibliography 
which had been published from the 1950s onwards with regard to the cultural presence 
                                                 
1 Cf. Eco, L’Isola del Giorno Prima, p. 55. 
2 Actually, we should refer to this post as college procurator, but since the procurators themselves used to 
omit the substantive “college” we followed their examples. Moreover, during in 17th-century Japan the 
nomenclature of the Societ of Jesus is hardly applicable. 
Procurator of 
Japan 
Economy of 
the Jesuit 
mission 
Evangelization 
of Japan 
Portuguese 
Padroado 
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of the Europeans (Portuguese for the most part, but also Spanish, Dutch and English) in 
Japan, the procurator of the Society of Jesus in Nagasaki had been studied only 
incidentally. 3 In other words, if on the one hand the procurator of Japan has been 
studied synthetically in several works, on the other hand there is still the lack of an 
analytical, direct and dedicated study about it. In effect, until recently the procurators of 
Japan in Macao and Nagasaki had not been considered worthy of specific attention, 
whereas the silk trade, the profitable thread hold by the Portuguese between the 
southern Chinese province of Guangdong and Kyūshū, had being receiving attention 
from European and Asian historians alike, such as Charles Boxer,4 Michael Cooper,5 
Okamoto Yoshitomo6 and Takase Koichirō,7 only to cite the most significant.  
As a matter of fact, it is difficult not to find references to the silk trade in almost 
every publication about the economy of the Estado da Índia.8 Recently, however, with 
few exceptions,9 this topic has aroused the interest mostly among Japanese historians, in 
particular Oka Mihoko’s.10 Yet, in these works the focus is almost always on the trade 
between Macao and Nagasaki and the procurators are seen only as players in the game. 
In the last decade, however, two articles had been dedicated to the office of procurator 
in Japan. These two works are an introduction to the procurator both in general and in 
                                                 
3  We are referring in particular to Michael Cooper’s biography of Father João Rodrigues Tçuzu. 
Rodrigues, in fact, most likely is the most famous Jesuit who filled the post of procurator both in Macao 
and in Japan, therefore Cooper inevitably touched topics relevant to that office. Cf. Cooper, Rodrigues, O 
Intérprete. Um Jesuíta no Japão e na China, Lisboa (Quetzal Editores), 1994. 
4 See in particular Boxer, Fidalgos no Extremo Oriente 1550-1770. Factos e Lendas de Macau Antigo, 
Lisbon (Fundação Oriente e Museu e Centro de Estudos Marítimos de Macau), 1968 and idem, O Grande 
Navio de Amacau, Lisbon (Fundação Oriente – Museo e Centro de Estudos Marítimos de Macau), 1968. 
Whereas, for a wider and comprehensive approach to the century of Portuguese presence in Japan, see 
Boxer, The Christian Century in Japan 1549-1650, Manchester (Carcanet Press Limited). 
5 In addition to the aforementioned biography of João Rodrigues, see also Cooper, “The Mechanics of the 
Macao-Nagasaki Silk Trade”, in MN, Vol. 27, No. 4, Tōkyō (Sophia University), pp. 423- 433. 
6 See Okamoto, 十六世紀日歐交通史の研究, Tōkyō (Hara Shobō), 1944. 
7 See Takase, “マカオ=長崎間貿易の総取引高・生糸取引量・生糸価格”, in 社會經濟史學, 48 (1), 
pp. 51-84. 
8 See for instance Subrahmanyam, O Império Asiático Português 1500-1700. Uma História Política e 
Económica, Lisbon (DIFEL Editora), 1995 and Souza, The Survival of Empire. Portuguese Trade and 
Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630-1754, Cambridge Mass. (Cambridge University Press), 
1986. 
9 We are referring in particular to the unpublished work by Ana Maria Leitão, Do trato português no 
Japão, presenças que se cruzam (1543-1639), Master Thesis in História dos Descobrimentos e da 
Expansão Portuguesa, Lisbon, unpublished. See also Sousa, The Early European Presence in China, 
Japan, the Philippines and Southeast Asia (1555-1590) – The Life of Bartolomeu Landeiro, Macao 
(Fundação Macau), 2010. 
10 See in particular Oka, “イエズス会日本貿易の虚と実”, in 紀要, 17, 2007, pp. 146-162 and idem, 商
人と宣教師 南蛮貿易の世界, Tōkyō (Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai), 2010. 
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Japan during the second half of the 16th century,11 and a thorough analysis of a text – 
which we are going to use in our work – that was written in 1629 by a former procurator 
of Japan.12 The principal aim of these two articles, however, is not as comprehensive as 
the one we are assuming.  
Our work does not revolve only around the procurator as an institution within 
the framework of the missions of the Society of Jesus. As a matter of fact, we have 
already specifically dealt with the side of the Society that equivocally bordered with 
secular matters in Japan in a recent work of us.13 With this dissertation, however, we 
took on the duty of exploring also the mentality of the men who assumed the honour 
and the burden of the office. Everything, however, gravitates around and towards the 
Italian Jesuit Carlo Spinola, whom we selected as our specific case for two reasons in 
particular. 
Spinola’s procuratorship began in autumn 1611, that is in a moment when the 
downfall of the Japan Jesuits had already started, yet the missionaries were still a couple 
of years away from being under the Tokugawa’s fire. By analyzing Spinola’s 
management of the office, we will be able to fill in the gaps left by two historians before 
us. Namely, Michael Cooper, who studied both the trade and the procurator but “left” 
Japan together with João Rodrigues in 1610, and Takase Kōichirō, a specialist on Jesuit 
trade in Japan. The Japanese historian has analysed the Society’s profits from the silk 
trade from the 1590s to 1614, but he has not discussed trade after that date, in other 
words during Spinola’s procuratorship. It is true that from the time of persecution, there 
is not as much documentation available as for the first quarter of the 17th century, yet, as 
we will see, it is still possible to give a fair amount of data with regard to incomes, 
expenditures and, in particular, debts. 
The second reasons that led us to Carlo Spinola’s time as procurator lies in the 
fact that the Italian Jesuit, despite his importance within the mission irrespective of the 
role of procurator, has not been given yet an accurate account of his life and deeds. 
Beside apologetic literature, in fact, before us only two historians, both of them Jesuits, 
had dedicated part of their work to Spinola’s life. Nevertheless, either their work is 
                                                 
11 See Faria, “The Functions of Procurator in the Society of Jesus. Luís de Almeida, Procurator?”, in 
BPJS 15, 2007, pp. 29-46. 
12 See Oka, “A Memorandum by Tçuzu Rodrigues: The Office of Procurador and Trade by the Jesuits in 
Japan”, in BPJS 13, 2006, pp. 81-102. 
13 See Frison, “«El officio de Procurador al qual aunque tengo particular repugnancia». The Office of 
Procurator through the letters of Carlo Spinola S.J.”, in BPJS 20, 2010, pp. 9-70. 
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rather old and inaccessible,14 or it is a schematic and generic article.15 Notwithstanding 
the relevance of these works, which remain excellent yet introductory guidelines, we 
will have the chance to clarify some aspects of Spinola’s early years – such as his 
birthplace and the identity of his mother – which have been quite obscure and uncertain 
until now. Additionally, Carlo Spinola’s case presents also another advantage for us. 
The Italian, in fact, filled the position of procurator also in Macao between 1601 and 
1602. This fact gives us the opportunity to approach Jesuit involvement in the silk trade 
from both sides – Macao and Nagasaki – thus giving a more inclusive analysis of it. 
In order to be as thorough as a dissertation requires, we will observe the 
procurator of the Society of Jesus through different lenses. The primary, of course, will 
be how the procurator was supposed to act in Nagasaki, what were his duties when the 
Nao do Trato berthed at Nagasaki’s port and when it was about to leave for Macao, his 
obligations towards his confrères in Japan and the Portuguese merchants in Nagasaki 
and Macao and his role before and during the persecution. Furthermore, since all the 
supplies had to pass through the procurator and registered in his accounts, it was an 
office of vital importance for the mission. Consequently, being appointed to this 
position could – and actually did – cause competition and antipathy among fathers of 
different nationalities. This specific topic, the power struggle within the Japanese 
mission, will be observed from historical and sociological points of view. On the one 
hand we will answer historically to the question: why Portuguese fathers could not 
accept Spanish and Italian confrères? On the other hand, conversely, we will take 
advantage of conceptual apparatuses that generated the sociological problem: what kind 
of situations triggered biased intergroup relationships? As we will see, the desire to 
assume important roles for the mission arouse from causes extrinsic to the religious 
domain, namely the European political situation after the union of the Iberian Crowns 
and, precisely, the assignment of leading roles (visitor, provincial, vice-provincial, 
procurator…) within the Asiatic missions. Hence, in order to explain what caused 
disunity between Portuguese and Spanish fathers first, and later between Portuguese and 
Italians, we are going to give an historical sketch Europe and South-East Asia between 
16th and 17th centuries. Moreover, to provide a deeper understanding of the attitude 
                                                 
14 See Pacheco (Yuuki), 鈴田の囚人 カルロ・スピノラの書簡, Nagasaki, 1964. 
15 See Ruiz-de-Medina, “Un genovés nacido en Madrid. C. Spinola, cientifico, misionero y mártir”, in 
Quaderni Franzoniani, anno V, 2, n. 10, 1992, pp. 69-86 and idem, “Un Jesuita de Madrid arquitecto de 
la Iglesia de São Paulo, Macao”, in RC 21 (II série – Portuguese edition), 1994, pp. 37-49. 
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assumed by the Jesuits, we will resort to contemporary sociological studies. We will see 
how 400-year old missionaries used to behave according to schemes that are now 
situated within tested intergroups behaviour. Our focus, then, will be directed to the 
very men who formed the missionary contingent. Through the letters of Jesuits both in 
Europe and in the Estado da Índia, we will see how an early nationalistic spirit 
permeated the missionaries and created dangerous idiosyncrasies between groups.  
Keeping our focus on the men more than the institution or the offices, there is an 
aspect that unites all those who assumed the role of procurator, with maybe one 
important exception – João Rodrigues. All of them expressed over and over their loath 
toward the job they were carrying out. Whether it was repugnância or defining the 
procurator as a negra occupação, this feeling of revulsion is a common thread that 
passes through the whole Assistancy of Portugal. An old Japanese proverb compares 
merchants to the Japanese folding screens (byōbu16), since both of them need to be bent 
in order to accomplish their duties: whilst the merchants bend their back to apprise the 
buyers and close the deal, the byōbu cannot stand if not correctly positioned.17 In a 
different way than Japan, European mentality, forged upon centuries of Aristotelian 
philosophy and Christian theology, reserved a different, yet as much scornful, treatment 
to merchants and trading activities. We are going to cope in particular with the 
ambiguous relationship between God and Mammon, i.e. between the world of faith and 
the dominion of money. Although we will see that the connection between Christianity 
and commerce is as ancient as the Bible itself, our focus will be more attentive in 
particular from the Early Middle Ages onwards, when the poverty of Jesus Christ 
assumed a concrete social value. The presence of money in theological literature is due 
mostly to the foundations of new religious orders – the Ordo Praedicatorum and the 
Ordo Fratrum Minorum – that worked separately from the Episcopal control and were 
forced to match their own rule with the economic and social conditions of a world, 13th-
century Europe, where money had already began to circulate widely. We will see how 
also in this early stage, there was openness towards compromise, openness that would 
fortify as the European mentality developed along the centuries and, by the second half 
of the 16th century, during the age of dissimulation and raison d’état, would lead the 
Praepositi Generales of the Society of Jesus to allow an activity that, as we will 
                                                 
16 屏風 
17 The proverb reads 商人と屏風は直ぐには立たぬ. 
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demonstrate, had always been prohibited to men of the cloth: trade, precisely the silk 
trade between Macao and Nagasaki. Thus, our analysis of the commercial activities of 
the Japan Jesuits will take into account also the critics against the Society of Jesus and 
the mentality where they generated from.  
Still, despite dealing with the trade represented the main obligation of the 
procurator in Japan, the economy of the Japan Jesuits was not confined to that. 
Although Ignacio de Loyola had clearly stated that only probationary houses and 
colleges were authorized to possess landed property, the Japan mission owned estates, 
both in India’s Province of the North and, only in a later stage, in the kingdom.18 As we 
will see, the possession of estates was allowed both by canon law and secular powers, 
and the same happened also for another commercial activity. As correctly stated by 
Serafim Leite, in fact, only ‘uma coisa está vedada ao Jesuíta, e em geral a todo o 
eclesiástico [...]: é o comércio propriamente dito’, that is ‘comprar objectos para os 
tornar a vender. Com lucro, naturalmente’.19 Leite, in this occasion, put up a defense of 
his fellows in Brazil. As we will see, the Province of Brazil participated actively in the 
industria açucareira, yet it was different from what was happening in Asia. According 
to the canon law there is a clear distinction between a commerce that comprises 
manufacture between the buying and the selling, as happened in Brazil with the 
production and selling of sugar, and a mere exchange without any modifications in the 
product, the silk trade. The Brazil Jesuits had to face different problems with respect to 
their confrères in Japan. They did not trade in silk, yet, following the example of 
Portuguese merchants, they became competitive sugar planters and exporters. The 
procurators in Brazil, then, not only had to take care of economic issues without 
creating scandals for the Society, but, differently from Japan, they also had to care about 
how the Royal officials would react to their way of handle the Society’s affairs. This 
and the other differences with the procurator in Japan that we will see in the last chapter 
of this work led us to believe that to enhance the scope of our work and to follow the 
selected approach, it was necessary to add a term of comparison to the procurator of 
Japan, which was as far in space as it was close in time.  
                                                 
18 Cf. Alden, The Making of an Enterprise –The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire, and Beyond 
1540-1750, Stanford University Press, 1996, pp. 382-383.  
19 Cf. HCJBII IV, pp. 165-167. We had to use both the first edition (Lisboa/Rio de Janeiro 1938-1945) and 
the second (São Paulo 2004), which in the footnotes are differentiate respectively by [I] and [II]. 
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To sum everything up, the main issues which we are going to face revolve 
around the economy of the Society of Jesus between the second half of the 16th century 
and the first half of the 17th and the Ignatian delegated to deal with it, i.e. the procurator. 
In order to provide an understanding as deeper as possible, we chose to adopt a 
comparative methodology. Following Marc Bloch’s teachings with regard to 
comparative history, namely the application of the comparative method to parallel 
societies,20 we are going to study Carlo Spinola’s procuratorship in comparison with 
those who preceded him and with those who filled the post in a completely different 
situation, that of colonial Brazil.  
Alongside with the procurator, the history of Christianity in Early Modern Japan 
will be directly addressed, since the procurator played a fundamental intermediary role 
between the mission and the Japanese country. In fact, before Spinola took on the 
position, during João Rodrigues’s times, the procurator acted also as sales representative 
for the Japanese rulers in Nagasaki. Moreover, in several occasions, the procurator was 
involved in the negotiation of the textiles’ price. Both duties generated harsh criticism 
by the exasperated General Claudio Acquaviva, who eventually ordered to stop 
handling capitals belonging to laymen, be that Portuguese or Japanese. Spinola assumed 
the office right when Acquaviva’s order reached Japan and filled the position until his 
capture in 1618. In other words, Spinola’s procuratorship covers exactly the lapse of 
time that saw the Province of Japan passing from a roughly normal situation to 
expulsion and harsh, deadly, persecution. Hence, we may affirm that the importance, as 
well as the need to study Spinola’s procuratorship, lies, firstly, in the fact that it 
occurred in a delicate moment in the history of Japan, the first time of stability after 
almost two centuries of tumults. Secondly, we can consider his procuratorship as the 
last one that actually took its start from the regulations written by Alessandro Valignano 
back in 1591, for after Spinola’s imprisonment these protocols were no longer 
applicable. As a matter of fact, from the second quarter of the 17th century, Jesuits 
fathers in Macao started to point out that even top quality silk was not as profitable a 
good as it was before, thus they started to look to other merchandises (gold and musk) 
                                                 
20 Bloch stated that there are two research strategies within the domain called histoire compare. The first 
strategy envisages the comparison between societies separated both in time and space, whose analogies, 
then, cannot be explained by direct influence or same origins. The second strategies deals with the study 
of parallel societies, geographically close and contemporaneous, hence continuously under each other 
influence and sharing the same origins. Cf. Bloch, “Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés 
européennes”, pp. 17-19. In our case, the Bloch’s societies are represented by the ways the Society of 
Jesus implemented its structures in different territories, such as Japan and Brazil. 
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in order not to be too dependent on Chinese textiles and also because they were less 
likely to cause scandal.21 
This topic leads us to the sources we are going to use. In order to achieve 
sufficient scientific results in the analysis of the office of procurator, we deemed it 
necessary to gather as many manuscript sources as limits of time and space allowed us. 
Thus, during the past four years, the research led us to visit almost all of the principal 
archives in Europe with regard to the Society of Jesus and the European expansion.22 
We spent also a couple of weeks at Tōkyō’s Sophia Daigaku, where, however, the 
research was mostly bibliographical.  
At any rate, as we said, Japanese historiography coped with the Jesuits trade in 
Japan until Tokugawa’s persecution broke out. Still, since our research aims to a 
comprehensive view of the procurator and the silk trade we found abundant 
documentation produced before and during the persecution in Japan. First of all in order 
of importance, Carlo Spinola’s epistolary. For the most part, his epistles are in the 
Roman archive of the Society of Jesus, but there are some letters and official documents 
he signed as procurator scattered through Portugal, England, Spain and, curiously, 
France. With all probability, we have consulted all the surviving manuscripts by Spinola 
and their copies. Through Spinola’s letters we were able to reconstruct his life, from his 
first year of novitiate to the martyrdom. It is obvious, however, that we could not do that 
only through his letters. One aspect about Carlo Spinola that has always puzzled 
historians is his birthplace and the exact date of birth. Whilst for the latter we can only 
advance our hypothesis based mostly on a linguistic deduction, thanks to the days spent 
researching in the old castle of House Spinola in Tassarolo, under the guide Oberto 
                                                 
21 Cf. Informação do trato que temos da China Japão, Macao, 10 February 1620. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 45 [I], 
f. 235v: ‘O trato douro he ainda muito mais limpo e com outros grandes bens. Porque o que aqui chamão 
pão de ouro, tem doze onças e meya de nosso pezo, e hum destes paes custa aqui na China setenta 
cruzados, as vezes oitenta e oitenta e cinco, de modo que o seu preço he entre sesenta e noventa cruzados, 
porque ha nelle abaixar e alevantar, como nas mais cousas de mercadoria. E conforme ao que se vende 
em Japão, se ganhara no ouro a cincoenta ou sesenta por cento, pouco mais ou menos. E assi os ganhos do 
ouro poderão ser como os da seda, e tem outros bens mayores, porque avulta muito pouco, e em pouco se 
emprega muita prata, pois com cincomil cruzados se comprão sesenta pães douro, e as vezes mais, e estes 
se mettem em hum escritorio bem pequeno [...]. Como este ouro occupa tão pouco lugar, he facil de 
meneyar com pressa, vende-se, embarcar-se desembarcar-se quasi sem ser sentido. Em hum caso de 
necessidade, facilmente hum homem pode embarcar e desembarcar o ouro que tem mettido nas aljebeiras, 
no seo, nas mangas, sem que ninguem lho note’. 
22 The research had been carried out in Portugal (Lisbon and Évora), Italy (Vatican City, Rome and 
Tassarolo), Spain (Madrid, Alcalá de Henares and Seville) and England (London). A detailed list of 
archives and funds visited follows in the Bibliographical References. 
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Spinola, we were finally able to give a certain answer to the question: “where was Carlo 
Spinola born?” 
Letters by Spinola and other procurators, however, would have been useless 
manuscripts in the absence of other, even more important, sources. We are referring in 
particular to the Regimento do Procurador que està em Jappão.23 This text, written by 
Visitor Alessandro Valignano in 1591, includes 34 articles defining in details the tasks 
and duties of the procurator of Japan in Nagasaki. Through the confrontation between 
Spinola’s management of the finance of the province and the 34 articles drawn up by 
Valignano, two things will appear clearly: the way Spinola abode by Valignano’s rules 
and how the visitor’s rules were still topical almost thirty years after they were 
conceived. 24 The drawing up of the Regimento, moreover, might be considered the 
starting point of the development process of the office of procurator. This process 
includes of course Spinola’s procuratorships in Macao and Nagasaki and ends with 
another Regimento, or better a memorandum, written in 1629 in Macao.25  
In order to achieve our goal, to provide a knowledge tout court of the procurator, 
we went looking for information regarding the procurators of the Society of Jesus in 
Asia and Brazil, as we said. Yet, it was unavoidably to end up searching for documents 
written and addressed to the Companhia in Europe. Although we are going to make use 
of some of these documents, we acknowledge that our thesis has two shortcomings in 
particular. The first is the small amount of space dedicated to the procurator in Brazil. 
Although, in fact, the last part has to be considered more as special chapter rather than a 
normal part of the dissertation, we recognize that there is still a lot to say about this 
topic, since, so far, Brazilian and Anglo-Saxon historians had been publishing several 
works with regard to the sugar production and the involvement of the Ignatians, but the 
procurators and their obligations appear only incidentally.26 In any case, through the 
documentation gathered in Rome and Lisbon, the main features of the procuradores in 
                                                 
23 As far as we know, two copies of the Regimento still exist. The original manuscript is in ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 2, ff. 114-118v and a 18th century copy in BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, ff. 37-41. 
24 Valignano, obviously, did not forget to write a similar Regimento also for the procurator of Japan in 
Macao. See Regimento para o Procurador de Jappão que Reside na China. Este deu aqui o P. Vizitador 
Francesco Passio quando veo de Jappão, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, ff. 10-13v. 
25 See Couzas que podem servir para os Procuradores, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-8, ff. 635-649. 
26 The author that gave more space to the procurator is Paulo de Assunção in his Ph.D. thesis Negócios 
Jesuíticos: A Administração dos Bens Divinos. Differently from the Brazilian case, there are works about 
the Jesuits’ procurators in other regions of Latin America, such as Peru and Argentina. Cf. Cushner, Farm 
and factory the Jesuits and the development of agrarian capitalism in colonial Quito, 1600-1767, New 
York (State University of New York Press), 1982. 
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colonial Brazil will be delineated nonetheless and we do not exclude to expand our 
knowledge of the Brazilian Province of the Society in the future.  
Secondly, we think that also the European colleges of the Society of Jesus might 
have been given more space. As a matter of fact, we deal with the procurators in Europe 
only marginally and through comparisons made by Rodrigues and Spinola themselves. 
It is true that we do not fail in starting our comparison from the fundamental treatises of 
the Companhia de Jesus, such as the Constitutiones or the Epitome Instituti Societatis 
Iesu, thus we will be providing the needed information as to how the office of 
procurator was conceived by the founders of the Society. Yet, some of the sources we 
have found, the notebook of the Évora procurator in particular,27 probably deserved 
more space and attention. In our defence, however, if on the one hand this lack may 
influence the general knowledge on the procurator in the Early Modern Era, on the other 
hand we think we fully respected our obligation toward both the history of Christianity 
in Early Modern Japan and the history of the Portuguese Expansion. 
 
*   *   * 
A few technical notes. Since our dissertation is based on European sources, we 
followed the Gregorian calendar, even for documents produced either before 1582 or for 
those who kept following the Julian calendar. In a few cases, we deemed it necessary to 
provide also the Japanese date and the nengō, i.e. the name of the period, but in these 
occasions explications are provided in notes. 
With regard to the transliteration of Japanese words, names and topography, we 
followed the Hepburn system, therefore we altered the 16th and 17th-century spellings to 
the actual version. We opted to follow the Hepburn also for those words which are now 
present in English dictionaries. Consequently, although now for well-known words like 
daimyo, shogun and Kyushu the long-vowel indicators are omitted, we decided to do 
otherwise and keep the indicator (daimyō, shōgun, Kyūshū) for the sake of 
pronunciation and out of respect for the Japanese language. In Japanese names the 
Japanese order, in which the family name comes first, is retained and in the Annex 
section there are lists both for Japanese anthroponyms and Asiatic toponyms, which are 
                                                 
27 See Varias Lembranças Pera hum Procurador, BNP, FG 4254 , ff. 1-138v. 
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modernized coherently with the rest in their transliteration, but not in their use. Then, 
those places that have changed their name since the 17th century, such as Miyako/Kyōto 
and Edo/Tōkyō, we decided to call them as they were used to in the past. 
European names are rendered according to today’s most common use, despite 
the numerous variations that appear in the sources, 28  and in accordance with the 
nationality of the subject. With the popes, however, we opted to follow the Anglo-
Saxon version of their names.  
With respect to the bibliographical references in the footnotes, we tried not to 
weigh them down too much and, except here in the Introduction and when in the text we 
propose further literature, we limited the information to the author’s last name, the title 
of the book/article/essay and the pages. Other information is provided in the 
Bibliographical References section at the end of the text.  
Quotations from the Bible are all taken from the Douay-Rheims Catholic Bible, 
which is available also online at http://drbo.org/index.htm.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Carlo Spinola, for instance, was called also Carlos Spinola or Carlos Espinola, whereas for Alessandro 
Valignano it is easy to find his surname spelled Valignani and his name Alexandre.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE UNION OF THE IBERIAN CROWNS AND THE EUROPEAN 
AND ASIAN STATUS QUO IN THE 16TH CENTURY 
 
 
I. 1.    The Old Continent divided 
In 1968, the English historian Sir John H. Elliott published a work in the wake of 
and in response to Braudel’s Mediterranée. As Elliott confessed in the introduction, his 
idea was to give back to the mentalities – religion, cultures and ideas – the space they 
deserved in the historic theorization regarding 16th century Europe. Elliott’s book is 
entitled Europe Divided and started from the assumption that the fracture of 
Christendom in that century rebounded on the very political status of the European 
countries.  
As a matter of fact, Europe in the 16th century was essentially divided. This 
statement must not be read through a Manichean lens, since Europe in 1500 was not 
divided between two opposed parties. There were nuances that evade a bipolar 
connotation, but still a division was in place. The 95 theses sent by the Augustinian 
German monk, Martin Luther, to the Archbishop of Mainz, Albert of Brandenburg, in 
October 1517, in fact, must be interpreted both for their religious and political 
repercussions. Luther, in fact, was not perpetrating the reformation of the Roman 
Church – he never actually used the word reform. His theses were part of a common 
practice of the monastic orders of the late medieval period which, in order to renew the 
state of the clergy, wished to enact some reforms. Luther’s theses were an invitation to 
an academic debate on the power of indulgences and the doctrine that legitimated them, 
not a reform of the entire church.29 Furthermore, the Augustinian did not represent a 
unicum in the academic debates of that time. As it has been stated, in fact, the document 
                                                 
29 Cf. CHC, p. 3 and Prosperi, Storia Moderna e Contemporanea. Volume primo. Dalla Peste Nera alla 
Guerra dei Trent’anni, pp. 196-197. 
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Luther signed in 1517 was not revolutionary. Theses against the indulgences had been 
beign published since the end of the 15th century.30 Yet, Luther spread his ideas in a 
time when the protests against the fiscal burdens imposed by Rome on the German 
churches – the Gravamina Germanicae nationis – were gaining strength, and the selling 
of new papal indulgences by the Dominican Johann Tetzel was the straw that broke the 
camel’s back. Moreover, Luther could rely on the high and fast spreadability of his 
theories through the new printing technology.31 Therefore, something that initially was 
only a request to debate a specific doctrinal issue, soon assumed political connotations, 
in particular after Luther burned the excommunication bull Exsurge Domine in 1520, a 
deed that has been considered as the spark which gave birth to the Reformation.32 Soon 
the German monk found several supporters among the German nobility who saw his 
rebellion as an opportunity to take away from Rome the management of the church 
properties in Germany. Frederick of Saxony, Luther’s prince, decided to support the 
monk, in order to establish his territorial rights in front of Carlos V. As an elector of the 
emperor, the elector of Saxony was able to gain a hearing for Luther at the imperial diet 
in Worms (1521). There, Luther confronted with the imperial delegate instructed that 
the papal dispositions should be put into practice. On this occasion, Luther took the 
debate to another level. He did not submit to the political authority, Emperor Carlos V, 
but neither did he bow to the religious rule of the pontiff. He could not go back on his 
theses, because he had to remain faithful to the imperative of his conscience.33 
Although Rome’s power had already been contested before and a loss of 
ascendency was taking place, this is the core of the question which would lacerate 
Europe once and for all: the refusal to submit to a power which was incontestable until a 
few moments before. The questioning of established powers inevitably produced the 
bewilderment of the traditional order and thus the problem regarding to whom the 
people were to send their obedience arose: ought one obey his king or was he still 
supposed to follow the precept of the apostles and obey God, rather than men?34  
This issue was faced in the Council of Trent (1542-1563) and produced the 
traditional doctrine of potestas indirecta elaborated by the Jesuit Cardinal Roberto 
                                                 
30 Cf. Febvre, Martinho Lutero: um destino, pp. 88-89. 
31 On the German social restlessness see Febvre, op. cit., pp. 98-103. 
32 See NCMH, p. 69. 
33 Cf. Prosperi, op. cit., p. 202 and Bonney, The European Dynastic States 1494-1660, p. 16. 
34 Acts of Apostles 5:29: ‘But Peter and the apostles answering, said: We ought to obey God, rather than 
men.’ 
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Bellarmino, but already anticipated by the School of Salamanca. Bellarmino based his 
theory on what Thomas Aquinas stated about the subordination of temporal purposes to 
spiritual ones and described the Christian believer as a man subject both to temporal 
sovereignty and to the pope. 35  Yet, a straightforward subordination of secular to 
ecclesiastical authority was ruled out by considerations of political theology and factual 
reality. With regard to church interference with temporal matters, Bellarmino basically 
follows the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria who conceived the existence of two 
distinct orders – the spiritual and worldly – ruled by two potestates – civil and 
ecclesiastic – both independently authorised.36 Consequently, according to both Vitoria 
and Bellarmino, just as an emperor is not allowed to rule over the whole humankind, the 
pope does not possess temporal authority outside his own territory.37 Bellarmino took 
the debate farther by stating that although the pontiff’s power outside the boundaries of 
the Holy See is purely spiritual, that does not impede him from intervening in temporal 
matters when exceptional situations arise, such as the welfare of Christendom or the 
preservation of the Church of Rome.38  
In a time when the pope put himself as a political subject who wished to operate 
a monopoly upon the souls of his boundless domain, it is easy to imagine how the 
overlapping of the two jurisdictions, spiritual and secular, had repercussions also in 
international relationships. The point basically can be resumed with the following 
question: should foreign policy follow the interests of the country or should it abide by 
religious obedience when the two did not coincide?39 The political division created by 
the two confessions was a factual attack on the European society, a society which until 
then was safely ordered under the protection of religious unity. But now, after Luther 
and after Emperor Carlos V’s attempts to re-establish the European status quo, the 
uniformity of Christendom was only a memory and it began to appear clear that also the 
political order, both national and international, would soon follow.40  
                                                 
35 Cf. Filoramo, Il Sacro e il Potere. Il Caso Cristiano, pp. 178-182. 
36 Cf. Höpfl, Jesuit Political Thought. The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540-1640, p. 53-55. 
37 Cf. Frajese, “Una teoria della censura: Bellarmino e il potere indiretto dei papi”, pp. 139-152 and 
Fabbri, Roberto Bellarmino e Thomas Hobbes - Teologie Politiche a Confronto, pp. 43-45. 
38 See Fabbri, op. cit., pp. 47-48. 
39 Cf. Höpfl, op. cit., p. 6 and Elliott, La Europa Dividida 1559-1598, pp. 43-45.  
40 Carlos’s various attempts to find a common ground to allow both Lutherans and Christians to live 
together were all disastrous. In addition, when the Christian theologians gathered at Trent finally agreed 
to welcome also Protestant theologians it was already too late. The most of the issues, such as the 
principle of sola fide, in fact, had already been settled without taking in consideration any Lutheran point 
of view. This basically meant that the fracture between the two confessions was already irreconcilable. 
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Regarding the interior peace and uniformity of a country, in 1591 a Carmelite 
theologian, the Spanish Pedro Cornejo, advised all the Christian sovereigns to: 
‘no permitir en sus Reynos y Señorios otra [religion] que la Catolica Romana, ni tener paz ni 
amistad con los hereges, pues jamas Republica es ni fue bien gouernada, ni pacificada donde 
la dissension y diuersidad de fees reyna, ni naturalmente lo puede ser. Y la causa es, porque 
todos los nacidos, capazes de razon, creen naturalmente auer vn Dios, principio y causa de 
todas las cosas, y cada vno cree y tiene por cierto y firme, ser el verdadero aquel en quien el 
cree, adora, y tiene por tal: y los otros estar ciegos y engañados. Y [...] donde ay este rancor y 
fuego interior, ni puede auer amistad buena, ni paz durable’.41  
Politically, Europe was following this direction. In Germany, peace was reached at 
Augsburg in 1555, after a decade of intermittent civil and religious wars. In the early 
1550s, Carlos V entrusted his brother Fernando to negotiate a system for the 
coexistence of Catholics and Lutherans in the Empire. Fernando, knowing that he was 
going to rule Germany without the resources of the Netherlands and Spain, opted 
shrewdly for a compromise which basically resulted in granting the princes the right to 
impose their own confession on their subjects. This principle was later summarized by a 
German law professor with the famous expression cuius regio, eius religio (‘whose the 
regime, his the religion’). For the Imperial crown this concession meant a heavy defeat, 
a formal abdication of authority of the princes over a field which Carlos V had always 
considered to lie peculiarly within the emperor’s prerogatives.42  
Moreover, also Rome lost something in the Peace of Augsburg. The papacy, in 
fact, starting from the pontificate of Boniface VIII (1280-1290) had been preoccupied 
with the risk of a schism following the divisions between European countries and the 
intensification of secular control over the church. In order to obtain formal recognition 
of its pre-eminence, the papacy established a direct relationship with the European 
monarchies based on special agreements called concordats, through which the popes 
bartered away their benefices to princes and feudal lords, but also to important merchant 
families, in return for recognition of the supreme authority of the church and also for 
political support. These concordats had two strictly related consequences for the Roman 
Church:  
                                                 
41 See Cornejo, Compendio y Breve Relacion de la Liga y Confederacion Francesa, ff. 8-8v and Elliott, 
op. cit., p. 95. 
42 Cf. NCMoH, pp. 193-195; Koenigsberger, Mosse and Bowler, Europe in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 
240-241 and Prosperi, op. cit., pp. 235-236. 
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1. by granting the prerogative to choose the ecclesiastical body over the secular 
powers – as happened in France and England, the popes lost their influence 
over the episcopates outside their lands; 
2. on the eve of Reformation, in comparison with other European countries 
Germany was rather fragmented, a fact that conferred great authority to the 
pope, in particular of economic sort (the grievances we saw before). Yet, when 
whole provinces followed their political rulers and moved away from Rome’s 
aegis, it appeared clear that the concordats stipulated in order to give back 
political power to the church, in the long-term weakened it.43 
Between the diet of Worms of 1521 and the diet of Augsburg of 1555, then, 
Europe saw first the birth of the authority of conscience with Luther’s alleged statement 
‘Hir stehe ich; ich kann nicht anders’, and then the rising of the political principle that 
secular princes were allowed to impose their confessions on their lands. The idea that 
sprouted from the diet of Augsburg would seem to have been incorporated and reformed 
by the strategic theorizations of the Jesuits. The Society of Jesus recognised from its 
inception that an engagement with the world of secular rulers was inescapable. The 
founders had never doubted that the Society’s missions would require the patronage of 
secular authorities or that, when called upon, members of the Society would render 
services to rulers as was appropriate to men of the cloth. Yet, one of the defining issues 
in early modern political thought concerned the loyalty of the people when secular and 
ecclesiastical rulers came into conflict. According to the Society of Jesus, the church 
was a respublica perfecta as any secular commonwealth. It was, then, legitimate for the 
Society to foster a resolution to this issue that subordinated political to ‘spiritual’ 
authority. 44  In a few words, the Jesuits acknowledged that the secular lords were 
irreplaceable for the survival and sustenance of the Companhia, yet they also 
recognized that the secular authorities could not wield their power without the 
legitimation of the Roman Church, which, consequently, was still coated with a layer of 
spiritual superiority. Accordingly, Cardinal Bellarmino described the Catholic Church 
as a respublica Christiana born out of the confrontation with the Protestant Churches 
and the emerging early modern state. Bellarmino used this expression to indicate both 
                                                 
43 The Reyes Catolicos – Fernando and Isabel – for instance had the power to appoint bishops in their 
lands. This right was then conferred in perpetuity to Carlos V and his successors by his former tutor, Pope 
Adrian VI, in 1523. Cf. Bonney, op. cit., pp. 1-3 and also Prosperi, op. cit., pp. 177-178. 
44 Cf. Höpfl, op. cit., pp. 5-7. 
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the church as opposed to secular commonwealths and the Catholic Church insofar as it 
incorporated and in certain cases ruled over the various secular respublicae.45 
We would like to suggest a reflection on this point. According to the founder of 
the Order, Ignacio de Loyola, the Society must work to convert to the Jesuit persuasion 
persons of considerable importance by serving them as spiritual counsellor or court 
confessor, although they were supposed to be unswerving supporters of Papal 
supremacy. 46  Once the Ignatians became acquainted with the Japanese advanced 
civilization, they adopted a strategy which, would seem to be partly ascribable to the 
mentality that led to Augsburg’s precept. Once the missionaries grasped the 
fundamental features of the Japanese society, as its rigid hierarchy, they decided to put 
into practice Loyola’s advice, 47  and directed their efforts at the conversion of the 
daimyō.48 Although, during the first phase of proselytization the Ignatians targeted also 
the lowest strata of the Japanese society, starting from the mid-1560s the conversion of 
the lords was considered as the fastest and most secure way to obtain a great number of 
conversions among the commoners and also a way to assure support for the mission 
which was at the same time political, economic and territorial. This strategy was not 
shared by everyone within the Society of Jesus and found even more opponents outside 
the Ignatian Order. Contrarily to what the Society fostered, in fact, the Friars Minors, 
the harshest opponents of the Jesuits in Asia, considered the conversion of the daimyō 
not as the first step in the evangelization of Japan, but secondary to the conversion of 
the poor and pariahs.49 Fray Juan de Zamora, a Franciscan sent to Japan, stated that 
‘pobres simples predican, pobres leprosos convierten y pobres nos sustentan y pobres se 
bautizan, porque pauperes evangelizatur’. 50  The Franciscans often developed their 
strategies by following a path opposite to the one chosen by the Jesuits, and this is 
                                                 
45 Cf. Tutino, Empire of Souls. Robert Bellarmine and the Christian Commonwealth, p. 14. 
46 Cf. Bonney, op. cit., pp. 70-71. 
47 Loyola in his foundational text remained ambiguous on this point. Although, in fact, he prohibits the 
Jesuits to mingle in wordly business (negotia sæcularia), which included both the conduct of lawsuits and 
the management of finances, he also stressed the importance of preserve the benevolence of the key 
figures within the secular world. See Constitvtiones Societatis IESV et Examen Cvm Declarationibvs, pars 
X, section 11, note b, pp. 364-365: ‘In primis conservetur benevolentia Sedis Apostolicæ, cui peculiariter 
inservire debet Societas, deinde Principum Sæcularium, & Magnatum, ac primariæ auctoritatis hominum, 
quorum favor, aut alienation animi multum facit, vt ostium divino servitio & bono animarum aperiatur, 
vel præcludatur’. See also Höpfl, op. cit., pp. 57-58. 
48 For Japanese words’ definition and characters refer to the Glossary. 
49 See Tratado que os religiosos de S. Francisco espalharam em Goa em Baçaim no ano de 1598 contra 
os Padres da Companhia de Jesus que andam na conversão de Japão, BL/Add. 9858, ff. 61v-78v, in 
particular ff. 65 and 78. 
50 Cf. Correia, A Concepção de Missionação na Apologia de Valignano. Estudo sobre a Presença Jesuíta 
e Franciscana no Japão (1587-1597), p. 99. 
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particularly true regarding the object of their conversions. Fray Jerónimo de Jesus 
namely wrote that: 
‘El santo Comissário51 estando siempre pensativo y solícito acerca del modo que tendrá para 
predicar en Japon la ley de Dios evangélica, parece que le reveló el Señor que, para ir 
acertado, havía de ir por passos contrarios de los por donde iva la Compañia. La Compañia 
buscaba a las cabeças, porque cogido un Grande, cogían a sus vassalos [...]. El santo 
Comissario, por el contrario, buscaba a pobres.’52 
The attacks of the Franciscans on the Society of Jesus relied on a system of thought that 
belonged to the medieval mentality, a system that enhanced tradition to the detriment of 
the adaptation promoted by the Ignatians. An uncompromising system grew time before 
the confessional dissensions mentioned at the opening of the chapter. On the contrary, 
the Society of Jesus was founded in 1540 – between Luther’s rebellion and the 
summoning of the Council of Trent. The Society presented itself in a Europe which had 
drastically changed over the latter forty years both in political disposition and in 
mentality, in a Europe where political means were used to reach religious purposes, and 
vice versa.53 Thus, to be the ultimate army at the pontiff’s disposal, the Ignatians had to 
develop a progressive and pliable constitution to pursue God’s glory both inside and 
outside Europe. This kind of mentality could only be born in a time where Christendom 
had been violated and shattered and, in particular, had seen princes of the Holy Roman 
Empire decide what confession their people were to follow. However, it is still too soon 
to venture out to Japan, first we must see what was happening in the Iberian Peninsula. 
 
I. 2.    Portugal heredado y conquistado por Felipo 2 
Three years after the diet of Augsburg and two after his abdication, Carlos V 
died. Earlier, in September 1556, he handed over the title of Holy Roman Emperor to 
his brother Fernando I, who was eventually accepted and duly elected in February 1558. 
Yet, as early as October 1555, the emperor had already renounced Burgundy in favour 
                                                 
51 Fray Pedro Baptista.  
52 See Pérez, Fr. Jerónimo de Jesús: Restaurador de las Misiones de Japon: sus Cartas y Relaciones 
(1595-1604), p. 77, apud Correia, op. cit., p. 99.  
53 Luther deliberately courted political controversy as part of his strategy for spreading his teaching. In 
1520, in fact, he addressed the Catholic princes directly in his Appeal to the Christian Nobility of the 
German Nation in which he adroitly listed a range of grievances they felt in their relations with Rome. Cf. 
Bonney, op. cit., p. 30. 
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of his son Felipe, whereas the Spanish kingdoms in the Old World and the New 
followed in January 1556.54 
The first two decades of reign had been years of great difficulty for Felipe II of 
Spain. In the 1560s he had to keep a defensive attitude owing to a peculiar succession of 
events – the revolt of the Granada Moriscos and the Netherlands, the outbreak of the 
French wars of religion, and the stepping up of the Turkish naval attack.55 Although at 
Lepanto in 1571 the Lega Santa summoned by Pius V momentarily managed to keep at 
bay the Ottomans, the 1570s were also sombre years overshadowed by the failure to 
subdue the revolt in the Netherlands, and by the royal bankruptcy of 1575-1576. Yet, 
the mineral resources of the New World came to his rescue. The introduction of the 
amalgam of mercury in the refining of Peruvian silver started to yield results in the 
1580s, when ships from Spanish America managed to supply Spain with two or three 
million ducats a year.56 This abundance gave Felipe real freedom of manoeuvre, which 
included plans for the recovery of the northern Netherlands, a maritime attack against 
England, the intervention both in the civil wars in France and, finally, in the Portuguese 
dynastic crisis.57  
 
I. 2. 1.    The Portuguese crown between regency and kingship (1564-1578) 
Until now the 16th century European status quo has been described, but few 
words have been spent on the Portuguese kingdom. During that century, Portugal kept a 
neutral profile within lacerated Europe. Its neutrality was enhanced by its geographical 
position and by expansionist strategies which, between the 15th and 16th centuries, 
favoured the Atlantic Ocean over the continent as the instrument to ameliorate its own 
                                                 
54 Although Felipe II became king of Naples in 1554, it was after his marriage with Mary Tudor Queen of 
England in 1555 that Carlos V began to give up his dignities. As early as October 1555 he renounced both 
the dignity of sovereign of the Orden del Toisón de Oro and the Low Countries. Finally, in January 1556 
Felipe received also the crowns of Castile and Aragon. Cf. Bonney, op. cit., pp. 122-124 and Bouza, D. 
Filipe I, p. 40. 
55 Elliott, op. cit., pp. 180-187.  
56 Cf. Braudel, Civiltà e imperi nel Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo II, vol. 1, pp. 509-510. Contrarily to 
what happened with silver, after 1550, the flow of gold to Europe started to diminish. Accordingly, at the 
turn of the 16th century a gram of gold was worth 10,5 grams of silver. Around 1550, on the other hand, it 
was worth 11,1, whereas around 1600 11,8 and 14,3 fifty years later. See Braudel, Espansione europea e 
capitalismo 1450-1650, p. 42 and pp. 67-68. 
57 Elliot, Imperial Spain 1469-1716, pp. 268-70, Marques, A Parenética Portuguesa e a Dominação 
Filipina, pp. 38-39 and Braudel, Mediterraneo, vol. 2, pp. 1183-1184. 
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political importance.58 These circumstances took Portugal to an unwanted isolationism 
and to lack of influence in European diplomatic contests. This condition came into 
being in particular owing to the premature death of almost all the sons and brothers of D. 
João III, which limited the chances of signing alliances through marriages, alliances 
already lessened by the Protestant schism. Basically, in fact, the House of Avis had but 
an option: to choose between marriages within Portugal or with its neighbours, the 
Habsburgs, a practice already used more than once. France too might have been an 
option, but during the reign of D. João III, it was considered more as an enemy in the 
Atlantic than an ally.59 Only two years before D. João III’s death, there was already a 
clear sense of danger about the future of the Portuguese Royal family. The ‘political 
disorientation’60 of the House of Avis appears in all its drama if we consider that when 
the king died, the sole legally available heir within the House was his grandson, a boy of 
only three years old.61 This boy, Sebastião, would come to be known as the Desired (O 
Desejado) and around him would be created a messianic myth, but, with regard to this 
work, he shall only be considered as the penultimate Portuguese king before the 
Spaniards took over his kingdom. 
As we have just said, Sebastião inherited the Portuguese crown from his 
grandfather, D. João III, whose nine heirs all died prematurely. The last of them, João, 
got married to Carlos V’s daughter, Joana of Austria, in 1552 and two years later 
Sebastião was born, just a few days after his father’s death. Only three years later, in 
1557, also D. João III died and the Portuguese crown eventually fell on the head of the 
three-year old Sebastião. Hence, at that time the problem was not finding an heir, but 
rather to find an apt regent to accompany the young king until he came of age to rule.62  
                                                 
58 Cf. HP III, pp. 42-43. 
59 Cf. Costa, “O Império Português em meados do século XVI.”, pp. 89-90. The French-marriage would 
actually have been quite favourable for the Portuguese Empire, since a joint pact with France would have 
guaranteed peaceful and profitable relations in Brazil. However, although also the Holy See favourably 
saw this marriage, eventually the project was abandoned. Cf. HP III, pp. 542-543. 
60 See Costa, op. cit., p. 91. Cf. also HP III, p. 69. 
61 We might still add that D. João III had another grandson, the prince Carlos, son of Felipe II and his 
daughter Maria, who would die in captivity by the hand of his own father. 
62 Despite the disorientation of the House Avis, it must be said that it was not a lucky House either. 
Beside Sebastião, in fact, there was also another legit heir, D. Duarte, the 5th Duke of Guimaraes. He was 
another grandson of D. Manuel, son of the homonymous D. Duarte 4th Duke of Guimaraes, brother of D. 
João III and D. Henrique. D. Duarte, however, died in 1576, but if he would have been alive after 
Sebastião’s demise in Morocco, Felipe II’s claim to the Portuguese Crown would have been null and the 
succession would have been ensured.  
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Initially, following an informal meeting of the Conselho Régio, the regency was 
assumed by Catarina of Austria, wife of the late João III, who, also during the reign of 
her husband played an important and influent role within the Portuguese kingdom. Yet, 
her political implication combined with her lineage – sister of Carlos V and aunt of 
Felipe II – aroused the suspicion of part of the Portuguese aristocracy, who saw this 
“Castilian regency” as a threat to the political autonomy of the Portuguese crown.63 
Notwithstanding the unease of the aristocracy, however, the first to grant full support to 
Catarina was Cardinal Henrique, her brother-in-law and future king of Portugal. 
As the Portuguese saying goes: De Espanha nem bom vento, nem bom 
casamento. The Portuguese aristocracy had more than one reason to suspect Catarina of 
partiality for Spain. As a matter of fact, the sole direct cousin of Sebastião – Carlos – 
resided in Spain and he was the son of Felipe II and his first wife, D. Maria de Portugal. 
Furthermore, it was not the first time that Castile patently showed designs on Portugal. 
One of the first crises to undermine the Luso-Castilian relations happened between 1383 
and 1385, when a bitter struggle took place between João of Avis, one of the bastard 
sons of D. Pedro I, and the followers of the queen consort of Portugal, Leonor Teles de 
Meneses, wife of Fernando I. The struggle began with the death of King D. Fernando I 
in October 1383,64 when the question of the Portuguese succession assumed particular 
relevance. The king, in fact, left behind only an 11 year old heiress, Beatriz, who had 
been promised first to a younger son of Juan I of Castile but eventually married to Juan 
himself. The marriage contract stipulated that she and Juan I reign jointly over Portugal 
until their (potential) son reached the age of fourteen, at which point he would inherit 
the kingdom. In the meanwhile, Queen Leonor was to govern as regent. Yet, if no heir 
were fathered, then the Portuguese crown would pass directly to the kings of Castile. 
Therefore, Juan I, who was twenty five at the time, had only to let things follow their 
own course and Portugal would be his.65 Yet, the election of Leonor as regent, probably 
conceived by João Fernandes Andeiro Count of Ourém, provoked some resentment in 
the court both for her alleged scandalous behaviour with Andeiro and for her 
identification with Castile, which earned her the epithet of a aleivosa, the traitor. The 
growing political tensions within Portugal led the aforementioned João of Avis to 
                                                 
63 Cf. Polónia, D. Henrique o Cardeal-Rei, pp. 139-140 and HP III, pp. 530-531 and 541-542. For a more 
comprehensive study with regard to Catarina of Austria see Buescu, Catarina de Áustria. Infanta de 
Tordesilhas. Rainha de Portugal, A Esfera dos Livros (Lisbon), 2007.  
64 With regard to D. Fernando I see Gomes R. Costa, D. Fernando, Lisbon (Temas e Debates), 2009. 
65 Cf. Baleiras, Leonor Teles, Uma Mulher de Poder, pp. 110-158. 
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embrace arms. In December 1383, he had Andeiro murdered, then assumed control of 
Lisbon, and the câmara acclaimed him regedor e defensor of the kingdom, while 
Leonor fled to Santarém. Avis’s patriotic coup d’état, however illegitimate, had the 
effect of stirring Juan I. The Castilian king proceeded to annex the royal arms of 
Portugal to his banner and entered the country by force. As would happen in other 
moments of Portuguese history, like the Habsburg annexation, the Portuguese were not 
all united beneath the same banner. Around João of Avis gathered a disparate coalition 
of some great and many lesser nobles, the metropolitan clergy and most of the 
bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the north, the home of the old seigniorial nobility, 
supported the legitimist claim of Castile. 
The hostilities began in early 1384. The initial victories of Avis’s forces both in 
the south and in the north attracted new followers to the national front, whereas the 
failing attempt to break Lisbon’s walls and the plague led Juan to call back his armies in 
September. João then felt confident enough to summon the Cortes – the assembly of the 
three estates: the aristocracy, the clergy and the people – at Coimbra in 1385, in order to 
legitimize his claim to the throne and, consequently, to frustrate any legitimate tentative 
to regain the throne by Leonor or Juan I. Thus, although a definitive military 
confrontation was yet to come, on 6 April João of Avis was unanimously proclaimed 
João I, king of Portugal.66 
It is hard to ignore here some resemblances between this crisis and the one 
which would take place almost two centuries later. In both cases, we find difficulty in 
finding a proper heir to the throne (Beatriz and Sebastião) and the prompt intervention 
of the Spanish Crown in the attempt to annex Portugal to its dominion. However, the 
results of the two cases, as is known, are not comparable. After being acclaimed king of 
Portugal by the Coimbra Cortes, João had still to fight the remaining legitimists in the 
north while preparing to force back a new invasion from Spain. But thanks to the aid of 
                                                 
66 Cf. HP II, pp. 523-524, NHP IV, pp. 523-528, TNCMH, pp. 643-645, Disney, A History of Portugal 
and the Portuguese Empire, vol. 1, pp. 117-120 and Subrahmanyam, O Império Asiático Português 1500-
1700. Uma História Política e Económica, pp. 49-50. For a wider approach to D. João I see Coelho M. H. 
da Cruz, D. João I, Lisbon (Temas e Debates), 2008. It has been pointed out that the close connection 
between the Houses of Avis and Habsburg-Trastâmara not only created an anti-Castilian attitude in 
Portugal, but was also used by Felipe’s advocates, who, during the negotiations for the succession to the 
Portuguese crown, reminded the oath of D. Manuel I in 1499 as heir to the crown of Castile and Aragon 
and, in particular, the succession rights that could have been claimed by Felipe’s son, D. Carlos, if this 
one was still alive in 1578. See Bouza, op. cit., p. 77. 
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Richard II of England67 he was able to put an end to the invasion and to confirm Avis’s 
rule. Two centuries later, however, history would not repeat.  
As we saw, at the death of D. João III, his grandson, Sebastião, was acclaimed 
king of Portugal, with his grandmother, Catarina, as regent.68 Catarina, however, first in 
1560 and then again in 1562 expressed the desire to renounce the regency, for the 
burden was heavier than she could bear, and indicated her brother-in-law, Henrique, as 
substitute.69 To choose Henrique – Catarina stated – was an unobjectionable decision, 
for he was not only the oldest relative of Sebastião, but he was also a seasoned man 
both in spiritual and secular matters. 70  The reactions to her decision were not 
homogeneous. If the principal heads of the Portuguese nobility saw the displacement as 
a shift from a pro-Castilian to a more patriotic front, Filipe II’s reaction was totally 
unfavourable. Accordingly, he recommended Catarina to keep her post along with the 
aid of Henrique. In 1562, however, the Cortes convened and Henrique’s nomination 
was legitimately accepted by the end of the year. He would keep the regency for six 
years, until the completion of the young monarch’s fourteenth year in January 1568, 
assisted by the Conselho de Estado, whereas the tutorship of the king was left in 
Catarina’s hands.71 The Cortes, in fact, tackled also matters regarding the education and 
the spiritual formation of the young king. With regards to the former, it was proposed 
that D. Sebastião should be educated according to the Portuguese custom, trying to keep 
him away from Castilian habits.72  
Henrique during his regency tried to handle both the marriage policy and 
international relations with the prospect of moving the Portuguese kingdom away from 
Spanish influence. His intention was to give Portugal an independent position in the 
international theatre. He tried to achieve this by arranging Sebastião’s marriage with 
Marguerite de Valois, a proposal already advanced by the Cortes. Yet, owing to Felipe 
                                                 
67 In May 1386, D. João and Richard II formalized an agreement reached two years before. Under the 
terms of this treaty, Richard II agreed to provide Portugal with military assistance against Castile, 
whereas the Portuguese naval strength was to be put at English disposal. The two kings also agreed upon 
granting reciprocal trading rights to their respective citizens in each other’s territory. See Russell, The 
English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the time of Edward III and Richard II, passim. 
68 For a biography of Sebastião see Cruz M. A. Lima, D. Sebastião, Lisbon (Temas e Debates), 2009. 
69 Cf. NHP V, pp. 742-744. 
70 Cf. Polónia, op. cit., pp. 146-147. 
71 Ivi, pp. 148-50. 
72 See NHP V, p. 744: ‘Vista à portuguesa, com seu camareiro mor; coma à portuguesaa; cavalgue à 
portuguesa; fale à portuguesa; todos seus actos sejam portugueses; e com isto lhe fareis hábito para que 
tenha grande amor ao reino e coisas dele’. 
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II and to the pillaging of Madeira by some French corsairs, the plan was aborted. 73 
Felipe II had personal reasons to hinder this marriage. Before he actually entered the 
negotiations for the Portuguese Crown after Sebastião’s and Henrique’s deaths, in fact, 
the king of Spain had already set his eye on the Portuguese kingdom. What attracted the 
Spanish monarch was the strategic position played by the Portuguese kingdom in the 
Atlantic commercial routes, both in relation to the Spanish Indies and to the North 
Europe. 74  Felipe, furthermore, tried to find suitable matches for Sebastião, while 
keeping the Portuguese court in the dark about it. Eventually, however, King Sebastião 
postponed any decisions regarding his marriage, basically showing that a marriage was 
against his will.  
Once he sat on the throne, D. Sebastião I proved to be more interested in 
liberating North Africa from the Muslims than in keeping his house alive. In 1574, he 
visited Ceuta and Tangier, according to the Jesuit father Amador Rebelo ‘para ver 
aqueles lugares e sua disposição para os efeitos que ele entendia e fabricava em seu 
ânimo.’75 The military proposals of the young king never found the consent of either 
Catarina or Henrique.76 Nevertheless, in 1576 Sebastião announced to the city of Lisbon 
about his plan to stop the Muslims’ advance and met his uncle Felipe II, hoping to 
receive military support from him. 77  In the meanwhile, he took administrative and 
financial measures in order to better prepare the jornada de África. In February 1578, 
Henrique wrote a letter to his nephew earnestly trying to dissuade him from pursuing 
that folly crusade. Henrique had in mind in particular the interest of House Avis and 
wrote that ‘em nenhuma maneira o devia fazer, não tendo filhos, porque maior 
inconveniente é aventurar sua pessoa a algum perigo, e não poder tomar o lugar, que 
atalhar a não virem os Turcos meter-se nele.’78 Notwithstanding this letter, however, 
once the king had at his disposal all the resources he needed for the jornada he left 
                                                 
73 Cf. Polónia, op. cit., pp. 167-173 and NHP V, pp. 744-745 
74 As we said, in the 1560s and the 1570s Felipe was occupied in dealing the revolt of the Spanish 
Netherlands. If Felipe was to take possess of the Portuguese routes, he would have cut out the rebellious 
provinces from the salt and spices’ commerce they were entertaining with Portugal. Furthermore, the 
union with Portugal would have had also positive repercussions for Castile within the territories divided 
by the treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Zaragoza (1529). It was decided that vessels belonging to one 
country were not allowed to sail through the other country’s territories, but with the union this ban would 
have been revoked. See Bouza, op. cit., pp. 56-59. 
75 Apud NHP V, p. 748. 
76 Sebastião’s scorn and violent reprimands towards those counselors who did not agree with him are well 
known. Cf. Polónia, op. cit., pp. 180-184. 
77 See Palacio, “Un español Rey de Portugal”, pp. 187-188. 
78 Apud Polónia, op. cit., p. 188. 
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Lisbon for Morocco. On 4 August D. Sebastião I perished in the infamous battle of 
Alcácer Quibir.79 On 24 August the confirmation of his demise arrived in Lisbon and 
only four days later Cardinal Henrique was acclaimed as D. Henrique I, king of 
Portugal.80 
 
I. 2. 2.    Avis’s dynastic crisis and the Habsburg seizure of Portugal 
The intricate situation in which the Portuguese Crown fell owing to the death of 
its legitimate king is well known, thus neither time nor words will be wasted in 
describing it thoroughly. Furthermore, the main problem within the Portuguese court is 
clearly illustrated by stressing two simple features of D. Henrique I. When Henrique 
ascended to the throne he was already a sick, 66-year old man and the most powerful 
ecclesiastic of the realm.81 The issue, then, was obviously the lack of a direct heir and 
the trouble of producing one.82 The need to compensate for this deficiency was even 
more urgent in consideration of Castile’s pressure. Felipe II, in fact, as soon as he 
received news of Sebastião’s death, sent to Lisbon his representative Christóvão de 
Moura.83 Officially Moura should support the Rei-cardeal to find a way to secure the 
line of descent, but in reality Felipe II did not approve D. Henrique’s retrocession from 
the ecclesiastical state in order to get married and procreate an heir.84 Accordingly, he 
wrote to Gregory XIII that he had pretensions to annex the adjoining realm and, thus, he 
advised the pope not to concede to Henrique the papal dispensation.85 The pontiff for 
                                                 
79 See HP III, pp. 544-546 and NHP V, pp. 748-752. 
80 See NHP V, pp. 752-753. 
81 Christovão de Moura – Felipe’s privado in Portugal after Sebastião’s demise – described to his king the 
condition of the Portuguese court with bitter irony: ‘Yo soy llegando aquí de pocos días, y heme topado 
diferentísimo gobierno del pasado, porque había un rey mochado y fácil, y con priuados de la misma edad 
y sustancia, y hállome ahora con un rey viejo y recatado y con ministros de la misma manera y en tiempo 
que me cuentan los pasos y las palabras, y todo se les antoja conforme al miedo que tienen de Castilla.’ 
Apud Labrador, “A Função Inedradora da Casa Real Portuguesa de D. João I a D. Filipe I (1385-1598)”, 
p. 35, n. 56. 
82 There was, of course, also the problem of ransoming all the nobles and soldiers – almost 10’000 people 
– held captive in Morocco. The ransom represented a real blow to the crown’s coffers, which had already 
been scraped to the bottom by Sebastião to arrange the expedition. Felipe II joined Henrique in the 
process, but not out of generosity, it was a shrewd manoeuvre to gain consensus and political support by 
Portuguese aristocracy. See NHP III, p. 750, Polónia, op. cit., pp. 194-198 and Palacio, op. cit., p. 188. 
83 See Marques, op. cit., p. 38. 
84 See Polónia, op. cit., p. 204, Marques, ibid. and Gattoni, Gregorio XIII e la Politica Iberica dello Stato 
Pontificio (1572-1585), pp. 77-78. 
85 See King Felipe II to Pope Gregory XIII, 25 October 1578. AGS, Secretaria de Estado 931, f. 98: ‘Yo 
escrivo a Don Juan de Çuñiga mi embaxador que diga a Vuestra Sanctidad lo que del entenderá sobre las 
cosas de Portugal. A Vuestra Sanctidad suplico le oyga y crea como a mi mismo y tenga por cierto que la 
causa que me ha movido a advertir a Vuestra Sanctidad de lo que se me offreçe sobre aquella materia es 
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his part diplomatically limited the statements to quotes on S. Thomas’s writings with 
regard to the possibility of conceding the dispensation to presbyters like Henrique.86  
In any event, in March 1579, D. Henrique convoked the Cortes. The agenda 
included Henrique’s marriage and the election of an heir in case the king should die 
before the closing of the Cortes, as eventually happened. Accordingly, five governors 
were nominated. 87  In the meanwhile, Rome was informed by his correspondent in 
Portugal – Antonio Sauli – that Spain had already started to gather troops in Galicia and 
Badajoz. Consequently, Gregory XIII warned Spain not to proceed manu militari with 
Portugal. Felipe II, in fact, was trying to have his claim acknowledged as the most valid 
one while Henrique was still alive. He attempted to achieve that by limiting the dispute 
on the succession to the king’s decision, instead of passing through the juridical 
examination of each claim. Moreover, the deployment of the troops was a clear sign that 
he would not tolerate a decision against his claim.88 While a powerful menace was 
gathering at Portugal’s borders, the king was getting older and weaker and the situation 
was worrisome not only for the Portuguese people, but also for those who lined up with 
Henrique as did the Jesuits. Sebastiano Sabino, the procurator of the Portuguese 
assistancy, accordingly wrote that: 
‘temo non ci serrà più tempo et che già serranno finiti i nostri favori et privanze con il Re di 
Portugallo, perché questo Re par che corra in fretta verso la morte, è vecchio et fiaccho, et 
quasi di continuo sta con alcuna indisposizione, per il che et per li grandi peccati che hora 
vivono sopra la terra, dubito che presto [God] se lo chiamarà per sé; dopo sua morte non so 
quel che serà.’89 
In January 1580, in fact, the Cortes opened another session in Almeirim, but only 
twenty days later, on 31 January, D. Henrique died.  
                                                                                                                                               
por lo que toca al serviçio de Dios y al bien dela Christiandad y por dessear, como hijo obediente suyo, 
por la grande reverencia y amor que tengo a Vuestra Beatitud, que no vea en tienpo cosa ninguna que se 
pueda notar, como estoy cierto que no succederá, teniendo Vuestra Sanctidad tan Sancto zelo al serviçio 
de Dios. Y, conociendo la obligaçión que, a esto, le pone el lugar que por el representa en la tierra. 
También dirá Don Juan a Vuestra Sanctidad, de mi parte, la pretensión que yo tengo a aquel Reyno de 
que he querido dar cuenta a Vuestra Sanctidad’. 
86 See Gattoni, op. cit., pp. 82-83. 
87 João Telo de Meneses, Francisco de Sá, João de Mascarenhas, Jorge de Ataide and Diogo Lopes de 
Sousa. 
88 See Gattoni, op. cit., pp. 94-95, Bouza, op. cit., pp. 83-85 and Elliot, Imperial Spain, pp. 271-273. 
89 Procurator Sebastiano Sabino to General Everard Mercurian, Lisbon, 31 May 1579. ARSI, Lus. 68, f. 
152. See also DI XI 1577-1580, p. 591. 
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The five governors, then, had to evaluate the claims of five candidates, but 
basically only two of them had strong rights: Dona Catárina of Braganza, as the sole 
survivor of D. Duarte’s offspring and granddaughter of D. Manuel, and Felipe II, son of 
Manuel’s oldest daughter, Isabel. To those two, can be added D. António Prior do 
Crato, who, although the bastard child of D. Manuel’s third son, Luís, had the support 
of large parts of the Portuguese people.90 As we mentioned before, Portugal was not 
united in supporting one of the candidates. They all had their own supporters and Felipe 
made no exceptions. There was in fact a part of both the Portuguese aristocracy and the 
clergy that sensed greater patronage potential from a monarch already so powerful.91 
And also amongst the mercantile bourgeoisie tied-up with overseas commerce there 
were those who saw the union of the crowns as an opportunity to create a wide open 
space between the Portuguese and Spanish Indies.92 The short reign of Henrique, in fact, 
is situated in a time of intense international economic crisis. The 1570s saw the 
interruption of the flow of European precious metals, which consequently affected the 
cereal trade and caused both an even stronger dependence on the Peruvian silver and the 
research for new sources of auriferous supplies in the Portuguese domains overseas. The 
Portuguese empire, in fact, suffered from certain structural weaknesses, the most 
important being the lack of silver-mines. Portugal had an empire essentially based on a 
series of commercial transactions. It needed silver to purchase Asian spices, which 
represented a great part of its international trade, within which the African trade played 
a substantial part. The defensive politics assumed by D. João III with regard to North 
Africa – i.e. confining the Portuguese dominion within just three coastal fortalezas – 
meant access to the wheat-lands of southern Morocco was lost. Thus, Sebastião’s 
crusade represented a further and harsh blow to the Portuguese economy. 93 
Increasingly, therefore, Portugal was forced to turn to Spain for silver and well before 
                                                 
90 A thorough analysis of the claims of the candidates is in HP III, pp. 552-559. Regarding Felipe II’s 
claims see also Bouza, op. cit., pp. 72-107. The other two candidates were Emanuele Filiberto of Savoy, 
son of D. Beatriz and Carlos III and Ranuccio Farnese, son of D. Maria and Alessandro Farnese. 
91 Cf. Labrador, op. cit., pp. 35-36. 
92 AGS, Secretaria de Estado 401, pp. 257-259. ‘Que as Navegações de todo o descoberto, assim no 
oriente, como no ocidente, serão comuns somente a estas duas Nações Castelhana e Portuguesa [...]’. 
Apud Bouza, op. cit., p. 157. Cf. also HP III, pp. 564-565, Elliot, op. cit., pp. 270-271, Marques, op. cit., 
p. 43. 
93  Cf. Braudel, Mediterraneo, vol. 2, pp. 1265-1266 and Disney, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 176-177. 
Furthermore, it is worth to add that as early as the 1540s Portugal’s share of European pepper imports fell 
and the spice trade with the Flanders had become uneconomic. The feitoria at Antwerp, in fact, was 
therefore closed and Portuguese maritime trade to northern Europe declined. Cf. Godinho, Os 
Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, vol. 4, pp. 216-217.  
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1580 the prosperity of Lisbon had come to depend on that of Seville.94 Felipe II’s Spain, 
in particular, in conjunction with the revolt of the Netherlands experienced its second 
bankruptcy in 1575, when the king suspended payments to the bankers, and the growing 
threat on the Christianity exercised by the Ottoman Empire, which eventually led to 
Lepanto in 1571.95 
Nevertheless, the death of the Rei-cardeal weakened the juridical power of the 
Cortes, which had to face the juridical insubordination of the Castilian candidate and his 
military menace as well. Eventually, in fact, the Cortes was suspended in March. It has 
been said that the strategy adopted by Henrique somehow favoured Felipe’s claim to the 
throne.96 After the unsuccessful attempt to find a bride, in fact, during the Cortes the 
king directed his efforts almost exclusively against António. Henrique’s aversion – 
deepened after Rome in November 1579 granted its support to the Prior do Crato97 – 
was formalized by the royal banishment issued on 24 November 1579. Contrarily to 
what Henrique expected, however, the banishment radicalized the divisions within the 
Portuguese society. António, in fact, enjoyed the support of the Portuguese nationalist 
fringe against the foreign conqueror.98 After the banishment, however, António fled the 
                                                 
94 Cf. Godinho, op. cit., pp. 218-219. With regard to this strict economic relation between the Andalusian 
port and Lisbon, it is worth to remind that one of the (unkept) promises Felipe II made during the 
campaign for the Portuguese crown, was exactly to relocate Seville’s Casa de Contratación in Lisbon. As 
often happens with political games, however, this promise was never put into practice. Cf. Bouza, op. cit., 
pp. 157-158. Furthermore, according to Braudel, if Filipe would have moved the administrative centre of 
the monarchy from Madrid to Lisbon, he would have probably avoided disasters like the Invencible 
Armada. Although, in fact, Madrid was the right place whence to look upon Europe and the 
Mediterranean Sea, Lisbon leaned out to the Atlantic Ocean, closer than Madrid to the new dynamics of 
the world. Cf. Braudel, op. cit., pp. 1272-1273. 
95 Cf. Elliot, op. cit., pp. 263-271. By 1575, the need of the Spanish monarchy to have recourse to the 
Genoese bankers for short-term credits took the floating debt to almost of 15’000’000 ducats. On 1 
September 1575 Felipe II promulgated an edict under which all asiento contracts concluded since 14 
November 1560 were declared null and void. The discontinuance of payment of the mercenary armies in 
the Netherlands caused the broke out of mutiny and plundering. On 5 December 1577, the king was 
obliged to conclude a new agreement with the Genoese bankers. The crisis of 1575-7 again confirmed the 
supremacy of the Genoese banks over Spanish public finance. Consequently, Felipe II made repeated 
attempts to smash the Genoese hegemony and asked Spanish bankers to play a greater part in the asiento 
contracts. Cf. CEHE V, pp. 374-375 and Braudel, Espansione europea e capitalismo 1450-1650, pp. 57-
58. 
96 Cf. Braudel, Mediterraneo, vol. 2, pp. 1266-1269 and Marques, op. cit., p. 42. 
97  Cf. ANTT/Bulas, Maço 37, doc. n.º 24, Breve do Papa Gregório XIII que principia Minime 
voluissemos no qual certifica ao Cardeal Rey D. Henrique que a sua tenção e mente he concorrer para o 
augmento e quietação de seu Reyno e vassalos e a sentir as suas justas pretenções, apud Gattoni, op. cit., 
p. 99. 
98 Ivi, pp. 99-101. Portuguese oppositions against the Habsburg did not end with the official acclamation 
of Filipe as king of Portugal and was not limited to political or military manoeuvres. In the 1580s, in fact, 
Portuguese opponents had been able to enlist French and English support by offering concessions in the 
Brazil trade and there had even been intimations of territorial concessions. Cf. Schwartz, “The Economy 
of the Portuguese Empire”, p. 31. 
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country only to return later. On 16 June 1580, notwithstanding the decisions of the five 
governors, António had himself acclaimed as D. António I of Portugal in Santarem. In 
that very month, Spanish troops crossed the Portuguese border transforming the 
psychological pressure into physical threat. Although the supporters of D. António put 
up some resistance, they were no match for the Spanish army. Lisbon surrendered at the 
end of August, forcing D. António to flee leaving the country in the hands of the 
Spaniards. 99  As promptly stressed by the historian Fernando Bouza, both Felipe’s 
accession to the Portuguese throne and the following sixty years of political union of the 
two crowns were marked by a flexible dichotomy between lawful negotiation and 
violence of weapons. This dichotomy was never concealed even during Avis’s dynastic 
crisis. As Felipe’s former ambassador to the Portuguese court explained, in fact, the 
negotiation should be carried out with weapons in hands. 100  Accordingly, Simone 
Contarini, the Venetian ambassador to Madrid, in his account of the Spanish court 
plainly stated that the kingdom of Portugal was ‘heredado y conquistado por Felipo 
2’,101 and, considering the sum of money he spent in the ransoming of the Portuguese 
nobility, we can also add comprado, bought. 
 On 16 April 1581, however, the Cortes met in Tomar to recognize Felipe II as D. 
Filipe I of Portugal. In front of the Cortes as the new king, Filipe – from now on we are 
going to use the Portuguese nomenclature – granted general pardon to all except for the 
Prior do Crato and his main supporters.102 Following the counsel of Christovão de 
Moura,103 the king swore to ‘guardar todos os foros, vsos, & custumes, priuilegios, & 
liberdades concedidos a estes reinos pelos Reis delles’,104 i.e. that Portugal would be 
ruled according to its laws and customs and that the important offices within the 
Portuguese administrative structure, both political and ecclesiastical, would be assigned 
to Portuguese nationals. For instance, if forced to absent himself, Filipe would confer 
the vice-royalty onto a member of the royal family or onto a native. Moreover, the 
customs barriers – puertos secos – between Spain and Portugal were to be abolished, 
                                                 
99 Cf. HP III, pp. 561-563. 
100 AGS, Secretaria de Estado 410, 8-10: ‘a negociação se faça com as armas na mão’. Apud Bouza, op. 
cit., p. 85. 
101 Cf. Gobierno de Phelippe 3.º su Magestad, sus Reinos, y fuerças, su consejo, y la condicion de sus 
honbres grandes, y ministros, de su Potencia, com sus rentas y conceciones sacadas por menor, 
BNCR/FGes. 1159, f. 63v. 
102 See Provisão sobre o Perdão Geral aos Partidários do Prior do Crato, BNP, F. 2521. 
103 Cf. Labrador, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
104 See PMGP, f. 87. See also Palacio, op. cit., p. 192. 
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although Portugal was to keep its own coinage.105 In any case, the Provincia Cerrada, 
i.e. the correspondence between the geographical and political borders of the Iberian 
Peninsula, was finally achieved and would be governed by the articles signed at Tomar 
during the country’s sixty years of union with Spain. 106  Besides the political and 
economic reasons that led the Habsburgs to pursue the annexation of Portugal, there 
were also the Spanish humanists who nourished the concept of Hispania. The different 
people of the Iberian Peninsula, they postulated, shared the common identity of hispani, 
they were both the cultural and natural heirs of the Roman Hispania and of the 
Reconquista and the annexation of Portugal was seen as the last step for the restoration 
of the unified Iberian provinces beneath the Roman Empire.107 
Three months after the acclamation of the new king in Tomar, precisely on 29 
June, the king made his glorious entrance in Lisbon, finally cleansed of the plague.108 
He would remain in the Portuguese capital until February 1583, when the death of his 
heir, Diego, compelled him to leave for Castile. He appointed his nephew, the Archduke 
Alberto, Governor of the country and thus started the kingship of the Rey ausente.109  
After having briefly surveyed the European political and religious status quo in 
general, and, more in detail, the complicated situation of the Iberian Peninsula, it is time 
to move towards the Eastern side of the Estado da Índia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
105 The puertos secos would be re-imposed in 1593, along with the creation of a 3% duty on seaborne 
trade (Consulado) intended to provide for naval defence. The two taxes yielded considerable sums. In the 
1600s, the puertos brought in the royal coffers more than 24 million réis, whereas the Consulado more 
than 50. Cf. Rooney, “Hapsburg Fiscal Policies in Portugal 1580-1640”, in The Journal of European 
Economic History, 23 (3), p. 553.  
106 Cf. Elliot, op. cit., pp. 273-274 and Schaub, Portugal na Monarquia Hispânica (1580-1640), pp. 11-
12. The principle of the absolute Portuguese exclusivism within the Habsburg monarchy has been elected 
as the key piece of the Spanish politic behind the Estatuto de Tomar. See Bouza, op. cit., p. 186. 
107 Cf. Pujol, “Un Rey, Una Fe, Muchas Naciones. Patria y Nación en la España de los siglos XVI y 
XVII”, p. 41. For a wider and deeper debate on Hispania see also Belenguer, Arrieta and Fernández, La 
Idea de España en la Edad Moderna, Valencia (Real Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País), 1998. 
108 See Palacio, op. cit., p. 192. 
109 During o Portugal dos Filipes the king, whether Filipe I, II or III, was absent for almost fifty-eight of 
the sixty years of Habsburg rule. Accordingly, the Cortes convened only three times: in Tomar in 1581, 
briefly in 1583 to swear allegiance to the future Filipe II and in 1619 when Filipe II visited Lisbon. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS EMPIRE  
WITHIN THE HABSBURG CROWN 
 
 
II. 1.    The Cortes of Tomar: Filipe I of Portugal and the enactments with 
regard to the Ultramar 
Fernand Braudel, quoting a German historian, defined the lapse of time between 
1579 and 1592 as the royal silver cycle.110 It is within these years – he said – that we are 
to find the turning point of the 16th century. According to the French historian, in fact, 
the annexation of Portugal to the crown of Spain opened the great battle for control of 
the Atlantic and world domination. As a matter of fact, with the incorporation of the 
kingdom of Portugal and its Ultramar, Filipe became king of the largest kingdom of the 
century. Beneath his sceptre stretched out the most different lands and oceans. In 
Europe he possessed the whole Iberian Peninsula, Naples, Sicily and the southern 
provinces of the Flanders. Over the oceans he now owned Cape Verde and the African 
dominions of Portugal and both the Spanish and the Portuguese Indies, which basically 
meant that, as Lope de Vega wrote, ‘el mundo […] se puede andar por tierra de 
Felipe’.111 The unification of the peninsula, hence, turned out to be a vital step on 
Spain’s road to global mastery and marked a decisive shift in Europe’s centre of gravity 
from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. In fact, the long-running struggle with the 
Ottoman in the Mediterranean Sea started to wane after Lepanto and following the 
bankruptcy of 1575, Filipe was eventually able to aim aggressively at the whole 
world.112 The Catholic Monarchy – defined catholic because universal – represented the 
dialectical relationship of identity and otherness. Filipe’s monarchy, in fact, navigated 
                                                 
110 See Braudel, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 1262. The expression is taken from Fitzler H. A. M., “Der Anteil der 
Deutschen an der Kolonialpolitik Philipps II von Spanien in Asien”, in Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte 28, 1935, pp. 243-281. 
111 Vega, “Comedia Famosa de la Otava Maravilla”, Acto primero, f. 153v: ‘Tiene el de Portugal, por 
quien me atreuo, / â dezir, por ser cosa clara, y vista, / que el mundo, sin que en esto me anticipe, / se 
puede andar por tierra de Felipe’. 
112 Cf. Braudel, op. cit., pp. 1262-1263 and Parker, “David or Goliath? Philip II and his world in the 
1580s”, pp. 245-266. 
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its way through opposite dynamics, which often turned into harsh conflicts. Thus, in 
Europe and in the seas the Catholic Monarchy was at odds with the Protestant countries, 
the Netherlands and England. In the Overseas Empire, the European identity came into 
conflict – culturally and physically – with other identities that challenged it, permeated 
it, absorbed it and eventually refused it. Yet, this clash of identities was not confined to 
fixed Manichean categories. As we will see, in fact, it is easy to find aversion between 
two identities also in those groups held together by the same origin and the same 
goals.113  
Anyway, as we saw before, at his acclamation by the estates at the Cortes of 
Tomar, Filipe I assured his Portuguese constituency that the two kingdoms, and the two 
empires, would be kept administratively and conceptually separate. Namely, Filipe was 
trying to put into practice the principle of composite monarchies, a principle in 
accordance with which a ruler could separately rule distinct kingdoms without 
establishing an evident hierarchy between them. But could the same be done with two 
overseas empires? The two spheres of influence had been settled with the treaties of 
Tordesillas (1494) and Saragossa (1529) and Filipe’s intention was to respect those 
decisions, although, as we will see, the king’s voice did not reverberate so loudly in the 
Indies.114 
The Mercês de Tomar, i.e. the agreement reached between Filipe and the Cortes, 
were based on the Artigos de Lisboa, the oath taken by King. D. Manuel in 1499 to 
recognize his son, Miguel da Paz, as heir to the crowns of Portugal, Castile and Aragon. 
According to these Artigos, in case D. Manuel or his son inherited the two Spanish 
crowns, Portugal’s independent existence would be maintained. The Portuguese 
particularism attested in 1499 was ratified by Filipe in 1579 and thenceforth it was one 
of the pillars of the negotiations in Tomar.115 With regard to the political rule of the 
                                                 
113 On the Catholic Monarchy, its complexity and differentiations, the circulation of ideas and objects 
within as well as the first globalization see Gruzinski, Les quatre parties du monde. Histoire d’une 
mondialisation, Éditions de La Martinière, 2004. 
114 Accordingly with the expression coined by Prof. Subrahmanyam in “Holding the World in Balance: 
The Connected Histories of the Iberian Overseas Empires, 1500–1640”, p. 1360. 
115 See PMGP, f. 87: ‘Memorial das graças e merces qve Elrei meu senhor concederá a estes reinos, 
quando for jurado por Rei, & senhor delles, em que inclue as que lhe concedeo o serenissimo Rei Dom 
Manuel, anno de mil, & quatro centos, & nouenta & noue.’ Accordingly, the Capitvlos do Stado dos 
Pouos, the fourth chapter precisely, reads: ‘Posto que Vossa Majestade herdou estes reinos & senhorios 
de Portugal, nem por isso se vnirão aos de Castella. Mas os herdou principalmente & de per si. Pelo que 
lembramos & pedimos a Vossa Majestade que estes reinos fiquem sempre inteiros, & sejão per si, & em 
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country, the Conselho de Portugal was created, which was to cooperate directly with 
the king, provided that he was residing in Portugal. Filipe granted that no foreigner was 
to be admitted into the circle of government, namely ‘todos os cargos superiores, & 
inferiors, assi da justiça, como da fazenda, & do gouerno dos lugares, se proveja a 
Portugueses, & não a estrangeiros.’116 The exclusion of foreigners from public offices 
was of course extended also to the ecclesiastical domain following the directives of the 
Iuris Patronatus Regum Portugaliæ, that is, crown control over administrative positions 
and the ecclesiastical organization of the empire.117  
This list of concessions is not just an unfruitful quotation of juridical sources. As 
will appear clearly farther on in the work, the vigorous defense of Portuguese 
prerogatives and also the fair assignment to Lusitanian persons important offices – a 
sort of rendering therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s118 – transcended the 
boundaries of the Cortes. Or, since this is one of those cases when it is really difficult to 
ascertain what came first, we can phrase the concept with these words: the Portuguese 
sense of belonging to what they always had been considering their own – i.e. the 
Portuguese empire – and to a condition that had been laboriously conquered – the 
Portuguese discoveries and the Estado da Índia – was so strong that often a conflict of 
competence arose.  
In Tomar this self-preservation instinct allowed the three estates to carve out 
room for independence within the architecture of the Habsburg monarchy. Portugal was 
a part of it, but was not absorbed by it.119 In view of that, it is obvious that the Cortes 
                                                                                                                                               
tudo, & per tudo se ajão de reger & gouernar, per suas leis, ordenações, foros, & costumes, como atequi 
se fez, & vsou.’ PMGP, ff. 91v-92. Cf. also Bouza, op. cit., pp. 90-92.  
116 Cf. PMGP, f. 87v, Cap. IIII. See also chapter V and VI. Cf. also Schaub, op. cit., pp. 22-23. 
117 See PMGP, ff. 87v-88: ‘Cap. IX – Que todas as prelacias, abbadias, beneficios, & pensões, se darão a 
Portugueses. E o mesmo se entende no cargo de Inquisidor moor, & nas Comendas, & pensões dellas, & 
officios das ordens militares, & no Priorado do Crato. E finalmente em todas as cousas Ecclesiasticas, assi 
como atras fica dito nas seculares.’ With regard to the Papal bulls that established the Portuguese 
patronage see Demonstratio Iuris Patronatus Portugaliæ Regum respectu omnium Lusitane ditionij 
Orientalium Ecclesiarum, qua ipsum ius ad omnes presentandos etiam titulares pro eij regionibus 
Episcopos stabilitur, idemque ad mittendos Evangelicos operarios in easdem regiones exponitur ceteros 
omnes extraneos missionarios merito a Sancta Sede esse removendos ostenditur; argumentisque omnibus, 
que in contrarium addicci possunt, occurritur, BNCR/FGes. 1309, ff. 7-22v; for an introduction to the 
concept of Royal patronage within the Catholic monarchy see Boxer, The Church Militant and the 
Iberian Expansion 1440-1770, pp. 77-9 and Souza, The Survival of Empire. Portuguese Trade and 
Society in China and the South China Sea 1630-1754, pp. 23-25. 
118 Mt 22:21: ‘They say to him: Caesar’s. Then he saith to them: Render therefore to Caesar the things 
that are Caesar’s; and to God, the things that are God’s.’ 
119 We are avoiding here to take part in the debate around the concept of Habsburgs’ dual or plural 
monarchy. Even though I recognize that also before the annexation of Portugal the Spanish monarchy was 
not a fixed and defined unity, since it included also the crowns of Aragon, Naples, Sicily and so on, I do 
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required the future king to adopt the same regard with respect to commerce in the 
Ultramar. The 7th chapter of the Cortes reads: 
‘Cap. VII. – Que os tratos da India, & de Guiné, & de outras partes pertencentes a este reino, 
assi descubertas, como por descubrir, não se tirem delles, nem aja mudança, do que ao 
presente se vsa. E que os officiaes, que andarem nos ditos tratos, & nauios delles, sejão 
Portugueses, e naueguem em nauios Portugueses.’120 
As already done by D. Afonso V, who in 1472 claimed to be ‘Rex Portugaliæ & 
Algarbiorum citra & ultra Mare in Africa’, while the periplus of the Cape of Good Hope 
was still years to come, also in the Mercês granted by King Filipe I we see that the 
Portuguese Crown secured for itself the possession of the terræ incognitæ. We consider 
it relevant to stress this point. As is known, the Treaty of Tordesillas gave birth to the 
Iberian dispute on the Eastern side of the globe, the only area where Portuguese and 
Spaniards did not agree about the allocated boundaries. In fact, since Spanish ships had 
reached the East by sailing westwards and – according to Tordesillas’s dispensations – 
could claim what they discovered, it was now necessary to draw a line corresponding to 
that of Tordesillas’s in the East.121 The main bone of contention was the Maluku Islands, 
the much-coveted source of some of the most valuable oriental products. In 1529 at 
Saragossa, Emperor Carlos V and King D. João III agreed that the islands should remain 
with Portugal, but that an indemnity of 350’000 ducats should be paid to Spain.122 This 
new treaty did resolve the Maluku’s contend, but on the other hand left the Spanish 
Crown with a bitter taste of dissatisfaction for its ambitions in East Asia.123 Thus, when 
the Adelantado Miguel Lopez de Legazpi left New Spain in November 1564, he carried 
                                                                                                                                               
not deem it relevant to enter in that debate in this work. For a discussion on this topic see Pinto, No 
Extremo Da Redonda Esfera: Relações Luso-Castelhanas Na Ásia, 1565-1640 – Um Ensaio Sobre Os 
Impérios Ibéricos, PhD thesis, Lisbon, 2011 (photocopied), pp. 152-166.  
120 PMGP, f. 87v. It has to be said, however, that Filipe was less scrupulous about respecting Portuguese 
autonomy and interests in the Carreira da Índia than might first appear. From the early 1580s, in fact, he 
authorized sale of juros (bonds) at 7% against future revenues from the Indian customs. Filipe assigned 
most of the sums raised to financing the wars in Flanders. Cf. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia Under 
the Habsburgs, 1580-1640, p. 26. 
121 With regard to the disputes on Tordesillas’s meridian see Laguarda, “Las longitudes geográficas de la 
membranza de Magallanes y del primer viaje de circunnavegación”, pp. 135-177. 
122 It is worthy to underline that these treaties had almost exclusively political repercussions with a few 
consequences for the religious status of the pertinent territories. Hence, according to this principle, 
although Castile gained the temporal dominion on the Maluku Islands, the spiritual one remained within 
the Bishopric of Malacca. Cf. BPE, Cód. CXVI/2-11, n.º 12, ff. 1-1v. 
123 Cf. NCMoH I, pp. 429-430; and Valladares, Castilla Y Portugal en Asia (1580-1680) – Declive 
Imperial y Adaptación, pp. 1-12. Regarding the Portuguese-Spanish rivalry in Asia in the first half of the 
16th century Albuquerque and Feijó, “Os Pontos de Vista de D. João III na Junta de Badajoz-Elvas”, pp. 
527-578 and Pérez-Bustamante, “La Expedición de Ruy López de Villalobos a las Islas del Pacifico”, pp. 
611-626.  
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with him precise instructions from the Mexican Real Audiência about ascertaining 
whether Japan was geographically within Portugal’s sphere of influence or Spain’s.124 
As soon as the Spaniards reached the Asian archipelago of the Philippines, moreover, 
they started to send reports about the idea of conquering those territories – China,125 in 
particular, but later also Japan – which had already been claimed by the Portuguese, and 
those reports did not end during the union of the crowns.126 Furthermore, this prospect 
was pleaded also by those religious orders close to the Spanish Patroazgo, in particular 
the Friars Minors and Augustinians. 127 On the one hand the political authorities of 
Manila were trying to remove the Portuguese from the Chinese trading port of Macao 
and take over the silk trade with Japan. On the other hand, the Franciscans were trying 
to gain access to continental China and, later, to Japan. Politics, religion and commerce, 
then, travelled aboard the same ships.128 With regard to the Franciscans’ activity in 
                                                 
124 Cf. Bernard, “Les débuts des relations diplomatiques entre le Japon et les Philippines (1571-1594)”, 
pp. 106-107. It is relevant to stress that, with the exception of Filipe I of Portugal who acknowledged the 
Portuguese monopoly over Japan, the Habsburg court considered Japan geographic position as belonging 
to its halve of the world also during the 17th century. In 1633, in fact, Filipe III wrote to his ambassador in 
Rome, the Marquis of Castel Rodrigo, that he wished to see missionaries of various orders entering in 
Japan and ‘que estas entradas se hagan no solo por la India Oriental, sino tambien por las Occidentales en 
cuy demarcaçion cae el Xapon y las Philipinas (que es por donde ay mas facilidad y comodidad para 
hazerlas los Religiosos de mi Corona de Castella).’ AGI, Filipinas 80, N. 164, f. 1. For a general approach 
to the complicated relation of the two Iberian countries in Asia see also Lourido, “Portuguese e Espanhóis 
em Macau e Manila com os Olhos na China”, pp. 23-45. For a brief description of the uneasiness within 
the Indian province of the Society of Jesus created by Legazpi’s arrival see DI VII 1566-1569, pp. 159-
161. 
125 Regarding the first Spanish attempts to reach the see Ollé, La Invención de China - Percepciones y 
Estrategias Filipinas Respecto a China durante el Siglo XVI, pp. 97-103. 
126 See, for instance, the letter sent to Filipe I by Juan Pacheco Maldonado in the early 1570s: ‘It is 
necessary, on the arrival of the said five hundred soldiers, at the said islands [Luzon], to effect 
immediately the purpose for which they were brought- namely, to subjugate, settle, and explore both the 
said island of Luzon, and those regions nearest China: the Japans, the Lequios [Ryūkyū], and the island of 
Escauchu [Cochinchina]; this is a very important matter.’ See TPI III, pp. 302-3. In April 1586, in Manila, 
representatives of the church, military, crown, and citizenry met to discuss again the conquest of China. 
Everyone present agreed it ought to be done. What needed to be discussed instead was how, i.e. the 
funding, the weaponry, the troops and so on. See “Memorandum of the Various Points Presented by the 
General Junta of Manila”, in TPI VI, pp. 197-198.  
127 See Provincial Alessandro Valignano to General Acquaviva, Goa, 1 April 1585. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 10 
[I], ff. 26-26v. Cf. also DI XIV 1585-1588, pp. 7-8. With regard to the first reactions to the Spanish 
intrusion in Portuguese territories see Ollé, “A inserção das Filipinas na Ásia Oriental, 1565-1593”, pp. 8-
10. 
128 The first Franciscan missions from the Philippines to China were actually filling a gap left by the 
Portuguese Padronado, since by the end of the 1570s there was no missionary in China. On the other 
hand, as we already said, Filipe I never encouraged to violate the monopoly of the Society of Jesus for the 
evangelization of Japan. Cf. Costa, “A rivalidade luso-espanhola no Extremo Oriente e a querela 
missionológica no Japão”, pp. 479-80. It is true, however, that at this early stage Filipe was allowing his 
agents, although men of the cloth, to violate the pact sealed with Portugal and this situation was of help 
neither for the Portuguese nor for the Spanish, since the Chinese authorities did not allow Spaniards in 
Macao. Cf. Provincial Valignano to the Governor of the Philippines Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa, 
Macao, 14 December 1582. AGI, Patronato 24, R.57, f. 1. Apud Gil, Los Chinos en Manila. Siglos XVI y 
XVII, p. 460.  
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China, as early as June 1581, Filipe wrote a letter to ‘el poderoso, y muy estimado Rey 
de la China’, stating his desire to see the Friars accepted and protected in the Middle 
Kingdom.129 Although with this letter Filipe wanted clearly to establish his influence on 
the Indies, it has to be said that he personally promoted those missions directed towards 
territories still evangelically virgin.130 As for the commerce between the Spanish and 
Portuguese Indies, however, Filipe stood by what he swore in Tomar. In 1585, in fact, 
he wrote to his Viceroy in Goa, Dom Duarte de Menezes, that:  
‘asi pella via das Philipinas como por qualquer outra da Nova Espanha não pasem nem vão 
nenhum Castelhanos as ditas partes da China e Japão e mais portos e lugares dellas onde os 
portugueses tem seu trato, e navegação nem os ditos Castelhanos pella via das Phelipinas, e 
Nova Espanha tenhão nenhum trato nem comersio nas ditas partes da China por si nem por 
outrem.’131 
The same provision was therefore forwarded to Macao, where it was announced on 18 
August 1586, and to Manila, where it arrived only in May 1587.132 Another alvará133 
forbidding the ‘navegação e comercio da India oriental e partes dellas pertencentes à 
Coroa de Portugal pera as Indias occidentales da Coroa de Castella’ would be issued in 
March 1594.134 Notwithstanding these efforts, however, the huge distance that separated 
the centre of power where the decrees were issued and the Indies caused the king’s 
regulations to be systematically violated, as appears clearly from the correspondence 
exchanged between Lisbon and Goa in the 1590s.135 It was exactly the outside of the 
Iberian Peninsula that Filipe had to deal with, since there was the chance that his claim 
would not be acknowledged in the Portuguese Ultramar. In particular, Filipe wanted to 
find the whereabouts of António, since he feared that the Prior do Crato might have left 
                                                 
129 See King Filipe I to Emperor Wan Li, Emperor of China, Santarém, 5 June 1581. AGI, Patronato 24, 
R.54, ff. 1-1v. 
130 Cf. Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão e o Episcopado de D. Luís de Cerqueira, pp.183-189. 
131 See Provisão firmada por D. Duarte de Menezes, Vice-Rey da India, que defende que assim pela via 
das Philippinas, como por qualquer outra da Nova Hespanha, não passem, nem vão nenhuns 
Castelhanos ás partes da China, Japão..., Goa, 29 April 1586. BPE, Cód. CXVI, 2-5, ff. 72-72v. 
132 Ivi, f. 72v. 
133 See Glossary. 
134 See APO III, pp. 453-454. 
135 See APO III, pp. 276-277 and 423-424, and Costa and Gaspar, Portugal y Oriente: El Proyecto 
Indiano del Rey Juan, pp. 316-321. As it is obvious, the violation of the rules was not confined to the sole 
Spaniards – the Portuguese too used to trade between Macao and Manila – or to the first years of the 
Habsburgs’ rule. In 1621, in fact, the Dominicans in Manila wrote polemically to Filipe II that ‘las 
cedulas que V. Magestad envia, no las envia para que se guarden, sino para que sirvan no mas que de 
coco.’ See Carta de dominicos sobre estado de la Orden en Filipinas, Manila, 21 July 1621. AGI, 
Filipinas 80, N. 69, f. 1v. 
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Portugal to rally a revolt against the Spanish king. Although he was hiding in France,136 
there were rumours that he had taken ship for India and the Orient. Dispatches, then, 
were swiftly sent to Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa in the Philippines, instructing him 
to forestall António at Macao, and, by getting there first with the news, obtain the sworn 
allegiance of its citizens.137 As a trusted head of the expedition, Ronquillo chose the 
Spanish Jesuit Alonso Sánchez.138  
 
 II. 2.    An embassy from Manila: Father Alonso Sánchez S. J. in China 
The governor bestowed on Sanchez not only the assignment of informing the 
colony of Macao about the succession to the Portuguese Crown, but also of gathering 
information about the Chinese empire and coast. Ronquillo chose the Spanish father for 
two reasons: on the one hand, he had remained impressed by the dialectics of the Jesuit 
expressed during the synod in Manila in 1582; on the other hand, however, by sending a 
Spanish Jesuit he achieved a twofold result: first, he was sure of sending a reliable agent 
faithful to the Spanish Crown; second, Sanchez was a Jesuit, that is to say he belonged 
to an order strongly related to the Portuguese Padroado, which also had a stronghold in 
the city of Macao. Thus, Ronquillo thought that Sanchez would have fewer problems 
than other emissaries on entering Macao.139 The embassy left Manila on 14 March 
1582,140 but before describing how Sanchez carried out his duties in the Cidade do 
Nome de Deus, we have to take a detour to another Chinese entrepôt, the city of 
Guangzhou, the first and most important Chinese port founded during the Tang Dynasty 
to receive the tributes for the empire. It was in this city, in fact, that for the first time 
since his departure Father Alonso Sanchez shared with someone else one of the reasons 
that led Ronquillo to organize the embassy.  
When the first Portuguese vessels made their entrance into the Asian seas, they 
found fervent and peaceful commercial activities which were not supported by an 
                                                 
136 See for instance António’s letter to the Queen of France, La Rochelle, 13 July 1582. BL/Add. 24217, 
ff. 15-15v. 
137 Cf. de la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines 1581-1768, p. 38. 
138 See Provincial Antonio Sedeño to General Acquaviva, Manila, 12 June 1582. ARSI, Philipp. 9, ff. 8-
8v. See also the letter from the Bishop of the Philippines to Filipe I, Manila, 18 June 1583. AGI, 
Patronato 25, R. 8. 
139 Cf. Ollé, La Invención de China, p. 105. There are three accounts related to China by the hand of 
Father Alonso Sánchez written between 1583 and 1588.The second one, probably written in 1584, is in 
AGI, Filipinas 79, N. 13. See Ollé, op. cit., pp. 51-66. 
140 Relacion, f. 1v. 
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adequate military force. Also at this early stage, it was clear that if the Portuguese were 
to take over the Asian commercial routes, they had to establish secure ports to be used 
as naval bases and commercial warehouses through the employment of physical force. 
During the govern of Afonso de Albuquerque (1509-1515), the Portuguese conquered: 
Goa (1510) – the future capital of the Estado da Índia; Malacca (1511), the key to the 
centre of the Indonesian spices and a loyal Ming tributary, and Ormuz (1515), whose 
conquest gave them control of the Persian Gulf.141 With those ports the Portuguese 
snatched away the monopoly of the important spice routes of the Indian Ocean from the 
Muslim empires, with the exception of the Red Sea. In fact, the Portuguese Crown’s 
basic objective in the foundation of the Estado da Índia was exactly to dominate Asian 
maritime trade in spices and to force existing trading activities to pay for permission to 
trade in the Indian Ocean.142  
Afterwards in the 1520s, they tried to adopt the same aggressive scheme in the 
South China Sea, but the Ming coastal defenses managed to repel the attack.143 After 
this failure, however, and the subsequent expulsion ordered by the Ming dynasty, the 
Portuguese Crown officially withdrew from that region. The overseas’ strategy of the 
Avis, however, allowed Portuguese private entrepreneurs to take over the commercial 
liaisons with China. Between the 1530s and ‘50s, they kept visiting the South China Sea 
until they gained the trust of the Guangzhou’s mandarins after having helped to cleanse 
the mouth of the Pearl River of the pirates’ menace.144 These two phases saw an evident 
change in attitude both in the Portuguese strategy and seafarers. Those who reached the 
Chinese coast before the 1520s were products of the early Estado da Índia, which was 
                                                 
141 With regard to the Portuguese entrance in the Indian Ocean see Subrahmanyam and Thomaz Reis, 
“Evolution of Empire: The Portuguese in the Indian Ocean during the Sixteenth Century”, pp. 298-331 
and Disney, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 145-168. 
142 The Estado’s revenues, besides the customs-houses, came initially from the collection of cartazes (sea 
licenses) and, in particular, from the sail of various inter-Asian maritime trading routes, like the Macao-
Nagasaki silk trade. Cf. Souza, op. cit., pp. 12-14 and Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
143 Cf. Boxer, O Império Marítimo Português 1415-1825, pp. 59-64, HEP I, pp. 175-177 and Disney, op. 
cit., vol. 2, pp. 140-144. In 1524 and 1525 new restrictions were published imposing punishments on 
those found trading with, borrowing money from, and provoking disturbances with foreign merchants. 
The intention of the ban was to suspend foreign trade, not shut down trade among Chinese up and down 
the coast, which went on in full view of Chinese officials along the coast. Cf. Brook, The Confusions of 
Pleasures. Commerce and Culture in Ming China, p. 123. See also Subrahmanyam, O Império Asiático 
Português, pp. 142-143. 
144 Cf. Costa, “A Coroa portuguesa e a China (1508-1531) – do sonho manuelino ao realismo joanino”, 
pp. 54-57. With regard to Portugal-China early contacts see Barreto, Macau: Poder e Saber. Séculos XVI 
e XVII, pp. 35-95; Ptak, “Sino-Portuguese Relations, circa 1513/14-1550’s”, pp. 19-38; Loureiro, 
Fidalgos, missionários e mandarins. Portugal e a China no século XVI, in particular pp. 270-283, and 
Carioti, “The Portuguese Settlement of Macao: The Portuguese Policy of Expansion in the Far East, in 
Light of the History of Chinese and Japanese Intercourse and Maritime Activities”, pp. 29-31. 
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still focused on the ancient fight against the infidel Muslims. Hence they tried to inhibit 
the Muslim trade. On the other hand, the men who sought and found Chinese tolerance 
managed to put that kind of conflict behind them and instead of fighting, preferred to 
cooperate closely on a local level with Chinese and Indians because they became more 
interested in taking over the intra-Asian trade.145 
Canton, as Guangzhou was then known in the West, was situated on the banks of 
the Pearl River at quite a distance from the mouth of the estuary and had already served 
as a major port for foreign shipping for a millennium before the arrival of the 
Europeans.146 Between the establishment of the Ming Dynasty and the eunuch Zheng 
He’s seven expeditions, the Chinese government withdrew from maritime commerce.147 
Regardless of the official antitrade posture, however, merchants along the harbour-
studded coast of Fujian engaged actively in trade with South-East Asia during the 15th 
century. Among the merchants and investors in this illegal trade profit expectations ran 
                                                 
145 Cf. Wills, China and Maritime Europe, pp. 19-25. The change in attitude of the Portuguese Crown 
took place with the ascent to the throne of D. João III. The new king sent precise instructions to his 
officers in Asia to ‘trabalhar por tornar ao primeiro estado [de entendimento] e de se conserver boa paz e 
amizade’ with the Ming Empire. The new international politic contemplated the interaction with private 
Portuguese traders in the Estado and tolerance instead of aggressiveness towards other mercantile 
communities, which would become other diplomatic targets beside the centre of the Chinese dynasty. Cf. 
Alves, Um Porto entre Dois Impérios. Estudos Sobre Macau e as Relações Luso-Chinesas, pp. 58-59. 
146 The first Portuguese diplomatic mission dispatched to Guangzhou was sent by D. Manuel in 1515. It 
was headed by Tomé Pires, a former apothecary and scribe of the Malacca factory and first Portuguese to 
ever have written about the Japanese archipelago in his famous Suma Oriental, the most important source 
on the trade of maritime Asia at the beginning of the Portuguese arrival. See Cortesão (ed.), A Suma 
Oriental de Tomé Pires e o Livro de Francisco Rodrigues, Coimbra (Imprensa da Universidade). As for 
why an apothecary was chosen to play such a significant role, see Barreto, op. cit., pp. 59-64. 
147 The first Ming ruler, Zhu Yuanzhang (1368-1398), to gain full control over the border and the coasts 
trade from coastal port cities, forbade all private trade with foreign countries. From 1405 onward, the 
Ming sent seven large fleets under Zheng He via Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. The Chinese ships 
visited several countries and as soon as overseas rulers started to send regular tributes to China, the Ming 
imperial government saw fit to withdraw from its overseas ventures and again reinforce the maritime 
prohibitions, in order to concentrate its military forces on the land borders. Thus the tribute system that 
the early Ming emperors imposed on China’s neighbours, ostensibly to achieve political stability by 
establishing proper relations between them and the Middle Kingdom, in effect prohibited their own 
subjects from linking up with foreigners. The reasons for China’s withdrawal of its large government 
fleets are not fully understood. However, it has been speculated that the difficulty in dealing with the 
numerous embassies and the cost of receiving them, which was higher than the revenue, might have been 
a strong reason for the withdrawal from the expeditions. Anyway, defiant Chinese traders in the Malay 
Archipelago sought protection from local rulers and continued their activities as before. The Ryukyu 
connection is also of interest in this respect. Fujianese families moved over to the island kingdom situated 
between China and Japan and not only became the main transporters of goods between China, Ryukyu, 
and Japan but also formed a link with Southeast Asia. Thus the interplay between legal (tributary) and 
outlawed (private) ventures kept the Fujianese maritime tradition alive. This illegal activity, together with 
the arrival of the Portuguese, who were lured to China’s coasts by Chinese smugglers, gave rise to a wave 
of piracy along the China coast during the 1550s. Cf. Blussé, Visible Cities, pp. 15-16; Zhihong, “China’s 
Overseas Trade Policy and Its Historical Results: 1522–1840”, pp. 5-6 and Wills, op. cit., pp. 18-20. A 
study with regard to the Ryukyu foreign relations in the early Modern times based on sources in classical 
Chinese is Ptak, “The Ryukyu Network in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries”, pp. 7-23. 
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high. Consequently competition intensified and so did rivalries and turf wars. 
Furthermore, the matter was complicated by the famine-troubled decades of the 1540s 
and 1550s, when wakō148 bands raided where they could not trade.149 As is known, the 
Portuguese managed to play this situation to their own vantage by filling the 
commercial gap existing between China and Japan, but we shall return to this later on. 
As we said before, the Chinese accepted Portuguese merchants starting from the 
1550s. Seasonal trading between the two parties, in fact, had become a regular 
occurrence by 1549 and it would receive further confirmation by the mid-1550s, when 
Ming officials permitted the Portuguese to use sites on the Guangdong coast. It was 
between 1555 and 1557, in fact, that the fidalgo Lionel de Sousa secured permission 
from officials at Guangzhou to establish a Portuguese port at Macao, in those days only 
a village near the mouth of the Pearl River.150 Although the settlement was restricted to 
a small peninsula, representative merchants were allowed into Guangzhou. It was in 
Canton, in fact, that the Portuguese had to go in order to participate in the China trade. 
There a bi-annual fair was held which the Portuguese were allowed to attend,151 and it is 
where Sánchez arrived after having left Manila.  
It took almost two months of voyage to get there (they arrived in Canton in the 
morning of 2 May), yet as soon as they met with the ‘Aytao’152 Sánchez received an 
unexpected comfort when he heard that some Portuguese and Jesuits were in the city.153 
The words used by Sánchez when he met with a fellow Jesuit deserve to be quoted 
verbatim: 
‘Estávamos ya tan flartos [sic, fartos] del trato destos chinas y de sus bilezas y lisonjas y 
engaños que, quando bemos los portugueses, aunque bien differentes de los nuestros en la 
fayción, hábito y lenguaje, los abrazamos como quien bee a los Ángeles. De mi, 
especialmente, bien se puede sospechar la alegría y consuelo que sintiria quando, en tierras 
                                                 
148 See Glossary. 
149 Cf. Ptak, “Sino-japanese maritime trade, circa 1550: merchants, ports and networks”, pp. 283-285; 
Brook, op. cit., pp. 120-123 and CHCh VII, pp. 440-510. 
150 Cf. Souza, op. cit., p. 17. 
151 The fair was normally held about December-January and in May-June. Contracts were often made for 
a year in advance, but alternatively, contracts and advance payments might be made at one fair for 
deliveries at the next. See Boxer, O Grande Navio de Amacau, pp. 4-5. For a description of the fair see 
Boxer, Seventeenth Century Macau in Contemporary Documents and Illustrations, pp. 78-79. 
152  See Glossary. A recent paper regarding piracy in the Asian seas which provides an up-to-date 
bibliography is Ollé, “De Limahon (Lin Feng 林風) a Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功): A Reacção 
Pirática Sino-japonesa à concorrência Ibérica na Ásia Oriental (séculos XVI-XVII)”, in Costa and Gaspar 
(eds.), O Estado da Índia e os Desafios Europeus, pp. 139-162. 
153 Cf. de la Costa, op. cit., pp. 41-42.  
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tan estrañas y yendo como presso, a lo menos sin saver en qué pararía, me bi tan de rrepente 
con otro Padre de la Conpañía, principalmente con el amor y regalos que me mostró y 
hizo.’154 
The words we have quoted convey an emotion that almost everyone in his life must 
have experienced: the relief in seeing a known face, or also someone who belongs to the 
same place as we do, in a hostile environment. The feeling of familiarity kindled in 
Sánchez by the Western features of the Portuguese is no different from what we can feel 
when, after a long time, we come to hear our own language spoken in a foreign land. 
Familiarity, moreover, means also safety and protection, probably the reason why 
Sánchez compared the Portuguese to angels against the Chinese officers. Also Erasmus, 
when dealing with dynastic marriages and the role played by princesses in them, 
stressed that being married to ‘men who have no similarity of language, appearance, 
character, or habits’, is ‘as if they were being abandoned to exile’.155 Yet, affiliation to 
the same religious order could not compete always with the sense of belonging to the 
same land or crown. As we shall see later, the cohesion within a group is never as strong 
as the cohesion within its subgroups. A crown, in fact, may very well unify geographic 
borders, but people always stay more faithful to what they perceive more intimately 
their own. The father Sánchez met with, however, was both a subject of the Catholic 
Monarchy and an Ignatian. Although the Spaniard did not call him by name, it is known 
that he met with the Italian ‘Padre Doctor’ Michele Ruggeri. The emotion Sánchez felt 
at their first meeting would fortify as the two got to know each other and would remain 
strong also when Sánchez had to leave for Macao some months later. While in the 
Portuguese harbour, in fact, he remained in contact with Ruggeri and another Italian 
Jesuit, Francesco Pasio. Sánchez’s letters to his fellows showed palpably longing and 
profound friendship. Ruggeri described them as ‘llenas de amor y caredad’, since they 
were written by a ‘persona que nos amaba y deseava que azentasemos en estos Reynos 
tan axenos de nos’.156 Meeting with two Italian Jesuits was not only a source of comfort 
for Sánchez. Actually, he must have felt quite relieved not to have stumbled on a 
Portuguese. As he wrote, in fact:  
                                                 
154 Relacion, f. 12. 
155 See Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince, On the Marriage Alliances of Princes, p. 243. 
156 See Father Michele Ruggeri to Alonso Sánchez, Zhaoquing, 7 February 1583, AGI, Filipinas 79, N.11, 
f. 1. 
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‘Este Padre ytaliano [Michele Ruggeri] es de condición blanda y semejante a los chinas [...], 
ha estudiado tres o quatro años la lengua manderín y entiende algo della [...]. A solo este 
Padre, por ser ytaliano y nacido en Nápoles, donde primero que entrase en la Conpañía era 
doctor en leyes y havia servido a su Magestad en arregimientos, descubríle los negocios a que 
yba a Macán y mostré todos los papeles y relaciones del subceso de Portugal, más a ninguno 
de los portugueses lo quise descubrir en casi dos meses que estuve en Cantón.’157 
As written in the Relación, Sánchez found it convenient to have a neutral confrère to 
talk to. As we read in the quote, Ruggeri came from the kingdom of Naples, which back 
then included also the southern region of Puglia, where he was born. The Spaniards, 
actually the Aragonese, had been present in southern Italy since the first half of the 15th 
century. Starting with Alfonso V, uncle of Fernando el Católico, the Spanish monarchs 
used Naples as a base to establish their hegemony in Italy and the establishment in the 
Partenopean city of the Consejo de Italia – whence all the matters inherent to Naples, 
Milan and Sicily were sent to Madrid – came as a sanction to this policy. Naples and the 
Neapolitans, thus, were considered closer to the Spanish identity than the other Italian 
people. It is not a coincidence, in fact, that the Calabrian philosopher Tommaso 
Campanella in his famous treatise the Monarquía de España wrote that ‘España no tiene 
pueblo más amigo que el italiano. Por eso, para mantener esta amistad es necesario que 
halague con beneficios a napolitanos y milaneses’.158 Then, although Sánchez was part 
of a royal embassy, neither he nor anyone could foresee how Portuguese authorities 
would react to the news he was bringing. Conversely, he was assured by the historical 
past of the loyalty of the Neapolitan subjects of the Catholic Monarchy. Besides, the 
mistrust felt by Sánchez towards the Portuguese community, both laymen and men of 
the cloth, was shared also by Ronquillo, who regarded the Portuguese Jesuits in Macao 
as passionate regarding political matters as any layman.159  
However, Sánchez and the other Ignatians were also concerned about the 
Chinese authorities. Although, in fact, the Portuguese were now accepted on the 
Chinese coast, the same could not be said for the Spaniards from Manila. Knowing that 
Portuguese and Spaniards were now ruled by the same king would enhance the rights 
                                                 
157 See Relacion, f. 13v. 
158 Cf. Campanella, La Monarquía de España, p. 55, apud Sánchez, “Españoles e Italianos. Nación y 
lealtad en el Reino de Nápoles durante las Guerras de Italia”, p. 431. 
159  See Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa to King Felipe I, Manila, 8 April 1584. In Colín, Labor 
Evangelica de los Obreros de la Compañía de Jesús en las Islas Filipinas, vol. 1, pp. 313-4: ‘[...] de los 
mismos padres portugueses que residen en Macau no se puede fiar cossa alguna que aunque son 
religiosos no son menos apassionados en este caso que los seglares’. 
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granted to the Portuguese also to the Spaniards or, as was feared, would the Portuguese 
merchants be degraded to the same rank as their Iberian cousins?160 Sánchez’s words 
describe bluntly his diffidence towards the Portuguese and Chinese alike: 
‘[...] si acasso los chinas, a los quales yo decía que yba a Macán a ver a otros hermanos de mi 
religión [...], supieran por otra parte que yo yba con las nuevas y a tratar de la unión de que 
ellos an gustado tan poco, assí por esto como por tenernos por espías nos fuera muy mal, y los 
portugueses, con la disposición que entonces tenían, quizás les ayudaran.’161 
According to Sánchez, moreover, Alessandro Valignano, another trustworthy Italian, 
advised Ruggeri and Pasio not to show familiarity in public to Sánchez. The Spanish, in 
fact, once he had learned that Valignano was back at Macao, wrote to him in confidence 
of the purpose of his mission asking him how to behave in Guangzhou.162 Valignano 
probably did not want Canton-based Jesuits to get too involved with the Spanish 
embassy in order not to jeopardize both Sánchez’s mission and the whole of Christianity 
in China. 163  As the visitor would confess to Ronquillo de Peñalosa, in fact, the 
preservation of Macao was possible only through peaceful relations with Chinese 
officers. Yet, the Spaniards had not enjoyed a good reputation with the Ming Dynasty 
since their first appearance in the South China Sea and the situation got even worse with 
the news of the union of the Iberian crowns.164 The Middle Kingdom, in fact, feared the 
expansionistic crave of the Spanish and it seems that the Portuguese were probably the 
ones to inspire such fear.165  
In any case, the embassy left Guangzhou headed for Macao by the end of May to 
receive the city’s submission to Filipe I King of Portugal. The Sunday following 
                                                 
160 Cf. Father Francesco Pasio to Father Alonso Sánchez, Zhaoqing, 6 February 1583. AGI, Filipinas 79, 
N.11, ff. 4v-5: ‘esta gente es muy rica y sobervia y la gente de Castella muy mal acreditada con ellos y 
creo que no le recivan’. 
161 See Relación, ibidem. 
162 See de la Costa, op. cit., pp. 45-46. 
163 Cf. Relación, ff. 13v-14. 
164 Cf. Visitor Valignano to Governor Peñalosa, Macao, 14 December 1582. AGI, Patronato 24, R.57, f. 
1v: ‘y como los mandarines sean tan percatados en su govierno siempre tuvieron mucha sospecha de ver 
engradecer este pueblo especialmente despues que supieron dela venida delos Castellanos alos Luzones y 
de su conquista, por lo qual sintieron mucho el ver que tantas vezes de quatro años a esta parte llegassen 
aqui padres descalços y otros castellanos como V. S. sabra por ellos mismos que padecieron [...], y agora 
que entendieron esta nueva union delos estados de Portugal y Castilla tienen esta sospecha mucho 
mayor’. 
165 According to Father Alonso Sánchez, moved by the dread of losing their privileges in Guangzhou, the 
Portuguese instructed the Chinese interpreter to describe the Spaniards as ‘ladrones y espías, que yban a 
saver el lenguaje y puertos de su tierra y […] heran una mala gente que andaba a rrobar Reynos agenos y 
matarlos Reyes naturales dellos y que, en quantas tierras entravan, se alzaban con ellas’. Cf. Relación, ff. 
14-14v. See also Boxer, O Grande Navio de Amacau, pp. 38-39. 
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Sánchez’s arrival, Portuguese officers (Captain Major João de Almeida, four regidores 
and other Macanese elders) and ecclesiastic eminences (the Patriarch of Ethiopia 
Melchior Carneiro and Macao’s Bishop Leonardo de Sá)166 of Macao gathered in the 
residence of the Society of Jesus. After the meal, Sánchez was finally able to announce 
what was happening in Portugal: 
‘[L]es dixe con brevedad lo que Dios abía hecho. Como havia juntado los rreynos de Castilla 
y Portugal y, tratando blandamente el subceso del negocio y dissimulando las guerras y sacos, 
mostrandoles con esto algunos papeles en que no havia inconbeniente [...]. Y como Su 
Magestad tenía más de portugués que de castellano y que mostraba querer tener allá su corte, 
como entonces tenía, habiendo tomado el traje y servicios y predicadores de los portugueses 
y, al fin, todas las razones que sobre esto abía y a ellos podían saborearles algo el bocado, 
añadiéndoles las que havía para que [...] entendiesen quan bien les estava y quantas más 
fuerzas tendrían agora para defenderse de tantos enemigos de que estavan cercados en toda la 
Yndia y estenderse por las tierras de ellos, de que agora no tienen sino solas las playas y, 
particularmente para gozar de cossa tan rica como tenían al ojo y en las esperanzas en esto de 
la China.’167  
The diplomatic shrewdness of Father Sánchez is admirable. As we saw earlier, he was 
not sure as to how the Portuguese of Macao would react to the news he was bearing. 
Therefore, he did not confess to his Portuguese hosts that before Tomar Dom António 
had put up some resistance and there had been armed conflicts between the Spanish 
tercios of the Duke of Alba and the Portuguese army. He knew that such information 
may jeopardize the whole mission to the point of creating an enclave of resistance in 
Asia. On the other hand, however, he was not lying. He was just concealing details of 
the truth. Sánchez, in other words, was putting into practice a common diplomatic 
strategy of his age, the dissimulation, which, according to the Neapolitan philosopher 
Torquato Accetto, was nothing but ‘un velo composto di tenebre oneste e di rispetti 
                                                 
166 Dom Melchior Carneiro (Coimbra, 1519 - Macao, 1583) entered the Society of Jesus in Coimbra on 25 
April 1543. In 1555, he was appointed Bishop of Nicaea and coadjutor with the right of succession to the 
Patriarch of Ethiopia. In the same year, he set out for the Indies. He labored there on the Malabar coast 
until 1567, when he was sent to Macao, where he was appointed first Bishop of Japan and China ad 
interim, since the bishopric of Macao was established only on 25 January 1576 with the papal bull Super 
Specula Militantis Ecclesiae and the first nominee to the diocese in 1578 was Dom Leonardo de Sá (?–
1597). Cf. Teixeira, Bispos e Governadores do Bispado de Macao, Macao, 1940, pp. 77-83 and Costa, O 
Cristianismo, pp. 224-233. 
167 See Relación, ff. 16-16v. Cf. also de la Costa, op. cit., p. 46 and Astrain, Historia dela Compañía de 
Jesús en la Asistencia de España, vol. IV, pp. 452-454. 
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violenti: da che non si forma il falso, ma si da qualche riposo al vero, per dimostrarlo a 
tempo’.168  
 After Sánchez had presented the official dispatches, he asked the Portuguese to 
take the oath of allegiance on behalf of the city. They asked for some time, since they 
wanted to hear from the viceroy of Goa first, but a public oath-taking was excluded in 
order not to arouse the suspicions of the Chinese. Both the captain major and the bishop 
wrote to Governor Ronquillo that the Chinese suspicion and dislike of the Spaniards had 
increased considerably upon hearing of the union of the crowns. Hence all 
communication and exchanges, both of men and merchandise, were to be kept to a 
minimum. 169  The Portuguese were conscious that the only way Macao could be 
preserved was by doing exactly what the Chinese officials told them, because the city 
was completely dependent on the trade and hence on the good will of the Chinese.170 
Notwithstanding their hesitations, however, Macao eventually swore allegiance to the 
Spanish monarchy.  
Governor Ronquillo, then, was not wrong in choosing Sánchez as Spain’s chief 
ambassador. 171  Yet, Sánchez could not wait for the city to give the official oath. 
Chinese officers, in fact, were growing restless with the Spanish embassy. Valignano 
mobilized the confrères to arrange a way to get Sánchez out of the reach of Ming 
officers. The junk172 Sánchez boarded, however, in mid-July was wrecked off the coast 
                                                 
168 See Accetto, Della Dissimulazione Onesta, cap. IV – La simulazione non facilmente riceve quel senso 
onesto che si accompagna con la dissimulazione. Cf. also Villari, Elogio della dissimulazione – La lotta 
politica nel Seicento, pp. 1-48. 
169 See Bishop Leonardo de Sá to Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa, Macao, 4 July 1582 and João de 
Almeida to Ronquillo, Macao, 15 July 1582. Both letters in Colín, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 294-298. See also de 
la Costa, op. cit., pp. 46-47 and Ollé, La Invención de China, pp. 110-111. 
170 Alessandro Valignano reiterated these concepts in the letter to Ronquillo he wrote in December. See 
AGI, Patronato 24, R.57, Ibid.: ‘[...] es cosa de mucha importancia assi la conservacion dessas Islas 
Philipinas como la desta Ciudad y puerto de Amacao, y para dezir lo que siento desta por agora no se 
puede en ninguna manera conservar sino estando bien con los Chinas hasta que se le pueda dar a su 
tiempo remedio y seguridad.’ Also a Spanish Jesuit, the Rector of Macao’s college Pedro Gomes, agreed 
with these opinions. See his letter to Ronquillo of 30 January 1583 in AGI, Patronato 25, R. 13, ff. 1-1v. 
171 Alonso Sánchez’s unique intellectual qualities were patent also when he still was in Spain. There is a 
description of him sent to Rome in 1574 that states that Father Sánchez was, to the writer opinion, ‘el más 
raro ingenio que he visto; porque en sus estudios está tan bien en ellos ahora, como cuando los acabó de 
oir, que habrá cuatro años; gran talento para predicar y alguna inclinación á ello, y para tratar con 
prójimos y para gobernar. Recio y fuerte para cualquier trabajo, gran celador del Instituto de la Compañía, 
muy sólido y macizo en lo esencial de la religión […]. Es muy afable y de gran conversación, de gran 
obediencia, humildad, pobreza y gran castidad. Es muy aficionado á letras, grande poeta en castellano. 
Finalmente, entiendo in Domino ser para mucho más de lo que ahora hace, con ser harto’. See Astrain, op. 
cit., vol. III, pp. 532-533. 
172 According to Lourenço Mexia SJ, the compiler of the Carta annua de Japão do anno de 80, a junk, 
junco in Portuguese, was a ship slightly smaller than the nao do trato. Cf. ANTT/AJ, Livro 28, f. 129v. 
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of Formosa (present-day Taiwan) owing to a hurricane and the distraction of the 
pilot.173 After having spent some weeks there, the castaways managed to get back to 
Macao by way of a lifeboat.174 This delay, among other things, offered Sánchez the 
possibility to behold the ‘reducción de Macao a la obediencia de Felipe II’175 on 18 
December 1582.176 Through the aid of Ruggeri, the Spanish embassy received safe-
conduct to leave for Manila, where they eventually arrived by the end of March 1583. 
 
II. 3.    The Society of Jesus and the Macao-Nagasaki juncture 
The ship with Sánchez aboard that was wrecked near Formosa was no common 
ship, both in terms of destination and of officials. In effect, it fits within the dynamics of 
the annual voyage sent from Macao to the southern Japanese port of Nagasaki, which 
we are going to deal with in detail later. The owner of the ship, on the other hand, was a 
notorious Portuguese casado177 called Bartolomeu Vaz Landeiro, a trader who arrived 
in the Estado da Índia in the service of the crown in 1557 and moved to Macao in the 
1570s.178 He was one of those early pioneer magnates who took advantage of the lack of 
a strong and solid Portuguese political founding at Macao.179 The earliest settlers in 
Macao, in fact, governed themselves without any control or direction from Goa or 
Lisbon. After the oath of allegiance to Filipe I, however, it was decided to arrange the 
form of local government according to the other cities of the monarchy. Confirmation of 
this procedure was obtained by a decree signed by the viceroy at Goa on 10 April 1586, 
and at the same time the Cidade do Nome de Deus das partes da China was granted the 
same privileges as those possessed by the cities of Évora in Portugal and Cochin.180 
                                                 
173 See HJ III, p. 287. 
174 Cf. Relación, f. 17, HJ III, pp. 286-7, Ollé, op. cit., pp. 111-112 and Boxer, op. cit., p. 39. For a 
detailed description of the castaways’ vicissitudes in Formosa see Carta que o padre Pero Gomes 
escreueo de Amacao a outro padre acerca do seu naufragio que fez indo da China pera Iapão a treze de 
Dezembro, de 1582, in CE, vol. II, ff. 82v-85v and Pontos do que me alembrar, in TCJ, pp. 387-393. 
175 See Astrain, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 453. 
176 Cf. Ollé, op. cit., 114-115. 
177 Married settler. 
178 A recent biography of this intriguing figure of the 16th-century trading society, which made use both 
of European, Chinese, and Japanese sources is Sousa, The Early European Presence in China, Japan, the 
Philippines and Southeast Asia (1555-1590) – The Life of Bartolomeu Landeiro, Macao, 2010. See also 
Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Bartolomé Báez Landero contraídos en Filipinas, 
China e isla de Macán, y otras de Asia durante 28 años, AGI, Patronato 53, R. 2 and Letter of Governor 
Ronquillo de Peñalosa to Filipe I, Manila, 21 June 1583. AGI, Filipinas 6, R.5, N.53, f. 1v 
179 Cf. Souza, op. cit., p. 38. 
180 Cf. Boxer, Seventeenth Century Macau in Contemporary Documents and Illustrations, p. 4 and idem, 
Portuguese Society in the Tropics. The Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and Luanda, 1510-
1800, p. 44. Afterwards, Macao’s citizens demanded that the city received the same rights and privileges 
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Subsequently, the crown issued an alvará establishing that no private entrepreneur was 
allowed to export or import silk to Japan outside the contract signed by the 
Macanese.181 
Based at Macao before the founding of the Senado da Camara (municipal 
council), Landeiro managed to establish his fortune from astute dealings with Ming 
officials at Guangzhou. In the first half of 1580, in fact, Chinese authorities incapable of 
defending the region on their own sought Landeiro’s help to get rid of Chinese pirates 
ravaging the settlements along the Pearl River. Macao’s merchants played an important 
military role within the South China Sea. Fighting the pirates, in fact, not only ensured 
the Portuguese presence in Macao and good diplomatic relations with Chinese 
authorities, but eliminated possible competitors and trade enemies. On the other hand, 
the Ming dynasty made good use of the Portuguese naval force, and at the same time 
held on to a precious commercial partner, who was filling China with huge quantities of 
silver needed to restore the finances of the empire. Landeiro, in other words, belonged 
to the most powerful and wealthy Macanese elite.182 This fact is highlighted also by 
another detail. As we said, he was the owner of the large ship that was wrecked near 
Formosa. This junk, captained by André Feio, was laden with most of the merchandise, 
silk in particular, the citizens of Macao had sent to Japan.183 The fact that the biggest 
stash of Macao’s merchandise had been loaded onto Landeiro’s junk instead of the nao 
do trato is undeniable proof of the Portuguese prominence within the Macanese 
community and of the lack of royal regulation for the voyage. At any rate, Landeiro’s 
main source of income generated from trade with southern Kyūshū. The Portuguese 
merchant was, in fact, a real asset for the Society of Jesus in Japan, where, apparently, 
he came to be known as the king of the Portuguese. 184  He not only granted safe 
passages from China to Kyūshū, but proved also to be a useful tool for the 
                                                                                                                                               
as Porto, yet the crown in 1595, 1596 and 1709 ratified the 1586-concession. See Boxer, Fidalgos no 
Extremo Oriente, pp. 20-21. It has been stated that it was in particular due to the fear of a Spanish 
intrusion in the commerce with China that the Macanese founded the Senado of Macao. Cf. Lourido, op. 
cit., p. 27 and bibliography cited therein. 
181 See for instance APO III, pp. 545-546: ‘por justos respeitos do bem comum dos moradores da cidade 
do Nome de Deos das partes da China, por esta minha ley mando e defendo que da publicação della em 
diante nenhuma pessoa de qualquer sorte e condição que seja naõ leue nem mande a Japão ceda alguma 
fora do contrato que se fizer na dita cidade, pelo grande perjuizo que os moradores della disso recebem, 
sob penna de ser perdida toda a ceda que for achada fora do dito contrato’. 
182 Cf. Sousa, op. cit., p. 31-38.  
183 At least in the first half othe 1580s, the Portuguese used to embark the silk for Japan in two different 
ships. Cf. Sumario, p. 336. 
184 See Relación, f. 21: ‘Y ansi los xapones donde el ba muchas bezes con sus navíos le llaman el Rey de 
los Portugueses.’ 
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evangelization of important Japanese daimyō. To better understand the relationship 
between a private trader and the Ignatians, however, we shall travel some years back in 
time, to the days of Fernão Mendes Pinto and the first Jesuits in Asia. 
 
II. 3. 1.    Frutos and Fructificatio: merchants and missionaries’ interplay 
In the second half of the 17th century, the Jesuit António Vieira (1608-1697), one 
of the most influent and known Ignatian scholars who worked in the Brazilian 
“vineyard”, wrote that if there were not merchants who went looking for earthly 
treasures in the East and West Indies, who would transport thither the preachers who 
take heavenly treasures? ‘Porque pelo fruto espiritual que vaõ fazer os Missionarios’, – 
he continued – ‘vem de lá os frutos temporaes’.185 The policy of the Portuguese Crown 
was described also by the soldier-chronicler, Diogo do Couto: ‘Os Reys de Portugal 
sempre pretenderão nesta conquista do Oriente unir tanto os dous poderes, spiritual e 
temporal, que em nenhum tempo se exercitasse um sem outro’. 186 The Florentine 
merchant Francesco Carletti could not agree more. In his Ragionamenti del Mio Viaggio 
Intorno al Mondo with regard to the Spaniards he wrote that ‘dove non sentono 
ricchezze, non vi si accostano, le quali servono per allettare li soldati a far la strada con 
l’arme a’ religiosi e a difenderli dalli barbari’. 187  The merging of geo-political, 
economic, and religious motivations was the core of the Padroado Real over the 
missionary activities outside Europe, but the relationship between the Roman Church 
and the mercantile world, or between God and Mammon, was much older than the 
Royal Patronage. Also from a philological point of view, in fact, Christianity has been 
drawing expressions from the trading lexicon since its oldest days. The notion of lucrum 
animarum (gain souls), for instance, is a concept of evangelical origin, 188 that was 
                                                 
185 Cf. Vieira, Historia do Futuro, pp. 274-275: ‘senaõ os interesses temporaes, que traz as náos da India 
por estes espirituaes, que levaõ, quando vem carregadas dos aromas, & especies aromaticas daquellas 
partes? [...] As vossas Missões são hum paraiso, de que se naõ colhem frutos de arvores, senão frutos de 
frutos: cum pomorum fructibus. Porque pelo fruto espiritual que vaõ fazer os Missionarios, vem de lá os 
frutos temporaes, com que Portugal se enriquece, & se vaõ faltando os segundos frutos, he porque 
tambem vaõ faltando os primeyros de que elles nascem’. 
186 Diogo do Couto, Década VI, Livro 4, cap. VII, f. 79 of the 1614 edition. Apud Boxer,“Missionaries 
and Merchants of Macao, 1557-1687”, p. 216. See also Ames, Renascent Empire? The House of 
Braganza and the Quest for Stability in Portuguese Monsoon Asia, ca. 1640-1683, pp. 59-60 
187 See Guglielminetti, Viaggiatori del Seicento, p. 14. 
188 1Cor. 9:19-22: ‘For whereas I was free as to all, I made myself the servant of all, that I might gain the 
more. And I became to the Jews, a Jew, that I might gain the Jews. To them that are under the law, as if I 
were under the law, (whereas myself was not under the law,) that I might gain them that were under the 
law. To them that were without the law, as if I were without the law, (whereas I was not without the law 
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revitalized between the 11th and 13th centuries along with the nascent of an eremitic and 
monastic religiosity. 189  This new type of religiosity aimed in particular at the 
evangelization and monasticization of the ecumene. It is in this specific context that the 
lexicons of fructificatio were born, lexicons that included the concept productivity 
meant both as spiritual – i.e. the growth in number and quality of the fideles – and 
material, which resulted from careful management of the monasteries’ estates.190  
This strict connection between God and Mammon was strongly felt also in the 
Asiatic seas. As we have just seen, António Vieira deemed ineluctable the interaction 
between merchants and missionaries in order for the Portuguese Crown to achieve 
results (frutos/fructificatio) both in economic and spiritual terms. The Society of Jesus, 
on its part, was obliged also to negotiate patronage, passage, and protection within the 
territories it was trying to proselytize. It has been stated, in fact, that the Society’s 
successes in the overseas missions depended on how well the missionaries were able to 
master the intricacies of what sociologists call the inter-organizational field,191 that is, 
the opportunities and constraints rising from the interplay among the major colonial 
agencies, which in Asia were represented surely by military authorities and various 
indigenous institutions, but also by the Padroado and the Padroazgo.192 
Notwithstanding Filipe’s several reassurances to his Portuguese subjects with 
regard to the indissolubility of the Portuguese monopoly of the Asiatic commercial 
trades, the crown’s prohibitions were seldom observed by both the Portuguese and 
Spanish communities.193 Likewise, the papacy in the 1580s had to deal actively with the 
evangelization of the Asiatic missions. In the 1580s, Pope Gregory XIII took several 
steps to return the control over the propagation of Christianity into the hands of the 
church. In order to free evangelization from the royal patronages, the pontiff started to 
                                                                                                                                               
of God, but was in the law of Christ,) that I might gain them that were without the law. To the weak I 
became weak, that I might gain the weak. I became all things to all men that I might save all’. 
189 The concept did not stop to inspire men of the cloth also in the second half of the 17th century. In the 
translator preface of a philosophical text printed in 1653, the anonymous author wrote to the Genoese’s 
Congregatione della Pietà ‘Oh di qual negotio sei Congreatione! doue i Paradisi sono tue Indie, le tue 
merci sono anime, I tuoi talenti sono virtù, il tuo tesoro è Dio’. Cf. Nieremberg, La Differenza Fra il 
Temporale, e L’Eterno, translator preface, n. pag.  
190 Cf. Todeschini, I Mercanti e il Tempio – La società cristiana e il circolo virtuoso della ricchezza fra 
Medioevo ed Età Moderna, p. 180, n. 74. 
191  With regard to this concept see Cropper (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Inter-Organizational 
Relations, Oxford Handbooks Online, 2008. 
192 Cf. Harris, “Jesuit Scientific Activity in the Overseas Missions, 1540–1773”, pp. 72-73. 
193 Between 1586 and 1598 the order was reiterated almost on a yearly basis: in 1586, 1587, 1590, 1591, 
1593, 1594, 1595, 1596, 1597 and 1598. See BPE, Cód. CXVI, 2-5, ff. 72-72v; APO III, pp. 80, 276-7, 
423-4, 482, 604, 670, and 869-70 and AGI, Patronato 25, R. 56. 
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think about a congregation of cardinals appointed ad conversionem infidelium. At the 
same time, he found in the Society of Jesus and its peculiar fourth vote circa missiones 
the perfect device to give back to Rome the control over the missions.194 Even though 
the patronages’ rights contemplated the selection of the missionaries to be sent to the 
Indies,195 on 28 January 1585, the pontiff issued the Bull Ex Pastoralis Officio through 
which he granted to the Society of Jesus the monopoly of the Japan and China missions. 
On his part, Filipe I, although in 1581 he invited the king of China to receive 
Augustinians and Franciscans missionaries in his empire, 196  in April 1585 he 
corroborated the wording of the bull with a real cédula, hence justifying the monopoly 
of the Society of Jesus in Japan.197 However, the following year, on 15 November 1586, 
the new Pope Sixtus V, a former Franciscan and not as fond of the Ignatians as Gregory 
XIII, issued the Brief Dum ad uberes fructus thus raising the custodia de San Gregorio 
Magno in the Philippines to a province with the right to start missions in China and 
other Asian countries.198 It is evident how secular and spiritual powers merged together 
in order to obtain mutual benefits. For instance, when the Brief Ex Pastoralis Officio 
was published in Manila in July 1586,199 the reaction of the Spanish community was 
unanimous:  
‘Sucedio tambien en el mesmo tiempo publicarse en las Filipinas un breve de Gregorio XIII 
de feliz recordaçion, en que (por causas que le movieron de mucha consideraçion e 
importançia) prohibe la entrada en Iapon al negocio delas almas alos religiosos que no fueron 
dela Compañía. Estas dos cosas parecieron pessadas assi alos seglares delas Filippinas 
(porque les cerrava la puerta de todo su trato y ganançia temporal) como alos Religiosos de 
otras Ordenes, por çerrarsela el Papa para el trato delas almas.’200 
                                                 
194 Cf. Prosperi, Tribunali della Coscienza – Inquisitori, Confessori, Missionari, pp. 578-581. 
195 Cf. Tamburello, “La crisi del Patronato cattolico portoghese nello scacchiere dell’Asia estremorientale 
nei secoli XVI-XVII”, p. 343. 
196 See AGI, Patronato 24, R. 54. 
197  Cf. BA, Cód. 51-VIII-18, ff. 240-240v. Apud Costa, “A Rivalidade Luso-Espanhola no Extremo 
Oriente e a Querela Missionológica no Japão”, pp. 518-519. The cédula was received and published in 
Goa on 12 April 1586. 
198 Cf. Correia, “A Apologia de Valignano e a Defesa do Padroado e dos Direitos da Coroa Portuguesa na 
Ásia Oriental”, p. 172. In the years following its publication, the Brief Dum ad uberes fructus would 
represent the basis upon which the Franciscans would found their claim upon the evangelization of Japan. 
This brief, in fact, made no mention whatsoever about Gregory XIII’s bull or the Japan mission. The lack 
of further clarification from Rome took the Friars Minors to play this ambiguity to their advantage by 
interpreting the brief as if it included both China and Japan. Cf. Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão e o 
Episcopado de D. Luís Cerqueira, pp. 210-211. 
199 The brief was published by the Jesuit Antonio Sedeño on 2 July. Cf. Bernard, op. cit., p. 114.  
200 See Apologia Societatis Contra Calumnias ipsi irrogatas a F. Joanne de Santa Maria Provinciali 
Franciscanorum in Indiis Occidentalibus, BNCR/FGes. 1246, f. 299v. The italic is ours. 
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Following the publication of an accusatory treatise against the Society of Jesus and the 
evangelization of Japan by the hand of Fray Martin de la Ascensión OFM in 1597, 201 
eminent Ignatians felt compelled to respond in kind. The most famous answer is 
Alessandro Valignano’s Apologia,202 since the Italian was the main target of the Friar 
Minor. However, responses appeared also in Europe. This quote, however, is taken from 
a memorandum that in 1599 was sent to Filipe II of Portugal by Baltasar Barreira, the 
procurator of the Portuguese Assistancy in the Spanish Court.203 Also from this small 
quote it appears clearly that missionaries and merchants were actually in the same boat, 
as the saying goes. Their aim was the same, the fructificatio, although different in specie, 
and they shared also the opponent, which was identified in the Portuguese patronage 
and in the Society of Jesus.  
The close relation between these two capital figures of the European expansion 
was even stronger in the first century of the Estado da Índia. It is certain that the 
Society’s overseas missions would have been impossible in the absence of private trade 
and colonial enterprises. Yet, it is also true that the strategic alliance with Jesuit 
missionaries was useful also for Portuguese merchants, who were for the most part 
practical people in need of scholars who could deal with Asian high officers, and who 
thus became necessary as soon as Portugal came into contact with advanced cultures, 
such as China and Japan. The very settlement of Macao appears to be ascribable to a 
partnership which was at the same time political, commercial and evangelical. Amongst 
the members of this enterprise, find place giant figures of 16th century European 
expansion and culture, such as the Portuguese merchant and writer Fernão Mendes 
                                                 
201 Cf. Tratado que os religiosos de S. Francisco espalharam em Goa em Baçaim no ano de 1598 contra 
os Padres da Companhia de Jesus que andam na conversão de Japão, Macau, 16 November 1597. 
BL/Add. 9858, ff. 61-80. A compilation of treatises written by Fray de la Ascención in ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
40. 
202 Apologia en la qual se responde a diversas calumnias q se escrivieran contra los PP. da la Compañía 
de Japon, y de la China. Autor el Padre Alexandre Vilignano [sic] Visitador de la misma Compañía in 
BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-58. Although it is a text well known and quoted, there are in particular two 
monographs that focus on the Apologia. Correia, A Concepção de Missionação na Apologia de 
Valignano. Estudo sobre a Presença Jesuíta e Franciscana no Japão (1587-1597) and Alessandro 
Valignano, Apologia de la Compañia de Jesus de Japon y China (1598), edited by Alvarez-Taladriz, 
Ōsaka (Eikodo), 1998. 
203 This particular office was created successively to the annexation of Portugal to Spain. This type of 
procurator was delegated to deal at court matters inherent the Portuguese Assistancy. The court 
displacement from Lisbon to Spain (Valladolid first and then from 1606 Madrid) and the centralized and 
bureaucratized nature of Filipe’s government obliged the Society to have a father at court in order to have 
its claims heard and answered. Cf. Zubillaga, “El Procurador de la Compañía de Jesús en la Corte de 
España”, pp. 1-4. 
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Pinto and the Navarre Jesuit Francisco Javier, the first Ignatian to set foot in Japan in 
1549.  
 
II. 3. 2.    First economic activities of the Society of Jesus in Asia 
It is in the 1550s that Macao started to gain prominence within the regular 
international commerce in the South China Sea. In 1554, the Portuguese reached an 
understanding with the Chinese to settle an exchange hub on the island of Sanchuan, 
some fifty miles to the southwest of Macao, but it was moved to Lampacau 
(Langpokao) in 1554. Although Lampacau remained their exchange hub until 1558 at 
least, from Western sources we know that Fernão Mendes Pinto and the vice-provincial 
of the Society of Jesus in India, Melchior Nunes Barreto, were in Macao around 
1555.204 There are, however, Chinese documents that state that Portuguese merchants 
had been in Macao since the early 1550s asking Chinese officers at Guangzhou to 
authorize the displacement of the settlement from Lampacau to Macao. According to 
Barreto this kind of request could come into being only after a thorough analysis of the 
physical and commercial geography of the mouth of the Pearl River, therefore after at 
least two decades of analysis and trading activities in the zone. In the mid-1550s, 
however, most of the Portuguese merchants in the South China Sea converged in the 
Lampacau-Macao axis and Macao began to emerge more as a permanent establishment 
than just a stop between Guangzhou and Japan.205  
The reasons that allowed Macao to become one of the most important 
commercial hubs of the Estado da Índia involve China, Japan, and the Portuguese 
trading community together. Since it is quite a complicated matter yet relevant to our 
work, a brief summary will be presented.  
In the mid-1540s, the Ming appointed a special officer in order to get rid of the 
illegal trade – Sino-Japanese for the most part, but with a relevant Portuguese and 
Asiatic participation – and of the piracy along the coasts of Fujian and Zhejiang. As a 
consequence of those naval raids, between 1547 and 1549 the international trading 
community that had gathered there was forced to move toward the mouth of the Pearl 
River. At the same time, a more private partnership, between Portuguese traders and one 
                                                 
204  See CE, I, ff. 32v-37. Cf. Boxer, Seventeenth Century Macau in Contemporary Documents and 
Illustrations, pp. 3-4, idem, Fidalgos, pp. 15-16 and Barreto, op. cit., pp. 16-17 and 25-28. 
205 Cf. Barreto, op. cit., pp. 31-34. 
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of the most influential Chinese merchant-pirate of his age, Wang Zhi, moved firstly to 
Hirado in Japan and some years later, in 1555, converged to Macao.206 While busy 
attempting to suppress piracy, the Ming had also inner problems to solve. The Middle 
Kingdom, in fact, was passing through a half-century of fiscal crisis. The transition 
between the 15th and 16th century saw the Ming cut to half legal silver production. 
Consequently, there was a shortage of the supply of silver needed by the government, 
which stimulated the growing trade with Japan in the second quarter of the 16th 
century.207 It was at that moment that China began the process that would lead it to be ‘a 
bomba aspirante do metal branco de todo o mundo’.208  
Yet, the commercial relations between the Ming and Japan were not exactly 
friendly. After Japan underwent the two unsuccesful Mongol invasions (1274 and 1281), 
the Japanese started to pay more attention to coastal defences and naval force and were 
no longer ready to admit that they were Chinese vassals. This situation got even worse 
due to Japan’s political disunity following the end of Kamakura Bakufu 209  and the 
division between the northern and southern courts during the so-called Nanbokuchō 
Jidai,210 when the Chinese had no official political counterpart in Japan with whom to 
establish a formal agreement. Also after the foundation of the Ashikaga Bakufu and the 
establishment of the kangō bōeki,211 Japan’s political status did not precisely fit with the 
Chinese tributary scheme. Yet, Ming’s persistence to establish friendly relations led 
Japan to send eleven tributary missions between 1433 and 1549. The Chinese, for their 
part, dispatched seven missions between 1404 and 1419, but then only one in 1534. 
Despite these numbers, however, the tributary voyage between the two empires was 
stopped three times in the 15th and 16th centuries: between 1453 and 1496, between 
1523 and 1539 and eventually ended with the last official embassy that left Japan in 
1547. Following the precious research of Wang Yi-T’ung, it is quite surprising that the 
Ming Dynasty tolerated official intercourse with Japan for so long. Besides wakō’s 
piracy, in fact, Japanese embassy personnel often behaved with outrageous insolence on 
Chinese soil, not respecting Ming’s instructions and threatening Chinese officers if 
Japanese requests were not met. This kind of misbehaviours always caused troubles and 
                                                 
206 Cf. Barreto, op. cit., pp. 81-84 , CHCh VII, pp. 494-495 and CHCh VIII, pp. 341-342.  
207 Cf. Brooks, op. cit., p. 94 
208 See Godinho, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 217. 
209 See Glossary. 
210 See Glossary. 
211 See Glossary. 
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the interruption of official exchanges, as happened between 1523 and 1539. Also when 
intercourse was renewed, uneasiness and mutual suspicion did not vanish. It seems that 
the interrumption of official intercourse, then, has to be ascribed to these three reasons: 
wakō’s plunderings, Japanese embassies’ disrespect for Chinese accepted custom and 
Japan’s unstable internal conditions.  
After 1453, and in particular following the chaos of the Ōnin wars (1467-1477), 
which basically gave birth to the Sengoku Jidai,212 there was a shift in the management 
of the embassies from the bakufu to influential families of western Honshū and Shikoku. 
In the ten years preceding the last embassy, trade with China had been conducted 
largely by the Ōuchi family at Hakata and the Hosokawa at Sakai.213 When the envoys 
sent by the two families, who were both self-proclaimed official embassadors, happened 
to meet in China, they often adopted violent behaviour which Ming officers interpreted 
as acts of piracy, therefore depriving them of the seal for official commerce. Given such 
chaotic circumstances, when the last Japanese embassy left China in 1549, the Ming 
decided to close official relations with Japan.214  
Alongside these intercourses, however, from the 1530s until at least the 1570s an 
illegal commerce between Japan and China flourished. The recent discovery of great 
silver deposits in Japan gave rise to a spontaneous illegal trade carried out both by 
Japanese smugglers and merchants from the provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian and 
Guangdong who sought to carry away the silver produced in Japan to China.215 As early 
as 1543, as is known, they were joined by the Portuguese,216 who were quick to learn 
                                                 
212 See Glossary. 
213 The Ōuchi family of Suō was a powerful family which established its rule in the western Honshū 
province since the early Kamakura period (1185-1333). During the Muromachi bakufu (c. 1336-1573), 
the Ōuchi were first appointed shugo of both Suō, today’s eastern part of the Yamaguchi Prefecture, and 
the neighbouring province of Nagato, and then by the 1420s of the northern Kyūshū provinces of Buzen 
and Chikuzen. Although, the family began to lose power and control over its territories owing to the Ōnin 
war, in the first half of the 16th century, the Ōuchi controlled not only these four provinces, but also the 
provinces of Iwami and Aki until 1551. An introductory essay about the Ōuchi is Matsuoka and Arnesen, 
“The Sengoku Daimyo of Western Japan: The Case of the Ōuchi”, pp. 64-100.  
214 Furthermore, a rebellion in the Ōuchi domain brought the family to its downfall and then to the loss of 
the official seal to commerce with China. Cf. Wang Yi-T’ing, Official Relations between China and 
Japan, 1368-1549, pp. 2-4 and pp. 60-81. Cf. also Matsuoka and Arnesen, op. cit., pp. 64-65 and Carioti, 
op. cit., pp. 26-29.  
215 Cf. Atwell, “International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy circa 1530-1650”, pp. 68-70; 
Brown, Money Economy in Medieval Japan. A Study in the Use of Coins, pp. 61-63, and Kobata, “The 
Production and Uses of Gold and Silver in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Japan”, pp. 251-253.  
216 With regard to the Portuguese arrival in Japan see Schurhammer, “O Descobrimento do Japão pelos 
Portugueses no Ano de 1543”, pp. 485-580; Arimizu, “Os Primórdios das Relações Históricas Luso-
Japonesas. Discussão sobre uma Hipótese de Intermediação dos Piratas Sino-Japoneses”, pp. 259-266 and 
Flores, “Os ‘Descobridores’ do Japão”, pp. 5-16. 
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how thorny the official relations between the Middle Kingdom and Japan were.217 As 
we know, after the Ming had tried to repress illegal trade on its Eastern coast, Wang Zhi 
took refuge in Hirado, a place the Portuguese acknowledged as the best harbour in 
Japan,218 and would frequent assiduously in the 1550s.219 According to Japanese studies, 
it seems that Wang Zhi established his first outpost in Kyūshū as early as 1542 upon 
invitation of the daimyō of Hizen, Matsuura Takanobu, who built his fortune upon trade 
with foreign countries. The Matsuura, however, were not the only ones involved in 
commercial activities. Their principal rivals were the Ōmura of Nagasaki. Between 
1560 and 1564 the two families fought to ensure the Portuguese vessels and their 
shipments of Chinese merchandises and firearms would anchor in their ports. It is likely 
that Wang Zhi acted as intermediary between Matsuura Takanobu and the Portuguese 
with whom he used to deal in China. Wang Zhi’s residence in Hirado, in fact, provided 
the perfect docking for the Portuguese, as well as an irreplaceable partner who helped 
them to open another place for affairs in Asia.220 
Yet, in the 1550s Portugal’s partnership with Wang Zhi started to represent a 
problem. On the one hand, the Portuguese did not want the Ming to treat them as pirates 
and, on the other hand, they did not want an intermediary with a fixed base in Japan. It 
is exactly in those years that Portuguese merchants started to settle in Macao, without 
official permission though. In order to obtain Chinese consent, they proved their loyalty 
to the Ming by siding with them in offensives against pirates and they also distanced 
themselves from Wang Zhi by establishing friendly relations with the Ōmura of 
Nagasaki. The Portuguese approach to the Ming dynasty, the Chinese need for silver 
and private economic interests in the international trades stressed the need for a free port 
in South-Eastern China that was not inextricably dependant to the Guangzhou fair. The 
Ming eventually responded to the Portuguese demands for a chão, a permanent 
                                                 
217 Cf. DI III 1553-1575, p. 319: ‘esta discordia de entre os chinas e japões é grande meio para os 
portugueses que quiserem ir ao Japão, porque como os chinas não vão lá para tratar com suas fazendas, 
têm grande meio os mercadores portugueses para lá fazerem seus proveitos temporais.’ 
218 Cf. CC, ff. 156-156v: ‘Firando, por ser terra de milhor porto que ha em Iapão, e quando os Portugueses 
vem a esta terra, a elle vem’. See also f. 137v, f. 142 and f. 177v. 
219  See Avisi Particolari Del’avviamento Che Iddio da alla Sva Chiesa Catholica Nell’Indie, et 
Spetialmente nelli Regni di Giappon, con informatione della China, Riceuuti dalli Padri della Compagnia 
Di IESV, questo Anno del 1558, pp. 22-24. 
220 For a more detailed account on Hirado’s history before and during the Portuguese presence, see Carioti, 
“Hirado, postazione internazionale dell’Estremo Oriente, nella I metà del secolo XVII”, in Il Giappone, 
vol. XXXVII, pp. 55-68 and vol. XXXVIII, pp. 47-67. 
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settlement, at Macao and in 1557 the City of the Name of God was born, in the same 
year of Wang Zhi’s surrender to the authorities.221  
With the establishment of Macao, the Estado da Índia finally set a fixed and 
secure foot in China. Before Macao was founded, however, we saw that the mouth of 
the Pearl River already functioned as an obligatory passage for the merchants who 
wanted to trade between China and Japan. At that moment, in fact, what the Portuguese 
were lacking was a port similar to Macao in Japan.222 
 In the Portuguese mercantile community established at Macao in the mid-1550s, 
we find examples of those faithful merchants who, as heirs of a mentality which was 
giving way to more practical and financial ways of life, sometimes put the lucrum 
animarum in front of their own gain. Fernão Mendes Pinto, a former novice himself 
who helped financially the Japan mission in the early days,223 Bartolomeu Vaz Landeiro, 
who lost a significant amount of money to help the fathers spreading Christianity in 
Kyūshū,224 and Duarte da Gama, who helped the mission with alms during the six years 
he was in Japan,225 may be included in this illuminated group. Although during the first 
decade of the proselytazion of Japan the sites frequented by the merchants and the 
missionaries did not exactly overlap,226 the importance of such traders is undeniable, but 
the same can also be said for the shrewdness of the missionaries within the 
aforementioned inter-organizational field. As we saw, the daimyō Matsuura Takanobu, 
and the likes of him, were willing to harbour the Portuguese ships in their domains. It 
was a secret to nobody that Japanese southern daimyō welcomed the first missionaries 
not so much out of sympathy with the Christian belief as from the economic benefits of 
                                                 
221 Cf. Carioti, op. cit., pp. 31-37. With the Portuguese settled at Macao, the commercial voyages to Japan 
finally consolidated in fixed stops. The concessionaires started the voyage in Goa, whence in April or 
May they sailed for Southeast Asia (Insulindia) where they bought spices. Afterwards, they had to go to 
Malacca to acquire the trading rights between Malacca and Macao. They normally arrived in China by the 
end of July. There they loaded their ships with merchandises and goods bought at the annual fair of 
Guangzhou, an operation that took enough time to let the monsoon end and then forced the ships to 
remain at Macao until the following year. 
222 Cf. Costa, Portugal e o Japão. O Século Namban, pp. 21-24. 
223 Fernão Mendes Pinto offered 300 ducats to Javier to build the first Jesuit residence and the first church 
in Yamaguchi. See DI III 1553-1557, p. 143 and Schurhammer, Francis Xavier. His Life, His Times, vol. 
IV: Japan (1549-1552), pp. 271-272. Before this help, Javier had already received from Pedro da Silva, 
Captain of Malacca, a quantity of pepper to sell in Japan, in order to maintain the missionaries and to 
build a church. Cf. Ruiz-de-Medina, “«El Trato del Japón» y los Jesuitas”, p. 313. 
224 Cf. Boxer, “Missionaries and Merchants of Macao, 1557-1687”, pp. 215-216 and Sousa, op. cit., pp. 
28-29. 
225 See CC, ff. 109-109v. 
226 During Javier’s years, the main centre of evangelization was in Yamaguchi, in Honshū, not in the 
southern island of Kyūshū. 
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the trade with the Portuguese.227 They had quickly and correctly identified the Jesuits as 
influent figures with the Portuguese merchants, but this comprehension worked also the 
other way around. Before Nagasaki became the terminal port of the Portuguese ships 
from China in 1571, the Jesuits tried to persuade the merchants to patronise the ports of 
those daimyō who were favourably inclined to their faith. 228 With the exception of 
Funai – where the mission started in 1553 and in 1555 a hospital was founded – 
between the 1550s and the 1560s the Ignatians suffered several setbacks. 229  The 
residences of Yamaguchi, Hakata and Hirado were shut down. As a matter of fact, in 
1558 Matsuura Takanobu, believing that the Portuguese would still visit his harbours 
even without him being a patron of the Christian faith, expelled the missionaries and 
they reacted by directing the ships to other territories.230 In 1561, while the Portuguese 
were seeking a port which could serve as a base both for commercial and evangelical 
enterprises,231 another daimyō, Ōmura Sumitada,232 entered the competition to harbour 
the trade with the foreigners. The Superior of the Japan Mission, Father Cosme de 
Torres knew that it was recommendable to find a place in North-Eastern Kyūshū, 
therefore he sent a brother to inspect the eastern coast of the island. Afterwards, an 
agreement between Sumitada and Cosme de Torres was reached. The Japanese lord not 
only accepted the proposal for opening trade with the Portuguese at Yokoseura (near the 
modern port of Sasebo), but, eager to found a Christian community in his fiefdom, he 
donated to the missionaries half of the port town, so that the Christians could reside 
there without any disturbances. Furthermore, he promised to share the incomes from the 
                                                 
227 Cf. HJ I, pp. 270 and 298-299. 
228 The description of the events in Bourdon, La Compagnie de Jésus et le Japon 1547-1570, pp. 420-431. 
See also Boxer, op. cit., p. 215 and CHJ IV, pp. 321-323. Between 1549 and 1571, the Portuguese ships 
arrived at Tanegashima, Hirado, Funai, Yokoseura, Satsuma, Fukada and Kuchinotsu. From 1571 
onwards, with just two exceptions in 1579 and 1582, both at Kuchinotsu, the ships from China always 
docked at Nagasaki. Cf. Lista dos annos, viagens, e Capitaes moores do trato de Jappão, in BA/JÁ, Cód. 
49-IV-66, ff. 41v-42v transcripted in Boxer, Fidalgos, pp. 273-276. 
229 Cf. Costa, op. cit., pp. 24-29. 
230  Cf. BNL/FG 4534, f. 112: ‘O remedio que humanamente se alcança [...] hé que não venhão 
Portugueses a este porto, porque tem grande proveito este senhor dos mercadores que lhe vem ao porto.’ 
231 Although, the Portuguese merchants had elected Hirado as the most suitable harbor in Kyūshū, in 1561 
following the murder of Captain Major Fernão de Sousa and his men in Hirado in front of a Shintō shrine, 
they had to move elsewhere. 
232 Ōmura Sumitada (1533-1587) was the second son of the daimyo of Arima, Haruzumi Sengan (1483-
1566), but was adopted by Ōmura Sumiaki (?-1551) when he was four years old in order to seal an 
alliance between the two families. In the 1570s, he was beleaguered and nearly destroyed by a 
confederation of external and internal enemies led by his own brother Arima Yoshisada (1521-1577) and 
by Ryūzōji Takanobu (1529-1584). Owing to the Ryūzōji’s expansionistic ambitions, Sumitada came into 
contact with the missionaries of the Society of Jesus, as he considered them as the means to come into 
possession of the Western military technology. Cf. Ribeiro, Samurais Cristãos. Os Jesuítas e a Nobreza 
Cristã do Sul do Japão no Século XVI, pp. 65-68. For a brief survey on the House of Ōmura see Elison, 
Deus Destroyed, pp. 88-91. 
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trade with the fathers and to exempt the Portuguese ships to pay the mooring fees.233 
Moreover, he accepted the Christian faith with the name of Dom Bartolomeu.234 Both in 
1562 and in 1563 the Portuguese dropped anchor in Yokoseura,235 but the idyll ended 
that very year. Owing to an uprising incited by Buddhist monks, the port of Yokoseura 
was turned into a heap of ashes. The confusion caused by the revolt, moreover, put the 
deals of that year in danger. Although the transactions had already been completed, in 
fact, the Japanese merchants were not able to check whether they had received as much 
silk as the quantity of silver they had paid. Apparently, the Portuguese tried to take 
advantage of the revolt to cheat the Bungo merchants, who did not react well. They 
killed some Portuguese and took the Jesuit Cosme de Torres and Luís Fróis prisoners. 
Eventually, however, the Portuguese paid off their debts and the Jesuits were freed.236 
 Although the situation ended well for both parties, the need for a safe port both 
for missionaries and for merchants became even more pressing and a solution was 
needed. In 1565, the Portuguese ship came back to Fukuda, also situated in Ōmura’s 
territory. In 1567, however, the Great Ship of Tristão Vaz de Veiga went to Kuchinotsu 
in Arima, which represented a hard economic blow for Sumitada. Apparently, in order 
not to see the incomes of the trade with the Portuguese slip through his fingers, Ōmura 
himself went to Kuchinotsu to confer Cosme de Torres. It is not clear whether Torres’s 
subsequent actions were consequential to Sumitada’s visit, still in that very year, the 
Spanish Jesuit sent Brother Luís de Almeida to proselytize the territory of a leading 
                                                 
233 Cf. CE, I, f. 109, Bourdon, op. cit., pp. 433-434, Fujita, Japan’s Encounter with Christianity. The 
Catholic Mission in Pre-Modern Japan, pp. 50-51 and Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 26-27. For a 
description of the port see CC, ff. 245v-246v. 
234 Cf. Bourdon, op. cit., pp. 419-452 and Costa, op. cit., pp. 29-30. Although it is commonly stated that 
Sumitada was the first daimyō to have received the Christian faith, this statement has to be specified. 
When Sumitada received the sacred sacrament in 1563, in fact, his rank was that of kokujin [Glossary], 
which in the Japanese hierarchy is a lower rank that the daimyō. As Valignano wrote: ‘En las partes de 
Shimo, en el señorio de las tierras de Omura, después de haber gastado algunos Padres cerca de trece años 
en Japón […], llegaron a estado que convirtieron a un kunishu llamado Omuradono, hermano del yakata 
[Glossary] o rey de Arima [Arima Yoshinao].’ Sumario, p. 272. As a matter of fact, it is highly probable 
that Sumitada wanted to acquire the Portuguese trade also to rise in rank. Valignano’s quote is also a good 
example of the change happened from the 1580s in Jesuit understanding and commucation of Japanese 
ranks and hierarchy. Before Valignano, in fact, the missionaries used European nomenclature (king, 
marquis, dukes…) to identify the Japanese hierarchy. Yet, Jesuit reports in the 1580s resorted to the use 
of Japanese words with the consequent disappearance of European titles. Cf. Pinto, “Japanese Elites as 
Seen By Jesuit Missionaries. Perceptions of Social and Political Inequality among the Elites”, pp. 32-33. 
235 In 1562, the Jesuits not only arranged for the Great Ship to come to Yokoseura, but also caused 
another nao and a Portuguese junk from Macao to be brought round from Hirado, where they had already 
berthed, to Sumitada’s harbor. Three more Portuguese ships visited Yokoseura in 1563. Cf. CHJ IV, pp. 
322-324. 
236 See Libro Primero del principio y progresso de la Religion christiana en Jappon, y dela especial 
providencia de que Nuestro Señor usa con aquella nueva Iglesia, BL/Add. 9857, ff. 100v-102v. 
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vassal of Sumitada.237 Along with D. Bartolomeu’s baptism, in fact, also his liege man 
Nagasaki Jinzaemon Sumikage received the sacrament and took the name of Bernardo. 
Bernardo’s domain was situated on a long promontory on the Hizen coast, whence his 
family probably took their name.238 Only two years later, in 1569, Father Gaspar Vilela 
was invited there to baptize Bernardo’s retainers and he also received the ground upon 
which a Buddhist temple – ‘um pagode’ – was erected to build a church, the famous 
Todos os Santos.239 These pieces of information all refer to Bernardo’s territory, which 
was a small castle-town, jōka-machi,240 about a kilometre and a half away from the 
harbour-city, which only came into being a couple of years later, both bearing the name 
Nagasaki. Japanese and European sources regarding the birth of this new town differ. 
The former, which were compiled in the late 18th century, state that in 1571 Ōmura sent 
a retainer by the name of Tomonaga Tsushima to lay out the plan of the town and it was 
on the basis of this survey that the core of the town was edified.241 The oldest European 
source, Luís Fróis’s História de Japam,242 on the other hand, asserts that through the 
suggestion of an imprecised father, D. Bartolomeu gave the promontory to divide 
among the Christians.243  
 Regardless of whether Nagasaki was a Civitas Lusitanorum or just a Japanese 
settlement with Portuguese influence, 244  the Jesuits had finally found the perfect 
situation. They received a territory from a converted lord where they could at the same 
time mend the Japanese Christendom gathered there and deal with the Portuguese 
merchants. Yet, in Nagasaki, the interaction between trading souls and trading goods 
                                                 
237 See CE, I, f. 252: ‘O anno passado [1567] mandou o Padre Cosme de Torres ao Irmão Luis Dalmeida a 
Nanguaçaqui o Senhor do qual vassallo de dom Bertolameu ja era Christão, onde o irmão fez muitos 
Christãos.’ See also f. 253v.  
238 Nagasaki (長い崎) literally means long point of land, long promontory. 
239 Cf. CE, I, f. 302v and Boxer, Christian Century, pp. 99-100. With regard to Nagasaki, its story and 
foundation as a Portuguese settlement see Pacheco, “The Founding of the Port of Nagasaki and its 
Cession to the Society of Jesus”, pp. 303-323, Curvelo, “Nagasaki, an European Artistic City in Early 
Modern Japan”, pp. 23-35 and Elison, “Nagasaki: The Early Years of an Early Modern Japanese City”, 
pp. 63-102. 
240 城下町 
241 Cf. Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 305-306 and Elison, op. cit., pp. 71-72. 
242 See HJ II, pp. 376-377. 
243 Fróis’ account is quite vague in details and this haziness might indicate lack of knowledge of the 
events in question. The sequence of the events, however, was described along the same lines also by 
Valignano in his Apologia, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-58, f. 74v and by Father Pedro Morejón as quoted in 
Sumario, I, p. 78, n. 52. 
244 The debate took place in Elison, op. cit., pp. 70-74 and in the review of the book where Elison’s essay 
is published by Oliveira e Costa in the e-Journal of Portuguese History, Vol.7, number 2, Winter 2009 
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Portuguese_Brazilian_Studies/ejph/html/issue14/html/jcosta.html 
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achieved a whole new level and this kind of symbiosis began with a man who united the 
two spheres in himself: Luís de Almeida.  
 Almeida was presumably born around 1525 in Lisbon, where he studied 
medicine and the humanities. He left for Goa in 1548 with the royal diploma to operate 
as a surgeon. In the Estado da Índia he engaged in business activities that took him to 
Malacca and, in 1553, to Hirado at the behest of the Portuguese trader-adventurer 
Duarte da Gama.245 In the mid-1550s, he was already quite known in Macao as one of 
the merchants involved with the Japan trade.246 In 1555, in fact, he went again to Hirado 
on board Duarte da Gama’s ship. By that time, he was already a patron of the Society of 
Jesus’s mission in Japan. In September, the Jesuit Baltasar Gago informed the confrères 
of the Portuguese Assistancy that Almeida had offered alms to a hospital for the poor in 
Bungo and sent 100 cruzados invested in musk (almíscar) to the Ignatians in Lisbon to 
have a retable made by artists there in Europe.247 Evidently, Almeida was not content 
with himself just helping the mission with his financial means, since in that year he 
started taking the spiritual exercises and began his novitiate.248 In 1556, he was received 
into the Society by Cosme de Torres, but was ordained as priest only in 1580 in 
Macao.249  
His deeds in Japan included in particular tireless evangelization, having visited 
almost all Jesuit territories in Japan, as well as the medical activity he carried out in the 
hospital of Funai.250 Yet, what interests us more is what he left behind when he began 
his novitiate. As Fróis wrote: 
‘Luiz de Almeida […] foi o primeiro portuguez que em Japão foi recebido, e tudo o que tinha 
deixou à Companhia para sostentação dos Padres e Irmãos, e remedio dos pobres christãos; 
porque não tinhão naquelle tempo os Padres outra couza mais, que as esmolas que os 
portuguezes lhe davão quando chegavão com seos navios a Japão, e do collegio de Goa erão 
providos do vinho das missas, seos vestidos, livros e alguns ornamentos.’251  
                                                 
245 Cf. Faria, “The Functions of Procurator in the Society of Jesus. Luís de Almeida, Procurator?”, p. 37 
and Bourdon, op. cit., pp. 305-306. 
246 Cf. Barreto, op. cit., p. 31. 
247 See CC, ff. 107-107v. 
248 See CC, ff. 108v-109. 
249 See HJ I, p. 59, n. 3. 
250  With regard to Almeida’s activity once he entered the Society of Jesus see Carvalho, “Luís de 
Almeida, medico, mercador e missionário no Japão”, pp. 105-122. See also DJ, pp. 30-31 and p. 47. 
251 See HJ I, pp. 59-60. 
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As confessed by Fróis, the Japan mission depended internally on the financial means of 
the College of Goa and externally on the alms and other economic aids from the 
Portuguese traders. As we saw, Almeida was one of those traders and his last deed as 
such was to bestow his fortune on the mission. Furthermore, in 1554 D. João III granted 
the Jesuits in Japan a royal donation of 500 cruzados252 to be paid out of the Malacca 
customs, 253 although this kind of help was often paid tardily. 254 Fortunately for the 
missionaries, there were also impromptu aids. In 1556, the Portuguese Brother Pero de 
Alcáçova received from the Governor of Malacca Francisco Barreto two casks of silk, 
which, according to Luís Fróis, would grant the Japan mission an income of almost 
1’000 cruzados.255  
At any rate, the Ignatians with a minimum of experience in Japan always 
complained about the scarcity of financial resources. They used to complain both about 
the officers of the crown in the Estado, who did not comply with their jobs, and about 
the great poverty of the Japanese, due to the continuous wars between lords. 256 
Although kirishitan daimyō 257  like Ōtomo Yoshishige 258  managed to offer the 
                                                 
252  In a later source – Catalogus Tertius Seu Redituum Provinciae Indicae – we see that the alms 
amounted to 600 pardaus de oro. See DI VIII 1569-1573, p. 481. One pardau de ouro was worth 360 
réis, but in the second half of the 16th century it fluctuated between 360 and 400 réis. The cruzado was a 
Portuguese golden coin, principally used in Asia as currency exchange, whose value was fixed at 400 réis 
in 1517. Cf. Martini, Manuale di metrologia ossia misure, pesi e monete in uso  attualmente e 
anticamente presso tutti i popoli , p. 279 and Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 313-314.   
253 Cf. Bourdon, op. cit., p. 374. Francis Javier wrote that he could afford to remain in Japan more than 
two years thanks to the ‘esmolas que ho cristianíssimo Rey de Portugal nos manda dar nestas partes’. 
Moreover, he added that when he left Lisbon for Goa, D. João III gave him ‘pasamte de mil cruzados’. 
See DJ, p. 311. 
254 In 1575, the year following his arrival in India, Alessandro Valignano complained with the general 
about the difficulty in collecting the subvention. Namely he wrote that ‘[l]e residenze che sono in Tanà et 
in Damano, con quelle di Coulam et della Costa di Travancor et Malacca, Malucco et Giappone vivono 
tutti d'una elemosina che li dà il Re di Portogallo ogn’anno, la quale, come che si ha da riscuotere da 
mano delli fattori et officiali de Sua Altezza, sono ordinariamente mal pagati et ci danno che fare’. See 
Alessandro Valignano to General Mercurian, Cochin, 4 December 1575. ARSI, Goa 47, ff. 42-58v. Quote 
in f. 45v. Transcripted in DI X 1575-1577, pp. 143-219. Four years later, he wrote again about this topic 
complaining that in the past six years the donation was issued not even in one occasion. See Valignano to 
Mercurian, Kuchinotsu, 5 December 1579. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 8 [I], f. 241. Sabino Sebastiano, from his part, 
criticized the fact that the secular officers who were supposed to deliver the subvention were not 
interested in doing so and neither were they zealous Christian believers. See DI XI 1577-1580, pp. 588-
589. 
255 See DI III 1553-1557, pp. 528-529. 
256 With regards to the poverty of the Japanese people, both low and highborn, Valignano dedicated a 
paragraph in the Sumario de las cosas que pertenecen a la Provincia de la Yndia Oriental. Namely, he 
wrote that the Japanese ‘[s]on assi mismo por una parte tan pobres que es cosa de espanto ver con quan 
poca cosa se sustentan aun los reyes y señores, los quales tienen de tal manera repartidas sus tierras entre 
sus vassallos que aunque son dellos en todo servidos sin hazer nengun gasto quedan todavía poca renta 
comunmente’. See Rego, Documentação para a História das Missões do Padroado Português do 
Oriente, vol. XII - Índia, p. 528. 
257 切支丹大名 
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missionaries annual revenues from their territories, the Japan mission always suffered 
from a pathological lack of financial means. For this reason the fortune the missionaries 
got hold of when Almeida became one of them was promptly and actively put at the 
service of the mission. 
According to Gaspar Vilela, Almeida handed over to Cosme de Torres the 
important sum of 2’500 cruzados.259 Torres could not ignore the critical situation of the 
finances of the mission; he knew that with just the royal alms he could not look after 
Christendom, however small it was at that time, and he was also aware that Almeida’s 
inheritance would not last forever. Hence, after having consulted with the former 
merchant, in 1557 he decided to invest the money, ‘para que crescendo os ganhos, 
podessen sostentar os operarios’.260 Also at that early stage of the Portuguese presence 
in Japan, the trade that guaranteed a secure and profitable income was the trato da seda, 
i.e. the silk trade which basically can be described as the exchange of Japanese silver for 
Chinese silk. The following description, drawn from Vilela’s letter to the General, 
shows us the earliest phase of the silk trade, that is before the armação contract was 
stipulated. Although the present work deals more specifically with an advanced stage of 
the trade, it is useful to be included it here, since it shows another example of the fervid 
                                                                                                                                               
258 Ōtomo Yoshishige Sōrin (1530-1587), son of Ōtomo Yoshiaki (1502-1550), was the daimyō of Bungo 
from 1550 to 1578, when he handed over the rule to his son, Yoshimune, and was baptized, on 28 August. 
He When he took over the domain, he ruled over two provinces, Bungo e Higo, but when he retired, 
Ōtomo’s domain included also Chikugo, Chikuzen and Buzen. He always kept a positive and helpful 
behaviour towards the Portuguese and the Jesuit missionaries. Cf. Schwade, “D.Francisco de Bungo e o 
seu projecto de fundar uma cidade cristã em Hyūga (Fiunga)”, pp. 41-48 and Schurhammer, “Ein 
fürstlicher Gönner des hl. Franz Xaver: Ôtomo Yoshishige, König von Bungo”, in Varia, Rome-Lisbon, 
1965, pp. 327-334. 
259 In the same year, Francisco Cabral wrote to Borja that Almeida’s contribution to the mission amounted 
to four or five thousand cruzados. Cabral’s letter is characterized by a strong criticism regarding the 
fathers participation in the trade and the use of silk robes, hence it not unlikely that he was exaggerating 
the numbers. Cf. Father Francisco Cabral to General Francisco de Borja, Nagasaki, 5 September 1571. 
ARSI, Jap. Sin. 7 [I], f. 21. However, in another source, an inquiry about whole the missionaries of the 
Indian province ordained by General Diego Laínez, with regard to Luís de Almeida we read that ‘levaria 
cinquo mil cruzados consigo. Fez lá [in Japan] esprital, casa, igrejas, e sostenta os padres [...]’. Cf. DJ, p. 
261. So, the doubt remains. Must we believe to Torres who was writing with the awareness of engaging in 
a forbidden practice and then might have sweeten the pill or should we trust a general inquiry redacted in 
Cochin and a critic who wrote fifteen years later? Be as it may, Almeida’s donation to the mission granted 
him the second place in the list of the benefactors of the Japan mission. See Titulo dos benfeitores 
principaes em Jappão, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, f. 98: ‘O Padre Luiz de Almeida foi tãobem hum dos 
primeios benfeitores de Jappão, o qual sendo mercador honrado e rico se meteo la em Jappão na 
Companhia e lhe deixou esmola quatro ou sinco mil taeis os quais andarão empregados na carreira de 
China para Jappão, e dos ganhos delles se sustentavão os Padres e ministros daquella Christandade por 
não terem outra couza de que se sustentar’. 
260 Cf. Father Gaspar Vilela to General Francisco de Borja, Goa, 3 November 1571. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 7 
[III], ff. 78-78v. 
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relation between those two agents of the Portuguese Crown in the Estado da Índia and 
the earliest involvement of the Society of Jesus: 
‘Todos os annos parte do porto de China hum navio caregado de seda [...] e miudezas261 para 
Japão, cuja capitania he dada por el rei de Portugal a alguns fidalgos por seus sirvisos  e que 
cada ano vai hum capitão novamente na nao que vai fazer a tal merqansia, do que tira ho 
capitão soo de huma viagen, com fretes a seu, 60 mil cruzados a mais.262 Neste navio que 
digo, vai ho dinheiro da Igreja entregue a hum Portugues que leva e tras a modo de feitor263 
este dinheiro, e vende-se toda a seda que vai na nao juntamente por mão de 4 mercadores [...]. 
Depois de vendida, ho dinheiro que nos cabe da seda que se vendeo se recolhe para 
sostentação dos Padres e Irmãos, a ho mais se torna a mandar a China.’264  
According to Vilela, the beginning of the Jesuits’ participation in the silk trade was 
conceived as a one-time solution, but it is certain that between 1556 and the 1570s the 
missionaries participated on more than one occasion.265 Torres saw Almeida’s donation 
as a great opportunity to raise the finances of the mission and the investment actually 
paid off. The 2’500 cruzados invested in silk generated an income of 18’000-20’000 
cruzados.266 At that time, the Japan mission belonged to the Society’s Indian province, 
which, on the one hand, meant that it had to maintain no colleges, seminars, or 
                                                 
261 See Glossary. 
262 Alessandro Valignano, some thirty years later, would write that from a ‘viage de Japon [se] saca 
quarenta o cincuenta mil ducados’ and would compare the incomes of a Japan voyage with that of a 
fortress. See Sumario, p. 340. Cf. also Boxer, Christian Century, p. 106. These numbers are not 
corroborated by Jan Huyghen Van Linschoten who in 1598 wrote that the Capitão-Mór of the Japan 
voyage might easily earn between 150 and 200’000 ducats. Cf. Boxer, Fidalgos, p. 19. Linschoten’s 
estimate, however, seems a bit exaggerated even if compared with what wrote the Italian Jesuit Celso 
Confalonieri in 1622: ‘a cidade sempre a comprou [the Japan voyage] a oito mil ducados e [...] este anno 
rendeo sesenta nove mil ducados de fletes aos renderos, e foy dos piores annos.’See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 18 
[I-II], f. 20. Takase in his article dedicated to the quantitative analysis of the Nagasaki-Macao trade 
demonstrated that there is no concordance throughout the documentation that covers almost the whole 
century of Portuguese presence in Japan. According to his study, which does not aim exactly to the 
quantification of the incomes of the Captain, the amount of investments made by the Portuguese in silk 
and other merchandises ranged from 400’000 ducats in the last quarter of the 16th century to more than 
1’000’000 in the first thirty years of the 17th century. Cf. Takase, マカオ=長崎間貿易の総取引高・生
糸取引量・生糸価格, pp. 51-60  
263 See Glossary. 
264 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 7 [III], ff. 78v-79. 
265 In the aftermath of Almeida’s donation, the Japan mission invested twice in the silk trade, in 1557 and 
in 1559. Cf. Luís de Almeida to Melchor Nunes Barreto, Funai, November 1559, in DJ, p. 227: ‘Nos, o 
anno que V. R. se de qua foi [1556], não mandámos nada á China. O segundo anno muito pouco. Só este 
anno se mandou.’ 
266 Vilela wrote two letters of the same tenor to General Borja, one in November 1571 and the other in 
January 1572. In the first one he claimed that the income amounted to 18’000 cruzados, whereas in 1572 
he wrote that ‘[f]oi este dinheiro creçendo, se vierão ajuntar 20 mill cruzados’. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 7 [III], f. 
88v. 
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probationary houses at its own expenses.267 On the other hand, however, the two-thirds 
of that income were redirected to the headquarters in Goa, and only 6’000 cruzados 
were utilized for the needs of Japan alone. Although the number of Jesuits in Japan 
from Javier’s arrival in 1549 to Vilela’s letter in 1571 never exceeded fifteen units,268 
6’000 cruzados would not last forever. By that time, the annual expenses of the mission 
amounted to 2’000 cruzados, for just eight residences and fifteen Jesuits,269 hence it was 
clear what the mission needed: steady financial help from Rome, Lisbon or Goa or to 
keep on with what Cosme de Torres started.270  
Participating in any trade whatsoever was an activity forbidden by the church 
from its very beginning. Later we will have the opportunity to face directly this topic, 
but even now we see what kind of attitude the missionaries took towards it. Vileva 
wrote this letter to Borja so that the general could ease his mind about the matter. Yet, 
as a matter of fact, criticism against Jesuits’ participation in the trade arrived soon after 
1556 and consequently Torres asked Provincial António de Quadros how they were 
supposed to proceed. 
News about Jesuit participation in the silk trade had already reached Europe, 
otherwise Vileva would not have written such detailed information. Moreover, we may 
also infer that what Vilela wrote did not correspond to the truth. Firstly, from his words 
a reader might gather that the investment happened only once. Furthermore, Vilela 
wrote that the Japan mission received 6’000 cruzados out of the total 18’000 and he also 
explained that the expenses amounted at 2’000 cruzados per year. It is true that in 1571 
the expenses were higher than in the 1550s, yet it is still hard to believe that they were 
able to endure fifteen years with just that capital. Probably they kept receiving alms 
from Portuguese merchants and Japanese converts, yet it is likely that the Society 
                                                 
267 To help us understand the expenses implied in being a territory per se there is an interesting document 
wrote in Macao in 1612 by the Italian Visitor Francesco Pasio. Pasio wrote a formula (recipe) to 
Acquaviva describing what kind of conditions had to be satisfied in order for someone to fund a 
residence. Namely, Pasio thought that the minimum amount of money needed were 1’000 taéis, that is 
1’500 cruzados, ‘dos quaes a metade se arriscaram pera com os ganhos della se sustentar a residencia e a 
outra metade ficara sem se arriscar, pera que perdendose huma metade, fique a outra.’ See Formula de 
aceçitar [sic] Residencias da Companhia em Japão e China, feita pello Padre Francisco Pasio Vizitador 
e approvada per N. R. P. G. Claudio, in RAH/Jes. Legajo 21, 9/7236 [I], ff.  
268 For a diachronic analysis of the number of Jesuit in Japan from the outset with Javier to Hideyoshi’s 
death in 1598, see Costa, “Os Jesuítas no Japão (1549-1598) – Uma análise estatística”, pp. 17-47.  
269 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 7 [III], ff. 78v-79. In the 1572-letter, maybe in the attempt of arousing sympathy in 
Rome, Vilela changed the expenses value a little bit: nine houses and three thousand cruzados per year. 
Cf. ARSI, ivi, f. 88v. 
270 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 7 [III], f. 88v. 
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engaged in the silk trade also during the 1560s. If it were not so, we would not be able 
to explain the following. 
The oldest information produced in Rome against the Jesuits and the silk trade is 
a letter written in 1567 by the third superior general to António de Quadros, which was 
probably conceived as response to the pontiff’s prohibition for all the missionary orders 
operating in the Portuguese padroado of engaging in any trade whatsoever.271 Similar 
prohibitions, moreover, had been established by the Portuguese Crown even before the 
Portuguese arrived in India. Since at least the reign of D. Afonso V in the 15th century 
Portuguese kings had forbidden both men of the cloth and fidalgos to engage in 
commercial activities under threat of excommunication, because ‘nom convem a seus 
estados’.272 The same prohibition was reproduced also in the Ordenações Manuelinas273 
and was also re-issued in the most important legislative code of the Catholic Monarchy, 
the Codigo Philippino.274 Although these are juridical texts, collections of laws inherent 
to the most different fields of the Portuguese and Spanish societies, also in here it 
appears a feature of the mentality that marked Europe from the Middle Ages until the 
Early Modern times: the consideration of commerce as a blameworthy activity and the 
consequent illicit act that came by being a part of it. Accordingly, during the reign of D. 
João III, the strong bond that tied House Avis to the commerce in the Flanders and in 
India appeared as something below the royal dignity. Partly due to difficult and 
erroneous economic managements and partly to the murmuring created by this kind of 
mentality, from the 1550s it can be noted a change in the royal policy with regard to the 
trade, namely the Portuguese factory in the Flanders shut down, there was a sensible 
decrease in tonnage of the ships engaged in the Cape route and the crown, in order to 
stimulate the participation of privateers in the commerce in the Estado da Índia, started 
to loose its strict control over the financial exchanges and established the system of 
concessions.275 Although at first the fidalgos preferred to sell their commercial rights to 
third parties in order to obtain lower, but ideologically unexceptionable, revenues, by 
                                                 
271 The prohibition was issued by Pope Pius IV on 4 October 1563. See Borges, The Economics of the 
Goa Jesuits 1542-1759. An Explanation of Their Rise and Fall, p. 58. 
272 See Ordenaçoens do Senhor Rey D. Affonso V, livro IV, titulo XXXXVII – Do Clerigo, ou Fidalgo, 
que compra pera reguatar, pp. 175-176 
273 See Ordenaçoens do Senhor Rey D. Manuel, livro IV, titulo XXXII – Do Fidalguo ou Creliguo ou 
qualquer outra pessoa que compra pera reguatar, pp. 78-80. 
274 See Codigo Philippino ou Ordenações e Leis do Reino de Portugal, livro IV, titulo XVI – Que os 
Clerigos e Fidalgos não comprem para regatar, p. 798. 
275 Cf. Costa, “O Império Português”, pp. 102-103 and Subrahmanyam, O Império Asiático Português, 
pp. 123-125. 
70 
 
the time the Habsburgs had entered in Lisbon the situation was rather different, as 
demonstrated by this text: 
‘Estes fidalgos, com esta sua tão apregoada nobreza, que parece não deveriam atender a outra 
coisa senão às armas e às letras – que são aquelas artes que detêm a primazia – são quase 
todos comerciantes, embora se mostrem inimigos mortais de tal nome, visto costumarem 
chamar comerciante a todo aquele que pretendem apelidar de pessoa baixa. E, no entanto, o 
que parece bem estranho, são comerciantes mais baixos do que tendeiros e a maior parte das 
riquezas que possuem ganharam-nas com o comércio’.276 
For the European nobility participating in commerce or handling money was considered 
an activity that did not befit to their status. Nevertheless, however, eventually the allure 
of the gain proved to be stronger than the old traditions.  
 The power that comes with the amassing of capitals was watched with disdain 
not only in Europe. Economy has always had a bad relationship with the laws and with 
who made those laws, notwithstanding the place or time. Pre-modern Japan, for instance, 
represents a further example.  
The foundation of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1603, would assure almost three 
centuries of peace throughout the Japanese archipelago with just the exception of the 
Ōsaka campaigns in 1614-1615, until the arrival of the U.S. Commodore Matthew C. 
Perry in 1853.277 Only two years after the shogunate was born, Tokugawa Ieyasu gave 
up the shōgun seat and assumed the title of ōgosho, retired shōgun.278 By doing that, on 
the one hand Ieyasu granted the inheritance of the title and dogdged commitments with 
the court; on the other hand, he was free to plan a socio-political order functional to the 
edification of a peaceful country, the so called bakuhan taisei. 279  The Tokugawa 
Bakufu, in particular through the deeds of the first two shōgun, yearned to find a social 
justification for samurai’s hierarchic supremacy during a period when swords and 
spears where no longer useful, at least in the battlefields. Since the Sengoku Jidai, in 
fact, public authority – kōgi280 – was maintained in particular through military power, 
but also through political legitimization in front of the traditional authority as 
                                                 
276 See “Uma descrição de Portugal em 1578-80”, apud NHP V, p. 324. 
277 With regard to the battle at the Ōsaka castle see Totman, Tokugawa Ieyasu Shogun, pp. 163-168. 
278 大御所 
279 Cf. Leupp, Servants, Shophands, and Laborers in the Cities of Tokugawa Japan, pp. 9-12. See also 
Glossary.  
280 公儀 
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symbolized by the office of the tennō and through the daimyō’s ability to acquire power 
by gaining access to sources of wealth within his domain. Yet, it was with Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi and the first Tokugawa’s shōgun,281 that the general recognition of the kōgi 
as a status was achieved.282 Since with the Tokugawa shogunate there was almost no 
need to demonstrate superior military force, the bakufu transformed the Japanese society 
in a “feudal” political system ‘that froze life, deplored all innovations and made rigid 
distinctions within a very complex hierarchy of status divisions among retainers’.283 The 
Japanese society, following Hideyoshi’s decrees of 1588,284 and 1591285, came to be 
divided into four hereditary status groups usefully called shinōkōchō, 286  with the 
merchants relegated to the last step of the social pyramid. The quadripartite society had 
its ideological foundation in the Neo-Confucian philosophy287, according to which the 
giri,288 the duty or social obligation, represented one of the fundamental principles. The 
chōnin, however, respected another principle, that of ninjō, 289  the human feelings. 
During the day, they hoarded cash, whereas at night they were the rich dwellers of the 
kuruwa,290 the authorized quarters of the city where the social distinctions did not count 
anymore and the only thing which could ensure anything was money, those capitals that 
samurai and nobles were not allowed to handle.  
Differently from Europe, then, where the change in mentality corresponded also 
to a change in attitude toward commercial activities and handling money, in Japan the 
rigidity of the society generated a situation in which the merchants were despised and 
often deprived of both rights and resources, yet they were still essential because apart 
for them nobody had access to financial capitals. 
                                                 
281 In the Japanese historiography this period corresponds roughly to early Kinsei 近世 period. It follows 
the Chūsei 中世 period and precedes the Kindai 近代. As to what years these periods correspond, 
Japanese historians did not reach an agreement yet. To get an impression of the different theories see Hall, 
Nagahara and Yamamura (eds.), op. cit., Introduction, pp. 11-14.  
282 With regard to this topic see Sasaki and Toby, “The Changing Rationale of Daimyo Control in the 
Emergence of the Bakuhan State”, pp. 271-294. 
283 See Maruyama, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, pp. 10-11. 
284 The “sword-hunt”, Katanagari 刀狩. For an analysis and the transcription of the edict see Berry, 
Hideyoshi, pp. 102-106 
285 The “warrior-peasant separation”, Heinō Bunri 兵農分離. Cf. Berry, op. cit., pp. 106-111. 
286 The locution is an abbreviation for bushi 武士 – the warrior elite, nōmin 農民 – farmers, shokunin 職
人 – craftsmen, and chōnin 町人 – merchants. 
287  Also called Zhu Xi philosophy (shushigaku 朱子学 ) from the name of its most important 
representative, the Chinese Zhu Xi (1130-1200), or simply Song philosophy (sōgaku 宋学) from the 
name of the Chinese dynasty (960-1279) when it was born. 
288 義理 
289 人情 
290 廓 
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We saw, then, what kind of relationship existed between the European laity and 
money. We can already foreshadow that for the men of the cloth the situation was even 
more complex. The aforementioned letter by General Borja, in fact, reads: ‘Ansi mismo 
de quanto nos descontenta el modo de sustentarse los nuestros en Japon con aquella 
grangearia poco segura, y menos edificativa; y como si ubiesse otra manera mas segura 
nos consolaramos todos’.291 He also wrote to Cosme de Torres, inquiring the Spaniard 
about rumours he had heard regarding fathers dressed in silk and engaged in 
commercial activities. The letters arrived in Japan in 1571 when the post of superior had 
already taken over by the former soldier Francisco Cabral. The Portuguese reported to 
the superior general how to the increasing participation in the silk trade corresponded 
pervasive laxity and the infringement of the vote of poverty.292  
Besides the unavoidable uneasiness regarding the involvement in a secular 
practice, both Rome and Lisbon grew worried about the financial situation of the 
mission. The 1570s was a busy decade in this regard. In January 1570, Borja invited the 
fresh-appointed visitor, Gonçalo Álvares, to use the Japan mission’s capital to buy 
estates in India, in order to stop the participation in the trade.293 The same year, D. 
Sebastião conceded to the mission an annuity of 500 pardaos in the Caranjá Island in 
Bassein.294 Exactly one year later, the Portuguese monarch corroborated this idea by 
granting the mission licence to buy real estate in India up to the value of 600’000 
réis,295 whereas on 26 February 1574 he augmented his grandfather’s subvention of 500 
cruzados paid in the Malaca customs to a perpetual annual alms of 1’000 cruzados for 
the foundation of a college in Japan.296 Between 1574 and 1584 the Ignatians in Japan 
bought three villages (aldeias) in the Province of the North in India,297 in order to derive 
income from the renting of lands and the management of granaries (Table 1).298 The 
                                                 
291 See General Francisco de Borja to Provincial António de Quadros, Rome, 8 October 1567. BA/JÁ, 
Cód. 49-IV-56, f. 198. See also Sumario, I, p. 42*. 
292 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 7 [I], f. 21. See also Sumario, I, pp. 42-43 and VMP, I, pp. 205-209. 
293 See DI VIII 1569-1573, p. 189. 
294 See Valignano’s Sumarjo de todos os colegios, e casas, rezidencias, e pessoas, rendas, e gastos, que 
tem a prouvincia da Companhia na India feito no anno de 1586, in BNCR/FGes. 1274, f. 12v. 
295 See DI VIII 1569-1573, pp. 406-407. 
296 The text in RAH/Jes. Legajo 21, 9/7236 [II], f. 959. 
297 Provincia do Norte was the name given to the Portuguese fortresses and claimed territories in northern 
India, namely Diu, Daman and Bassein. 
298 The three villages, situated in the island of Salsette, were Ponvém, bought in 1574 for 1’400 pardaos, 
Condotim, bought in 1577 for 4’000 pardaos and Mulgão, bought in 1584 for 5’000 pardaos. See Lista 
do que rendem as fazendas que os Padres da Provincia de Japam tem neste Norte nas quatro Aldeas de 
El Rey Dom Sebastiam da glorioza memoria passado no anno de 1571, AHU, Cód. 1659, ff. 143-148 and 
Titolo dos bens de raiz de Jappão, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, ff. 94v-97v. In addition to the three aldeias, 
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Caranjá revenue and two of the three villages were bought partly with the money the 
Goan College owed to the Japan mission and partly with the money Luís de Almeida 
handed over to Torres back in 1555, whereas the third aldeia came into Jesuit 
possession after Pope Gregory XIII with the Brief Mirabilia Dei conceded the annual 
allowance of 4’000 cruzados paid off the officii collectoriæ iurium Camere Apostolicæ 
in Hispanie regnis.299  
The royal licence issued by D. Sebastião in 1571 did not contrast the dictates of 
the Roman theology; yet Portuguese legislature had to pass through several stages 
before D. Sebastião could issue that licence. O Desejado’s permit, in fact, allowed the 
Japan mission to buy fazendas both normal and reguengas. The reguengos were those 
lands conquered and then incorporated within the royal possessions for which the tenant 
was supposed to pay an annual tribute, called foro, to the king. According to the 
Portuguese legislature, the Society of Jesus paid the foro for the aldeias it had acquired 
in the Province of the North, although initially the tax was deducted from the payments 
the Society received in the Malacca customs (see Tables 2 and 3). 
We have already alluded to the relationship between the faithful Christians and 
the trading world and more will come later. Commerce, however, was not the only 
inconvenient activity in which the Roman Church became involved. This topic started 
much before the Jesuit Japan mission was founded and it still stirs (apologetic) 
historiography.300 The Jesuit historian Serafim Leite, for example, wrote that the Roman 
Church ‘pode possuir bens, e sempre os possuiu’.301 As a matter of fact, during the 
                                                                                                                                               
there was another village, Mulgão, which was illegally incorporated within Jesuits’ estates. As a 
consequence, the Goan government placed the aldeia under scrutiny but the Society eventually won the 
controversy. See Teixeira, Baçaim e o seu Território: Polítca e Economia (1534-1665), pp. 338-339. 
Moreover, it would seem that the Ignatians came in possession of high-value territories, since the 
Portuguese community in Bassein made some complaints. In 1579, Valignano wrote to Mercurian to give 
to the general a detailed account on the finances of the Japan mission. With regard to the purchase of 
other aldeias he wrote that: ‘né meno si può comprare nell’India, perché ancora nell’India non se ritruova 
altra cosa stabile sotto la giurisdititone de S. A. che alcune ville nelle terre di Bazzaino, le quali sono si 
poche per li molti portughesi che ivi sono, che per comprare quel poco ch’ivi habbiamo si causò molta 
mormoratione, & molto scandalo, lamentandosi molti che noi occupavamo per noi tutta quella terra’. Cf. 
ARSI, Jap. Sin. 8 [I], f. 240v. For a wider description of Jesuits’ possessions in the Province of the North 
in the early and later modern era see Borges, “Jesuit Economic Interests in the Portuguese Province of the 
North till the mid-18th century”, pp. 49-56. For the incomes of the Japan mission from its outset to the 
mid 17th century see Rodrigues, “Local Sources of Funding for the Japanese Mission”, pp. 115-137. 
299 See BNCR/FGes. 1274, ff. 12v-13. For a list of the payments issued in Madrid from 1603 up to 1639 
see Registro de la recaudación de la renta pontificia para el Japon, que se paga en la Nunciatura 
madrileña, RAH/Cor. 9/2665, ff. 115-167v. 
300 See HCJBII IV, pp. 165-166. 
301 See HCJBII IV, p. 167. 
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Early Middle Ages the popes were the greatest landowners of all.302 By that time, the 
canon law began to allow land possession also to a high degree, but the problems arose 
when the secular powers mingled with Rome’s possessions and broke the 
ecclesiasticam immunitatem. With regard to this sensitive matter of jurisdiction, Pope 
Honorius III wrote an ‘epistula decretal’ decreting excommunicated anyone who just 
‘induzem costumes contra a liberdade Ecclesiastica’, 303  and the concept was later 
revived by Boniface VIII.304 With regard to the Portuguese Kingdom, several accords 
(concórdias) were signed between the reigning house and the Holy See in order to 
discipline such matters. The first concórdia we know of was signed between D. Sancho 
II and Pope Gregory IX on 25 November 1238, in which the king swore to ‘goardar, et 
pòr em execução os artigos da liberdade Ecclesiastica’.305 D. Sancho’s oath was not 
respected in its interity by King Dinis I, who, on 1 July 1317, declared that religious 
orders and monasteries were not allowed to inherit land properties, because it would be 
a detriment to the reign.306 The same was established by the first king of the House of 
Avis, D. João I, who also established that any property acquired without the king’s 
licence had to be handed over to the crown within a year from the issue of the charter.307 
Basically, D. João I was trying to ascertain through a juridical lens the amount of 
territory legally and illegally possessed by the church in Portugal, which then logically 
led to the incorporation within Avis’s territories of the illegal areas. At first, D. João I 
did not include the reguengos within the territories the church could possess. Some 
years later, however, João, along with the infant Duarte, signed a concórdia that 
                                                 
302 The Church first became a significant landowner during the pre-Carolingian period, from about the fall 
of Rome until the mid-eights century. This stage was followed by a threefold increase of those holdings 
from 751 until 825. During the third stage, centred in the 10th century, the first serious attacks upon 
Church property occurred. Some property was secularized, but such losses were often offset by additional 
generous donations of land. In the fourth stage, from the mid-tenth to the mid-eleventh century, the 
attrition of Church property was temporarily halted and even reversed, especially in Spain, southern 
France and, somewhat later, Italy. Cf. Herlihy, “Chuch Property on the European Continent, 701-1200”, 
pp. 81-105. 
303 See Parecer Sobre a Lei do Reino sobre esta Matéria de Imunidade Eclesiástica, ANTT/AJ, Livro 13, 
f. 103. 
304 Ivi, f. 108. 
305 See Raccolta di Concordati su Materie Ecclesiastiche tra la Santa Sede e le Autorità Civili, p. 59 and 
Parecer donde se intenta concluir que o Príncipe Secular não tem jurisdição sobre as pessoas e bens 
Ecclesiasticos, ANTT/AJ, Livro 13a, f. 196v.  
306 See Ordenações de D. Dinis, D. Afonso IV e D. João I sobre os Mosteiros e Igrejas não comprarem 
Rendas, ANTT/AJ, Livro 13, ff. 50-50v. 
307 Ibid. 
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extended the church rights also to those territories, 308  therefore enabling almost a 
century later D. Sebastião to give the 1571-licence. 
In addition to canon and Portuguese law, however, we have to take into account 
also the internal statute of the Society of Jesus, the Constitutions drawn up by Ignacio 
de Loyola. In a later emendation of the chapter regarding the ‘pobreza y cosas 
consiguientes á ella’ we read that only probationary houses and colleges were 
authorized to possess landed property.309 Yet, the Japan Mission/Vice-province owned 
estates, those in India we have just seen, but also, from the 17th century, in the 
kingdom.310 
At any rate, the earnings that came from Salsette were used to buy sacramental 
wine, oil and the provision (matalotage) for those missionaries en route from Goa to 
Japan.311 In the summary Alessandro Valignano wrote in Goa in 1586, we also find the 
total amount of expenditure in Portugal, India and Macao made on account of the Japan 
Vice-province. The Italian father wrote that that expenditure amounted to 1’072$000 
réis (2’680 cruzados), which alone represented almost one third of the whole income of 
the vice-province (3’303$000 réis, 8258 cruzados).312 
Between 1572 and 1573, however, the Society of Jesus lost two valuable 
members. First, the Superior General Francisco de Borja and then Gonçalo Álvares, 
who died en route for Japan in July 1573.313 Their replacements, in particular with 
                                                 
308 See Concordias feitas perante el Rey Dom João, e o Infante Dom Duarte seu filho e todos os Prelados 
de Portugal e Cabidos, ANTT/AJ, Livro 13, ff. 82v-84v. 
309 See Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Latinæ Et Hispanicæ Cum Earum Declarationibus, p. 189: ‘Alterar 
lo que toca á la pobreza sería alargar la mano á tener alguna renta ó posesion para el uso proprio, ó para 
Sacristía, ó para fábrica, ó para algun otro fin, fuera de lo que toca á los Colegios y Casas de probacion’. 
Cf. also HCJBI I, p. 41, and IV, pp. 165-168 and Alden, The Making of an Enterprise - The Society of 
Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire, and Beyond, 1540-1750, pp. 382-383. 
310 By 1635 the Japan Province and the Colleges of Old St. Paul’s, Bassein, Taná and Damão could claim 
the land revenues of 29 villages, district centres or village wards in the Northern Province. Situated in the 
southwestern part of Goa territory near the Salt River were three other villages whose income became 
vital to more than one Jesuit facility: the town of Assalona (modern Assolna) and its two neighbours, 
Velim and Ambelim. Despite these exceptions, the restriction to possess estates was not removed until 
1892 (24th General Congregation). Alden, ibid. With regard to estates in the kingdom, see Auto de posse, 
que tomou o P. Jorge de Gouvea como procurador de Japão das cazas da Cordoaria Velha, e das que 
estão a Sam Paulo, e das que estão na rua dos fornos iunto ao troco año 1615, ANTT/CJ, Maço 86, ff. 1-
4. 
311 See Rego, op. cit., p. 543 and BNCR/FGes. 1274, ff. 13v-14. 
312 See BNCR/FGes. 1274, f. 14v: ‘Somão as ojto adiçois de cima que se gastão em Portugal, na India, e 
na China, a conta de Japão [...] hum conto e setenta e quatro mil réis, os quais descontados dos tres contos 
trezentos e tres mil e nove centos réis, que somão as rendas de Japão, ficão dous contos duzentos e vjnta 
[sic] nove mil e nove çentos réis’. 
313 See DI VII 1566-1569, pp. 16*-17* and DI IX 1573-1575, p. 295.  
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regard to Álvares, would open a new phase in the history of the Society of Jesus and the 
evangelization of Asia that will take us closer to the main subject of this work. 
 
TABLE 1 
ACCOUNTS OF THE ALDEIAS IN THE PROVINCE OF THE NORTH  
BELONGING TO THE JAPAN MISSION BOUGHT AFTER THE 1571-ALVARÁ 
Village Revenues Expenses Net Yield Equivalence 
Ponvém 
434 pardaos,314 3 
larins315 and 16 
bazarucos316 
363 pardaos, 1 larim 
and 15 bazarucos 
70 pardaos,  
3 larins and  
1 bazarucos 
25$200 réis 
63 cruzados 
Condotim 
396 pardaos, 2 larins 
and 2 bazarucos 
206 pardaos, 3 larins 
and 7 bazarucos 
189 pardaos,  
3 larins and  
15 bazarucos 
68$000 réis 
170 cruzados 
Mulgão 
404 pardaos and 1 
larim 
310 pardaos, 3 larins 
and 7 bazarucos 
130 pardaos,  
2 larins and  
15 bazarucos 
46$800 réis 
117 cruzados 
Marol 
1480 pardaos, 3 
larins and 14 
bazarucos 
851 pardaos, 3 larins 
and 4 bazarucos 
728 pardaos,  
3 larins and  
10 bazarucos 
262$000 réis 
655 cruzados 
SUBTOTAL 
1020 pardaos  
and 3 larins 
367$200 réis 
918 cruzados 
 
 
Expenses for the  
procurator of the villages 
184 pardaos 
66$240 réis 
166 cruzados 
TOTAL 
836 pardaos, 
3 larins and  
1 bazaruco 
301’000 réis 
752 cruzados 
Source: Lista do que rendem as fazendas que os Padres da Provincia de Japam tem neste Norte nas 
quatro Aldeas de El Rey Dom Sebastiam da glorioza memoria passado no anno de 1571, AHU, Cód. 
1659, ff. 143-148 
 
                                                 
314 As specified earlier (see note 226), during the 16th century the pardao de oro had not a fixed valued, 
fluctuating between 360 and 400 réis. In this case, I made the equivalences by fixing the value at the 
minimum, i.e. 1 pardao de oro = 360 réis. 
315 The larim was a silver coin which was worth between 60 and 100 réis. See Glossario Luso-Asiático. 
In this case, four larins made for one pardao. 
316 Ancient small coin used in the Portuguese India with different values, but when first coined in 1510 it 
was worth two réis. It was made of different metals, such as copper, tin, and lead. See Glossario Luso-
Asiático. 
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TABLE 2.1 
REVENUES OF THE THREE ALDEIAS IN 1586 
Village Gross revenue Net revenue Equivalences 
Ponvém 280 pardaos 280 pardaos 
100$800 réis 
252 cruzados 
Condotim 480 pardaos 480 pardaos317 
172$800 réis 
432 cruzados 
Mulgão 650 pardaos 500 pardaos318 
180$000 réis 
450 cruzados 
TOTAL 1’410 pardaos 1’260 pardaos 
453$600 réis 
1134 cruzados 
Source: Alessandro Valignano, Sumarjo de todos os colegios, e casas, rezidencias, e pessoas, rendas, e 
gastos, que tem a prouvincia da Companhia na India feito no anno de 1586, BNCR/FGes. 1274, ff. 12v-
13v. 
 
TABLE 2.2 
REVENUES OF THE THREE ALDEIAS IN 1615 
Village Gross revenue Net revenue Equivalences 
Ponvém 564 pardaos, 1 larim 564 pardaos, 1 larim. 
203$100 réis 
508 cruzados 
Condotim 399 pardaos and 2 larins 399 pardaos and 2 larins 
144$000 réis 
360 cruzados 
Mulgão 
541 pardaos, 2 larins and 
20 bazarucos 
372 pardaos, 1 larim 
and 20 bazarucos 
134$000 réis 
335 cruzados 
TOTAL ca 1’505 pardaos ca 1’336 pardaos 
481$000 réis 
1202 cruzados 
Source: Titolo dos bens de raiz de Jappão, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, ff. 94v-97v. 
 
                                                 
317 The incomes from Ponvém and Condotim did not pay the foro. As I mentioned before, the foro was 
not collected because the respective value – 60 pardaos for Ponvém and 80 for Condotim – was levied on 
the 1’000 cruzados that the Society received in the Malaca customs. Cf. AHU, Cód. 1659, ff. 143-144 and 
BNCR/FGes. 1274, f. 12v. 
318 Valignano complained that out of the 650 pardaos of revenue, the Japan Vice-province had to pay 150 
pardaos as foro to the Basseim customs, although the Jesuits obtained an alvará stating that also that 
annuity should have been levied in Malacca. Yet, as appears clearly in Table 3, also twenty years later the 
situation would remain unchainged. Cf. BNCR/FGes. 1274, f. 13v. 
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II. 3. 3.    The Japan Jesuits and the armação contract 
In the summer of 1579, the Procurator of the Portuguese Assistancy in Lisbon, 
the Italian Sebastiano Sabino, wrote a worried epistle to General Everard Mercurian 
informing the Belgian about a habit that was infecting the Society of Jesus.319 Sabino 
was reporting what he had heard from Father Afonso Pacheco, the mission procurator 
sent to Europe to enlighten the Society about what kind of modifications had been 
conceived in and for the Province of India after the arrival of the new Visitor, 
Alessandro Valignano. Pacheco reported that the fathers in India, included the Father 
Superior in Japan Francisco Cabral, were akin to ask D. Henrique I a licence to buy a 
share of the silk which was sent yearly from Macao to Nagasaki. They believed it was 
easier for the province and less detrimental for the crown to acknowledge their 
participation in the silk trade instead of bestowing further donations, since the one they 
already had by the Portuguese kings was seldom collected.320 
 As showed earlier, the Curia Generalizia was already aware of the interference 
of the missionaries of the Society of Jesus in the Macao-Nagasaki trade. As a matter of 
fact, Gonçalo Álvares had been instructed to divert the incomes of the Japan mission 
towards those financial instruments that were considered licit means of earning by 
Rome. Owing to Álvares’s death, however, it was necessary to appoint rapidly a 
substitute. One of the principal duties assigned to Father Alessandro Valignano along 
with the appointment as ‘Visitatorem Societatis nostræ in universa India Orientali’321 
                                                 
319 See Procurator of the Portuguese Assistancy Sebastiano Sabino to General Everard Mercurian, Lisbon, 
20 August 1579. ARSI, Lus. 68, f. 227v: ‘mi pare si vada introducendo nella Compagnia, sotto alcun 
colore, simil peste de religione’. 
320 Sabino was informing Mercurian not only about the silk trade. The college of Santo Antão and the 
residence of São Roque, both in Lisbon, in fact, had previously received a royal permit to import from 
India cargos of indigo and other spices, as well as the exemption to pay the customs fees and the freight 
charges. ARSI, Ibid. See also Father Emmanuel Teixeira to General Franicsco Borja, Cochim, 10 
February 1571. ARSI, Goa 12 [I], f. 67v: ‘A cassa de São Roque de Lixboa ajudamos aqui quoanto 
podemos, em lhe negocear hum alvytre ou esmola que S. A. d’El-Rei de Portugal lhe faz pera ajuda do 
edifficio daquella cassa, e asi os ajudaremos quanto nós podermos enquoanto V. P. outra cousa não 
ordenar. Este ano de 70 largou S. A. o contrato que tinha das especearias a todas as pessoas que em 
Portugal lhe paguasem certos direitos. Escreverão-nos os Padres de Portugal lhe mandasemos 
empreguado todo o dinheiro que podesemos, como fizemos mandando-lhe hos mil pardaos que aqui 
tomamos a cambyo empregados com outro emprego que já estava feito. Mas com este largar das 
especiarias parece-lhes aos homens ficar já isto em puro tracto; e, conforme a iso, falão quá niso, e pode 
ser que ajudando-se de em Portugal andar a Companhia no paço. Se a V.P. parecer que isto pede avisar-se 
disto em Portugal pera que, se for posivel, mudar-se este alvitre ou esmola em outra cousa, como se ffez a 
dos Collegios de Coimbra e Santo Antão, parecia quá conveniente e quasi necessario, segundo o que 
vemos e ouvimos’. 
321 Patent of appointment in ARSI, Hist. Soc. 61, f. 3. See also Sumario, p. 9* and VMP, I, pp. 35-36. 
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was to look after the economic conditions of the India Province, along with the faculty 
to allow the silk trade or to put an end to it.322  
During the sea voyage from Cochin to Goa, Valignano wrote a long document in 
which he gave to Mercurian a summary account of the state of the province following 
point by point the general’s instruction he had received in Lisbon the year before 
(1574). They are a total of 32 points, which give us an idea of the subjects that appeared 
important to the head of the Society. The 22th point is the one regarding the silk trade, a 
matter that Valignano knew better than to face it alone.323 Yet, Valignano’s knowledge 
was based solely on what his fellows had written or informed him about, not on his own 
experience; hence he did not want to express any definite opinion.324  
Therefore, in December 1575, he gathered the most influent fathers of the 
province in Chorao to analyse several urgent issues. The 45th query (pregunta) regarded 
whether or not the Jesuits were to cease to participate both in the spice commerce in the 
Maluku Islands, in which was tangled up the College of São Roque in Lisbon, and in 
the trade between Macao and Nagasaki.325 With regard to the latter, although it was 
eventually decided that it was not advisable to modify anything before Valignano could 
judge the situation in loco, two opinions came out, one liberal and one orthodox. The 
former was supported by eleven out of thirteen fathers and basically stated that the 
commerce was to be allowed, provided that it was limited to the minimum necessary to 
maintain the missionaries, who were actually in need of further subventions beside the 
alms of 1’000 cruzados conceded by D. Sebastião.  
The liberal party added also a more practical point, which rebounded directly 
into the evangelization process since it included the passage from Macao to Japan. As 
we saw, the papist missionaries bound for Japan used to cross the Chinese Sea aboard 
the Portuguese Nao do Trato, a channel quite expensive, even for the ministers of God. 
Inside these carracks, there were specific and costly rooms (cámaras), where the 
passengers could put their belongings. However, the merchants were granted a cámara, 
whose size was accorded to the amount of fretes they paid on the loaded goods. The tax 
                                                 
322 See Apologia, f. 87: ‘Y en el año de 73 siendo yo embiado de Roma por nuesto P. General Everardo 
Mercuriano, por Visitador dela India, y Japon entre los otros puntamientos truxe este, es a saber que 
examinasse con mucha deligencia la preciosa necessidad que havia desta ayuda con faculdad de pirmitirla 
o quitarla en todo o em parte, conforme alo que pareciesse necessario’. 
323 See ARSI, Goa 47, ff. 42-58v and DI X 1575-1577, pp. 143-219. Cf. VMP, I, pp. 48-51. 
324 Cf. for instance what he wrote to General Mercurian in ARSI, Jap. Sin. 7 [I], f. 306.  
325 See ARSI, Goa 47, ff. 17-35v and DI X 1575-1577, pp. 228-313.  
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on the goods was never as expensive as the purchase of a cámara alone. Therefore, the 
Ignatians looked to the trade not only as a means of support but also as a cheaper way to 
reach Japan. Although it is likely that adding an economic reason in order to justify a 
dubious economic activity did not find favourable responses, also here it emerges how 
the economic management of the evangelization was one of the crucial points for its 
success. 
The orthodox faction, on the other hand, considered the meddling in the trade 
immoral and urged to abandon it as soon as possible. They preferred to slow the 
proselytazion by diminishing the quantity of the missionaries to an affordable number 
until other ways of financing the mission were found, instead of mingling in such unfit 
activities.326 
Valignano, for his part, felt compelled to explain his own position in a private 
letter to Mercurian. He confessed that he would rather line up with the orthodox party, 
yet he carefully avoided to express definitive statements and postponed any decision to 
the time when he could judge with his own eyes.327  
Nevertheless, he did not want to waste time either. Hence, he sent Mercurian the 
proceedings of the consulta at Chorao and a letter to Cabral in Japan asking the 
Portuguese several things, among which appeared also a request for delucidations about 
the silk trade. In order to provide judicious answers, Cabral convened a consultation in 
Kuchinotsu by the end of 1576. With regard to the capital needed in Japan, the meeting 
deliberated that 15’000 cruzados per year would be enough to cover both the 
missionaries’ (5’000 cruzados) and the buildings’ expenses (10’000 cruzados). 
Furthermore, the fathers complained about how uncertain the royal subvention in 
Malacca was and concluded by stating that the mission would be better off if it could 
have a fixed share of 90 picols328 of silk in the trade with Macao.329  
The general idea that came out of Kuchinotsu was shared also by Francisco 
Cabral. During his first ten years in Japan, Cabral stressed in more than one occasion 
                                                 
326 Cf. ARSI, Goa 47, ff. 30-30v and DI X 1575-1577, pp. 294-295. 
327 See Visitor Alessandro Valignano to General Everard Mercurian, Chorao, 30 December 1575. ARSI, 
Goa 47, ff. 103-108v. Quotation in f. 107: ‘Quanto al tratto della Cina sto in dubbio per le lettere che di là 
scrivono; tuttavia mi par megliore la 2da opinione, ma non si farà mutatione finché habbi visitato quelle 
parti, benché, come già scrissi, al presente il tratto è nullo o molto poco, perché persero tutto il capitale’. 
See also DI X 1575-1577, pp. 360-387. 
328 See Glossary. 
329 Cf. Sumario, pp. 42*-43* and VMP, I, pp. 229-230. 
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that financial support was even more urgent than to have more missionaries and he also 
solicited Valignano not to send more missionaries until a stable income was found.330 
Once Valignano had received both Kuchinotsu’s answers to his questionnaire 
and Cabral’s letter, he forwarded them to Rome, where they arrived by the end of 1578. 
The answer provided by Mercurian roughly exemplifies the attitude the Curia would 
maintain during the years towards the silk trade: at first a strong objection, then, after 
having received further data about it a more rational opening.331 The general, in fact, 
had already sent his answers to the proceedings of the consultation of Chorao and he 
had proved to be contrary to the participation of the Society in any trade whatsoever. 
Yet, when he received Cabral’s letter to Valignano and the records of the Kuchinotsu 
meeting he wrote: 
‘Quanto al trato delos nuestros de Iapon, me occurre dizir a V. R. que aunque en las 
respuestas dela congregacion se determino que del todo se quitasse, todavia vistas las 
razones que el Padre Francisco Cabral escrive en su carta a V. R., me parece que pueda 
suspender la execucion hasta otro aviso nuestro que daremos luego que ternemos 
informacion de V. R. acerca de lo que iuzga de ver se hazer en el dicho negocio’.332  
Valignano only received Mercurian’s answers in 1580, when he had already reached 
Japan.333 As a matter of fact, after leaving Goa, the visitor spent ten months in Malacca, 
and eventually arrived in Macao on 6 September 1578.334 There, in the Portuguese 
entrepôt, the Italian changed radically his opinion about the Jesuits’ participation in the 
trade and he also moved the first official steps for that participation to be acknowledged 
by the Macao’s mercantile community and eventually by the political and religious 
authorities in Europe. 
 It did not take long for the Italian Jesuit to evaluate objectively in what 
conditions the Japan mission was. Although in Chorao he aligned himself with the 
group of Jesuits opposite to the commerce, three months in Macao were enough to make 
him change his mind. To be precise, in a letter to Mercurian written in December he 
wrote that unless the alms for the mission would be as high as six or eight thousand 
                                                 
330 See Father Cabral to General Mercurian, Nagasaki, 1578. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 8 [I], ff. 201-204v. 
331 Cf. Cousas que pertencem à Vice-Provincia do Jappão, BPE, Cód. CXVI/2-11, n.º 44, pp. 7-8. A copy 
of this document also in BL/Add. 9860, ff. 265-268. 
332 See General Mercurian to Visitor Valignano, Rome, 4 December 1578. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 3, f. 2v. 
333 Cf. Sumario, p. 42*. 
334 Cf. VMP, I, pp. 36-37. 
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cruzados per year, it would be impossible to step out of the silk trade. Japan – 
Valignano wrote – was a country weakened and impoverished by civil wars, whose 
endemic poverty obliged the fathers to sustain on their own the heavy burdens of the 
mission, such as the expenditures of each residence, churches’ ornaments, alms to the 
poor and presents to daimyō and other lords, who ‘no hazen ninguna cosa sino por 
interes’.335 According to Valignano, the fathers in Japan were in need of about 6-8’000 
cruzados per year, which although represents almost a half less than what established in 
Kuchinotsu two years before, the visitor would more or less confirm this assessment 
also after he had spent more than a year in Japan.336 Notwithstanding this difference, 
however, also Valignano came to the conclusion that participating in the silk trade was 
inevitable, since, as he said, the Japan Jesuits were ‘fundati nell’aere’,337 that is to say 
that they completely lacked financial stability. It is around this time that the Italian gave 
the first apology of their involvement: 
‘[E]mbian los Padres por sus procuradores forasteros cada anno ocho o diez mil cruzados a 
comprar ceda aqui em la China, la qual se viende despues en Japon con la ceda delos otros, 
de que va a Japon cada anno cargada una nave, y con las ganancias deste caudal hazen los 
Padres todos aquellos gastos, y aunque esto todo lo saben todos los Portugueses, toman lo 
bien, porque ven claramente que no se puede dotra manera aquella Cristandad conservar y 
que lo menos que se gasta es con los Padres, los quales viven en Japon muy parcamiente, y 
aumque este modo de tratar es muy contrario ala professio de religiosos, todavia neste caso, 
parece que cede el Jus politico al natural y ala caridad cristiana, porque realmiente no se 
puede la cristianidad desta manera conservar, y por esto el tratar de quitar este trato no 
puede ser sino alcamçandose primeiro modo y renta para se poder sustentar.’338 
There is a part of this quote in particular that merits our attention. Before entering the 
Society of Jesus in 1566, Alessandro Valignano had acquired the doctorate in utroque 
iure at the University of Padua in 1557 and being a jurisconsult would marked his 
                                                 
335 See Visitor Valignano to General Mercurian, Macao, 1 December 1578. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 8 [I], ff. 213-
216v. Quote in f. 215. 
336 On 5 December 1579 he wrote that the Japan mission needed at least 6’000 cruzados, whereas in 1580 
he slightly raised the bar by stating that the minimum amount of money needed amounted to 7’000 
cruzados. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 8 [I], f. 240v and f. 273v. 
337 Ibid. Valignano probably took the inspiration for this expression by contrasting it to the parable where 
Jesus, to explain the importance of listening and put into practice, compares and contrasts two builders: 
one wise and one foolish emphasizing how important is to have a strong foundation. Matthew, 7:24-26: 
‘Every one therefore that heareth these my words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man that built 
his house upon a rock. And the rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and they beat upon that 
house, and it fell not, for it was founded on a rock. And every one that heareth these my words, and doth 
them not, shall be like a foolish man that built his house upon the sand’. 
338 Ibid., ff. 215-215v. 
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activity as visitor in Asia.339 In this specific case, in fact, he was more worried about the 
civil repercussions of their participation in the trade rather than the infringement of a 
complex theological system. In other words, it looks like that when it came to deal with 
such secular matters Valignano’s juridical background was more compelling to him 
than his religious side. As a matter of fact, he acknowledged that participating in the silk 
trade was unbefit for men of the cloth, yet the shortage of incomes caused the ius 
positivum (man-made laws) to fall in front of the ius naturale, i.e. those natural laws 
that provide an objective reference that allows us to determine whether our decisions 
and actions are right or wrong and thus moral and the Christian carity.  
As shown above, since the 15th century the Portuguese Crown had been 
prohibiting the nobility and the clergy as well from involving in commercial activities 
and the same law continued to be enacted also during o tempo dos Filipes. We saw that 
Valignano received from Mercurian the authority to sanction the participation in the 
trade, hence in this letter his intention was not to bend the canon law, rather to suggest 
that the civil law was subordinated to necessity, not the other way around.  
If, on the one hand, Valignano did not want to go against the virtue of 
obedience, which for the Ignatian Order was irrespective of wheter it was the civil or the 
ecclesiastical polity,340 on the other hand for the Italian and the Jesuits lato sensu there 
was a hierarchy also between ius and lex, with the former as prior. Although the two 
were normally treated as interchangeable, unlike lex, ius was permeated with the generic 
notion of what is right. It would seem that Valignano used this ius-lex scheme to 
describe the interaction between ius naturale and ius positivum.341  
In this specific case, Valignano wanted to grant to the community of Jesuit 
missionaries what in the Thomist universe is called securitas (safety) or salus (welfare), 
a condition that was also called the common good. The Jesuit philosopher Francisco 
                                                 
339 Cf. Sumario, pp. 4*-5* and Luca, “Alessandro Valignano: Un Profilo”, pp. 43-44. 
340 The Ignatians basically followed the Fourth Commandment, which was understood to include not only 
the duties of children to their parents but the duty of all inferiors to obey their superiors. According to this 
interpretation, the Jesuits were ‘likewise commaunded to carrye the like love, obedience, and reverence to 
our spiritual fathers, and to al our Superiors; as be Bishops, priests, religious men, and prelates of the 
Church; kings, princes and secular powers […]. Hereby are also al parentes and superiours warned, what 
love and special care they are bound to carry towards their children, and to al such as be their subjects’. 
See Gabriel Loarte, The Exercise of a Christian Life, apud Höpfl, op. cit., p. 53. It would seem that this 
feature of the Society was a collateral cause of the nationalistic rivalries that plagued the Jesuits in the 
Estado da Índia, which will be part of the third chapter. 
341 Cf. Höpfl, op. cit., pp. 263-270. 
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Suárez, for instance, described it as a community where individuals should be able to 
live in peace and justice, with such a sufficiency of worldly goods as the preservation 
and convenience of bodily life demands.342 Judging from these quotes, it does not seem 
preposterous to think that this was the philosophical basis upon which Alessandro 
Valignano planned his next moves. 
Although he spent less than a year in Macao, Valignano concluded an agreement 
with the mercantile community for the formal participation of the Japan Jesuits in the 
Macao-Nagasaki silk trade, the so called armação (o armación) contract. 343  The 
armação was a type of commercial contract known in Europe as commenda. The 
commenda was the dominant institutional form of conducting long-distance trade from 
the Early Middle Ages, when its use became widespread in the Mediterranean, until the 
early seventeenth century, when it was gradually replaced by the rise of joint stock 
companies in Europe, such as the English and Dutch East India Companies. The basic 
economic features of the commenda contract included a sedentary investor 
(commendator) who delivered capital or goods into the possession of a travelling 
associate (tractator). If the tractator invested capital of his own to that of the 
commendator, the contract is commonly referred to as societas maris or bilateral 
commenda. The tractator, then, took the capital away with him, generally overseas, and 
on expiration of the time or voyages specified in the agreement made between the 
parties, he returned to the home port to render account and divide the profits with the 
commendator. The proftis were divided according to a ratio agreed upon in the original 
contract.344 
With regard to the silk trade there are several documents, since a large number 
of missionaries spent some ink writing about it. Unfortunately, the original papers of the 
contract which were preserved in the archive of the city are no longer available. Yet, 
there are three manuscript sources in particular that had been helping historians to put 
the pieces together. Namely, in chronological order: 
                                                 
342 Cf. Francisco Suárez, Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore in Decem Libros Distributus, pars III, 
cap. II.7, apud Höpfl, op. cit., p. 284. 
343 See Apologia, ff. 87-87v. 
344 Cf. CEHE, pp. 49-53 and Pryor, “The Originis of the Commenda Contract”, pp. 5-8.  
86 
 
1. Apologia en la qual se responde a diversas calumnias que se escrivieran contra 
los PP. de la Compañía de Japon, y de la China.345  
2. Informação da armação ou contrato da Companhia em que os moradores de 
Amacao mandão a sau çeda a Japão.346 
3. Informação do trato que temos da China e Japão.347 
It is not clear when the silk trade between Guangdong and southern Japan 
exactly started. On the other hand, it is likely that Portuguese merchants started to 
import Chinese silk soon after their arrival at Tanegashima, otherwise it would be 
difficult to explain why, as early as 1556, the Jesuits believed the silk trade to be such a 
profitable commerce. 
The armação, however, is a further development of the silk trade. As we saw, 
the Portuguese Crown started to grant concessions to privateers to trade in the Estado 
from the 1550s onwards. In the first phase of the Macao-Nagasaki trade, those who 
received the crown appointment to make the voyage to Japan went on their own ships 
from Goa or Malacca to Macao, where they negotiated with local merchants the 
percentage of freight charges (fretes) they were to receive for the transportation of the 
silk. Each of the merchants would then load the goods he could send, with silk as the 
first choice. This commercial scheme, however, had a big flaw. Those who were part of 
the initial freight contract, in fact, were allowed to load their merchandises before the 
others. The captains, in order to obtain the highest percentage of freight dues, privileged 
to make deals with Macao’s wealthiest merchants, a group of not even fifteen persons, 
who were therefore allowed and had the capital to load almost all the silk Japan needed. 
Consequently, the less wealthy were left only with less profitable merchandises 
(miudezas348) and without the high-profit game. The inequity of this scheme along with 
                                                 
345 See Abbreviations. 
346 Father Manoel Dias to General Acquaviva, Macao, 18 April 1610. ARSI, Jap. Sin 14 [I], ff. 341-342. 
Another copy in APTCJ, Caja 102, n.° 19 
347 Eminent fathers of the Japan Province to General Muzio Vitelleschi. Macao, 10 February 1620. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin. 45 [I], ff. 234-237v. Except where otherwise stated, all the information provided about the 
armação comes from these three sources. With regard to the armação contract, beside the manuscript 
documentation provided, see Cooper, “The Mechanics of the Macao-Nagasaki Silk Trade”, pp. 423-433, 
although the Jesuit historian limited his work to a brief historical introduction and then he went straight 
on to the translation of Manoel Dias’s manuscript. For a shorter explanation of the armação contract see 
also Boxer, Christian Century, pp. 117-121, Moran, The Japanese and the Jesuits. Alessandro Valignano 
in sixteenth-century Japan, pp. 117-128 and Sousa, op. cit., pp. 19-22.  
348 See Glossary. 
87 
 
the growth of the city gave birth to general discontent and in the 1570s led the Patriarch 
Melchior Carneiro, who at that time was acting as bispo de anel for Macao, since the 
Macanese bishopric would be created only by the end of the decade, to try and organize 
a way to distribute with equity the investments and, in particular, the profits from those 
commercial journeys. Hence, the silk shipped to Japan started to be sent by corporate 
agreement ‘em que todos, pobres, laicos’ – the socially disfavoured and the institutions 
such as the Misericórdia, as well – ‘metessem seu pouco, e a este contrato chamão aqui 
armação’,349 and the share of silk allotted to each merchant was called the bague.350 
For negotiations in the sale of merchandise to run smoothly, in due time the  
eldermen who administered the city (Vereadores) met with all its residents and they all 
elected three men as their procurators (commendatores) in order to draw up the 
armação contract with the captain of the voyage (tractator) on behalf of all the people. 
Often enough, the elected were the eldermen themselves and they were appointed in 
particular to accomplish numerous tasks. Through the listing of these tasks, the 
mechanism of the whole Japan trade will appear clearly:351  
1. After they have assessed the amount of silk it could be sold in Japan at high 
profit margin, they were supposed to arrange with the captain on the amount of 
silk to be laden on the ship and they will pay him a 10% freight rate, provided 
that the captain will not carry in his carrack more than the contracted amount of 
silk, under penalty of a certum quid. In order to recompensate him for the 
possible loss and to discourage him from not respecting that condition, he would 
receive another payment from the citizens called alças, which fluctuated 
between three and four thousand cruzados. Another condition stipulated that 
even if the merchants of Macau were not able to collect the amount of silk 
assessed by the procurators and agreed upon in the armação contract, the city 
                                                 
349 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 341. The meaning of the Portuguese word armação is not directly linked 
to the trading business. Its use in this specific field would seem to derive from the expression: found a 
company por armação, which means that the merchants involved in a common trade were given the 
opportunity to arm of their own accord the ships they will be using without any intromission by the 
officers of the crown. This kind of contract was also used as a way to improve the defenses of the 
shipments from the attacks of Dutch and English vessels, as suggested by the Viceroy Dom Miguel de 
Noronha in October 1633. Cf. Carta De El-Rei [Filipe III] to the Viceroy of India, Lisbon, 20 December 
1633. Livro das Monções 18 (1633), f. 106.  
350 See Glossary. 
351 The following list is taken both from Manoel Dias’s letter and from the Informação of 1620. The 
bibliography consulted regarding the armação, in fact, relied exclusively on Dias, whereas farther and 
detailed information are to be found in the source from 1620. 
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had to pay the fretes on all the the amount of silk agreed in the armação, not on 
the factual amount of silk laded. 
2. The procurators, then, had to divide the amount of silk among all the 
Portuguese men in the city and some foreigners.352 The allocation of the share 
was based on the capital and the expenses of each merchant, who was 
calculated as a household. Ideally, the bague assigned to a household was 
supposed to yield revenue sufficient to support the family for a year in keeping 
with his station. Although the maximum quote per merchant was 12 picols, we 
will see that the Society of Jesus was an exception. 
3. The same elected procurators made also a rough estimate of the public expenses 
incurred by the city in the yearly transaction, so that the participants in the 
armação paid a variable surcharge (2%-4%) depending on the approximate 
amount required by the city to cover expenses. 
4. Together with the captain of the ship, the procurators had to keep a strict watch 
that only the carrack, and no other ship, shipped to Japan with silk, in order not 
to compromise the armação’s profits. The watch had to be even greater in those 
years when the Great Ship did not sail. 
5. Besides prohibiting silk exports to Japan, the procurators and the captain 
ensured also that no silver belonging to Japanese entered the Macanese harbour. 
6. The three elected had to appoint a factor (feitor) to go to Japan and actually sell 
the silk, a registrar (escrivão) and an accountant (contador) to help the feitor 
keep track of the deals, a guard (escutilheiro) who held the silk locked away 
and other minor officers all to be paid through the armação. 
                                                 
352 Manoel Dias exactly wrote: ‘estes tres eleitos repartem estes dous mil picos de çeda por todos os 
homens portugueses que ha nesta çidade, e alguns de outras nações como Chinos’. Unfortunately, the 
Jesuit did not explain on what basis some foreigner had right to the bague and others not. This is an 
interesting topic, in particular if related to a law issued by D. Filipe I on 7 July 1591 and confirmed by 
Filipe II in 1605, which stated that ‘ningun estrangero, ni otro qualquiera prohibido por estas leyes pueda 
tartar, y contratar en las Indias, ni dellas à estos Reynos, ni otras partes, ni passer á ellas, si no estuviere 
habilitado con naturaleza, y licencia nuestra. Y solamente puedan vsar della con sus caudales, y no los de 
otros de sus naciones, assi en particular, como en conpañía publica, ni secreta’. See Recopilación de 
Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, tome IV, book IX, chapter 27: De los Estrangeros, que pasan á las 
Indias, y su composición, y naturaleza, que en ellas pueden adquirir para tratar, y contratar – Ley 
primera. Que ningún Estrangero, ni persona prohibida pueda tratar en las Indias, ni pasar à ellas. It is 
likely that the Portuguese settlers in Macao let some Chinese merchants enter the armação in order not to 
exacerbate Ming authorities, who, on the other hand, found a way to keep the Chinese commerce with 
Japan alive. 
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7. In Japan, the silk was sold in bulk (por pancada) at a price agreed between the 
Portuguese and the representatives of the commercial communities of Nagasaki, 
Miyako, Edo, Ōsaka and Sakai, hence it was not a selling between individuals. 
It was the same purchasing method adopted in the Guangzhou fair where the 
Portuguese bought the Chinese silk. The pancada was an ancient way of sealing 
contracts known to different times and civilizations. In South-East Asia, it was 
used also in the Philippines when the Spaniards traded with the sangleyes, the 
Chinese merchants.353 
We briefly saw in seven points how the Japan trade was carried out. Now, we need to 
focus in detail on the Society of Jesus and see through what kind of conditions the 
Ignatians entered and participated in the armação. 
 First of all, there is a doubt in the history immediately preceding the formal 
participation in the contract of the Jesuits. As we saw earlier, Valignano sealed the 
agreement with the city for the formal participation of the Japan Jesuits in the trade 
almost as soon as he got there. It is commonly stated that he signed the contract in 1578, 
but it would seem more likely that he waited for the carrack to return from Japan to 
have a complete vision of the trade, which happened on 2 February 1579.354 In any case, 
by the terms of the contract signed by Valignano the Jesuits were allotted a share of 50 
picols out of 1’600, which was the maximum cargo shipped annually. However, in a 
later missive and then in the Apologia, Valignano confided to Mercurian that he decided 
to formalize their participation in the armação in order to limit the fathers’ trade to a 
quantity that would not create any scandal with the mercantile community of Macao.355 
                                                 
353 When Father Alonso Sánchez was sent to Spain in 1586 as procurator of Manila, he proposed to the 
king to adopt the pancada system also in the Philippines. According to Sánchez, the king had to forbid 
the sangleyes to sell their goods retail, instead it was the city itself, through its elected procurator, that had 
to buy the merchandise in bulk at an established price. Filipe agreed with Sánchez and in 1589 ordered 
Governor Gómez Pérez das Mariñas to adopt the wholesale system. In any case, the establishment of the 
pancada caused several claims and protests and was slowly abandoned until the official abolition in 1696. 
Cf. Gil, Los Chinos en Manila. Siglos XVI y XVII, pp. 54-56. 
354 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 8 [I], ff. 217-217v: ‘Aos dous de fevereiro, dia da Gloriosissima Virgen N. 
Senhora, chegou a deseada nao de Japão a este porto, com a qual alegramos todos [...] e ainda que se 
perdeo muito fato, todavia parte pola alegria de ser de tão grande perigo salvada a nao, parte porque se 
recompem os danos com a venda da seda e mais meudesas que fiquavão, não se sintio nada, todavia 
sintimos muito a perda do iumquo que foi de Sião pera Japão’. 
355 Cf. Visitor Valignano to General Mercurian, Nagasaki, 6 August 1580. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 8 [I], f. 273v: 
‘agora estava reducida la cosa con el contrato alo mejor que se podia y que son necessarios cada año alo 
menos siete mil ducados para sustentar lo que esta hecho, y el gasto va cresciendo cada año, mas que 
aviendo comodidad para se sustentar de otra manera a todos nos parescia muy bien que se quitasse’. Cf. 
also Apologia, f. 87v: ‘trate tambien con esta Ciudad de Macao, sobre que este empleo de seda, se hiziesse 
de cierta y determinada quatidad, con su voluntad, y beneplacito, para que quedasse como una renta cierta 
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As a matter of fact, with this deal the bague of the Society of Jesus was almost four 
times bigger than the wealthiest merchant in Macao (50 picols against 12). 
Nevertheless, the sources tell that before reaching Macao the visitor had received a 
patent from the viceroy to participate in the armação with a share of 90 or 100 picols, 
which was excluded from the pancada. In other words the Jesuits had the right to sell 
their portion whenever they wished, which evidently gave them the possibility to exploit 
the fluctuations in the Japanese market.356 Taking into account the high interests around 
the Japan trade, it is obvious that this kind of privilege would arouse a lot of complaints 
when the armação contract was drawn up. In order not to put the Society in a very bad 
light, Valignano contrived a way to obtain what the royal patent granted without 
indispose the Macanese mercantile community.357 In the purchase of silk at Macao he 
granted that the Japan Jesuits were allotted a share of 50 picols, but then he made the 
Vereadores add a clause to the contract. This clause established that if, by any chance, 
the Japan market did not buy all the silk shipped in the carrack, the 50 piculs belonging 
to the Society would always be considered as sold ‘por el precio dela primera 
pancada’,358 which was the highest ruling price in the official exchange. Furthermore, 
the factor would give the Jesuit procurator in Nagasaki another 40 picols for the price 
they were bought at Macao. So if on the one hand the missionaries could sell them in 
another occasion for a higher price than the pancada’s or store them for the following 
year, on the other hand the factor would not come back to Macao with unsold silk.359  
This privilege was exploited by the critics of the Society, the Friars Minors, 
who, among other things, accused the Japan Jesuits to be the ones who established the 
pancada-price with the Japanese merchants, an accuse that was an obvious reference to 
                                                                                                                                               
de manera que no uviesse en ello mudança, y si hiziesse con la moderacion devida, y satisfacion del 
pueblo’. 
356 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 341 and ARSI, Jap. Sin. 45 [I], f. 235. The sources do not agree on the 
exact amount of picols granted to the Society. Since Francisco Cabral sent requests for 90 picols, it would 
seem more likely that the crown responded to such demand. In 1617, however, Father Valentim Carvalho 
wrote again that they were entitled to receive 100 picols, but confessed also that in more than one 
occasion the Vereadores allowed the missionaries to load up to 70 picols in accordance with the needs of 
the mission. Cf. Carvalho, Apologia do Japão, p. 59. On the other hand, there were also years when the 
Captain Major could not buy the 1’600 picols of silk at Guangzhou, as happened in 1579 and 1580, which 
caused a big loss of earnings for the missionaries. Cf. Sumario, p. 335. 
357 At least in two occasions, in 1579 and in 1580, in fact, Valignano admitted that he sealed the contract 
in order to decrease the Jesuits’ participation in the silk trade. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 8 [I], f. 241 and f. 273v. 
358 See Apologia, f. 87v. 
359 This was not the only privilege the Jesuits had in the armação, although it was the greatest. As it has 
been shown in the third point above, in addition to the fretes of 10%, the armação contemplated a 
supplement on the merchandise to repay the city of the expenses for the trade. Although it was variable, 
the Jesuits obtained that they would pay a fixed rate at 3%, whether that the common merchants paid the 
2% or the 4%. 
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the role of intermediary often played by the procurator at Nagasaki, and added that they 
would sell the silk for a higher price in order to make better gains.360 
With regard to the incomes from the trade at Nagasaki, Valignano did not skimp 
on the details. Writing from Kuchinotsu in December 1579 he described to Everard 
Mercurian the specifics of the economy and the financial activities of the Jesuits in 
Japan. He wrote that the whole capital of the mission amounted to 20’000 taéis,361 
roughly 30’000 cruzados.362 Half of this capital was invested in Chinese silk. To be 
exact, about 8’000 cruzados in silver were sent from Nagasaki to Macao to buy the 50 
picols of silk, an investment which yielded an income of little more than 2’000 
cruzados.363 The remaining 7’000 derived from the unsold silk the Portuguese factor 
handed them over, whose quantity may vary and yielded the same income as the 50 in 
the armação.364 Thus, by summing the approximate sum of 4’000 cruzados with the 
incomes from the three aldeias in the Province of the North, which in 1586 amounted 
roughly to 1100 cruzados, we see that in the 1580s the Japan Jesuits had a total income 
of little more than 5’000 cruzados.365 The other 15’000 cruzados, in fact, were divided 
between the residences and houses of the mission in gold and silverware.366  
This capital notwithstanding, Valignano knew that everything was constantly 
exposed to danger. The Italian Jesuit explained clearly to Mercurian the disastrous 
consequences of the loss of a cargo, which he estimated to be as high as 20’000 
                                                 
360 Cf. Carvalho, op. cit., p. 55. 
361 See Glossary. 
362 According to nearly all the sources consulted, scudi or escudos, cruzados and ducats (ducados) were 
coins of the same value and were therefore used interchangeably. Their ratio to the Portuguese réis was 
1:400, whereas to the tael 1,5:1. In this letter, Valignano referred to scudi and it would not be 
preposterous to hypothesize that the reason why he decided to adopt that currency was only because he 
was writing in Italian. As a matter of fact he wrote about our currency. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 8 [I], f. 240:  
‘arriva la summa di tutto quello ch’habbiamo in questo giorno presente in questo giorno presente 
ventimila taeli, che ridutti alla nostra moneta fanno giustamente il numero di trentamila scudi’. 
363 In the Apologia Valignano explained that each picol was bought for 90 taéis (135 cruzados) and sold 
in Japan for 140 (210 cruzados). Cf. Apologia, f. 89v. This means that – arithmetically – to buy the 50 
picols of the contract 7’000 cruzados would have been enough. Accordingly, the sale in Japan would 
generate an income of 10’000 cruzados, to which we have to subtract the expenditures to buy the 50 
picols (6’750 cruzados), the fretes (1’000 cruzados) and the 3%-surcharge (300 cruzados) and we obtain 
the total income which amounted to 1’950 cruzados. Fair warning, this is only an esteem that does not 
take into consideration all the variable that might occurred and it is based on fixed data that were 
evidently approximate and were used only to convey a general idea.  
364 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 8 [I], f. 240. 
365 In the Sumario, written only four years later, Valignano made some changes in the numbers. Namely, 
he wrote that they invested 10-12’000 ducats in silk which granted an income of 5-6’000 ducats. See 
Sumario, pp. 310-311. 
366 Ibid.: ‘Gl’altri quindicimila scudi stanno ordinariamente in oro et in argento ripartiti in diverse case & 
residentie, delli quali circa duemila stanno in argentaria che serve per le chiese como sono calici, 
candelieri d'altare, turribuli & altre simili cose’. Cf. Sumario, pp. 109-110. 
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cruzados, and insisted on the indigence of Japanese lords and commoners alike. In the 
28th chapter of the Sumario he expatiated upon this topic,367 and stressed that until that 
moment they had succeeded in converting important lords, kunishu as Ōmura Sumitada 
in 1563, Arima Yoshisada (André) in 1576 and Arima Harunobu (Protásio) in 1580,368 
but not as powerful as to receive the protection and the eventual real estates they needed 
in order to step off the silk trade. For that matter, up to the 1580s, few of the more 
significant Japanese personages had become Christians. D. Francisco of Bungo, for 
instance, turned Christian only after his retirement, although he maintained the grasp 
over his fief, whereas Ichijō Kanesada 369  was deprived of his domain and sought 
assistance from the very Jesuits.370 At any rate, in the 1580s both Valignano dream and 
nightmare actually came true. 
 
II. 3. 4.    Possession: The cession of Nagasaki to the Society of Jesus 
Two years after his arrival in Japan, Valignano called together a big mission 
conference. Since at that time was quite troublesome and expensive to gather all the 
important fathers of the mission in the same place, the consulta took place three times in 
three different places between 1580 and 1581: one in Usuki, one in Nagasaki and the 
last one in Miyako.371 
The triple conference, whose conclusions were eventually drawn at Nagasaki, is 
of capital importance within the history of the Jesuits mission in Japan, because it was 
the first successful tentative of organizing the mission according to precise project 
guidelines contrived by Valignano on the basis of the fathers experience and of his two 
years on the Japanese soil. As a matter of fact, the consulta established that Japan ought 
to be considered and organized the same way as an ordinary province of the Society, 
                                                 
367 Cf. Sumario, pp. 312-315. 
368 Arima Harunobu (?-1612) was the second son of Arima Yoshisada. He inherited the title of his father 
in 1571 and was at first a prosecutor of the Christian faith. Cf. Ribeiro, Samurais Cristãos, p. 87. 
369 Ichijō Kanesada (1543-1585) was related to D. Francisco and ruled over Tosa. When he lost his 
domain in 1574, he fled o Bungo where he expressed the desire to become Christian. He received the 
sacrament in 1575 with the name Paulo. He tried to recover his domains, but never succeeded. Cf. 
Sumario, p. 280, n. 35. 
370 Cf. Elison, Deus Destroyed, p. 103. 
371 With regard to the consulta cf. VMP, I, pp. 7-50. In Usuki, beside Valignano, were present the 
following Jesuits: Father Francisco Cabral as Superior of the Japan mission. Father Lourenço Mexia, 
Father Luís Frois, Father Melchior de Figueiredo, Father João Baptista, Father Pero Ramon and Father 
Antonino, Father Gonçalo Rebelo and Father Francisco de Laguna. In the second meeting in Shimo, 
Father Gaspar Coelho and Father Luís Almeida, and, finally, in Miyako Valignano met with Father 
Organtino Gnecchi Soldo and other Jesuits there.  
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although it would not reach that hierarchic station until 1611. Namely, the government 
of the mission was divided among three fathers, each of whom was appointed as 
superior of a specific geographic area and all the facilities of the Society therein, with a 
fourth father as ‘Superior Universal de Japão’.372 Furthermore, the fathers decided to 
found two seminars for the education of Japanese and Portuguese, since ‘este era unico 
e verdadeiro remedio pera se poder insenar e acrescentar a Christandade de Japão’.373 
Amongst the many topics debated, two in particular are relevant to the present 
work, namely the 13th – Del remedio que se ha de procurar para la sustentaçion 
temporal de Jappon – and 14th –. Si es bien tener los lugares de Nangasaque y de 
Monguy.374 
With regard to the 13th point, the fathers agreed that it was unfit for men of the 
cloth to participate in a trade, moreover since this one was put to risk by the hazards of 
the sea. Nevertheless, other means of maintenance seemed nowhere to be found. The 
consulta, in fact, established that the mission in the current situation was in need of 
8’000 cruzados per year, but if further colleges or residences were to be opened, then 
the annual income could not be inferior to 12’000 cruzados.375  
The awareness of the uncertainty of an income that had to weather storms and 
tufones, led some of the fathers, among whom there was also Luís Almeida, to propose 
the purchase of rice fields that could yield a profit, called ryōchi.376 Besides being an 
obvious and certain source of food, the fathers were well mindful that in Japan daimyō, 
kunishu, samurai and so on received their income in koku377 of rice.378 Despite the 
opposition of the majority of fathers (18 out of 26, Valignano included), who thought 
                                                 
372 Cf. Carta annua de Japão do anno de 80 pera nosso padre geral em Roma, in ANTT/AJ, Livro 28, f. 
121v. 
373 Ibid. 
374 In the Roman archive of the Society of Jesus are to be found both the proceedings of the Usuki 
conference and the definitive outcome compiled in Nagasaki in 1581 and Valignano’s own impressions 
about the topics discussed signed on 6 January 1583. See Consulta feita em Bungo pollo Padre Alexandre 
Valignano Visitador da Yndia no mes doutubro do Anno 1580, açerca das cousas de Japão, ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 2, ff. 4-34v (also in BL/Add. 9852, ff. 71-88), Consulta hecha en Jappon por el Padre Alexandro 
Valignano Visitador dela Compañia dela Yndia, en el año de 80 y 81, ARSI, Jap. Sin. 2, ff. 42-69 and 
Resoluciones que el Padre Visitador da acerca delas preguntas dela consulta que hizo en Jappon en 
diversas partes el año de 1581, ARSI, Jap. Sin. 2, ff. 70-86v (also in BNCR/FGes. 1482). For an outline 
of the whole conferences see VMP, I, pp. 7-50 and Fujita, op. cit., pp. 97-100. 
375 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 2, ff. 60-60v. 
376 領地. Valignano described thoroughly the ryōchi in the Libro Primero del principio y progresso de la 
Religion christiana en Jappon, y dela especial providencia de que Nuestro Señor usa con aquella nueva 
Iglesia, BL/Add. 9857, f. 27. 
377 See Glossary. 
378 See Sumario, pp. 312-317. 
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that by acquiring those rice fields they would take the risk of being compared to wealthy 
lords and were also concerned about wasting any more money besides the sum invested 
in the trade, from later sources we know that eventually the Japan Jesuits came in 
possession of an unspecified number of ryōchi. 379  Also the 14th item regarded the 
acquisition of a territory, yet much bigger than simple rice fields.  
As we saw earlier, Ōmura Sumitada was the first lord to welcome the Christian 
faith along with the Chinese goods taken by the Portuguese. Yet, unlike many of the 
daimyō whose friendliness toward the Portuguese was motivated solely by the prospect 
of financial gain, Dom Bartolomeu took the Roman faith seriously. There was, of 
course, the basic and comprehensible instinct of survival in his decision to welcome the 
Portuguese ships, since his territories were continuously under attack and, therefore, his 
lordship was precarious, yet he displayed his faith without any fear and made large 
donations to the papist missionaries. In 1562 he conceded part of Yokoseura to shelter 
the Christians and in 1563 he received the baptism. In 1574, four Portuguese ships came 
to help Dom Bartolomeu against the forces of the Isahaya domain.380 The contribution 
to success persuaded Ōmura to destroy all the symbols of the local faith and to require 
all his subjects, under pain of exile, to turn Christian. 381  In 1580, however, Dom 
Bartolomeu went even further.  
Around that time he was about to be reduced to fealty by Ryūzōji Takanobu, the 
daimyō of Saga (Hizen). At that time, in Kyūshū was waging a struggle for 
predominance between Ōtomo Sōrin of Bungo, Ryūzōji and the daimyō of Satsuma 
Shimazu Yoshihisa.382 Dom Bartolomeu could not actually compete against them, he 
was not a dominant lord. He received his power (economical and military) through the 
trade with Macao and consequently he was quite worried when in 1579 following 
                                                 
379 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 2, f. 62 and BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, f. 37v. In the Resoluciones, Valignano wrote 
that he was against acquiring ryōchi owing to the dangerous political situation of Japan. Yet, he conceded 
that ‘si en algun lugar de Christianos que paresciesse seguro huviesse alguna obligacion entre el Señor 
dela tierra y la Compañía de manera que o la Compañía no podiesse escusar emprestarle algun dinero, o 
ellos offresciessen reochi para pagar lo que deven, en tal caso paresce que se podrian comprar, mas esto 
no se haga sino raramente, y quando paresciere que no puede escusar’. See ARSI, Ibid., f. 80. Eventually, 
what had been suggested by Valignano was underwritten also by General Acquaviva, who deemed this 
solution better than to wait for economic help from Goa or Europe. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 3, f. 10v. 
380 Cf. VMP, I, pp. 285-286 and Elison, Deus Destroyed, pp. 91-92.  
381 Cf. Elison, “The Evangelic Furnace: Japan’s First Encounter with the West”, pp. 130-131. With regard 
to the whole Ōmura family see Ribeiro, op. cit., pp. 65-86. 
382 Yoshihisa (1533-1611) was the son of the true founder of the Shimazu power in the 16th century, 
Shimazu Takahisa (1514-1571), who was able to conquer the Ōsumi province and was close to annex also 
Hyūga. Yoshihisa, however, managed to consolidate that power by completing the annexation of Hyūga 
and by winning crucial battles against the Ōtomo and Ryūzōji. 
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Ryūzōji’s attacks, the Great Ship of Captain Leonel de Brito, on account of the threat to 
its security, chose Kuchinotsu in Arima over Nagasaki.383 The fear of losing his own 
territories to Ryūzōji, who seemed to be interested especially in Nagasaki and had 
invaded Ōmura in 1577 and 1578, connected with his desire to have the Portuguese 
arrive at his ports led Dom Bartolomeu to a big step.384 
As we saw, in 1569 Father Vilela founded the Church of Todos os Santos and 
two years later Nagasaki was factually born. Although at first it was a port ‘incognito, y 
despoblado’, when Valignano arrived in Japan in 1579 there were already about four 
hundred houses.385 This is clear evidence of the growing importance of the city, both as 
a refuge for the Christians exiled from various regions, such as Shimabara, Gotō Rettō, 
Hirado, Yamaguchi and Hakata, and as a practical harbour for the Portuguese. Between 
1571 and 1578, in fact, the kurofune386 berthed at least five times at Nagasaki’s docks, 
but not in 1579, as we saw.387 In order to secure his fief from external attacks and to 
ensure always having the Great Ship in one of his port, Sumitada offered to the Society 
to take the port of Nagasaki for the church along with the an adjoining village called 
Mogi, on the sole condition that the ship would pay him an annual due of 1’000 
ducats:388 
‘Don Bartholomeu Señor de Omura y su hijo Sancho,389 tenendo respecto a lo mucho que 
devemos alos Padres dela Compañía, hago livre donacion para sienpre ala dicha Compañía 
y al Padre Visitador della del pueblo de Nangasaqui con todas las tierras y campos que son 
en sus confines sin quedar nada y asi doy desde agora la posse dellas y asi los dichos 
Padres dela Compañía podran meter por Capitan del dicho lugar quien ellos quisieren y 
tirarlo del carguo y a qualquiera que fuere por ellos elegido. Doi facultad para poder matar 
y hazer toda la justiçia necessaria para el buen govienro dela tierra y castigo delos que 
quebrantaren las leyes della. Tambien entrego y doi para sienpre lo que suele pagar la nave 
delos portugeses por el tiempo que esta en el dicho puerto, reservando para mi los 
derechos della y de todos los mas navios que llegaren al dicho puerto, los quales yo 
mandare recadar por mi officiales, los quales no se entrometeran en ninguna cosa que 
                                                 
383 Cf. Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 35-36. 
384 Cf. CE, I, ff. 466v-467 and Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 314-315. 
385 See Apologia, ff. 74v-75. According to the Pacheco, the sources present a succession of events that 
seem to indicate that already from 1568 Nagasaki was considered as the future port. Cf. Pacheco, op. cit., 
pp. 307-311. With regard to his interpretation of the facts see pp. 321-322. 
386 See Glossary. 
387 Cf. Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 32-35 and Okamoto, 十六世紀日歐交通史の研究, pp. 469-470. 
388 Cf. VMP, I, pp. 411-418, Boxer, Christian Century, pp. 100-101, Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 315-316 and 
CHJ IV, pp. 326-331. 
389 Ōmura Yoshiaki (1570-1616). 
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toque la justiçia o al govierno del dicho lugar y dela misma manera doi para sienpre alos 
Padres los lugares de Mongui, con todas las tierras y canpos que a ellos pertençe. Y para 
señal que nunca avra mutacion en la dicha donaçion, mas sera perpetuamente valiosa, hizo 
esta carta aseñada por mi y por mi hijo alos veintisete da 4.ª luna del octavo año de 
Tenxo.390 
Don Bartholomeu - Don Sancho.’391 
Although this document attests the cession of Japanese soil to foreigners, which was 
something quite unprecedented, later sources suggest that it should be considered more 
as a donation. In effect, the Ōmura conceded revenue by which they supported the 
missionaries working in their dominions. As Valignano explained in 1598, part of the 
deal was that the Jesuits remained as obedient and subject to D. Bartolomeu as before 
but were to be given the ships’ anchorage fees, whereas D. Bartolomeu reserved for 
himself the dominion over the land and continued to collect the tariff duties on the 
goods.392 Differently from the small and pre-existent town of Yokoseura, however, the 
fathers in Nagasaki became preeminent figures of a city born out of interest and faith. 
Also for the merchants, in fact, the situation was different than at Yokoseura. At 
Nagasaki, the Portuguese were offered a safe port, but their ships and other merchants’ 
as well had to pay dues to the Japanese lord. Dom Bartolomeu, in fact, surrendered part 
of the territorial sovereignty over the harbour, but guarded for himself a substantial flow 
of income from the trade of those ships.  
 Among the Jesuits, this donation was discussed often and at length at the triple 
conference. All the fathers that took part to the conference were veterans and 
connoisseurs of the turbulent Japanese islands. Therefore, nobody could deny that 
                                                 
390 9 June 1580. Tenshō 天正 is the name given to the era between 1573 and 1592 according to the 
Japanese tradition of inaugurating a new period by assigning to it a name which was at the same time 
commemorative and apotropaic. This custom, called nengō 年号 or gengō 元号, was introduced from 
China around the 7th century and remained  in force until the Meiji Jidai (1868-1912), when it was 
established that to the reign of an emperor ought to correspond the name of an era, issei ichigen no sei 一
世一元の制. 
391 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 23, f. 9. Tha Japanese text of the document is unfortunately not extant. For an English 
translation of the donation, see Pacheco, op. cit., pp. 313-314 and Elison, Deus Destroyed, pp. 94-95. 
According to Alvarez-Taladriz, the Japan Jesuits came in possession of Nagasaki ten years earlier, 
whereas this act might be seen or as a renewal of the old contract or as a way to give back to the fathers 
the city that might had been expropriated in the 1570s. Cf. Sumario, pp. 70*-71*, n. 179. 
392 See Apologia, f. 79: ‘D. Bartolame diò alos Padres lo que les diò en el puerto de Nangasaqi rezervando 
para si el dominio, y los derechos delas mercaderías […]; pues los Padres con todo el pueblo, y perto de 
Nangasaqi, que le davan tan obedientes, y sugetos como siempre, y ni ellos tenia fuersas para le 
contrariar, ni havia peligro, que lo hiziessen fuera desto, el darles aquella renta, no fue mas que gratificar 
alos Padres y començar de cumplir de alguna manera con la obligacion, que tenia conforme ala doctrina 
de S. Pablo, de sustentar el ministro del Evangelio en su tierra’. 
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having jurisdictional power over a city was quite positive for the mission, mainly for 
safety issues, economical reasons and political importance: 
1. Wars between neighboring territories broke out rather frequently, thus it was 
advisable to have a city fortified and easy to protect thanks to its geomorphology 
where to store the most part of the mission capital; 
2. Nagasaki could serve as a refuge for exiled Christians; 
3. The incomes from the city and the harbour in the selling seasons might not have 
been enough to sustain the mission, but it helped nonetheless; 
4. They could leave the territories donated whenever it might seem to them 
convenient to do so, although coming in possession of Nagasaki and Mogi had 
also a positive repercussion onto the political reputation of the fathers and onto 
the relationships with other lords.393 
Valignano privately wrote to Mercurian that he accepted Dom Bartolomeu’s offer only 
after having agreed on the fourth point. 394 The instable political situation of Japan 
obliged the visitor to consider all the scenarios and the inconveniences that may appear 
in the course of time from holding such an important commercial junction.395 As a 
matter of fact, history proved him right. In 1587, in fact, the Japanese hegemon 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi took over the jurisdiction over Nagasaki and issued the first decree 
of expulsion of the Christian missionaries. 
 
                                                 
393 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 2, ff. 62v-63. See also Valignano’s Resoluciones about the 14th item at ARSI, Ibid., 
f. 80v. 
394 Pacheco stressed out that it was Ōmura Sumitada’s idea to concede the port to the Society, not the 
contrary. Cf. Pacheco, op. cit., p. 321. As wrote by Valignano, in fact, as soon as he reached Nagasaki, 
Dom Bartolomeu wanted to talk with him regarding the cession, which would probably indicate that the 
Christian lord was in desperate need to resolve that intricate situation. The Japanese sources regarding the 
topic, all compiled after the expulsion of the missionaries, do not clarify the issue, although the most of 
them state that Ōmura decided to donate Nagasaki to the Society of Jesus upon pressing requests by the 
fathers. The Jesuits, on their part, had also to ask the general to obtain from the pope a brief which would 
absolve them of the formal irregularity of the involvement in capital jurisdiction. In other words, they 
were asking the pope to extend to the Society of Jesus the specific authority to engage in civil and 
criminal jurisdiction in the territories donated. The requested permission was granted by Pope Gregory 
XIII in November 1583, although owing to the demise of the pope, a formal brief was never published. 
Cf. Elison, Deus Destroyed, pp. 97-100. 
395 Cf. Pacheco, op. cit., p. 319. 
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II. 3. 5.    Expropriation: Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s proscription of the 
Christian faith and the seizure of Nagasaki  
When Francis Javier reached Japan in 1549, the shinkoku396 was passing through 
one of the most chaotic moments of its history. Its structures had been shaken to the 
foundations by decades of social upheaval and warfare. In the second half of the 15th 
century, the Japanese country had entered a time of military competition among the 
local daimyō, with complete transfer of power from the central administration to local 
magnates. As a matter of fact, the two main pillars of the archipelago, the tennō and the 
Ashikaga Bakufu,397 had been undermined and stripped of all factual power. In effect, 
although the imperial house continued to carry out the ceremonial function of 
nominating and legitimating the successive shōgun, this title had become so 
meaningless that nine rulers were nominated in less than fifty years. Both the tennō and 
the shōgun remained in their palaces in Miyako, but the ‘Flower Capital of myriad of 
ages is now a lair of foxes and wolves […]. The revolution of the Ōnin years destroys 
both the law of Buddha and the law of kings’.398 
 This age of decadence began in 1467, when a quarrel over succession in the 
Ashikaga Bakufu gave origin to the Ōnin disturbances (1467-77),399 a series of wars 
fought intermittently in and around the capital, between the coalitions of shogunal 
officials and shugo daimyō.400 Although this may be considered as the ostensible cause 
for the outbreak of civil warfare, the real cause of the war was the decline in the 
authority and power of the bakufu and the rise of the shugo daimyō as regional military 
overlords.  
The Ōnin disturbances are commonly accepted as the starting point of the 
Sengoku Jidai, the era of the warring states. This period is mostly distinguished by the 
shattering of centralized authority by large regional hegemons (Sengoku daimyō), who 
gained independent political and economic control over the lands they held or had 
                                                 
396 神國 
397 The second warrior government, which ruled between 1338 and 1573. 
398 Quotation from the Ōnin-ki (The Ōnin Chronicles, 応仁記), apud Berry, Hideyoshi, p. 2. 
399 応仁の乱 
400 See Glossary. 
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annexed. During that time of wars, in effect, power over land devolved specifically 
upon those able to muster and control military force.401  
The case of Ōmura Sumitada, from this point of view, is quite exemplary. As we 
saw, he was totally autonomous in his decision of creating and donating to foreigners a 
new settlement in order not to succumb to his hostile neighbour. As far as the Jesuits 
were concerned, this status quo had both advantages and disadvantages. On the one 
hand, the absence of a strong central government allowed the missionaries to search for 
hospitality in different fiefs, since, if one daimyō showed hostile to the Roman faith, 
they could easily take their chances in the next fief. On the other hand, however, the 
lack of political and administrative stability exposed the whole mission to destruction 
overnight, if the lord that welcomed the missionaries was ousted by another lord. It 
might also happen that the complex and flexible pattern of alliances could easily lead a 
lower lord to switch his allegiance to a stronger and unchristian lord and thus 
endangering the mission.402 As a matter of fact, the individual proprietor had but three 
alternatives to safeguard his holdings: to become militarily irresistible; to seek 
protection by alliance with others like himself or to subordinate to some superior lord. 
Sumitada, we might say, moved between the second and third options.403 
The absence of a political authority that could establish order and sanction 
whomever tried to subvert it and the resulting dictatorship of arms shattered the fixed 
hierarchic structure of the country and led to the disruption of normality. In their 
attempt to describe the chaos of Japan in that time, the missionaries referred to it as ‘o 
reino mais sujeito a desinquietações que parece haver no Universo’.404 This situation is 
exemplified by the principle of gekokujō,405 the overthrow of a superior by persons of 
inferior status. It was through the deeds of ‘the famous triumvirate of “Great 
Unifiers”’,406 Oda Nobunaga,407 Toyotomi Hideyoshi408 and Tokugawa Ieyasu,409 that 
                                                 
401 Cf. Berry, op. cit., p. 17. 
402 See HJ III, pp. 183-184. Cf. Boxer, Christian Century, pp. 42-43, Costa, O Japão e o Cristianismo no 
Século XVI, pp. 52-56.  
403 Cf. Hall, “Japan’s Sixteenth-Century Revolution”, p. 10. 
404 See HJ II, p. 350. 
405 下克上 
406 Cf. Hall, op. cit., p. 7. 
407  With regard to Oda see Lamers, Japonius Tyrannus: The Japanese Warlord Oda Nobunaga 
Reconsidered and Costa, “Oda Nobunaga e a Expansão Portuguesa”, pp. 258-272. 
408 Regarding Toyotomi Hideyoshi the most relevant work remains Berry, op. cit. 
409 There are two biographies about Ieyasu for the English readers, namely Sadler, Shogun. The life of 
Tokugawa Ieyasu and Totman, Tokugawa Ieyasu Shogun. 
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the chaos of Sengoku Jidai was eventually brought to an end. The main architects of the 
political unification of Japan under military rule were products of the gekokujō principle 
themselves and they probably could not have been able to rise if it was not for that 
specific situation.  
Nobunaga began his ascent from a relatively minor domainal base in Owari, near 
the Kinai region. Oda’s rise in Owari by deposing his overlord is a classic example of 
gekokujō,410 but even more exemplary are his way of handling the warfare411 and the 
relationship he kept with the traditional structures of authority, the tennō and the bakufu. 
Nobunaga, in fact, grew powerful enough to become the champion of the future Shōgun 
Ashikaga Yoshiaki. In 1568, he entered in Miyako at the head of some fifty thousand 
troops upon a claim of the tennō to restore the emperial estates, but especially for the 
purpose of legitimating Yoshiaki’s aspirations to the shogunal throne.412 Eventually, 
Yoshiaki was appointed shōgun and, immediately after, he sought to have Nobunaga 
accept the brand new post of kanrei, 413  an office equivalent to vice-shōgun, but 
Nobunaga refused, preferring to maintain his independent position. Moreover, in 1569 
he issued a set of regulations concerning the shōgun and his subjects, henceforth 
asserting his control over the bakufu’s administration. It ought to be recalled that Oda 
held no post within the bakufu. He was a mere bushi who happened to have enough 
power to govern the actions of those who he was supposed to serve. Accordingly, in 
1573, after three years of struggle against a coalition of warlords assembled by the 
shōgun, he forced Yoshiaki to flee both the capital city and the central arena of 
politics.414  
                                                 
410 Cf. Lamers, op. cit., p. 20. 
411 Oda Nobunaga was one of the first warlords to make wide use of Western musketeers. The firearms, in 
fact, came during a time when Japanese warfare was progressively bestowing more importance on the 
ashigaru 足軽 – the infantries – and it was amongst them that were chosen those known as teppōtai 鉄砲
隊, the companies of musketeers. Nobunaga placed particular importance on the teppōtai and used them 
effectively. For instance, at the critical battle of Nagashino in the Mikawa province in 1575, Nobunaga’s 
musketeers defeated the enemy’s cavalry, considered the warrior élite. Cf. CHJ IV, pp. 53-54 and Brown, 
“The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-98”, p. 239. We can ascribe Nobunaga’s warfare to 
the gekokujō because the implement of Western technology was a defiant act against Japan philosophy of 
war, which devolved in particular upon the use of the katana 刀, and would develop in the code of the 
samurai, the bushidō 武士道. 
412 With this regard see Hisashi and Elison, “The Political Posture of Oda Nobunaga”, pp. 149-193. 
413 管領 
414 Although Ashikaga Yoshiaki left the capital city, he did not resign his title. He continued behaving as 
a shōgun and became a political refugee who was planning to restore his power and honours with the 
encouragement and protection of powerful lords as Mōri Terumoto. Cf. Elison, “Hideyoshi, the Bountiful 
Minister”, p. 230. 
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Having expelled the shōgun and taken over his powers, Nobunaga was raised to 
the status of an imperial noble and continued to climb the imperial hierarchy until 1578, 
when he eventually abdicated all his titles. With him, or because of him, the Ashikaga 
shogunate ended and what remained of the imperial sovereignty was definitely 
smothered by one of Nobunaga’s preferred mottos: tenka fubu,415 the realm subjected 
by the military. 
In order to describe the respective roles played by the three unifiers in the 
unification of the country, it has been said that ‘Nobunaga quarried the stones for New 
Japan, Hideyoshi rough-hewed them and Ieyasu set them finally in their proper 
place’.416 Oda Nobunaga, in fact, could not carry out his plans of hegemony. In 1582 
was treacherously murdered by a vassal of him, Akechi Mitsuhide. The death of 
Nobunaga brought down the country into anarchy once again. As a fact, whilst keeping 
outside politics and usurping prerogatives belonging to the tennō or the shōgun, 
Nobunaga did not build an alternative system of government based on what he 
represented. Consequently, when he suddenly disappeared Japan was again in need of a 
ruler and Toyotomi Hideyoshi was the perfect man for that job.  
Hideyoshi was born during 1536, son of a neither prosperous nor influential 
farmer who did not even bear a surname to pass onto his heir. His status of a parvenu 
was known both among the Japanese and the foreigners. For instance, the Spanish Jesuit 
Pero Gomez described Hideyoshi in a derogatory manner as ‘un hombre en estado de 
sangre muy bajo que llevava hazes de llena a cuestas’.417 About the age of fifteen, 
however, the young Hideyoshi left home and traveled through Owari and Mikawa 
provinces looking for a master to serve as ashigaru and only a few years later he offered 
his allegiance to Nobunaga. He rose rapidly in Oda’s ranks and by the 1580s he became 
one of his chief and most valuable deputies, to the point of killing Oda’s assassin only 
few days after he was killed.  
At the time of his death, Nobunaga had extended his influence into a third of the 
country. More precisely the realm under his regime comprised twenty-nine of Japan’s 
sixty-six provinces. Yet, as testified by the coalition assembled by Yoshiaki in 1570, 
                                                 
415 天下不武 
416 See Boxer, op. cit., p. 56. 
417 Cf. RAH/Cor. 9/2663, f. 448.  
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there were still powerful enemies to subjugate and also other pretenders to be ruler of 
the Tenka,418 such as Nobunaga’s son, Nobukatsu, and Tokugawa Ieyasu. 419 
In the years after 1582, Hideyoshi managed to narrow the number of adversaries 
to his hegemony. Differently from Nobunaga, however, Hideyoshi chose to resort to 
diplomacy instead of warfare and came to peaceful accords with some of Nobunaga’s 
staunchest enemies. At the same time, as another means of acquiring legitimacy, he 
approached the court on his own initiative and received promotions in court rank. 
Differently from Oda, in fact, Hideyoshi craved for such official recognitions and never 
handed them back.420 In 1585, he was appointed kanpaku,421 imperial regent, one of the 
highest posts in the imperial court traditionally reserved for members of the Fujiwara 
family. The following year, after the abdication of Ōgimachi Tennō and the 
enthronement of Hideyoshi’s favourite candidate, the sixteen-year old Go-Yōzei,422 he 
became daijō daijin, 423 the grand minister of state. In only a bunch of years, then, 
Hideyoshi brought closer than ever the end of the turmoils of the Sengoku Jidai and he 
filled the void left by Ashikaga Yoshiaki and Nobunaga by obtaining from the tennō the 
legitimacy and the titles to rule the archipelago.  
Apart from the battles of unification and the political maneuvering themselves, 
the most massive activity begun under Nobunaga and completed by Hideyoshi was the 
series of land survey to consolidate the practices of land registration, tax assessment and 
peasant tenure into a single system, which formed the factual basis for the new social 
institutions that would characterize Japan until the half of the 19th century.  
In effect, during the century of internal wars, one of the main objectives of the 
Sengoku daimyō as regional overlords was to gain systematic control over the 
productive capacities of their domains. Hence, also before Nobunaga, powerful daimyō 
had already begun to undertake a similar task in their territories, in order to resolve 
                                                 
418 天下 Tenka literally means ‘all beneath the Heaven’. 
419 Hideyoshi reached an accommodation with Nobukatsu and Ieyasu in January 1585.  
420 It should be stressed, however, that also Nobunaga, shortly before his death, was offered the title of 
kanpaku and daijō-daijin. Although at first he refused to accept those titles, it seems that he postponed a 
definitive decision for a later moment. Therefore, the doubt still remains: would he maintain his 
independent posture or would he accept the court offerings?   
421 See Glossary. 
422 The prefix “go” 後 indicates that there had been already a tennō called Yōzei, namely the 57th tennō 
whose reign spanned the years from 876 to 884. It is the equivalent of the Western custom of adding an 
ordinal number after the name of a pope or a king. 
423 See Glossary. 
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proprietary claims among their subjects. In the same year of Oda’s capitulation, 
Hideyoshi issued orders for a systematic cadastral survey of the territory under his 
control, starting with the three districts of northern Ōmi that constituted his fief. This 
operation came to be called the Taikō kenchi 424  and proceeded in three steps: 
measurement of land, assessment of its quality425 and hence of its capacity to be taxed, 
and determination of ownership. By way of the kenchi, Hideyoshi secured for himself 
the rights of taxation and governance and the license to delegate such rights to his 
vassals or to religious institutions. Any remaining local authority that would assert such 
rights over its domains had those claims nullified and its lands reassigned. Furthermore, 
the land survey provided Hideyoshi with the knowledge and the power to limit the 
wealth of the daimyō by displace them towards less productive areas. 426 
The Taikō kenchi was obviously a lengthy process slowed also by the fact that 
political fragmentation caused landholding, tax collecting and military service 
recruitment systems to vary greatly from location to location. According to Hideyoshi’s 
plan each village and province had to deal with the survey and they had to send the 
cadastral registers to Hideyoshi’s headquarters, where superior authorities had to 
analyse precise figures on the total tax base and therefore provide Hideyoshi with the 
basis for a uniform tax system. Yet, although Hideyoshi started the kenchi as early as 
1584, by that time he had not yet subjugated all of the sixty-six provinces. He had to 
turn his gaze to the isolated southern region of Kyūshū.427 
In 1586, while at the newly built Ōsaka castle, Hideyoshi received an embassy 
by D. Francisco of Bungo, who begged his help in the prolonged struggle against 
Shimazu Yoshihisa of Satsuma. 428  When the Satsuma daimyō rejected Hideyoshi’s 
overtures concerning a truce, preparations for a military campaign were initiated. The 
kanpaku’s victorious operation in Kyūshū lasted about half a year, between 1586 and 
                                                 
424 太閤検地 
425 The quality of a land was determined on the basis of the kokudaka 石高 system, a method of assessing 
the agricultural yield of each parcel of land in terms of quantity of rice expressed in koku. With regard to 
this system see Wakita, “The Kokudaka System: A Device for Unification”, pp. 297-320. 
426 Cf. Berry, op. cit., pp. 53-54 and Hall, op. cit., pp. 17-18. See also CHJ IV, pp. 99-109. 
427 For the events related to the year 1587, with the exception of manuscripts and printed sources, we 
followed Boxer, Christian Century, pp. 142-155, idem, O Grande Navio, pp. 43-45 and Okamoto, op. cit., 
pp. 480-483. 
428 See CE, II, ff. 190-190v. 
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1587 and led Hideyoshi both to the dominance over southern Japan and to his encounter 
with the Christian missionaries.429  
After the pacification of Kyūshū, Hideyoshi had before him a vast new territory 
at his disposal. As customary of him, he showed magnanimity to the defeated Shimazu 
and decided only to reduce their holdings, but leave them their status as de facto rulers 
of southern Kyūshū and the wealthiest house on the region, with a holding valued at 
about 560’000 koku. The Ōtomo, for their part, had to content themselves with the 
confirmation of Bungo alone, as happened to all the houses (Arima, Ōmura, Matsuura 
and Gotō) that had supported Hideyoshi after his arrival. Those houses were part of the 
so called tozama 430  lords, i.e. damyō with independent land bases, submitted to 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi as a result of alliance or defeat, whose allegiance, then, was by no 
means assured. Both in the first campaigns after Nobunaga’s death and there in southern 
Japan, Hideyoshi opted to reward the tozama lords to avert hostilities. Also in South-
Western Japan, then, in order to establish a firm and lasting control over local warlords 
who had been enjoying a larger dose of autonomy than their Honshū’s peers, Hideyoshi 
deemed it necessary to reorganize the region according to his needs. Hence, he donated 
fiefs to some of his most loyal fudai daimyō 431 , like Terazawa Shima no Kami 
Hirotaka,432 and he enfeoffed the local tozama to neutralize their opposition and to 
secure their military cooperation. Moreover, the tozama enfeoffment turned out to be a 
practical solution also to prepare Hideyoshi’s grand military project: the invasion of 
China. Yet, before handling with the Asian continent, Hideyoshi had to deal with the 
Western preachers. First, however, it will be helpful to see how Hideyoshi used to cope 
with Japanese religious establishments.  
In 16th century Japan, the prosperous Buddhist monasteries were assimilated to 
the Sengoku daimyō, in terms of rights over the land, wealth and military force. Oda 
Nobunaga, for instance, waged a ten-year war against the monks of the Ishiyama 
                                                 
429 For a description of both the Ōtomo-Shimazu struggle and Hideyoshi’s campaign see CHJ IV, pp. 352-
359. See also Berry, op. cit., pp. 87-93. 
430 外様 
431 The fudai 普代 were those retainers who entered Toyotomi service voluntarily during the early stage 
of Hideyoshi’s carreer.  
432 Terazawa Hiromasa (1525-1596) was an old retainer of Oda and then passed to serve Hideyoshi. 
Following the Kyūshū campaing, he was given a 37’000-koku fief in Hizen. In 1592, the revenue was 
augmented until 80’000 koku and he received also the post of governorship of Nagasaki. 
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Honganji,433 followers of the Jōdo Shinshū.434 Also Hideyoshi had to use the hard way 
against religious institutions before going to Kyūshū. In 1585, in fact, he won the 
resistence of the Shingon 435  monastery in Negoro, a leading arm producer which, 
among others, had supplied the monks of the Honganji during the war against 
Nobunaga. Although the conflict lasted no more than few days, it shows Hideyoshi’s 
intolerance of religious independence and his way of dealing with religious institutions 
as if they were secular potentates. 
As we saw, Hideyoshi’s form of enfeoffment rested on the principles of land 
possession as defined by the kenchi. All kuge, daimyō, kunishu and monastic complexes 
could hold territories only as a concession (azukarimono436) sealed with the kanpaku’s 
shuin-jō,437 the vermillion seal. Yet, Ōmura’s domain partly eluded this kind of logic. 
We established that D. Bartolomeu was a weak Kyūshū daimyō,438 who managed to 
keep his fief autonomous in particular through the liaison with the Portuguese and the 
donation of Nagasaki to the Society of Jesus. He secured for himself the dominion over 
the land and continued to collect the tariff duties on the goods, yet he handed over the 
jurisdiction of the city to the missionaries. With the importance of the kenchi within 
Hideyoshi’s management of the Tenka in mind, it is plausible to suppose that when 
Hideyoshi was informed about the donation he might not have reacted positively, 
otherwise he would not take control over the city in 1587.439 The reasons that led him to 
the expropriation will appear clear if we just follow the events and the sources.  
                                                 
433 石山本願寺 
434 浄土真宗 
435 真言 
436 預り物 
437 朱印状 
438 The fact that D. Bartolomeu was not as big an asset as it would appear to the European readers who 
read him called “king” by the Jesuits is stressed in the Franciscan literature after the martyrdom of 1597. 
The aftermath of the execution of the 26 Christians at Nagasaki was marked by heated exchanges of 
accusations between members of the Iberian crown. For instance, in a anti-Jesuits treatise we read: 
‘[A]ntes que este Rey de Japão conquistasse a todo o Japão, que estava repartido entre alguns Senhores 
que chamão Tonos; hum delles depois de feito Christão, que, como os Padres dizem, o foi por interesse, 
ainda que depois cahio em a conta, e anda bem celebrado nas cartas e lhe chamão El Rej dom 
Bertholaameu, não sendo Rej, senão como Duque, ou Conde, porem tendo (mais lambido) o nome de Rej, 
e assi como em Hespanha são muito o que he Senhor de quatro legoas de terra, he chamado em as cartas 
Rej, que entendão em Hespanha que he algum Rej de França que se fez Christão’. See Tratado que os 
religiosos de S. Francisco espalharam em Goa em Baçaim no ano de 1598 contra os Padres da 
Companhia de Jesus que andam na conversão de Japão, BL/Add. 9858, f. 70v. 
439 Cf. Apologia, f. 75v: ‘[Hideyoshi] tomo [Nagasaki] para si, quitando a nosotros la anclage, y al hijo de 
D. Bartholame, que le sucedio en sus tierras, el dominio, y los derechos, que tenia en aquel puerto, y 
despues con estar debaxo de su poder, y con los muchos Christianos, que fueron desterrados de diversas 
partes, fue cresciendo en todo este tiempo mucho, tanto que agora avra en el cerca de mil casas’. 
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During the first years of rule, differently from Oda Nobunaga, the kanpaku had 
not many meetings with the fathers of the Society of Jesus. He officially received for the 
first time the Vice-provincial Gaspar Coelho, along with Father Luís Frois as 
interpreter, on 4 May 1586.440 During the meeting, Hideyoshi revealed his purpose of 
invading Korea and China and that he was about to build a fleet of 2’000 ships. It seems 
that Coelho saw this plan as an opportunity to get into Hideyoshi’s good graces and 
volunteered to use his influence with the Portuguese Captain Major to get military help 
and advanced also the hypothesis of creating a coalition of kirishitan daimyō to put at 
the kanpaku’s disposal.441 According to Jesuits’ sources, notwithstanding Hideyoshi’s 
great disdain for religious who meddled in military matters, the kanpaku issued a decree 
granting the fathers the possibility to preach freely throughout Japan. 442  Until that 
moment, the Japan Jesuits did not put a lot of trust in the new hegemon. Hideyoshi, in 
fact, never showed much interest for the Western missionaries and they never went so 
far as to call him the man chosen by God, as they did with Nobunaga.443 In effect, 
although that meeting generated a slight optimism, which increased during the 
kanpaku’s Kyūshū campaign, eventually Coelho’s proposals turned out being double-
edged for the missionaries. 
Hideyoshi established the headquarters for the campaign at Hakata, in northern 
Kyūshū. In the middle of the operations, he received Father Coelho there and he invited 
the Portuguese to visit him once again before he moved back to the capital.444 Before 
this last meeting took place, however, Coelho was unexpectedly visited by the kanpaku. 
As a matter of fact, Hideyoshi’s interest for Western shipcraft was compelling enough 
                                                 
440 In addition to Coelho and Frois, the Jesuits delegation included two more fathers, four Brothers, fifteen 
dōjuku and some of the youngsters from the seminaries, for a total of about thirty persons. See CE, II, f. 
178v. 
441 Gaspar Coelho’s military posture was criticized by his own brethren for being unfitted for a man of the 
cloth. In 1598, for instance, the Italian Organtino Gnecchi Soldo described Coelho’s behaviour as more 
similar to that of a ‘Capitanio d'armi che di pastore d’anime’. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 13 [I], f. 66v.  
442 The decree was issued on 20 June 1586. The fathers asked, and apparently obtained, also that their 
estates should not be exploited for military uses and that they should not be charged of any obligation in 
the cities they lived in. Cf. CE, II, ff. 178v-179 and CHJ IV, pp. 348-349. 
443 Cf. Carta Annua do Jappão de 1582, ANTT/AJ, Livro 28, f. 191v: ‘Senhoria estas partes [Miyako] ha 
ia muitos annos hum Senhor chamado Nobunanga, que com seu esforço e ardis de hum pequeno reino 
que tinha, em pouco tempo se fez Senhor de toda a Monarchia de Jappão [...]. Este homem parece que 
escolheo Deus para aparelhar o caminho a nossa Santa lei sem elle entender o que nisso faz, porque não 
somente estima em pouco e despreza os Camis e fotoques, a quem os jappões tem tanta devoção, mas 
ainda he cruel imigo e perseguidor dos Bonzos’. 
444 For a brief account of the two meetings see Okamoto, op. cit., pp. 469-475. 
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to make a visit to the fathers directly on board their fusta.445 He was the most welcomed 
of visits, of course. Hideyoshi took his time in studying the ship. He was really curious 
about it and ended his short tour giving praises to the Portuguese naval engineering.446 
When the scheduled meeting took place, after the war was won and over, Hideyoshi 
showed again his interest on Western ships and expressed his desire to see the 
Portuguese Nao do trato, which that year berthed at Hirado.447 The vice-provincial tried 
to dissuade Hideyoshi by telling him that moving the ship there presented several 
problems, but Hideyoshi insisted. Eventually, the Captain Major Domingos Monteiro 
had to go personally to Hakata to offer his services to the hegemon and to declare his 
inability to comply with Hideyoshi’s desire. Even though it seemed that the kanpaku 
understood and accepted the apologies, only a few hours later during the night, 
Hideyoshi changed radically his attitude towards the Christian faith, its preachers and its 
believers. That very night, in fact, Hideyoshi sent an accusatory letter to Coelho,448 
deprived the last strong kirishitan daimyō,449 Takayama Ukon Justo, of all his estates 
and exiled him to a peripherical region.450 As a final point, on 24 July 1587 Hideyoshi 
issued the official edict of proscription of the Christian faith, which would never be 
revoked. 
This is not the place to discuss the motives that led Hideyoshi to that abrupt 
change of attitude. Yet, it would be useful to look into the reasons behind Hideyoshi’s 
1587 decree, which obviously had been already analysed at length by several historians. 
Some consider the five-point decree as founded upon political and allegiance reasons, 
with no religious fundaments.451 Others, on the other hand, state that the religion was 
the issue, since the Christian belief was considered strong enough to jeopardize the very 
                                                 
445 A fusta was a boat of some two or three hundred tons. According to Moran it was built directly upon 
Coelho’s order. Cf. Moran, The Japanese and the Jesuits, p. 73. It has been also stated that it was 
frequently used in naval battles against pirates. Cf. CHJ IV, pp. 361-362.  
446  See CE, II, f. 199v: ‘Depois de a ver toda com muita curiosidade (por ser mui differente das 
embarcações dos Iapões) & gabando seu artificio’. 
447 Cf. Okamoto, op. cit., pp. 467-468. 
448 See CE, II, f. 207v. 
449 Between 24 May and 11 June 1587, in fact, both Dom Bartolomeu and Dom Francisco died. 
450 Takayama Ukon Justo (1553-1615) was one of the most faithful Japanese converted lords. He was a 
retainer of Nobunaga and then passed to serve Hideyoshi. He was definitely expelled from Japan in 1614 
and took refuge in Manila where he was welcomed as a champion of the Christian faith. Unfortunately, he 
died at Manila shortly after his arrival. Cf. Laures, “Takayama Ukon. A Critical Essay”, pp. 86-112. 
451 Cf. Boxer, Christian Century, p. 151, Cooper, Rodrigues, O Intérprete Um Jesuíta no Japão e na 
China, pp. 93-94 and Moran, op. cit., pp. 113-114. 
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social order Hideyoshi was trying to establish throughout the country. 452  It is our 
opinion that this kind of discussion is substantially based on an anachronistic view of 
the relation between politic and religion. In early modern Europe, kings and their 
vassals punished the crime of heresy as the most serious political offense, that of lese-
majesty. Disagree with the religion of the ruler was a form of political sedition. Hence, 
the heretic was basically a traitor. Betraying the fides involved the failing of fidelitas as 
a political link, since the heretic broke the very foundation of that link and he therefore 
deserved the worst punishment.453 In Japan the same happened. Take, for instance, the 
example of Takayama Ukon. His refusal to apostatize was considered as a political deed 
and was punished accordingly. Furthermore, it would seem that through Takayama’s 
weakening, Hideyoshi was trying to break up the group of kirishitan daimyō close to 
him.454 
Before the decree was issued, however, an epistolary exchange between 
Hideyoshi and Coelho took place. Also at this early stage of the kanpaku’s indignation, 
an accusation among all is worth to be quoted. Hideyoshi blamed Coelho to have come 
to Japan to spread a faith ‘prejudicial a todas as leis de Japão, enganosa, & distruidora 
de seus costumes & do gouerno da Tenca’.455 It is clear that Hideyoshi wanted to defend 
not only the Shintoism and the Buddhism, considered as cults belonging to Japan’s own 
nature. In the third point of the edict we find once again this accusation: ‘os Padres 
procedão com sua seita, assim [...] se ficão quebrando as leis de Japão’.456 In this case, it 
would seem that the Jesuit who translated the text of the decree was biased by the very 
mentality we are addressing. In the original text in Japanese, in fact, we do not find the 
correspondant for ‘se ficão quebrando as leis de Japão’, instead we read ‘日域の仏法を
相破る事’, which can be translated as ‘destroying the law of the Buddha in the place of 
the rising Sun’. We can see, then, that political and religious criticisms were actually 
interchangeable and it is, therefore, useless to exclude one in favour of the other.  
                                                 
452 Cf. Berry, op. cit., pp. 92-93 and Massarella, A World Elsewhere. Europe’s Encounter with Japan in 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, p. 162 
453 Cf. Prosperi, Tribunali della Coscienza, pp. 48-49. 
454 Cf. Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão, pp. 170-171. 
455 See CE, II, f. 209. 
456 Ivi, f. 209v. 
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Yet, what is significant to us now is how Hideyoshi stressed the importance of 
the juridical laws he had recently established, which was the main point of the second 
item:457 
‘O segundo. Vindo [the fathers] a estes reinos & estados de Iapão, fazem-nos de sua seita, 
pera o qual destruem os templos dos Camis458 & Fotoques,459 & isto he cousa agora & dantes 
nunca vista, nem ouuida de gente, quando o senhor da Tenca dá aos homens Reinos, Vilas, 
Cidades, & rendas, não he mais que polo tempo presente, & elles são obrigados a guardar 
inteiramente as leis, & determinações da Tenca, mas fazer a gente plebea outras perturbações 
semelhantes a estas he cousa dinha de castigo.’460 
In this entry, Hideyoshi attributed great importance to the fact that the the local lords 
were not the juridical possessor of their domains. According to Hideyoshi, who spoke as 
the lord of the Tenka, the daimyō were in charge of a land they did not own, but they 
only managed it ‘polo tempo presente’, temporarily (当座の事). Therefore, how could 
D. Bartolomeu donate something that was not his own? Nagasaki, in other words, 
represented a unicum within the Japanese country and as such embodied also some of 
the uncertainties that Hideyoshi was trying to level. The Taikō kenchi and the kokudaka 
system jointly symbolize firstly the effort to gain firmer control over the domains’ 
resources and productive output, but also a means to unify different systems into a 
single and official one. The cadastral registers assured Hideyoshi a complete knowledge 
of the productive capacities of the fiefs. Yet, the silk trade in Nagasaki granted to Dom 
Bartolomeu and the Society of Jesus an income that did not fit within the kenchi 
registers. 
We do not have the sources to confirm or refute this hypothesis. Yet, there has to 
be a part of truth in it. In 1590, three years later, Manila’s Archbishop, the Dominican 
Domingo de Salazar, 461  wrote an intriguing letter, which deserves to be quoted at 
lenght: 
                                                 
457 We opted to quote the Portuguese translation of the edict for the following reason. This translation 
enables us not only to read the content of the edict, but also to peer into the mentality of the translator, as 
we have already showed. At any rate, an English translation from the Japanese could be found in Boxer, 
Christian Century, p. 148 and Elison, “The Evangelic Furnace”, p. 145 
458 Kami 神, the principal spiritual entities of the Shintoism. 
459 Hotoke 仏, the Buddha. 
460 See CE, II, f. 209v.  
461 Domingo de Salazar (c. 1512-1594) studied law at the University of Salamanca before dedicating his 
life to the Dominican Order. He set off for the Spanish Indies in 1553, proselytizing especially in Florida 
and in Mexico, where between 1571 and 1576 carried out duties with the Inquisition. He went back to 
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‘Dezimos que la culpa desto [the edict] mas esta en los Padres que alli an predicado, que en el 
Rey que los a mandado salir, porque como aqui nos emos informado de Spañoles que an 
estado en aquellas Islas462 y delos Japones naturales dellas, el motivo que aquel Rey tuvo para 
hechar de alli alos Padres no fue porque predicaban el Evangelio […], sino porque aquellos 
Padres aunque con buen zelo para no ser costosos alos Japones, que es gente muy pobre, an 
uzado la mercancia en aquellas Islas traziendolas sus cargazones de Macan como alos demas 
y siguiendo su correspondencia los Padres de Macan con los de Japon y que para hazer esto 
tienen un breve del Papa Gregorio XIII, que aunque sea assi y ellos lo ayan hecho con buen 
intento para sustentar como dizen los seminarios o Collegios que alli tienen, pero cosa cierta 
es que este modo de predicar el Evangelio ni lo enseñaron los apostoles ni le han enseñado los 
Barones apostolicos entrando a predicar con mercadorias, sino con el menos provecho de 
todas las cosas […]. Tambien emos sabido que toman aquellos Padres algunos puertos del 
Japon, donde cobraban el anclaje y derechos de mercadorias, como V. Magestad los cobra 
[...], y tenian un procurador deputado de su orden que cobrava estos derechos. Tanbien nos an 
dicho que la tierra adentro começaban a tener algunos pueblos aunque desto no tenemos tanta 
certidunbre como delo primero’.463 
We should pause a while on Salazar’s words and try to understand whether there is 
something behind them or they show plainly their true nature. That the Spanish had a 
strong – colonial, commercial and religious – interest over Japan, China and the silk 
trade was no mistery. Attempts to snatch the Portuguese monopoly over those fields 
arrived both from laymen and from men of the cloth. Salazar himself only four days 
before he wrote this letter had confessed that he accepted Manila’s diocese because it 
was close to China.464 It would be normal, then, that Salazar was trying to achieve the 
same result here: belittle the name and the successes of the Padroado in front of the 
king in the attempt of obtaining the unconditioned support of the monarch to the 
detriment of the Iberian neighbours. Yet, the only consequence that the Archbishop’s 
words may have caused in the Spanish court was to limit or to impede the Ignatians’ 
                                                                                                                                               
Europe, but in 1578 he was appointed as first bishop at Manila, where he arrived in 1581. Cf. Porras 
Camúñez, Sinodo de Manila de 1582, Madrid, 1988, pp. 36-115. 
462 There is the possibility that Salazar was referring to Father Alonso Sánchez. The Spanish Jesuit, in 
fact, had shown his uneasiness towards the participation of his confreres in the silk trade. Once he finally 
got to Manila he wrote a letter to Acquaviva, stating that ‘alo menos avia V. P. de remediar que los padres 
no fuessen a Canton al tiempo de el empleo por que los manderinos chinas (que son los juezes) y todos 
los mercaderes tienen alos Padres por tratantes y demas caudal que ningun portugues, y llevandome a mi 
por aquellas ciudades dela China a dentro sin que supressen quien era en una de ellas dixo un mandarin  
'ya la conosco, que de unos padres es que estan en Macan y vienen cada año a Canton a comprar 
mercaduria y hazer vinanga (que es contratar o emplear)’. See ARSI, Philipp. 9, ff. 19v-20. 
463 See Archbishop Domingo de Salazar OP to King Filipe I, Manila, 29 June 1590. ARSI, Philipp. 9, ff. 
215-215v. 
464 Cf. Gil, Hidalgos y Samurai, p. 32, n. 23. 
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involvement in the trade, which did not happen, but it does not seem likely that King 
Filipe would take the silk trade away from the Portuguese and give it to the Spaniards. 
Then, in our opinion the prelate’s letter can be interpreted in two ways. The first is that 
he had some grudge (political or religious in this case did not seem to matter much) 
against the Society of Jesus and desired to spread slanders against it, maybe in order to 
facilitate the entrance of the Preachers in China. The second, on the other hand, 
presupposes that Domingo de Salazar was actually stating the truth and thus the Jesuits’ 
involvement in the silk trade between Macao and Nagasaki played actually a role within 
Hideyoshi’s behaviour. It is true that Hideyoshi wanted Brother João Rodrigues to 
handle his bargains, yet that does not exclude that the kanpaku wanted to limit the 
Jesuits’ participation in such a delicate and profitable matter. In favour of the latter 
interpretation, there is the general tone of the letter, which is neither angry nor 
excessively accusatory and, until a certain point, it stretches to justify the Ignatians and 
the trade.  
Furthermore, considering the dimensions of the undertaking of mapping the 
sixty-six provinces of Japan, it seems reasonable to think that for Hideyoshi would have 
been illogical to leave such a particular city in the hands of a foreign institution, on top 
of it a religious one that had already demonstrated to have a certain military 
resourcefulness. Beside Coelho’s fusta, in fact, the fathers had also other intruments for 
their defense. Right after they gained possession of Nagasaki, precisely in 1582, thanks 
to the income of the Japan voyage, they could afford to erect a defensive wall made of 
hard-pressed clay (taipa) all around the city. Furthermore, Nagasaki itself had already 
been provided with a fortress and six bulwarks.465 It is not clear to what extent Nagasaki 
had been militarized by 1587, yet it should not surprise that a tyrant as Hideyoshi 
preferred to take the city for himself. Nevertheless, in the second general conference of 
the mission in August 1590, it was debated whether it would advisable to have a fortress 
in Nagasaki in case Hideyoshi would restore the Jesuits’ control over the port. The 
fathers were all of the opinion that ‘não se tivesse [in Nagasaki] Fortaleza em nosso 
nome, nem fosse por nosoutros sustentada, nem provida de gente darmas e 
                                                 
465 Cf. ANTT/AJ, Livro 28, f. 179v: ‘O apposento que nesta terra temos, fiquou mui fermoso e seguro com 
a cerqua que este anno se fez ao redor de huma taimpa mui forte de que toda a fortaleza de Nangaçaque 
esta cerquada com seus baluartes. Fez-se esta obra toda com o dinheiro que os navios dos portugezes 
custumão a pagar ao Senhor da terra’. 
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moniçoens’.466 Valignano, in his personal Resoluções on the conference, agreed on what 
had been decided, but incidentally added also some details that help us understand better 
the level of military defence at Nagasaki. Namely, he wrote that ‘já a artelharia toda se 
tem mandado pera a China no junco que ja partio e se venderão as munições e 
espingardas que em casa estavão guardadas’.467 It would seem, then, that the Ignatians 
not only participated on the expenses of the former fortress, but they also kept in their 
premises firearms and ammunitions presumably used by the Portuguese or Japanese 
garrison.  
At any rate, however, the kanpaku did not deal with Nagasaki when he rewarded 
fudai and tozama daimyō with land concessions. It is likely that Nagasaki was a topic 
that deserved to be handled separately, since coping with the port meant dealing with 
the Society of Jesus. 
The 1587-decree against the Christian faith is famous in particular because it 
was not enforced. As a matter of fact, Hideyoshi’s order to expel the missionaries did 
not consider that the only way the Jesuits could actually go away was aboard the Great 
Ship. Fortunately for the fathers, in 1587, owing to the turmoils in Kyūshū, Macao’s 
citizens resolved to cancel the Japan voyage. Consequently, the missionaries had to wait 
at least nine months before being able to leave. In any case, while they were waiting for 
Hideyoshi to decide, they all gathered at Hirado. It is true, as it is commonly stated, that 
eventually Hideyoshi did not impose the expulsion, but the blow he inferred on the 
mission was heavy nonetheless. In addition to the confiscation of Nagasaki, in fact, he 
expropriated also the Jesuits’ estates in Ōsaka, Sakai and Miyako, and, furthermore, he 
forbid the Portuguese merchants to display Christian symbols aboard the kurofune468 
and to bring any more missionaries to Japan.469  
 In 1587, then, the Japan Jesuits lost two Japanese Christian lords and a third one 
was weakend and exiled. They lost the port-city and, to make things worse, they lost 
also the income from the missing voyage. In 1589, however, Hideyoshi received an 
embassy by the Captain Major Jerónimo Pereira and confessed that he was not adversed 
                                                 
466 See Segunda Consulta Geral feita pello Padre Alexandre Valignano Visitador da Companhia de Jesus 
em Jappão em Agosto do anno de 1590, ARSI, Jap. Sin. 51, ff. 149v-150.   
467 See Resoluções do Padre Visitador sobre a dita consulta, ARSI, Jap. Sin. 51, f. 170v. 
468 Hideyoshi expressely stated that the merchants were in no means included in the decree of expulsion. 
Cf. CE, II, f. 209v: ‘O quarto, porque a nao vem fazer sua fazenda, & he cousa mui differente, fação 
embora suas fazendas’.  
469 Cf. CE, II, f. 209. 
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to the Christian faith, but added that the evangelization would shake Japan to its very 
foundations; hence he could not allow it. It would seem that the plan of the kanpaku was 
not to eradicate Christianity from Japan, rather to show to the Westerners the limitless 
boundaries of his power without scarying them to the point of interrupting any contact. 
Whilst the possession of Nagasaki was given back to the Ōmura, the silk trade 
continued to prosper. In that very year of 1589, precisely on 29 April, Alessandro 
Valignano was again in Macao waiting to set for Japan. Before returning there, 
however, the Italian Jesuit had to stipulate again the armação with the city merchants. 
Two things had changed since 1579: first, the participation of the fathers of the Society 
of Jesus in the contract was confirmed by a royal decree on 18 April 1584 and, second, 
in 1586 Viceroy Dom Duarte de Menezes had granted to Macao the same privileges as a 
city of the kingdom, which obliged the Macanese community to renew the contracts. 
Valignano never regret having stipulated the armação although he kept receiving 
criticisms and reprimands almost every year from Rome or Goa. In 1599, he wrote in 
exasperation to the father provincial in India that those who had no experience in Japan, 
simply could not understand what it took for the mission to survive: 
‘Eu pola graça de N. Senhor não naçi filho de mercader, nem nunca o fui, mas folgo de ter 
feito o que fiz por amor de Japão, e creo que N. Senhor tambem o tem por bem feito e que me 
faz e fará muitas merçes [...], por onde Padre meu quem esta farto, e lhe não falta nada não 
pode ser bom Juiz dos apertos que padecem os que estão morrendo de fome em grande 
necessidade, e se qualquer de Vuestras Reverencias se visse colos gastos destas Provincia as 
costas e com tam pouca renda, e cabedal, e esse pouco tam perigozo e imcerto eu lhe aseguro 
que não dormiria o seu sono muito descançado’.470 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
470 See Visitor Valignano to the Provincial of India, Shiki, 12 October 1599. BL/Add. 9860, f. 67. Cf. 
Boxer, Missionaries and Merchants, p. 224. 
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 Conclusion 
The first part of the present work was dedicated to a contextualization conceived 
to be not a mere presentation of the historical fact, rather a framework able to introduce 
us to the whole status quo of the 16th century. Of course, the raison d’être of this thesis 
is still ahead, but it would not have been possible to deal with such a topic – the 
procurator of the Society of Jesus in Japan – without a straightforward understanding of 
the facts and the men involved. It is understandable that for the sake of brevity a lot of 
choices had to be taken, hence limiting space – or not assigning it at all –to important 
facts that happened in the period and places we have examined. It was necessary to 
make such choices in order to maintain the focus on the principal subjects of this 
dissertation. However, there are some elements that have been slightly left aside more 
for a narrative purpose.  
First of all, the narration abruptly stops at 1587, whereas the very title of this 
work imposes to move our analysis at least 25 years further on. The last ten years of 
Hideyoshi’s rule will not be just censored off, but in the first part was necessary to give 
a certain amount of notions to explain better what happened in the first twenty years of 
the 17th century. And it is undeniable that what happened in the 1580s, both in Europe 
and in Asia, clearly defined the first half of the following century: the Iberian Provincia 
cerrada came into being with a series of political and economic consequences both in 
the Atlantic Ocean and in Asia, the pontiffs recognized the Jesuits’ efforts in Japan and 
granted them annual donation to continue the proselytization, as already done by the last 
kings of the Portuguese House Avis, Dom Sebastião and Dom Henrique. In Asia, on the 
other hand, two fundamental cities for the Asian trade within the Portuguese patronage 
were founded in less than thirty years. The two of them both strictly linked to 
Portuguese private entrepreneurs, the silk trade and the Society of Jesus. The latter got 
to the point of being in charge of Nagasaki, but that did not go well. In the second part, 
we will see how Hideyoshi’s rule waned and we will directly see Tokugawa Ieyasu and 
how the Jesuits coped with him. 
Secondly, we are leaving aside the mentality of the human beings, whose 
existences we are approaching and trying to understand. Practically all the theme faced 
in this first part, namely the union of the Iberian crowns, the involvement of men of the 
cloth in secular matters and the very office of procurator, will be dealt with in the 
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second part in a different manner, less devoted to the historical facts perhaps, but it is 
history nonetheless. 
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PART 2 
THE MEN AND THE OFFICE OF PROCURATOR:  
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
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CHAPTER I 
 
CARLO SPINOLA’S LIFE FROM HIS BIRTH UNTIL 
THE APPOINTMENT TO PROCURATOR OF THE JAPAN 
PROVINCE 1564-1611 
 
I. 1.    A low-born noble: Carlo Spinola’s birthplace 
The Jesuit Father Carlo Spinola died burned at the stake on 10 September 1622, 
on what Japanese historiography calls the Genna Daijunkyō,1 the great martyrdom of 
the Genna era.2 In that martyrdom, twenty-two missionaries (Jesuits, Dominicans and 
Franciscans) were burned alive, whereas other thirty found their death by the Japanese 
swords.3  
In the Chiesa del Gesù in Rome is preserved an oil painting made by an 
anonymous Japanese artist, which is almost an actual photography of the martyrdom 
(Picture 1). The painting is so detailed that we are able to identify Carlo Spinola among 
the sentenced to death (the fifth one standing starting from the left), and has therefore a 
big historical value, which goes beyond the artistic one. In addition to this visual source, 
we obviously have several descriptions of this martyrdom,4 and we are going to quote 
an excerpt from the first published biography of Carlo Spinola: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 元和大殉教 
2 The Genna era spanned the years from 1615 to 1625. 
3 Cf. Em tempo do Emperador Daifuzama forão mortos por odio de nossa Santa Fé cento e trina e nove 
pessoas, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-55, p. 324. 
4  See for instance De Novis Christianæ Religiois Progressibvs, et Certaminibvs in Iaponia, anno 
MDCXXII. In Regno Sinarvm MDCXXI et MDCXII and Relación breve delos grandes y rigurosos 
martirios que el año passado de 1622 dieron en el Iapon a ciento y diez y ocho ilustrissimos Martyres, 
sacada principalmente de las cartas de los Padres de la Compañía de Iesus que allí residen, y de lo que 
han referido muchas personas de aquel Reyno, que en dos Nauios llegaron a la Ciudad de Manila a 12 
de Agosto de 1633. 
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       Picture 1 Anonymous, Genna Daijunkyō, Rome, Chiesa del Gesù, 17th century 
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‘Il nostro Padre Carlo fù il primo di tutti, che ne riportò la desiderata palma [of the 
martyrdom]; il quale non potè lungamente contrastare con quegli ardori [of the flames], 
non solo per essere già vecchio [...], ma molto più perche alcune fauille di fuoco di quelle, 
che dalle legna saltando volauano per aria, se gli fermarono nel petto, e gli accesero la 
veste [...]. Si che mancandogli a poco a poco le forze, cadde a terra, e quasi che la 
ringratiasse per la corona, che riportaua da lei, abbracciolla in quell’vltimo atto, e spirò, 
con questa morte nascendo eternamente al cielo li 10 di Settembre 1622’.5  
Numerous Western philosophers and writers from the ancient times 6 up to the 16th 
century7 had been asserting that whilst there may be disguise and dissimulation in a 
man’s life, in the last scene of death there is no more counterfeiting. ‘Nam veræ voces 
tum demum pectore ab imo eiciuntur, et eripitur persona, manet res’,8 the truth, in other 
words, at last issues from the heart. According to this branch of our philosophy, then, 
the way a man faces his death has the power to give a good or an an ill repute to his 
whole life. If we were to judge Spinola’s life though his death, we would state that as a 
martyr he could not have left a better testimony of his belief.  
 We know all the details with regard to his death. The day, the place, the reasons, 
the people involved, who he was with, the moments before and after the execution. We 
also know that when he was already tied to the stake, a Japanese Christian managed to 
snatch the carapuça – a beret – the Father was wearing as a relic.9 Unfortunately, for 
the moment he was born, we are not as lucky. The information about Carlo Spinola’s 
early years is quite scanty and inconclusive. Yet, the research that had been carried out 
during the last years might shed some light upon them.  
 The precise date of Spinola’s birth has never been ascertained. It is our opinion 
that he was probably born between 24 and 31 of December 1564, although recently it 
has been stated that he was born in the first months of 1565.10 In this regard, Jesuit 
sources are often discordant,11 but it seems that the year 1564 is confirmed by the Jesuit 
                                                 
5 Cf. Spinola F. A., Vita del P. Carlo Spinola della Compagnia di GIESV morto per a Santa Fede nel 
Giappone, p. 214. 
6 Cf. Seneca, Epistulæ Morales ad Lucilium, 17, 102. 
7 Cf. Michel de Montaigne, Essays, XVIII – That men are not to judge of our happiness till after death. 
8 Cf. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, III, 57-58.  
9 The orignal letter in Japanese that attested this fact still survives. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, ff. 133v-134. 
10 Cf. Ruiz-de-Medina, “Un Jesuita de Madrid Arquitecto de la Iglesia de São Paulo, Macao”, pp. 37-38.  
11 By way of example see how various catalogues of the Ignatians disagree about this point. In the Lista 
dos Padres e Irmãos que forão pera a India e Japão ano de 1596 we read ‘P. Carlos Espinola, genovês, 
de 30 anos e da Companhia 12’, that is to say that he was born in 1566. See DI XVIII 1595-1597, p. 530. 
Nevertheless, the Catalogo dos Padres e Irmãos da Companhia de Jesus da India, feito em dezembro de 
1599 reads that ‘P. Carolo Espinola natural de Genova de idade de 34; da Companhia 15’, which means 
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historian Daniello Bartoli, according to whom when Spinola entered the Society of 
Jesus (23 December 158412) he was about to turned twenty.13 As a matter of fact, it 
would seem that not even the individual concerned was conscious of his date of birth. In 
the first and indisputable source that mentions him, the Colleggii Neapolitani Catalogus 
of the 1590s, we find the following table: 
Nomen et 
Cognomen Patria Ætas Vires Tempus Societatis Tempus Studiorum 
Carolus 
Spinola 
Genuensis 
Natus anno 
1562 ut putat 
Mediocres 
Ingressus ani 
1584, mense 
9mbri 
Studuit humanioribus literis 
annum et logicæ annum in 
Societate 
Source: Colleggii Neapolitani Catalogus, ARSI, Neap. 80, f. 8v. 
As registered in this catalogues, Spinola supposed (putat) that he was born in 1562. It 
was not strange back then for someone to ignore his date of birth. Actually, it 
commonly happened until the very 20th century that people knew only approximately 
when they were born. Yet, not even the first biographers of Carlo, his fellow Father 
Bento Fernandes14 and the already quoted Fabio Ambrosio Spinola,15 could ascertain 
Spinola’s date of birth.16 
 What is even more intriguing, anyway, is Carlo Spinola’s birthplace. Since the 
publication of the first biography in 1628 until the latest works about the Italian Jesuit, 
the place of his birth was always given as secure information and there has always been 
                                                                                                                                               
he was born in 1565. Cf. ARSI, Goa 24, f. 282. The same can be desumed from the data in Catalogo 1.° 
das Informaçoens comunas dos Padres e Irmãos de Jappão feito em Junho de 1617, we read that ‘O P. 
Carlos Spinola Italiano de Genova anno de idade 52 da Companhia 32’, which means he was born in 
1565. Cf. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, f. 166v. 
12 Cf. Spinola, op. cit., p. 10 and ARSI, Med. 47, p. 24. 
13 See Bartoli, Dell’Historia della Compagnia di Giesu. Il Giappone, seconda parte Dell’Asia, IV p. 133: 
‘[…] giovane in età di venti anni, non ancora compiuti’. 
14 Bento Fernandes was born probably in 1578 in Portugal and set off for the Indies in 1602, reaching 
Japan three years later. He got acquainted with Spinola in Miyako and remained in Japan even after the 
decree of expulsion of 1614 and continued to proselytize until his capture in 1633, the same year of his 
martyrdom. Cf. Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão, pp. 773-774. 
15 We do not have precise information about Fabio Ambrosio Spinola, but he did not belong to the same 
branch of the Spinola family as Carlo, the Counts of Tassarolo. Fabio was born on 5 October 1593 and 
entered the Society of Jesus on 28 August 1610, in the Milanese province, which included also Genoa, 
where most likely he was born and would die on 18 August 1671. 
16 Namely, Fernandes wrote that Spinola ‘entro na Companhia de dezanove pera 20 annos de idade’. See 
Fernandes, “Da vida e virtudes do Padre Carlo Spinola” in Relaçam das vidas, e mortes gloriosas, que 
por pregare o Santo Evangelho nos reinos de Iapão alguns Padres, e Irmãos da Companhia de Iesu 
padeceram no anno de mile seis centos, e vinte e dous, feita pello Padre Bento Fernandes da mesma 
Companhia residente em Japam, in ARSI, Jap. Sin. 60, ff. 224-233. Fabio Ambrogio Spinola wrote 
something similar: ‘essendo di età di 19 in 20 anni’. See Spinola, op. cit., p. 10. Considering that Carlo 
Spinola entered the novitiate on 23 December 1584, we deduce that he was born between the last days of 
December 1584 and January 1585. Cf. ARSI, Med. 47, p. 24. 
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an understandable need to correct the mistake in favour of historical precision. At any 
rates, three probable birthplaces have been suggested: Genoa, Prague and Madrid. 
 The first one, Genoa, is, we might say, an honest mistake. The Spinola, in fact, 
were one of the most important aristocratic houses in Genoa. After almost two centuries 
of alternation between self-rule under doges chosen for life and foreign rule in particular 
by Milan and France, starting from 1531, Genoa instated the dogeship on a two year 
basis. Until the 18th century, the doges were chosen in particular among two houses: 
Doria and Spinola. Carlo Spinola, however, belonged to a secondary branch of the 
family, namely the Counts of Tassarolo, an aristocratic title created by Emperor 
Ferdinand I in 1560 for Marcantonio Spinola, Carlo’s oldest uncle. It was highly 
probable, then, that Carlo was born between Genoa and Tassarolo. Furthermore, the 
Jesuit catalogues that survive from the time he was in Italy, i.e. 1584-1595, under the 
column called Patria unmistakably report Genuensis. In the early modern period, the 
substantives patria and natio were interchangeable and shared a certain polysemy, 
although the latter usually referred to wider spaces than the former. They could indicate 
the place where one was born, but may also refer to a community with a collective 
culture. From the political point of view, in particular, the parameters that lead to the 
identification of one’s natio were the dynasties, the titles, the relationship with the 
country and the rights enjoyed therein. 17  As a consequence, then, although the 
catalogues of the Society were compiled upon questioning the individual registered, 
from them we can only deduce that Spinola belonged to a Genoese family.18 Moreover, 
if we take a look to later catalogues drawn up in Japan, we always read Father Carlo 
Spinola, Italian, natural of Genoa.19  
In any case, if we sum the catalogues to the first biographies of Carlo Spinola, it 
would not be strange to conclude that he was actually born in Genoa. Yet, in 1675 the 
rector of the Prague University Matthias Tanner wrote that ‘Carolus Spinola […], Pragæ 
in Bohemia natus’.20 Tanner’s volume is the visual record of the martyrdoms of his 
confrères throughout the whole missions of the Society in the 16th and 17th centuries. 
                                                 
17 Cf. Spagnoletti, “El Concepto de Naturaleza, Nación y Patria en Italia y el Reino de Nápoles con 
Respecto a la Monarquía de los Austrias”, p. 483. 
18 Cf. Ruiz-de-Medina, op. cit., p. 38. 
19 Cf. ARSI, Goa 24, f. 282, TCJ, pp. 581, 595, 658 and 853. 
20 Cf. Tanner, Societas Jesu usque ad Sanguinis et Vitæ Profusionem Militans. In Europa, Africa, Asia, et 
America, contra Gentiles, Mahometanos, Judæos, Hæreticos, Impios, Pro Deo Fide Ecclesia Pietate. Sive 
Vita et Mors Eorum, Qui Ex Societate Jesu in causa Fidei, &Virtutis Propugantæ, Violentam Morte Toto 
Orbe Sublati Sunt, p. 289 
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According to the medieval and early modern mentality, a martyr was intended not as a 
man who failed, but as someone to be celebrated and, in particular, emulated. As he 
wrote in the initial paragraph of Spinola’s biography, ‘[s]anguinis Martyrum, non 
tantum semen est Christianorum, sed etiam exhortatio Martyriorum, dum imitari non 
piget, quod celebrare delectate’.21 A contemporary biographer of Carlo, the Spanish 
Jesuit Ruiz-de-Medina, ascribed Tanner’s assertion to the fact that he wanted to claim 
for his own country the birth of a glorious martyr of the Society of Jesus.22 According to 
Ruiz-de-Medina, in fact, Tanner did not found his theory on solid historical clues but on 
a disputable inference. Namely, the Bohemian wrote that since Carlo’s father, Ottavio, 
served under Emperor Rudolf II, whose court was in Prague, then Carlo must have been 
born there. 23  Ruiz-de-Medina followed this reasoning but refuted the conclusion. 
Accordingly, he corrected his fellow on the fact that around the year Carlo was born the 
young Rudolf was sent to Madrid in order to receive a Christian education, which 16th-
century Prague was not able to offer. Hence, he concluded, Carlo must have born in 
Madrid, since his father moved there along with Rudolf’s retinue. Actually, this was not 
an original idea by Ruiz-de-Medina. In 1711, in fact, appeared in prints the second 
volume of the history of the Neapolitan province of the Society written by the 
Neapolitan Francesco Schinosi. As we know, Carlo Spinola entered the novitiate in 
Nola, therefore Schinosi dedicated two pages to the martyr. With regard to his birth, he 
wrote that Carlo ‘nacque del 1564 in Madrid; come ci è palese [...] per l’antico 
Notamento del Noviziato Nolano [Schinosi’s note: In arch. Prov. Neap.]’.24 Schinosi at 
least provided a reference, a rather vague one, though. Since we were not able to find 
this reference, we cannot question its intrinsic truthfulness. Still, another source can be 
added to the dispute, a source that was either ignored or unknown by previous 
historians. 
In the private archive of House Spinola in Tassarolo still survive several family 
trees compiled since the 17th century for family use. If on the one hand these family 
trees lack all the bibliographical data historians usually rely upon, such as who was the 
compiler, when he drew them up and what kind of sources did he have access to, on the 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Cf. Ruiz-de-Medina, op. cit., p. 38. 
23 Tanner, op. cit., p. 289: ‘Carolus Spinola è Comitum [sic, Contium] Tassaroliorum [sic, Tassalorium] 
Illustrissima progenie, Patre Octavio, Rodulphi Cæsaris, magno stabuli Magistro, Pragæ in Bohemia 
natus [...]’. 
24 Schinosi, Istoria della Compagnia di Giesu, Appartenente al Regno di Napoli, descritta da Franscesco 
Schinosi della medesima Compagnia, vol. II, p. 77. 
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other hand the fact that they were conceived as a product for Spinolas’ eyes only led us 
to believe that their contents had not been submitted to a board of censors. This idea is 
reinforced by the information about Carlo Spinola we found in a family tree of the 
Tassarolo line probably drawn up in the second half of the 19th century: ‘Beato Carlo 
Gesuita, Martirizzato al Giappone, nato da Donna libera di Praga’.25 ‘Donna libera’ is 
most likely a euphemism for prostitute. Is this the reason why we do not find any 
mention whatsoever about Carlo’s mother in his letters? Ottavio, in fact, never got 
married and as stated in a petition made by his brother Filippo he had only a child. At 
any rate, this is not the kind of information a noble lineage want to spread about an 
eminent ancestor who was recently proclaimed blessed.26 It is also probable that during 
Carlo’s life such a detail must have been concealed in order not to jeopardize the 
religious path chose by Carlo. During Pope Sixtus V pontificate (1585-1590), in fact, 
decree establishing who could take the religious votes and who could not was issued. 
With regards to bastard children, the pontiff ordered: 
‘[Q]ue não sejão admittidos à Religião, salvo sendo primeiro examinada sua vida e custumes 
e mais circunstancias acerca de sua sufficientia etc. E achando-se que tem mericimentos taes 
que suprão o defeito que tem do seu nacimento e que serão muy proveitosos com sua doutrina 
à Religião e sendo sobre isto feita deliberação matura no capitulo Geral ou Provincial, sejão 
polo Geral ou Provincial com unanime consentimento dos definidores aprovados e admitidos 
ao habito’.27 
It is true that Sixtus V seated on the chair of St. Peter few months before Carlo 
Spinola’s admission in the Society of Jesus, yet we suppose that this decree was the 
product of a pre-existent mentality, not a revolutionary act by the pope. It is true, 
however, that if we read all the information about Spinola’s birth in the light of the 
family tree and the consideration of bastard children in 16th century Europe everything 
starts to make more sense. Carlo’s obliviousness of his birthday, for instance, may be 
ascribed to the fact that he was never registered in a parish, whereas the uncertainty 
regards his birthplace has to be attributed to Spinola’s own desire of keeping his 
mother’s profession a secret. 
                                                 
25 An inventory of Spinola’s private archive has not been made yet. We are therefore unable to provide an 
identification of the manuscript we quoted. 
26 Spinola was beatified by Pope Pius IX in 1869. Cf. ARSI, Archivio della Postul. Gen. (Santi e Beati) - 
Beati Carlo Spinola e Soci. 47 – Breve di beatificazione di Carlo Spinola insieme con 205 Martiri 
Giapponesi. 
27 Cf. Acerca de nova Constituição do Papa Sisto sobre os Ilegítimos e outras Pessoas que não podem ser 
admitidas às Religiões, in ANTT/AJ, Livro 3, f. 317v. 
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 To reinforce the Prague-theory, we may add also another proof. Both Tanner and 
Schinosi’s lines of argument start from the assumption that Ottavio Spinola followed 
the Rudolf at Madrid in 1563 as Highest Equerry (Cavallerizzo Maggiore) to the 
emperor. By that time, however, Rudolf was only eleven-year old boy who had not yet 
inherited the crown, whereas Ottavio did not receive that title until the 1570s. However, 
Carlo Spinola’s grandfather, Agostino, had five sons.28 Three of them belonged to the 
high ranks of the Habsburg crown, under the rule of Carlos V, Fernando I, Maximilian 
II and Rudolf II. Agostino’s firstborn, Marcantonio, was Highest Equerry of Emperor 
Maximilian II, but in the 1560s was appointed educator (aio) of the emperor’s offspring 
when they were sent to Spain.29 It was Marcantonio, then, not Ottavio who was chosen 
to accompany Rudolf and his brother Ernest to Madrid. The theory sponsored by both 
Schinosi and Ruiz-de-Medina, then, seems to have more than a flaw. We cannot exclude 
outright that the 21-year old Ottavio went to Spain as well, yet it seems more probable 
that at least initially he stayed at the imperial court, which in the 1560s was exactly in 
Prague, and then he went to Madrid to join Marcantonio. What about Carlo? Did he go 
with his father or only joined him years later? The only thing we know, if Schinosi is a 
reliable source, is that he was registered in the Toledan diocese, which back then was 
the main diocese in Spain and included also Madrid. In effect, also Fabio Ambrosio 
Spinola wrote that ‘Carlo […] passata la fanciullezza, e pueritia, nela quale diede 
principio allo studio della Grammatica, andò con non sò che occasione in Ispagna’,30 
where Carlo continued his studies, perhaps in one of the Society’s collegia nobilium.  
In conclusion, the evidences we have been gathering seem to enable us to 
determine two things: First, the impossibility to define the exact date of birth of Carlo 
Spinola for lack of parish or civil documentation and Spinola’s unawareness as well. 
Second, the almost absolute certainty that he was born in the capital city of the Holy 
Roman Empire, after a while he moved to Spain.  
The current state of knowledge does not allow us to give further information on 
Spinola’s early years. Something else might be said about what kind of teaching were 
given in the colleges for nobles, but nothing else that regards Carlo. We know that he 
                                                 
28 See Annex B – Counts of Tassarolo Family Tree. 
29 Spinola, op. cit., p. 2: ‘[...] fu Marc’Antonio [...] con titolo [...] di Cauallerizzo Maggiore, doppo con 
carico d’Aio de’ figliuoli di Massimiliano, quando passarono in Ispagna, oue fù honorato con la Croce di 
Sant’Iago, & vna buona Commenda’. 
30 Ivi, p. 3. 
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remained only a few years in Spain,31 and perhaps as early as 1575 he went to Southern 
Italy, precisely to the bishopric of Nola, where he eventually met with his uncle, the 
Cardinal Filippo. 
 
  I. 2.    The trajectories of a Jesuit (1584-1600) 
In this part, we are going to list and define Carlo Spinola’s first movement as a 
novitiate until his departure from Italy. This period spans the years from 1584 to 1595 is 
relevant to our research because it was in those years that Carlo gathered the necessary 
knowledge that allowed him to be appointed procurator of the Japan Vice-province. 
Hence, we are going to survey briefly his movements throughout the Italian provinces 
of the Society of Jesus and his studies as a novice as he kept climbing the hierarchy of 
the Ignatian order. Differently from the previous chapter, in this section we can rely 
both on printed and manuscript sources, which enable us to be more precise about date 
and places and, therefore, less imaginative in our deductions. We are going to focus 
mostly on those details that form a solid base for the rest of the work. 
 
I. 2. 1.    The Neapolitan Province, the Collegio Romano and Milan 
 As we saw, it is highly probable that Spinola spent his youth in Madrid and then 
moved back to Italy. We ignore whether he actually passed by his family’s earldom in 
Tassarolo, but we know that by the mid-1570s he was in Nola, near Naples, guest of the 
Archbishop Filippo Spinola. Not even ten years after his arrival, between 1583 and 
1584, Carlo had already made up his mind about taking the black robe of the Society of 
Jesus. On 7 December 1584, he sent a letter to his uncle Filippo to inform the new 
cardinal of the Roman church about his resolute desire of being admitted in the order 
‘per il giorno di S. Tomaso’ and to receive his placet.32 The feast of St. Thomas the 
Apostle was (and is) celebrated on 21 December. Spinola, however, received Filippo’s 
                                                 
31 The only confirmation of the fact that Spinola was not born in Italy is to be found in a letter the Jesuit 
wrote in 1606 from Miyako. Namely, he wrote that ‘[e]u todo o tempo que estivi em Italia tive grandes 
desejos de vir à Japão e fiz muito pera alcançalo’. Although the quote does not say a lot about Spinola’s 
whereabouts during his youth, at least it tells us that Spinola arrived in Italy from another country. Cf. 
ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 151v. 
32 The original of the letter did not survive until today. We only have an excerpt copied by Fabio 
Ambrosio Spinola and published in his work. Cf. Spinola, op. cit., pp. 8-9.  
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consent a little later than he expected, therefore he was accepted only two days later and 
eventually entered the novitiate at Nola ‘di età di 19 in 20 anni’.33 He stayed at Nola 
only for a year. When 1586 broke, in fact, he was forced to move to Lecce, Puglia, 
because the scarcity of subjects did not allow the novices to dwell for two entire years in 
the probationary houses. 34 However, in autumn, he went to Naples to continue his 
studies in philosophy and metaphysics. Also his staying in the viceregal city lasted only 
a few months, since in that same year we find traces of him in Rome. 
If one looks to the catalogues where Jesuits recently arrived in Rome were 
registered, we do not find Spinola’s name – and that is a pity, since this catalogue is like 
a registration form, which each Jesuit was supposed to fill with his private information, 
as well as the things in his possession. Carlo Spinola, in fact, did not officially enter the 
Collegio Romano, yet between 1586 and 1587 he was enlisted in the advanced 
mathematics course held in the scientific academy of the German Jesuit Christoph 
Clavius. 35  Most likely, he spent no more than few months in the Eternal City, as 
confirmed by Fabio Ambrosio Spinola and the French Charlevoix. 36 Unfortunately, 
however, we do not have detailed data regarding in staying in Rome. Clavius’s 
academy, in fact, was a foreign body within the institutional structure of the Society of 
Jesus. Although during the 1580s Clavius had been trying to have the academy 
officially recognized, it remained an informal course until 1594. This is why we do not 
have precise information about the Jesuits who attended it in the 1580s. Anyway, one 
thing that can be ascertained is that the average duration of attendance was usually of 
only one year,37 the same as Spinola.  
It is probably during this time that Carlo started to file letters with the Curia 
asking the pass for the Japan mission, though he had to wait almost a decade before 
                                                 
33 Spinola, op. cit., p. 10.  
34 See Spinola, op. cit., p. 10: ‘[...] la penuria de’ soggetti non permetteva in quei tempi che dimorassero i 
Novitiij l’intero spatio di due anni nelle Case di Probatione.’ The probationary houses – Domus 
probationis – or novitiate, were those places where the novices used to spend the two years before they 
made the Religious vows. 
35 Cf. Baldini, Saggi sulla cultura della Compagnia di Gesù (secoli XVI – XVIII), p. 91 and Frison, “Il 
contributo scientifico del gesuita Carlo Spinola nel Giappone del primo Tokugawa”, pp. 21-22. Father 
Christoph Clavius (1538-1612) 
36 Cf. Spinola, op. cit., p. 12: ‘..per qualche poco di tempo si trattenne studiando matematica sotto il P. 
Clavio’ and Charlevoix, Histoire de l’etablissement, des progres, et de la decadence du Christianisme 
dans l’empire du Japon, vol. III, p. 222: ‘Il fut envoye a Naples pour y faire sa Philosophie: il alla ensuite 
a Rome pour etudier les Mathematiques sous le fameux Clavius, & il fit des si grands progres dans ces 
sciences, qu'il fut charge de les enseigner, tandis qu'il etudoit en Theologie.’ 
37 Baldini, op. cit., p. 57. 
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seeing his desire satisfied.38 In any case, by the end of summer of 1587 he left Rome39 
headed for Milan, precisely the College of Brera. Although his acquaintance with 
Clavius lasted less than a year, the two of them remained in contact while Spinola was 
in Northern Italy, and this is an evidence of the intensity of the time the Italian spent 
with the German. In Milan, Carlo Spinola first completed the studies of philosophy, 
natural sciences and theology. Then, he taught Grammar in 159040 and in 1591 became 
Magister of mathematics, replacing replaced Bernardino Salino who had been in charge 
of the classes since 1589.41 Spinola held the chair until the end of 1594,42 when he 
defended the thesis in Theology 43  and was ordained priest, which was almost a 
necessary step in order to apply for the Asian mission, because of the strict order sent by 
Valignano back in 1587.44 Eventually, on 16 September 1595, while he was in Cremona 
participating in the growth of the mission,45 Acquaviva personally informed him that he 
had been selected to go to Japan: ‘[...] le dico che havendo fatta consideratione sopra i 
soggetti che voglono mandare col P. Procuratore del Giapone,46 tra gl’altri haviamo 
eletto V. R. [...]! Vada dunque allegramente con la benedizione del Signore che perché 
si vuol servir di la in cosí importante missione’.47  
After having received such pleasant news, Spinola only had to pack his things up 
and go to Genoa. On 5 January 1596, he set out from the port of Genoa in a galley of 
                                                 
38 We know that, at least until July 1585, Spinola did not ask the general for the pass. Spinola, in fact, 
does not appear in the list of the indipetæ from the Neapolitan province received by Acquaviva in that 
year. Curiously, among those who wanted to serve the Society outside Europe there is also the Italian 
Alessandro Ferrari, who set off from Lisbon along with Spinola some years later. Cf. ARSI, Neap. 3, ff. 
91 and 94. 
39 Spinola was not registered in the Catalogus Collegii Romani anni 1587 in octobr. Cf. ARSI, Rom. 53, 
ff. 76-84v. 
40 Ivi, f. 24. 
41 Cf. Baldini e Napolitani, Christoph Clavius: Corrispondenza, vol. I, part II, pp. 91-92 and vol. III, part 
II, p. 8. 
42 Cf. Fischer, “Jesuiten-Mathematiker in der französischen und italianische Assistenz bis 1762 bzw. 
1773”, p. 82. 
43See ARSI, Med. 47 f. 69v: ‘P. Carolus Spinola auditor Theologia, confessiones congregationis’.  
44 See Regimento para el Procurador de la India que reside en Portugal, DI XIV 1585-1588, p. 753: ‘[...] 
procure quanto fuere possible que los que vienen para esta Provincia y fueren para esso, se ordenen 
sacerdotes en Portugal antes que se partan’. 
45 According to Fabio Ambrosio Spinola, in Cremona Carlo founded a college ‘concorrendo à quest’opera 
egli stesso con gran somma di danari’. Cf. Spinola, op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
46 Gil da Mata (1547-1599) was sent from Japan to Europe as mission procurator in 1592. He was 
received by Filipe I in 1594 and the next year he was in Rome. 
47 See ARSI, Med. 22 [I], f. 8v. The official patent was issued two days later. Cf. ARSI, Hist. Soc. 61 
LIBER PATENTIUM 1573-1601, f. 50. 
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the Viceroy of Naples,48 for what was destined to be – using Daniello Bartoli’s words – 
‘la piu difficile, e la piu disastrosa via, che mai fino allora niun altro’.49 
 
I. 2. 2.    From Lisbon to Lisbon passing through Brazil and England 
Although we have already dealt with Spinola’s first attempt to reach the Estado 
da Índia elsewhere,50 it is still interesting to illustrate it here schematically. 
Spinola’s first voyage was a rather unfortunate one. In the best situations, a sea 
voyage from Lisbon to Goa would take no more than six months. The ships of the 
Carreira da Índia, in fact, used to come out of the Tagus when winter gave way to 
spring, that is between the end of March and the first two weeks of April, and they 
would reach Goa in September, provided that everything went according to plans. 
Spinola’s voyage turned out to be more complicated. It lasted twenty-one months and 
paradoxically ended right where it started, in Lisbon. The account of that journey is 
justifiably included in the História Trágimo-Marítima, the chronicle of the various 
shipwrecks that paid the toll of Portuguese overseas expansion.51  
In any case, the three ships52 that composed the armada of 1596 raised anchor 
on April 10 – the Holy Wednesday53 – with Carlo Spinola and other seven Jesuits 
                                                 
48 See Sforza, Lettera inedita del Beato Carlo Spinola ad Alberico I Cybo-Malaspina Principe di Massa, 
p. 710: ‘[…] alli 5 di Gennaro di 596 nelle galere del Vicerè di Napoli il conte di Miranda’. See also 
ARSI, Med. 21 [I], f. 13. Under Felipe II there were nine viceroyalties in the Spanish monarchy: four in 
the Iberian Peninsula (Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia and Navarra), three in Italy (Naples, Sicily and 
Sardinia), and two in the Indies (Nueva España and Peru). The Netherlands were ruled by a Governor, 
whose job was comparable to the one assigned to the viceroy. The viceroy in Naples at that time was Juan 
de Zúñiga y Avellaneda (r. 1586-1595). 
49 Cf. Bartoli, op. cit., p. 141. 
50 See Frison, “‘La piu difficile, e la piu disastrosa via, che mai fino allora niun altro’ - Carlo Spinola and 
his attempts to get to the Índias”, pp. 69-86.  
51 Spinola left a detailed description of their pilgrimage in his longest letter, written in Lisbon on 23 or 24 
March 1598, ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, ff. 137-140. See also Miyazaki, パードレ・カルロ・スピノラ、一五
九八年一月十八日、リスボン発、イエズス会総長クラウディオ・アクワビーヴァ宛書簡 (その
一), pp. 18-37, idem, パードレ・カルロ・スピノラ、一五九八年一月十八日、リスボン発、イエ
ズス会総長クラウディオ・アクワビーヴァ宛書簡  (その二 ), pp. 11-20. This disastrous and 
adventurous voyage was described also by Father Gaspar Afonso, another Jesuit aboard, and it was his 
account to be included in the História Trágico-Marítima. Cf. Peres, História Trágico-Marítima 
compilada por Bernardo Gomes de Brito, vol. V, pp. 81-171. The original manuscript used by the 
compiler is a letter that Gaspar Afonso wrote in Évora on 21 June 1599. See ARSI, Lus. 106, ff. 251-270v. 
52 The São Francisco, the Conceição and the São Felipe. 
53 Peres, op. cit., p. 85: ‘[...] uma Quarta Feira de Trèvas’. 
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aboard the main ship, the São Francisco.54 The route was the same as that sailed by 
Vasco da Gama: they set course for Cape Verde islands turning thence southwest, so as 
to encircle the anticyclone in the South Atlantic in a bow-like trajectory which took the 
ships close to the Brazilian coast, south of the Cape of Saint Augustine. Then they 
dropped slowly eastward, heading for the Cape of Good Hope.55 The Jesuits aboard the 
São Francisco occupied their time aboard dealing both with their studies and, in 
particular, with the religious offices, which was always quite an undertaking 
considering the number of people aboard, about 500. 
Two months after departure, precisely on June 16, the São Francisco had 
already reached the tropic of Capricorn and was sailing smoothly towards the Cape of 
Good Hope. But then, owing to stern wind the rudder broke. Since the ship was in no 
condition either to face the currents of the Cape or to go back to Portugal – the solution 
suggested by the pilot –, it was decided to build two big oars ‘ao modo com que se 
guovernão os barcos de Riba do Douro’,56 with which it was somehow possible to steer 
the ship. Eventually, after a week of debate, the crew convinced the Captain and the 
pilot to point the bow towards Salvador da Bahia in Brazil,57 although an alvará issued 
by the Portuguese Crown in 1565 expressly forbid Carreira’s ships to winter in Brazil 
(mostly for economic reasons), rather they were requested to go back to Lisbon, which 
is probably the reason why the pilot tried to go back to Portugal, in the first place.58 
In the early morning of 16 July, the São Francisco arrived at Salvador da Bahia de 
Todos os Santos. One of the buildings that stood upon the bay was the Jesuit Collegio 
da Baya, a college so skilfully built, that it could likely appear in Rome.59 
 After five months during which a new rudder was repaid and the hold was filled 
with new goods, like sugar, on December 12 the São Francisco left Bahia, looking for 
                                                 
54 Cf. DI XVIII 1595-1597, pp. 528-530: ‘Na nao S. Francisco: P. Gaspar Afonso, natural de Serpa, 
arcebispado d’Evora, idade 44 e da Companhia 24, pregador. P. Jacome de Vicari, natural de Napoles, de 
28 anos e da Companhia 13, acabados seus estudos. P. Alexandre Ferraro, napolitano, de 31 anos e da 
Companhia 12, tres anos de theologia. P. Carlo Espinola, genovês, de 30 anos e da Companhia 12, 
acabados seus estudos. Ir. Jeronimo Marucheli, napolitano, de 27 annos e da Companhia dez, estudou até 
phelisophia. Ir. Jeronimo de Angelis, siciliano, de 27 anos e da Companhia dez, coadjutor. Ir. Jorge 
Pereira, de Vila Real, arcebispado de Braga, de 18 anos e da Companhia 4, estudava latim. Ir. Bertolamé 
Sanches, do arcebispado de Toledo, de 30 anos e da Companhia 7, coadjutor’.  
55 See Albuquerque, Escalas da Carreira da Índia, p. 5. 
56 See ARSI, Lus. 106, f. 251v. 
57 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 137. 
58 See Provisão sobre as náos, que invernão, arriabbarem a esta cidade of 6 March 1565 in Boletim do 
Conselho Ultramarino – Legislação Antiga, vol. I (1446-1754), pp. 169-170. 
59 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 137v. 
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those winds which could possibly take the ship behind Pernambuco. They managed to 
surmount the Cape of Saint Augustine only on 20 January 1597 and subsequently 
reached the Tropic of the Cancer on February 18. But then a terrible storm almost tore 
the ship to pieces and then it was clear to everyone that the Canary Islands were 
definitely out of reach, as was Cape Verde. The only chance to make land was to go aft 
at the discretion of the wind, provided that the cargo was lightened. Therefore, 80 sugar 
crates were thrown overboard to let the wind slowly carry them until they caught sight 
of the Indias de Castella, precisely the Virgin Islands next to Puerto Rico. On 25 
March, thanks to the help of a Puerto Rican pilot, the ship entered San Juan’s port. 
After the eight Jesuits found accommodation in the hospital or in the Bishop’s or 
the governor’s residence, they started to help in the religious offices, which were 
particularly demanding since the São Francisco reached San Juan only a few days 
before the Holy Week.60 Once the Holy week was over, and with it the whole lot of 
confessions, the group of Jesuits divided. Following the Jesuit dictate of the ire bini, the 
four Italian Jesuits separated in two groups to better proselytize the villages around the 
city. They got back to San Juan in June, but they would leave the island only two 
months later, on 21 August ‘in un picciolo naviglio disarmato […], però nuovo, e 
stimato buono di vela’, heading for Portugal.61 
Also this part of the voyage, however, did not end well. The ship reached the 
Azores by mid-October, which meant that Portugal was only a week away. Yet, on 17, 
an English pirate ship came upon the Portuguese vessel and took it over. The years 
comprised between 1587 and 1597 correspond to the British assaults against Iberian 
interests in the Atlantic Ocean, which could be traced principally around the Azores and 
near the Iberian littoral. The British ships used to hunt their prey on the way back from 
India, so that the holds would be crammed with merchandise and the long journey 
would have weakened the ships’ resistance, as was the case of this ship.62  
The ship and all the crew were then brought to southern England. Spinola 
interpreted the mishap as a way to testify his faith and to put into practice his mission. 
Thus, he confessed to the English pirate that he was an Italian Jesuit, but, unexpectedly 
                                                 
60 Ivi, f. 138. 
61 Ivi, f. 139. 
62 Cf. Guinote, Frutuoso and António Lopes, Naufrágios e outras perdas da “Carreira da Índia” Séculos 
XVI e XVII, p. 122. 
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‘la cosa riuscì al contrario, perche ci cominciorno a riverire più, e trattar miglore [...], e 
mi dissero subito che non havea da temere, perche eglino non perseguono se non i 
naturali che vanno di propria volontà in Inghilterra per convertire alla fede del papa; 
tanto più essendo noi italiani, co’ quali loro trattano, e non hanno guerra’.63 Spinola’s 
surprise was well justified. After the death of the Catholic Mary I in 1558, the 
assumption of the English throne by Elizabeth I brought renewed persecution of 
Catholicism, particularly in the second half of her reign, after the papal bull Regnans in 
excelsis, in which Pius V excommunicated Elizabeth and threatened the same for all 
English Catholics who obeyed her. 64 Shortly before the publication of the bull, the 
Society founded an English college at Douai in France to provide a rallying-point for 
the scattered bands of Catholics who had fled from their native land. From being merely 
an asylum for refugees, Douai rapidly became the centre of a great missionary effort to 
wrest England from the grasp of Anglicanism.65 The appearance of the Jesuits put the 
English monarchy on the alert and in order to meet the increasing danger the penal laws 
were greatly amplified and strengthened. In 1585, with the issue of the Act Against 
Jesuits and Seminarists it was ordered that ‘all and every Jesuits, seminary priests, and 
other priests whatsoever […], shall within forty days […] depart out of this realm of 
England, and out of all other her highness’s realms and dominions’. 66 
The last part of the excerpt is even more important if read in the light of what 
would happen in Japan only two years later. According to Spinola, the English pirate 
underlined the political status of the two Jesuits as a reason not to harm them. As a 
matter of fact, the Elizabethan acts against Catholicism were not exactly actions of 
religious persecution, just like Hideyoshi’s were not. Elizabeth was more concerned 
with political rather than theological issues. The act was published to make the 
missionaries unable ‘to stir up and move sedition, rebellion, and open hostility within 
                                                 
63 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 139v. 
64 Pius V opened a process for heresy against Elizabeth on 5 February 1570 and twenty days later a bull 
excommunicating and deposing the queen was published. The bull was basically directed to the 
achievement of a twofold result. In the first place, by declaring the queen excommunicate and deposed, it 
aimed at destroying the allegiance of her subjects. In the second place, it not only legalized rebellion but, 
by implication, positively commanded it. See Black, The Reign of Elizabeth 1558-1603, pp. 135-137 and 
CHC VI, pp. 261-282. 
65 Cf. Black, op. cit., p. 139.  
66 Gee and Hardy (eds.), Documents Illustrative of English Church History, p. 486.  
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the same her highness’s realms and dominions’.67 The similarities with Hideyoshi’s 
edict of 1587 are more than evident. 
At any rate, afterwards the missionaries were taken to southern England, where 
the Captain provided accommodation for them, paying a daily fee of ‘due reali al 
giorno’.68 After almost a month, on 6 December 1597, the pirate decided to escort 
personally the Jesuits to the French of Saint-Malo, but the English Channel did not 
allow them to cross the sea. Having found a safe harbour in Plymouth, they had a 
fortunate meeting with a a German Catholic merchant, who ‘fa professione di condurre i 
preti d’Inghilterra, et Portogallo à sua patria, haveva passa porto d’ambedue i Regni, et 
all’hora veniva con particular licenza de la Regina, per poter condur seco à Portogallo 
alcuni de portoghesi, che in quel posto stavano’.69 On 10 January 1598, they sailed 
aboard a small ship and in only 8 days-time they reached Lisbon, exactly where 
everything began 22 months before. Spinola along with his Sicialian fellow Geronimo 
De Angelis70 went straight to São Roque where, since they were dressed in the English 
manner and they had not shaved, it was hard for the Portuguese Jesuits to recognize 
them, also because they were reported lost at sea and given for dead. Notwithstanding 
all the troubles of the navigation, they soon renewed their desire to reach Japan. 
‘aspettando di patire maggiori cose che non habbiamo patite sin’hora […], et adesso 
come à soldati vecchi pareranno via più le cose facili, et i pericoli minori’.71 
 
 I. 2. 3.    The end of the journey, the beginning of the mission: Carlo Spinola 
between Macao and Japan (1599-1611) 
 Despite Spinola and de Angelis’s strong desire to set off again for Japan, the two 
missionaries had to wait more than they expected. In effect, as early as March they were 
already ready to leave Lisbon. In a letter to an Italian brethren written on 8 March, 
Spinola wrote that ‘non ho più tempo, le navi stanno di partenza, sono cinque, ma tre 
                                                 
67 Ivi, p. 485. 
68 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 139v. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Geronimo de Angelis (1568-1623) was born in Enna, Sicily and entered the Society of Jesus in 1586. 
He travelled alongside Spinola from their embarkation at Genoa to their arrival in Japan.He remained in 
Japan after the expulsion decree of 1614, proselytizing in particular the northern regions and he was 
probably the first European to venture out to Hokkaidō, back then called Ezo. Eventually he was captured 
by the Edo bakufu and executed in Edo on 4 December 1623. Cf. Cieslik, “The Great Martyrdom in Edo 
1623”, pp. 1-12. 
71 Ibid. 
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grandissime, la mia avanza tutte, dimani credo, o al più tardi mercordì partiremo, e 
tornaremo a tentar l’impresa’.72 Unfortunately for the zealous Jesuit, however, owing to 
English corsairs out of the Tagus’ mouth, the armada was forced to delay the departure 
until the time it was too late to set sail towards the Estado da Índia.73  
 This delay offered to Spinola the opportunity to make his final profession of the 
fourth vow in October,74 and then by the end of March 1599 he left Portugal for the 
second time, while Lisbon was scourged by the plague.75 Obviously, it was not possible 
to keep the plague off the ship and although the epidemic lasted only until the equator, 
two missionaries succumbed to the disease.76 Afterwards, also Spinola got sick and had 
to rest a week in Mozambique. He recovered rapidly, however, and managed to get on 
board the ship do trato which used to sail between Mozambique and Goa. As early as 
December he was in the capital city of the Estado da Índia waiting for a ship to carry 
him to Macao. He set off in April and eventually reached Macao in August 1600.  
As we know, Spinola had been assigned to the Japan mission. According to 
plans, he should have left Macao the following summer, but the annual carrack bounded 
for Japan did not sail in 1601.77 Apart from the missing voyage, however, there was also 
another reason that kept Spinola in Macao one year longer than expected. On 27 
November 1600, in fact, someone set the Jesuit church on fire.78 According to Father 
Valentim Carvalho, the new rector of the college, nothing but the walls survived the 
fire. The Society of Jesus, consequently, had to find a temporary solution to celebrate 
Christian rites and the premises of the primary school were arranged for this purpose.79 
At the same time, however, the city of Macao rallied its means to aid the Society build a 
new church. The Captain Major, on a proposal from the citizens of Macao, granted half 
                                                 
72 Carlo Spinola to Father Pompilio Lambertenghi, Lisbon, 8 March 1598. BMA, MS 568 D. Piece 001, f. 
1. 
73 Ibid. Fabio Ambrosio Spinola wrote that the ships sailed but had to pull back because of the Dutch: 
‘[...] doppo qualche poco di camino da lontano scoperta vna grossa armata d’Olandesi, che su le volte si 
trattenne, e l’aspettaua per combatterle’. Spinola, op. cit., p. 75. Cf. HP III, p. 220. 
74 He made his profession on 28 October. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 37, f. 13 and Lus. 2, ff. 173-174. 
75 Father Carlo Spinola to General Claudio Acquaviva, Goa, 21 December 1599. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 
141. 
76 The Italian Felice Algerio and the Portuguese Afonso Álvares. 
77 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 83 and Jap. Sin. 36, f. 149. Regarding the Portuguese-fleet movements in 
1601, see Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 62-63 and Costa, “A Route under Pressure. Communication 
between Nagasaki and Macao (1597-1617)”, p. 86. 
78 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], ff. 45-45v and ARSI, Jap. Sin. 121, ff. 2-2v. 
79  ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 45v. The primary school (escola dos meninos) was probably the one 
constructed in 1572, where children were taught reading, writing and arithmetic. Cf. Teixeira, “The 
Church of St. Paul in Macau”, p. 55. 
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percent of the incomes from the trade with Japan to the Society so that, as Carvalho 
wished, at least half of the new building could be financed. 80  But of course, the 
resources the Society was in need of were not only economic. It was necessary to 
entrust someone with the project of the new church. In a recently work of ours, we have 
tried to clear any doubts with regard to Spinola’s authorship of the project of the church 
of São Paulo. Although a definitive proof, e.g. a signed project or a direct mention, did 
not come up yet, the sources we summoned point solidly to Spinola. Since this aspect of 
him will be dealt with in one of the next sections of this work, for now we shall say only 
that Carlo Spinola was in charge of drawing the plan of the new church, but he had 
nothing to do both with the factual building of the church body or the façade.81  
Spinola’s staying in Macao was filled also with other commitments and duties. 
As a matter of fact, it would seem that he took advantage of the prolonged permanence 
and started to learn Japanese.82 Moreover, during the spring of 1601 Spinola was chosen 
to be procurator by Valentim Carvalho. Spinola was chosen to replace the Portuguese 
Miguel Soares, who had died in September 1600. According to Spinola’s own writings, 
Carvalho’s choice was mostly dictated by the ability of the Italian Jesuit to create a 
climate of confidence and trust around his person.83 He was assured that he would have 
been in charge only until the departure of the Nao in summer, but owing to a diatribe 
between the Portuguese and the Chinese officers it was not possible to prepare the ship 
on time and therefore he was forced to postpone his departure.84  
The wait, however, was almost over, as was Spinola’s bad luck in sea travel. In 
the 1602 annual report, in fact, we read that the Nao da China ‘[c]hegou aos dez, ou 
onze de Julho às Ilhas de Goto, que estam aqui perto de Nangazaqui onde se vio em 
grande perigo, assim por hum tempo rijo que houve, como pelas grandes correntes, que 
                                                 
80 Valentim Carvalho estimated an income for the Society of about 2’500-3’000 cruzados, which was the 
half percent of the value of the goods that were expected from Japan. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 121, f. 2: ‘[…] 
todos universalmente movidos de charidade e compaixão fizerão entre si huma aiunta diante do Capitão 
Môr em que determinarão, uno animi concensu, que elles nos davão meio por cento de todo o que tinhão 
em Jappão trazendo N. S. a nao a salvamento, o que não foi tão pouco que a vinda da nao não montasse 
dous mil e trezentos taeis que vem a dizer tres mil sento e trinta e sete pardaos de reales.” For other alms 
offered to the Society at Macao, see ff. 4-4v. 
81 We faced directly this topic in our work “A face hidden behind the façade. New evidences about Carlo 
Spinola’s authorship of the project of São Paulo’s Church”, text presented at the International 
Conference on Macau Narratives, Lisbon, 8-11 May 2013 (printing).  
82 Cf. Pacheco, 鈴田の囚人 カルロ・スピノラノの書簡, p. 6. 
83 See Procurator Carlo Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal João Alvarez, Macao, 27 January 1602. 
ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 149. Miguel Soares (1551-1600) held the task of Procurator in Macao from 1588 
until his death. 
84 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 89. 
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hà entre aquellas Ilhas [...]’. 85 At any rate, the crew, Carlo Spinola, Geronimo de 
Angelis and other nine comrades made safely to Nagasaki. 86  Soon afterwards, the 
missionaries started to attend the Japanese classes at the Arima college, in order to be 
employed in the conversation and preservation of the Christendom of Kyūshū.87 
Spinola remained in Arima almost two years between 1602 and 1604. Each day 
during the first year he had to attend two lectures of Japanese,88 and turned out to be 
well-versed in the Japanese language. As early as 1603, in fact, he was already 
preaching in the native language and was assigned to the mission in Arie, south of 
Shimabara. 89  Spinola first-class education along with his aptitude for the Japanese 
language earned him the chance to test his qualities as a missionary in the most delicate 
region in Japan, the capital city of Miyako. In 1612, once he was called back to 
Nagasaki, he wrote to an Italian friend of him and he gave a brief description of the 
seven years spent there: 
‘dopo di havere imparata la lingua Giapponica per uno anno, et per un altro coltivato più di 
sei 8 mila anime nel territorio di Arima, mi mandorno i superiori al Miaco, che he metropoli 
di tutta l’isola, per compagno, et admonitore del nuovo Rettore di quella casa,90 ove stetti 
sette anni intieri, correndo come paroco ordinario di molte miglaia di christiani, che vi sono, i 
quali con essortationi publiche, et private, et con varij modi, et inventioni fui promovendo 
nello spirito con non puoco frutto; et perche in quella città è il nido dell’Idolatria, mi sforzai 
di indurre molti gentili alla nostra Santa fede, et ne baptizai più de duemila di mia mano, tra i 
quali vi furno non puochi dei nobili; et si con questi, come con gl’altri, che venivano molte 
volte mossi da curiosità a vedere, et udire le nostre cose, intrava con l’Astrologia, 
mostrandogli alcuni instromenti a proposito, delle quali cose non si può facilmente dire 
quanto sino curiosi, et quanto profitto ricevano per intendere che tutto ciò, che dicemo della 
nostra Santa Legge è vero, poiche del corso dei cieli, et cose metheorologiche, diciamo cose 
                                                 
85 See BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, f. 79v. 
86 In that year, a large part of the Chinese silks imported by the Nao do Trato remained unsold, since the 
Japanese merchants complained that the prices asked by the Portuguese, who evidently were trying to 
recover from the loss of the previous year, were too high. Cf. Boxer, The Christian Century, p. 273. 
87 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 34, f. 16. 
88 See BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, ff. 130-130v: ‘Rezideram este anno no Collegio de Arima, e no Seminario 
que a elle està anexo vinte da Companhia, alguns dos quaes se occupam no ensino, e criaçam dos 
alumnos, hum Padre em ler cada dia duas liçoens da lingoa Japoa a cinco dos nossos que na monçam 
passada vieram’. 
89 See TCJ, p. 447: ‘Em Arie – Padre Carlos Spínola, confessa na língoa e tem princípios pera a saber 
bem, por não aver hum ano e meyo que está em Japão. Italiano, Professo de 4 votos’. 
90 Father Pedro Morejón (c. 1562-1639). In Spinola’s letters we find several positive references to the 
Spanish father. For instance, in 1612, he wrote that Morejon ‘con su mucha humildad, caridad, y llaneza 
la mayor, que he visto en Japon, no parece superior, mas antes compañero, o inferior de todos’. See 
ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 154.  
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tutte conformi alla raggione, molto contrarie a i sogni, che loro insegnano i Bonzi suoi 
sacerdoti; si che già dicono a bocca piena che non possono essere si non buggie quelle cose, 
che insegnano intorno all’altra vita, le quali non si veggono, essendo tanto essorbitanti dalla 
raggione quelle che dicono de i cieli, et elementi; et adesso che veggono essere stati ingannati, 
si vergognano di havere tenuto per certe cose si false, et aliene dalla raggione’.91 
As we can guess from Spinola’s own words, his staying in central Japan was 
characterized by a particular method of proselytization. Both in China and in Japan, in 
fact, the Society of Jesus resorted to scientific demonstration to allure the curious 
mandarins and the kuge, the noble of the capital.  
 Only three years after his arrival, on 9 April 1552, Javier wrote to Loyola that it 
was necessary to send to Japan literate fathers with a good knowledge of astronomy 
(esphera), due to the great curiosity the Japanese felt towards scientific matters and 
meteorological phenomena, such as the reactions that caused rain and snow. According 
to Javier, in fact, being able to answer the numerous questions asked by the Japanese 
was the road to win their benevolence.92  
The same topic is to be found also in Frois’ História do Japam, where he wrote 
how Buddhist monks – not common people, then – kept asking questions about eclipses 
of the moon and the sun, high and low tides, and also about Western knowledge of the 
atmosphere. 
Almost fifteen years after Javier’s letter, in the 1570s, the new superior of the 
Japan mission, the Portuguese Francisco Cabral, wrote to Rome asking for textbooks 
about cosmology and philosophy for the same reason as Javier and Frois: he needed 
missionaries acquainted with scientific knowledge.93  
Since the early stage of the Japan Mission, then, almost all the Jesuits involved in 
the proselytization realized that in order to win over the Japanese people it was 
                                                 
91 Procurator Carlo Spinola to Father Bernardino Rossignoli, Nagasaki, 25 May 1612. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, 
ff. 156-156v. 
92 See Schurhammer and Wicki, Epistolae S. Francisci Xavierii, vol. II, p. 373: ‘Tambien es necesario 
que tiengan letras para responder a las muchas preguntas que hazen lo gipones. Seria bueno que fuesem 
buenos artistas; y no perdirian nadie que fuesem ssofistas para en las disputas tomar los gipones in 
contradicion; que supiesen alguna cosa dela esphera, porque huegan en grande manera los gipones en 
saber los movimientos del cielo, los eclipsis del sol, mengoar y crescer la luna; como se engendra el agua 
de la lluvia, la nieve y piedra, trovanes, relanpagos, cometas y otras cosas ansi naturales. Mucho 
aprovecha lla declaracion destas cosas para ganar la voluntad al pueblo. Esta information de la gente de 
Gipon me parecio ser cosa conveniente escrivir a vuestra santa Charidad, para que este al cabo de las 
virtudes que han de tener los Padres que alla am de yr’. 
93 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 7 [I], f. 159. 
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necessary to develop a missionary method that was at once mild and smart. The Japan 
Jesuits saw clearly the difference in premises and in results between the two 
interpretations of the compelle intrare, 94  which generated a dispute regarding the 
missionary method in Spanish America. Basically, the dispute opposed the notion of 
ecclesia militans, which justified military campaigns of conquest followed by forced 
conversion, to the employment of persuasion of the intellect by rational means nad by 
the gentle attraction and exhortation of the will.95 It is well known how this shift in 
mentality in Japan gave birth to the accomodatio principle, which materialized in 
Valignano’s handbook for the missionaries – Il Cerimoniale, yet the mere adaptation to 
Japan customs was not enough to grant an extensive evangelization. The Fathers, in 
fact, needed to create for themselves enough room for manouvre within the complicated 
structure of the Japanese society. One of the most functional ways devised by the 
Ignatians was to capitalize on Japanese extreme curiosity for Western inventions and 
scientific tools along with empirical demonstrations of scientific theories. 96  The 
measure of this insight is given by the different fates experienced in Tokugawa Japan by 
the Western faith and the Western science. The former was repelled and persecuted 
starting from 1612 until the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The latter, on the other hand, 
held an illegal status until the 1710s, when the eighth Tokugawa shōgun, Yoshimune, 
after taking possession of some Western scientific texts, started to encourage the 
learning of the foreign scientific thought and gave birth to the group of literati interested 
in the study of Dutch and Western culture, the rangakusha.97 In any case, it must not be 
forgotten that the scientific activity was only a way to dissimulate the Society’s real 
purpose. In other words, the scientific activity was a contingent element to their 
identity, mainly due to an interpretation of the Ignatian principle of acting close to the 
secular world.98  
                                                 
94 Luke 14:23: ‘And the Lord said to the servant: Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them 
to come in [compelle intrare], that my house may be filled.’ 
95 The main advocate of the second interpretation was the Dominican Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-
1566), the principal defender of the rights of the Indians as well as of the values of their religions and 
cultures. For a close examination of the change in the missionary methods see Prosperi, “Il missionario”, 
pp. 179-187. 
96 The same results were obtained through demonstration of Western superiority in military enginery. Cf. 
Lettera Annva del Giappone dell’Anno MDXCVI scritta dal P. Luigi Frois al R. P. Clavdio Acqvaviva 
Generale della Compagnia di Giesù, pp. 203-204 
97 蘭学者. Regarding this topic see Hirose, “The European Influence on Japanese Astronomy”, in MN, 19, 
pp. 295-314. 
98 Cf. Romano, “Les Jésuites entre apostolat missionaire et activité scientifique (XVIe-XVIIIe siècles)”, pp. 
214-215. 
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Hence, following the foundation of the college at Funai, the Japan Jesuits began to 
compose a scientific literature for Japanese audience. In 1583, the Spanish Pedro 
Gomez was chosen to write a textbook for the colleges’ students of philosophy. It took 
ten years to compose such a book, but in 1593 De Sphæra was finally available. De 
Sphæra constitutes the first part of a compendium and is the first Western scientific 
publication regarding Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmology in Japan and represented the 
starting point for several Japanese scientific books of the mid-seventeenth century.99 
Beside printing textbooks, however, the Society of Jesus was also conceiving a 
bigger plan in order to convert the greater number of Japanese. In November 1583, in 
fact, General Acquaviva envisaged the idea of creating a Collegio de Sciencias, as a 
separate and unique establishment within the mission, instead of teachings such topics 
in several colleges, which apparently was what the Jesuits in Japan have decided.100 
Unfortunately, beside Acquaviva’s letter, we do not have other primary sources about 
this college. Nevertheless, the most recent biographies of Carlo Spinola101 state that in 
May 1605 Father Carlo Spinola founded a scientific academy in Miyako. This 
information was first given by Charlevoix in 1715,102 but a manuscript that confirms or 
proves wrong such information had not come up yet.  
In any case, Spinola’s scientific knowledge allowed him to come into contact with 
Japan’s leading figures. In 1606 he wrote one of his most important and analysed 
letters, in which he confirmed the great importance the knowledge of of mathematic, 
which at that time had a wider meaning than today, since it included not only arithmetic 
and geometry, but also astronomy, optics, statics, and so on – had for the proselytization 
of Japan:  
                                                 
99 Cf. Hiraoka, “Jesuit Cosmological Textbook in ‘the Christian century’ Japan: De sphaera of Pedro 
Gomez (Part I)”, pp.99-101. 
100 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 3, ff. 6-6v. 
101 See for instance the entry “Carlo Spinola” by Yuuki Ryōgo (alias Diego Pacheco) in the Dicciónario 
Historico de la Compañía de Jesus: biografico – temático, vol. IV, pp. 3623-3624 and Vogel and Rankin, 
“European Expansion and Self-Definition”, pp. 829-830. 
102 See Charlevoix, op. cit., pp. 41-42: ‘On travailloit avec plus de succes a Meaco. Le gout que la Cour 
d’Ozaca avoit pris aux Mathematiques, sit juger aux Jesuites du College de Meaco, & sur tout au Pere 
Spinola, qui avoit professe ces Sciences en Italie avec honneur, que l’on pourroit s’attacher les Grands 
Seigneurs, & les rendre ou dociles pour le Royaume de Dieu, ou du moins favorables aux Predicateurs de 
l’Evangile, en leur inspirant la pensee de s’instruire des connoissances naturelles. On etablit donc une 
espece d’Academie, qui sut composee de tout ce qu’il y avoit a Meaco de gens distinguez par leur 
naissance, par leur merite, & par leur employ’. 
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‘A mathematica me sirve muyto para entrar na familiaridade destes Tonos103 principaes, os 
quaes sao muy curiosos d’estas cousas, e ate o Dairi,104 e Xongunsama105 tem noticia de mim, 
e me tem mandado a chamar; antes para ser estimado dos Japones he a parte mais necessaria, 
de modo que porque sabia mathematica foy milhor que eu viesse a Japao, e os que viessem 
para ca, e soubessem della, serao estimados’.106 
Although Spinola’s presence in Miyako was almost fundamental, since he was the only 
one who was at once fluently in Japanese, proficient in scientific topics and was also 
used to deal with the nobility, his time in Honshū did not last more than seven years. As 
we will see briefly, in fact, his services were needed again in Macao. 
 Before entering the last stage of Spinola’s life, which is going to be dealt with in 
details since it corresponds to his procuratorship, we must outline the new political 
junction in Japan, since it was the new political situation that influenced the evolution of 
the Christian church in Japan and, consequently, Spinola’s own faith. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 殿 It was an honorific suffix added after the name of an important lord. 
104 内裏 It can be translated with Inner Sanctum. For metonymy it indicates the tennō. In this case Spinola 
was referring to Go-Yōzei tennō. 
105 将軍様 Tokugawa Hidetada. 
106 See Carlo Spinola to Father João Álvares, Miyako, 3 December 1606. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, ff. 151-151v. 
In the Annua da Viceprovincia de Japam do anno de 1604, moreover, we read that Spinola met also with 
Toyotomi Hideyori. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 55, f. 148. Spinola’s letter is the fulcrum of our study regards 
Spinola’s scientific activity in Japan, upon which is based the information provided here. See Frison, “Il 
contributo scientifico del gesuita Carlo Spinola nel Giappone del primo Tokugawa”, pp. 21-56. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
JAPAN NEW JUNCTURE: 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TOKUGAWA BAKUFU 
 
II. 1.    Toyotomi Hideyoshi and international affairs: the Korean Campaign 
As we saw earlier, when Hideyoshi issued his 1587-edict against the Christian 
faith, he wanted the Jesuits out of the tenka within twenty days. As Coelho explained, 
however, they were technically unable to leave Japan without the nao do trato. Hence, 
the missionaries convened in Hirado where they held a general conference. Apparently, 
they all agreed that the moment to testify with their own blood and death the truth of the 
Christian faith had finally come and therefore no one was to leave the country. Fathers 
and Brothers, a contingent of 115 men, spread again throughout the island of Kyūshū, 
although the destructions perpetrated towards the mission’s estates caused the Ignatians 
to go back to a life of scarcity and privation.107 Furthermore, the deaths of D. Francisco 
and D. Bartolomeu delivered serious blows to the mission. The lord of Bungo, Ōtomo 
Yoshimune Constantino, on his part, at first decided to apostatize but then in 1590 came 
back to the flock. On the other hand, however, the Society could still rely on the 
converted lords in Buzen, Chikuzen and Chikugo. Besides, Takayama Ukon, after being 
disposed of his fief and exiled, was then granted another fief with the same amount of 
koku.108  
In the meanwhile, Hideyoshi had already started to think about the next steps for 
completing the unification. By 1591, in fact, he wiped out the last resistance in northern 
Japan and sent a member of House Shimazu to the Ryūkyū court with gifts to respond 
                                                 
107 Cf. Lettera Annibale [sic, Annuale] del Giapone delli 24 di Febraio 1589, pp. 4-6. 
108 See Father Gil da Mata to General Acquaviva, Japan, 15 July 1590. RAH/Cor. 9/2663, f. 488v. It 
would seem that in the aftermath of the edict the number of kirishitan daimyō augmented sensibly. 
Between 1591 to 1596, in fact, the lords of Tsushima – Sō Yoshitomo, Iga – Tsutui Sadatsugu, Mino – 
Oda Hidenobu, Hita – Mōri Takamasa, Tokushima – Hachikusa Iemasa, Shinano – Kyōgoku Takamoto 
and Tsugaru – Tsugaru Nagahira were baptized. Cf. Costa, “Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Christian Daimyō 
during the Crisis of 1600”, pp. 48-49 and 56-58 and idem , O Cristianismo no Japão, p. 176. 
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to the tribute sent to the kanpaku. In 1592, he handed over the title of kanpaku to his 
adopted son Hidetsugu and assumed the title of taikō.109 In the same year, Taicosama – 
as was commonly called by the Jesuits, put the first step outside the borders of Japan. 
As we saw, the 1587-edict was addressed exclusively to the preachers, not to the 
Western traders, whose relative importance Hideyoshi began to appreciate right at that 
time and not only five years later, he made the first move to both implement and control 
foreign trade by centralizing its management. 
We have a document which claims that in 1592 Hideyoshi bestowed exclusive 
formal permits – the shuin-jō110 – to travel for purposes of trade to foreign countries, 
including the Philippines (Roson) and Amakō (Macao).111 Under the shuin-jō system all 
Japanese shipping, or that belonging to foreigners resident in Japan, which were 
engaged in maritime commerce with foreign countries had to be provided with the 
shuin-jō. Skippers or merchants whose voyages were not authorized by this official 
permit were regarded as pirates or smugglers and punished accordingly. There is a 
debate about the authenticity of this document, but it is a fact that Hideyoshi encouraged 
international relations, although he was probably only trying to obtain abroad what he 
had already achieved in Japan, i.e. the political recognition of his status. In 1591, in fact, 
not only did he manage to get rid of the wakō that used to pillage in the Chinese Sea, he 
also addressed a letter to the Viceroy of the Indies at Goa, Matias de Albuquerque, in 
which he basically established again the principles expressed in the 1587-edict. The 
taikō wanted Albuquerque to know that ‘the unit of the nation was set on a firm 
foundation, and now foreign nations, far and near, without exception, bring tribute to 
us’. After this subtle advice of sending tributes, Hideyoshi warned Albuquerque that 
Christian Fathers were not to be received courteously in Japan, instead ‘no matter what 
sect or denomination they represent – they shall be destroyed’. Yet, he concluded the 
                                                 
109 太閤, regent in retirement. 
110 朱印状, literally “red seal”. 
111 See Berry, op. cit., pp. 134-135: ‘From the first year of Bunroku, individuals from Nagasaki, Kyōto, 
and Sakai received red-seal documents and were authorized to sail to these countries for purpose of trade: 
Kōnan [south Vietnam], Tonkin [north Vietnam], Champa [Vietnam south of Kōnan], Kamboja 
[Cambodia], Rokukan [southern Thailand], Patani [Thailand], Shiyamu [Siam], Taiwan, Roson [the 
Philippines], and Amakō [Macao]. Five ships from Nagasaki [were authorized]: two ships to Suetsugo 
Heizō; one ship to Funamoto Yaheiji; one ship to Araki Sōtarō; and one ship to Itoya Zuiemon. Three 
ships from Kyoto: one ship to Chaya Shirōjirō; one ship to the Suminokura; one ship to the Fushimiya. 
One ship from Sakai to the Itoya.’ 
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letter by stating that if the viceroy was eager to establish ‘amity with this land, the seas 
have been rid of the pirate menace, and merchants are permitted to come and go’.112  
The year before Hideyoshi had this letter written and sent, precisely on 3 March 
1591, he had received an embassy from the viceroy at his palace in Miyako, the 
Jurakutei. 113  The embassy was headed by Alessandro Valignano – in a diplomat 
capacity – and the four Japanese youngsters that had been sent to Europe in 1582. 
Valignano presented to Hideyoshi a letter and a present from Albuquerque. As we read 
in the annual report of 1591-92, the embassy turned out to be rather successful, as 
Hideyoshi first distributed gifts to the whole Portuguese party: 
‘[H]izo llamar los quatro cavalleros Japones con todos los demas portugueses y pajez y a cada 
uno mando dar un tablero pequeño con sinco barras de plata y un cosonde114 de seda y alos 
Irmãos João Rodrigues y Anbrosio Fernandes que servian de lenguas, mandou dar a cada uno 
un tablero mediano con 30 barras de plata y dos cosondes de seda (y porque cada barra tiene 
quatro cruzados y tres reales de España, hera la cantidad que dio al Padre Visitador 860 
cruzados y otros tantos alos dos Padres y alos dos Irmãos 258, y a todos los demas 21 
cruzados  y medio que sumado todo viene a ser 2’494 ducados fuera de 36 cosondes de seda 
que valdrian mas de otros 100 cruzados, la qual dadiva fuera dela honrra que con esto a todos 
hizo fue segun la costumbre de Japon una liberalidad muy grande que por ventura 
Quvacundono nunca hizo)’.115 
The kanpaku, then, officially allowed ten Fathers to dwell in Nagasaki and declared that 
he was going to be more tolerant provided the Jesuits continued to act with modesty and 
discretion, and indulged in no overt anti-Buddhist or iconoclastic acts, as used to happen 
in Takayama Justo’s domain. Moreover, the kanpaku sent to the viceroy a letter ‘en un 
papel hecho aposta de ocho palmos de largo y quarto en alto’ along with various gifts, 
such as a naginata – a Japanese halberd,116 a tachi – a long-sword,117 a katana and a 
wakizashi,118 the short-sword the samurai used to carry along with the katana, ‘muchas 
                                                 
112 The quotations are from Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. 1, pp. 316-318. There is also a Spanish 
version of this letter, probably a coeval translation, which offers the same information as the English one 
although it is dated ‘alos 20 anos dela hera tenxo [Tenshō] alos 25 dias dela septima luna’, which means 1 
September 1592. Cf. RAH/Jes., Tomo 116 9/3689, ff. 71v-72v. See also Gil, Hidalgos y Samurai, pp. 39-
42. 
113 聚楽第 
114 It is probably the Japanese word kosode 小袖, which indicates a type of kimono. 
115 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 51, f. 319. 
116 長刀 
117 太刀 
118 脇指 
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delas quales se estiman en Japon en 500 yen, 1U yen, 2U yen, 4U yen hasta 6U 
cruzados solamente por respeto del temple del hazero antiguo’, and finally some 
precious silks.119 
Aside from his positive response to the viceroy’s embassy, Hideyoshi 
commissioned Buddhist monks from the Kyōto Gozan, 120  the leading Rinzai Zen 
temples in the capital, to draft a letter also for the Spanish Governor in Manila, Gómez 
Pérez das Mariñas.121 Hideyoshi informed the Spaniard about his long-awaited project 
of conquering China, a plan that would lead him to transfer the headquarters in Nagoya 
before long. Once there, the taikō expected das Mariñas to send him an embassy bearing 
the banner of submission, otherwise an attack would punctually be prepared.122 Father 
Antonio Sedeño reported the fact to Acquaviva with words that rightly describe how 
Hideyoshi’s letter was received in Manila: ‘[e]ste año embio el Emperador de alli al 
Governador destas Yslas una embaxada llena de amenazas, diziendo que se luego no le 
embia un embaxador a que le de la obediencia que embiara sus exercitos a 
destruyrlas’.123  
As written to Manila, Hideyoshi deployed a great army of more than 160’000 
troops at Nagoya and crossed the sea to Korea. The Korean expedition was only the 
initial, yet unavoidable, step in Hideyoshi’s grand scheme to bring China under his 
control. It must be remembered, however, that Hideyoshi probably conceived the 
campaign also within the scope of his plan of keeping under Japanese control the intra-
Asian trade in the China Sea. Yet, it is undeniable that he was also reaching for an 
empire: the Korean expedition was designed to inspire awe throughout Asia and to fix 
                                                 
119 For a detailed description of Hideyoshi’s gift see RAH/Jes., Tomo 116, 9/3689, ff. 71-71v. 
120 五山 
121 Cf. CHJ IV, pp. 69-70. 
122 Cf. Berry, op. cit., p. 212. As commonly happens, the time of politic was much slower than the time of 
trade. Manila, in fact, had already had various contacts with Japanese vessels before Hideyoshi’s letter. It 
was commonly pirates, but, for instance, in 1589 it is reported the arrival at Manila of a Japanese ship 
loaded with supplies and lots of weapons which amounted to ‘mas de quinientos arcabuçes y otras tantas 
espadas a su usso y algunas armas enastadas’. At first, out of caution, Spanish officers captured the crew 
and confiscated the goods, but once they realized they were dealing with merchants and not with pirates, 
they let them return to their business, whereby ‘se a proveido esta tierra de armas’. See Fiscal Gaspar de 
Ayala to King Philip II, Manila, 15 July 1589. AGI, Filipinas 18A, R.7, N.49, f. 6. In addition to the 
commercial ties, there were also private Japanese lords who offered logicistic and military support for a 
Spanish expedition against the South-Eastern China coast, just like did Konishi Yukinaga Agostinho, who 
in 1587 sent a letter to Manila offering 6’000 men or more and ammunitions to conquer Brunei, Siam, 
Maluku or even China. See AGI, Filipinas 18A, R.5, N. 32, f. 4 and Boxer, The Christian Century, p. 259. 
123 See Father Antonio Sedeño to General Acquaviva, Manila, 7 June 1592. ARSI, Philipp. 9, f. 276. 
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Hideyoshi’s greatness for posterity. 124  During the meeting Hideyoshi had with the 
Macao’s Captain Major Jerónimo Pereira in 1588, whilst confessing that personally he 
had nothing against the Christian faith, the Japanese seemed to have stated that the kami 
and Buddha were nothing but ancient Japanese lords who because of their legendary 
deeds started to be worshipped as divinities.125 In the Western philosophy of religion, 
Hideyoshi’s statement would be part of the Evemerism, a concept named after the 
Greek philosopher Evemeras, according to which polytheistic gods were in fact ancient 
historical characters whose exploits were then deified. Was Hideyoshi’s real intent to 
become part of the Shintō’s pantheon and being worshipped by the posterities? 
Alessandro Valignano126 and Father Francesco Pasio127 would answer positively to this 
question. We can also add that he was actually posthumously deified by Go-Yōzei 
tennō with the title Toyokuni Daimyōjin,128 a tutelary deity of Japan. This cult, however, 
was wiped out in 1615 by that other Japanese who had himself deified and whose 
sanctuary is still there at a hundred odd kilometers from Tōkyō,129 Tokugawa Ieyasu. 
In any case, during the first stage of the Korean War, Hideyoshi showed 
supreme confidence in his victory.130 In effect, the Japanese forces landed in Korea in 
May 1592, took the fortress of Pusan and occupied Seoul within a month. Yet, by the 
end of summer counteroffensive began to form and soon appeared unstoppable. Heavy 
defeats at sea stalled the transfer of fresh troops and supplies for the Japanese brigades 
and the Korean operated a scorched earth policy. In the same time, Chinese soldiers 
                                                 
124 See Berry, op. cit., p. 207. 
125 Cf. Lettera Annibale [sic, Annuale] del Giappone delli 24 di Febraio 1589, pp. 136-137. 
126  Cf. Valignano, Lettera del P. Alessandro Valignano, Visitatore della Compagnia di GIESV nel 
Giappone e nella Cina, de’ 10 d’Ottobre del 1599 a Reuerendo P. Clavdio Aqvaviva Generale della 
medesima Compagnia, p. 36: ‘Non lascierò quì di dire, che tra l’altre cose [...] ordinate da Taicosama, fu 
anche questa, che dopo d’esser publicata la sua morte, lo facessero Camo, chiamandolo Scinfaciman 
[Shin-Hachiman 新八幡神], che vuol dire nuouo Faciman, appresso i Giapoonesi [sic], Dio della guerra, 
e gli edificassero vn sontuoso tempio [...] doue sepelissero il suo cadauero, e vi collocassero la sua statua, 
acciò tutti l’adorassero’. 
127 Cf. Father Francesco Pasio to General Acquaviva. Nagasaki, 3 October 1598. In Hayus, De Rebvs 
Iaponicis, Indicis, et Pervanis Epistolæ Recentiores, p. 500: ‘Denique cupidus nominis sui apud omnen 
posteritatem perpetuandi, vt nempe coleretur tanquam DEVS, noluis corpus suum (licet mos in tota 
Iaponia contrarius obtinuisset) post mortem concremari, sed in arcam artificiose ad id elaboratam 
inclusum in propugnaculo suo, idque loco recreationibus & udis destinato, deponi. Itaque se voluit 
deinceps esse inter Chamos (hoc enim nomen est magnorum Dominorum), virtuteque bellica olim 
prestantium, qui post mortem in Deos relati putantur). Appellati autem voluit Scinfaciman, hoc est, 
nouum Faciman; nam vt olim apud Romanos Mars, sic Faciman apud Iaponios habetur Deus belli’. 
128 豊國大明神 
129 The Shintō shrine Tōshōgū 東照宮 at Nikkō in the Tochigi Prefecture. 
130 See for instance his letter to Hidetsugu sent on 27 June 1592, where he promised to his son the post of 
Civil Dictator of China and stated that ‘Korea and China are within easy reach and no inconvenience is 
anticipated for any concerned, high or low’. See Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. 1, pp. 319-320. 
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crossed the borders and started to push the Japanese southward. By mid-1593 
negotiation appeared the only alternative to defeat and by the end of summer 
Hideyoshi’s first Korean expedition came to an end along with his dream of subjugating 
the Ming.  
The negotiations that followed were long and inconclusive. After the first 
meeting at Nagoya in 1593, the Chinese embassy left and did not return to Japan with a 
response to Hideyoshi’s terms until the end of 1596.131 By that time, however, not only 
Hideyoshi’s life and energy was drawing to an end, but he had to handle again a matter 
regarding the Western faith and its preachers. This time, however, his resolution went 
much further than the simple issue of a decree. 
 
II. 2.    Toyotomi Hideyoshi and foreign affairs: the San Felipe incident 
 We saw that because of the dispositions made by Hideyoshi in 1587, Christianity 
ceased to be a matter confined to the domain of a single lord and became a national 
problem. We saw also that Hideyoshi did not enforce the expulsion but limited himself 
to destroying and confiscating Jesuits’ estates throughout the country. His tolerance, if 
we may call it so, is apparent also by the number and religious fervour of the daimyō in 
his own entourage, such as Konishi Yukinaga132 and Gamō Ujisato,133 and by the way 
he dealt with such a powerful lord as Dom Justo. Yet, the tide for the Japan Christianity 
was changing and the troubles this time came not from the Japanese, but from the 
Spaniards settled in the Philippines. 
                                                 
131 For a description of the campaing see Berry, op. cit., pp. 207-217. 
132 Konishi Yukinaga Agostinho (c. 1555-1600) first met Hideyoshi in 1577 and turned Christian in 1583. 
Following the Kyūshū campaign he was given half of Higo province, with the other half going to Kato 
Kiyomasa, with whom he came at odds frequently over the issue of Christianity. The two of them were 
named as chief commanders of the Korean expedition in 1592. Although in 1587 he offered his military 
help to Manila for military expeditions in South-East Asia, after the initial defeats in Korea he sought to 
reach a peaceful conclusion to the campaign. He was one of the most powerful kirishitan daimyō, but 
when Ieyasu rose to power, he chose to follow Toyotomi Hideyori and was defeated. Instead of 
commiting seppuku, which his faith forbade, he faced death by decapitation. Cf. Laures, Kirishitan bunko. 
A manual of books and documents on the early christian mission in Japan, pp. 113-114. 
133 Gamō Ujisato Leão (1556-1595) got married with one of Oda Nobunaga’s daughters and was given a 
sizeble fief in Ise. After Oda’s death, he joined Hideyoshi and served him in Kyūshū and in the Odawara 
campaign (1590), after which he was given a huge fief in Mutsu – Aizu. He received the baptism in 1585. 
During the Korean expedition, he served on Hideyoshi’s staff in Nagoya. He suddenly and mysteriously 
died in 1595. Cf. Costa, op. cit., p. 171, n. 452. 
149 
 
 Reaching Japan had always been part of the Spanish colonial plans and the very 
Christopher Columbus supported by the Reyes Catolicos passed the Pillars of Hercules 
headed for Cipangu. In Europe the arrival of the Portuguese in Japan was first made 
known by a Spanish officer, Garcia de Escalante Alvarado, who wrote his account of 
Portuguese first visits to the Ryūkyū and Japan while in Portuguese captivity in the 
Moluccas, and a Portuguese captain, Jorge Álvares. 134 It is known as well that the 
instructions received by Miguel López de Legazpi – el conquistador de Filipinas – in 
1564 mentioned the possibility of reaching the Japanese islands, which, the Spaniards 
still considered as part of their side of the world.135 In the 1570s, Felipe II received a 
letter from Manila by Governor Juan Pacheco Maldonado, who wrote his king about 
‘the rich country of Japan, whence is brought great quantities of silver’. Each year, 
according to Maldonado, an unspecified number of Japanese ships reached Philippine’s 
harbours to exchange gold for silver: ‘two to two and a half marcos136 of silver for one 
of gold’.137 Another account written in 1573 reads that there was an active commerce 
between Japan and the Philippines even before the Spaniards got there. Japan is 
described as China’s trading partner, with the exchange of silks for silver.138 Moreover, 
not only Japanese vessels visited the Spanish settlement, they also established a small 
colony in Manila, where 40 Chinese and 20 Japanese, some of them baptized, used to 
live.139 The relationship, however, was not always pacific.  
We saw that Hideyoshi claimed to rid the seas of the pirate menace, yet earlier in 
1582, Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa was forced to send an armada against 
two ships, ‘el uno de Japones y otro de sangleyes’, at Cagayan with subsequent death of 
two hundred Japanese, including the Captain of the ship and his son. 140 Although the 
Spaniards easily erased the menace, pirates’ incursions did not end. Three years later, in 
fact, Governor Santiago de Vera wrote to his king that Japanese pirates were often 
sighted off the coast of Cagayan plundering Chinese trading ships. Hence, he ordered to 
build six galeotas and suggested that, in order to keep the trade with China alive, it was 
necessary to provide strong defences for their ships with economic aid for the artillery 
                                                 
134 Cf. Lidin, Tanegashima: The Arrival of Europe in Japan, p. 21. 
135 Cf. Ollé, “A Inserção das Filipinas na Ásia Oriental (1565-1593)”, p. 14. 
136 The marco was the unit of weight used in weighing gold and silver in the different Latin countries. In 
Spain it was equivalent to 226 grams. 
137 See Letter From Juan Pacheco Maldonado to Felipe II in TPI, vol. 1, n.º 3, pp. 295-303. 
138 See Relation of the Western Islands Called Filipinas in TPI, vol. 1, n.º 3, pp. 190-208. 
139 Cf. Ollé, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
140 Cf. AGI, Filipinas 6, R.4, N.52. 
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from Nueva España. Without this help, he concluded, ‘no se podra hazer cossa 
fructuosa y cada dia se atreverian mas estos cosarios’.141 We have documents that relate 
wakō’s plundering also in the first years of the 17th century, consequently we can imply 
that Hideyoshi’s policy did not turn out to be a successful one. On the contrary, 
Tokugawa Ieyasu’s measures proved to be more decisive.142 
 At any rate, the needs to strengthen Manila’s defences and to provide the 
settlement with military supplies were direct consequences of the Japanese looming 
threat, which from 1592 onwards was not limited to pirates but included the tyrant 
Toyotomi. Hideyoshi’s aggressive international policy concerned the governor, and 
later his son Luis,143 to the point that he suggested a military alliance with the Chinese 
Empire,144 submitted a list of precautions to the war-officials of the city,145 and asked 
for Spanish soldiers and munitions to be sent to Manila.146 Following Hideyoshi’s letter, 
however, relations between Japan and Manila were established, although the first 
diplomatic exchanges did not go as good as both parties expected. 147  
Yet, whilst politic was trudging, trading activities began to take place with more 
regularity. Just as it happened in the Portuguese vessels from Macao, also the Spaniards 
used to carry aboard missionaries of the Roman Church, in particular Friars Minors and 
Dominicans. Although a few Franciscans reached Japan before 1590, it was a passage 
with no sensible consequences. Until 1593, in fact, the Jesuits had been holding the 
monopoly of the evangelization of Japan. Yet, as we just saw, the Spanish were 
interested in Japan before the discovery of the Philippines and also Francis Javier 
expressed his concern about a Spanish approach to Japan when he suggested D. João III 
to talk and dissuade Emperor Carlos V to reach the archipelago through the Western 
way.148 The diplomatic missions sent to China by Manila in the 1570s along with the 
several attempts made by the mendicant orders to gain a foothold in the Ming Empire 
                                                 
141 See AGI, Filipinas 18A, R.3, N.15, f. 6. 
142 In 1602, eager to trade with Manila, the shōgun issued the death penalty for more than 600 people 
accused of piracy, a deed which actually put an end to Japanese piracy in the Philippines. Cf. Gil, Los 
Chinos en Manila – Siglos XVI y XVII, p. 90 
143 See AGI, Filipinas 18B, R.4, N.29.  
144 See AGI, Filipinas 18B, R.2, N. 13.  
145 See TPI, vol. 1, n. 8, pp. 284-297. 
146 See AGI, Filipinas 18B, R.2, N.5 and N.7. 
147 For this part we followed our text presented at the conference As Filipinas e o Pacífico (c.1580-
c.1660) | The Philippines and the Pacific (c.1580-c.1660), “Commercial liaisons between Japan and the 
Philippines during the first years of the Tokugawa Jidai”. 
148 Cf. Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão, pp. 181-182. 
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exacerbated the situation, although they all ended in failure due to Chinese 
intransigence.  
Both the diplomatic and the religious undertakings were against the legal rights 
of the Portuguese patronage established at Tordesillas and Zaragoza, according to which 
the Chinese mainland felt within the spiritual jurisdiction of the Portuguese bishop of 
China and Japan resident at Macao. It was presumable, that once failed in China, the 
Spaniards would switch their attention to Japan, especially after they understood how 
profitable the silk trade was. In order to protect the Japan mission from Spanish 
intrusion, the Jesuits sent several requests for a bull to Gregory XIII forbidding any 
change in the existing status of the mission field. Yet in 1586 Sixtus V allowed religious 
in the Philippines to found missions in China and the Franciscans made no secret of 
their intention to do the same also in Japan and the chance of breaking the Jesuit 
monopoly occurred in 1592, the year of Hideyoshi’s letter to das Marinãs.149  
In that letter, the kanpaku mentioned that initially he meant to invade the 
Philippines without waiting on them to swear subjection, but he was persuaded to do 
otherwise by Harada Magoshichirō Gaspar, 150 a Christian merchant involved in the 
trade with Philippines. Harada, through the intercession of a counsellor of the taikō,151 
was able to convince Hideyoshi that it would be advisable to give the Spaniards a 
chance of submitting to Japan, instead of sending an army right away. Harada informed 
Hideyoshi about how well merchants like him were treated in Manila, and he also 
assured that a Spanish embassy would surely follow once he could talk with the 
governor and thus he was allowed to lead the delegation.152  
                                                 
149 Cf. Costa, op. cit., pp. 184-187 and Boxer, The Christian Century, pp. 154-160. 
150 According to Iaccarino, it was Harada Kiemon who convinced Hideyoshi, but eventually, due to bad 
health, he had to renounce to go and entrusted everything to his nephew, Magoshichirō. Nevertheless, in 
the sources we consulted, and quoted, only the latter Harada appears, although in one letter he appears as 
‘Faranda Maguoxichiro’, whereas in the other one the translator, most likely a Chinese, transcribed the 
name using the Chinese reading of the characters: ‘Guantien Chun Chit Lonc’, nowadays Yuántián 
Sunqiláng. Unfortunately, Iaccarino did not provide any archival evidences and thus we are not able to 
give further clarification to the matter. Cf. Iaccarino, “Alessandro Valignano e la missione Cobo (1592)”, 
pp. 130-131. 
151 Cf. RAH/Cor. 9/6255, f. 201: ‘..porque Faranda Maguoxichiro que por via de mercancia va y viene 
cada año a esse reyno, dixo a mi privado Faxeguaba Sonin que importava embyar yo luego alguna 
embarcacion de Japon y que el yria a essas Islas a dezir como mi armada yva alla y assi sin duda me 
darian luego obediencia y me pagarian tributo’. 
152 Cf. AGI, Filipinas, 18B, R.2, N.12, f. 6: ‘Guantien Chun Chit Lonc [...] me a dicho el buen tratamiento 
que ay haçen alos mercades Japones vasallos meos, que de aqui van a esas yslas, el qual perguntandole yo 
si el que govierna ay m’es amigo, me respondio y asegurado que como yo envie carta para el, que el me 
enviara envaxada. Y quando el no lo fuese, estando yo en mi Reyno asentado soy tan poderoso que tengo 
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Hideyoshi’s envoys reached Manila on 29 May 1592, yet das Mariñas had 
already been warned of their arrival by the Jesuit Superior in Manila, Antonio Sedeño, 
who had received two letters from Nagasaki written by Valignano stating that ‘un 
Jappon de Meaco mercader [Harada Magoshichirō], movido de su interes, dio a 
entender a Cambacudono que seria facil cosa hazer que el Governador delos Luzones le 
embiase embaxada, y le diese obediencia, y se sujetase a su mandado’.153 The Italian in 
order not to compromise the already precarious situation of the Japan mission gave 
Manila some advices in dealing with the Japanese emissaries. Das Mariñas, however, 
did not follow Valignano’s instructions. Instead he chose to send back an embassy 
headed by the Dominican Father Juan Cobo, who arrived at Satsuma by the end of July 
1592 and met with Hideyoshi almost a month later.154 It would appear that Cobo’s 
answers displayed to Hideyoshi for the first time the position and extent of the 
Habsburgs’s colonial empire and the fact that Portugal became part of that crown a few 
years earlier. Cobo was dismissed with a reply to das Mariñas but died en route for 
Manila.155 Another mission from Manila, this one led by four Franciscans, was cordially 
received by Hideyoshi in 1593. The Friars put forward proposals of peaceful relations 
with Manila and asked permission to remain in Japan until the answers from Manila to 
the matters faced with Hideyoshi came. Taicosama allowed them to reside in his 
country, provided always that they did not proselytize. He answered positively also to 
the Friars’ request of visiting Miyako and he offered to pay for their daily expenses 
while in the capital city.156 It has been stated that the Japanese tyrant permitted the 
                                                                                                                                               
gentes que vayan a conquestar qualquier reyno y aunque este es hombre bajo, yo le e dado credito por la 
buena raçon que da y asi pues no envio la jente que pensava enviar’. 
153 See “Copia de una carta que el Padre Alexandro Valignano dela Compañía de Jesus Visitador de 
Jappon y China escrivio al Reitor de Manila dela misma Compañía sobre avisos que embiava al 
Governador delas dichas Islas”, in Apologia Societatis Contra Calumnias ipsi irrogatas a F. Joanne de 
Santa Maria Provinciali Franciscanorum in Indiis Occidentalibus, BNCR/FGes. 1246, ff. 316v-317. Cf. 
also Iaccarino, op. cit., pp. 130-132. 
154  Ivi, pp. 133-137. Cobo came from Mexico to Manila in 1588 and was the most accomplished 
Sinologue among the Europeans in the Philippines, yet he did not speak Japanese. 
155 Cf. Iaccarino, op. cit., pp. 139-140 and Boxer, op. cit., pp. 160-161. The meeting turned out to be quite 
detrimental for the Society of Jesus. In effect, it was made clear to Hideyoshi that the viceroy’s embassy 
headed by Valignano had no official value and King Filipe would have never sent such a rich tributary 
gift. Hideyoshi did not take the news well and ordered to take down a church in Nagasaki along with its 
premises. Valignano knew something bad would happen if the news came to the taikō’s attention. In fact, 
when he wrote to das Mariñas mentioned that it was risky for the mission to reveal that Spaniards and 
Portuguese were now unite under the same crown. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 31, f. 37 and Iaccarino, op. cit., 
pp. 141-142. 
156 The record of the 1593-meeting was sent to Pero Gomez by the Miyako shoshidai 所司代, the 
shogunal governor of Miyako, Maeda Gen’i Hōin, on 9 September 1593. In RAH/Cor. 9/2665, ff. 203-
203v. The shoshidai’s letter was of paramount importance for the Japan Jesuits, since it cleared them from 
any involvement in the issue of the anti-Christian edict in 1587. As a consequence, on 28 September the 
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Friars to remain at Miyako in the hope that they would play a similar role to the Jesuits 
at Nagasaki, therefore creating an alternative to the Portuguese monopoly of trade in 
China.157 In our opinion, however, this deduction fails to include some elements. As we 
saw, Hideyoshi’s deepest motivation was seeing his leading status acknowledged by the 
countries surrounding Japan. His desire of receiving tributary missions from outside has 
to be read within the structure of the Chinese cultural sphere. Hence, the diplomatic 
visits the Portuguese Capitão-Mór or the Spaniards paid annually to the ruler of Japan 
are supposed to be interpreted as a formal recognition of submission to the Japanese 
empire. Hideyoshi’s threatening missives to the viceroy at Goa, the governor of Manila 
and the lord of Formosa if on the one hand promised amity and peaceful exchanges, on 
the other hand established a vertical relation in order to grant the very existence of those 
exchanges. At any rate, the fact that Hideyoshi handled the international relations in a 
subtle if inscrutable matter is proved by the words the Governor of Manila Francisco 
Tello wrote to Spain after Hideyoshi’s death: 
‘las cossas del Japon estubieron entretenidas los años passados aunque siempre con temores y 
amenazas de que abra de bajar a estas Yslas […], pero aseguravase en mucha parte este miedo 
con la ocupaçion que el Xapon tenia dela Guerra de Coria y palabras de Taycosama, Señor de 
Xapon, que significava queria la paz y amistad.’158 
Hideyoshi, in other words, asked for peace with the sceptre and the sword in his hand, 
although for the moment the latter was pointed towards Korea and China. Only three 
years before this letter was sent, however, the situation in Japan had changed drastically 
compared to the 1593 state of affair. 
On 19 October 1596, in fact, the San Felipe, a Spanish galleon bound for 
Acapulco and laden with rich cargo, ran aground off the coast of Tosa. After Hideyoshi 
was informed of the shipwreck, he sent to Tosa an envoy to inform the Spanish that all 
the goods in the vessel were now his for the taking. The upset Spanish captain, Matías 
de Landecho, managed to set a meeting with Hideyoshi and chose as his representatives 
the Franciscans in Miyako. The Friars’ behaviour in the capital city during the previous 
                                                                                                                                               
Capitão Mór, Gaspar Pinto da Rocha ordered an examination of the document at Nagasaki. The witnesses 
called to testify were: António de Abreu, Nagasaki householder; Mor João, 38 years old, Nagasaki 
householder; Bartolomeu Ryoshichika, 60 years old, Nagasaki householder; Murayama António, 31 years 
old, Nagasaki householder and João Rodrigues, about 32 years old, Portuguese and Brother of the Society 
of Jesus. See RAH/Cor. 9/2665, ff. 341-344v. 
157 Cf. Boxer, op. cit., pp. 161-162. 
158 See Carta de la Audiencia de Manila sobre su fundación y funcionamiento, AGI, Filipinas 18B, R.9, 
N. 122, f. 15. 
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three years had left the Jesuits and the Japanese converts aghast at their intemperate zeal. 
Hideyoshi’s apparent friendliness, in fact, had been mistaken for full patronage and 
made them forget about the 1587 prohibition of Christianity.159 According to the Bishop 
of Japan, Pedro Martins,160 and to the Captain Major Rui Mendes de Figueiredo,161 this 
excess of confidence and defiance of the taikō’s laws were the main causes for 
Hideyoshi’s swift and decisive decision to crucify twenty-six Christians at Nagasaki. 
But let’s proceed with order.  
It would seem that though inconclusive as it was, the first Korean campaign 
drained Hideyoshi’s coffers. The taikō, on his hand, had just refused to accept the Ming 
emperor’s offer to invest him formally as king of Japan, thus establishing Japan’s 
subordination to China and was now renewed in his intention of invading the continent. 
The new campaign, however, needed capitals. Moreover, in the 1590s a series of 
disastrous earthquakes devastated large areas of Japan, including his costly new palace 
at Fushimi. In these circumstances, the wreckage of the San Felipe represented an 
unexpected gift. Apparently, during the negotiations with the Japan officers to recover 
the cargo, the Spanish pilot in an effort to impress – maybe scare? – the Japanese with 
the power of the Spanish Empire, admitted that Spain overseas conquests had been 
facilitated by the mendicant orders, which normally preceded the arrival of the 
conquistadores. This incautious admission is believed to be the hint that led Hideyoshi 
to consider the Christian faith not only a disturber of political situation in Japan, but a 
factual threat to its independence and security. As a consequence, he forthwith 
sentenced the Franciscans to death, along with seventeen of their Japanese neophytes 
and three Japanese Jesuit lay brothers, for a total of twenty-six persons: 
‘Tendo eu prohibido os annos passados rigurosamente a ley que pregão os Padres, vierão estes 
dos Luções, dizendo que erão embaixadores e se deixarão estar no Meaco, promulgando esta 
lei, pello que a elles, e aquelles que receberão a mesma lei mando iusticar, são por todos 24 
[sic], os quais se ponhão na cruz em Nangasaqui, e se deixem estar nella asi daqui por diante 
muito mais e mais prohibo esta lei, pello que faço a saber isto para que o prohibão muy 
                                                 
159 As stated by Boxer, they had some excuse for believing that the edict was now a dead letter. There 
where Christians among the kanpaku’s entourage, the embassy from Goa was received in solemn official 
audience, as he received the Franciscans in 1593, moreover the Jesuits were quietly but steadily 
continuing their work in Southern Japan. See Boxer, op. cit., pp. 162-163. 
160 See Certidão do Senhor Dom Pedro Bispo de Japão acerca do estado daquella nova Igreia, BL/Add. 
9858, f. 1. 
161 See Outra certidão do Capitão Mor da Viagem de Japão, trata da mesma materia que a passada, Ivi, 
ff. 4-6v. 
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rigurosamente, e se por ventura ouver alguma que quebre este meu mandado, o mandarei 
iusticar com toda a familia. Feita o 1.º ano da era Queichoō aos 20 dias da mesma lua. Sello 
real’.162 
Since the foregoing is based substantially on Jesuits sources, hence partisans of 
the Padroado, it is interesting to take a look to the Spanish account of the matter, since 
it unveils again how troubles in Asia reawakened political divergences between two 
hearts that were held in only one hand. 163  Two sources in particular deserve our 
attention.  
The first is represented by Franciscans’ documents that attribute Hideyoshi’s 
sudden change to the Jesuits’ mischievous whispers. As we said, in fact, in the early 
1590s the Friars were carrying out freely their mission in Miyako. Their lack of 
experience on Japanese modus vivendi led them to misinterpret Jesuits’ caution for want 
of patronage by Japanese lords. More importantly, whilst the Society of Jesus saw the 
Friars’ blatant behaviour as one of the primary causes of Hideyoshi’s rage, the 
Franciscans interpreted the facts differently, or at least wanted their readers to do so:  
‘E assi os frades estavão com liberdade e os Padres sem ella, os frades com licença e favor del 
Rei e os Padres em sua desgraça [...]. Os Padres dizião missa escondidamente em sua casa, os 
frades trazião seu habito e andavão publicamente com elle. Os Padres andavão como 
seculares Japois não sahião de noite ou de modo que não fossem conhecidos. Os frades não 
guardavão nenhum comprimento do mundo, e secular, os Padres como puros seculares en 
trajo e trato, e comprimento tratavão com os Japões, os frades não tratavão se não com pobres, 
os Padres com ricos dizendo que se tratassem com os pobres, não quererião ver a sua casa os 
ricos. Os frades em seu trajo, casa e comida, mostravão que erão pobres, os Padres mostravão 
en tudo que erão ricos e assj erão vesitados de gente mais principal, os frades não tinhão tratos 
nem mercadorias, os Padres como puro mercaderes trazem seus empregos e tratos, os frades 
andavão descalços e a pé; os Padres calçados e em ombros de homens e palanquins, ou a 
cavalo com grande acompanhamento de criados. Os frades servião-se de alguns pobres 
humildes, os Padres tinhão variedades de criados e todos os de sua casa tem seu grao de 
honrra. Finalmente em modo de viver erão differentes, porem qual pregava mais propriamente 
                                                 
162 The text of the edict was translated and sent to the pontiff by Bishop Pedro Martins on 23 February 
1597. See BL/Add. 9860, ff. 25-26v. See also AGI, Filipinas 79, N. 28 and Boxer, op. cit., pp. 165-166. 
163 With regard to this specific topic, it is interesting to see how Jesuits’ and Franciscans’ accounts of the 
same event, like, for instance, the 1597 martyrdom of Nagasaki. As showed by Oliveira e Costa, the 
mutual accusation between the Ignatians and the Minors rebounded also on the editorial production in 
Europe. Thus, the contents of the publications reflect the orders particular views of the matter. Yet, only 
by reading the titles it is evident the origin of the text. Cf. Costa, O Japão e o Cristianismo no Século XVI 
– Ensaios de História Luso-Nipónica, pp. 216-219. 
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o Santo Evangelho e imitava a Christo Jesu crucificado e pobre, iulgueo quem os Padres 
quizerem, e assi parece que aos frades por pobres, e não terem se não pobres amigos, que 
pregarem a fee que está prohibida, fazem muitos e muitos Christãos e se sabe não lhes 
disserão nada. Que se pode dizer a isto?’164  
What can you say about that? Asked Friar Marcelo de Ribadeneira. First of all, it should 
be noted that the Friar worked within the Portuguese padroado, which means that his 
loyalty lay on his order, not the political institution that sent him in Asia. Moreover, the 
Ordo Fratrum Minorum was as related to the Spanish patroazgo as the Society of Jesus 
was to the padroado. Second, we can say that this treatise shows clearly how the 
Franciscans, maybe out of naïveté, failed to comprehend the complexity of Japanese 
society as thoroughly as the Jesuits did, since they kept dictating their Weltanschauung 
to a society that basically rejected it. At any rate, this work was formally condemned at 
the request of the Society of Jesus by the Inquisition at Goa on 14 August 1598.165 Yet, 
the Franciscans spread also another accusation against the Ignatians. According to an 
anonymous account of the San Felipe’s incident, on 14 November 1596, Hideyoshi 
from Miyako charged the Spaniards of being ‘ladrones cosarios que beniamos a 
comarcar la tierra para tomarla [...] ymbiando primero a los Padres de S. Francisco para 
que predicaran la ley de Nanbal’.166 The anonymous Spaniard wrote that Hideyoshi 
heard such things from ‘algunas personas y tres portugeses’, but did not specified 
whether they were laymen or men of the cloth. The vagueness was resolved by Fray 
Pedro Bautista, the commissioner of the Friars in Japan and one of the six Franciscans 
condemned to death. 167  Bautista, in fact, while imprisoned in Ōsaka, wrote to his 
confrères that he could not conceive as possible that such a wickedness as to call the 
Spaniards thieves could reside in the heart of a Christian.168 On the other hand, however, 
                                                 
164 See Tratado que os religiosos de S. Francisco espalharam em Goa em Baçaim no ano de 1598 contra 
os Padres da Companhia de Jesus que andam na conversão de Japão, BL/Add. 9858, ff. 78-78v. 
165 See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, ff. 119-119v. Cf. Boxer, The Christian Century, p. 77 and Costa, op. cit., pp. 
217-218. 
166 See Relaçion del biaje del galleon S. Pheliphe de Su Magestad aribada que hiço al Japon y su perdida 
y lo que mas a suçedido. Año de 1596, AGI, Filipinas 79, N. 28, f. 4. Cf. Gil, Hidalgos y Samurai, pp. 69-
71. ‘Nanbal’ is the wrong transliteration of the Japanese word Nanban 南蠻, literally the Southern 
barbarians, the expression by which the Japanese used to denote the Westerners and their culture, Nanban 
Bunka 南蠻文化. 
167 The other five condemned were Francisco Blanco, Gonçalo Garcia, Francisco de San Miguel and 
Filipe de Jesus. 
168 See Commissioner Pedro Bautista OFM to Fray Martin and Fray Juan Pobre, Ōsaka, 23 December 
1596. AGI, Filipinas 84, N. 80, f. 1v: ‘Por una parte no me puedo persuader que en pecho de Christianos 
tan gran maldad cupiese que digesen que eran ladrones los castillas’. 
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Pedro Bautista could not help but admire the Jesuits’ shrewdness and he was forced to 
admit that at the end of the day ‘los padres estan libres […] y nosotros en prision’.169  
The second source that deserves our attention is a letter signed by Governor 
Francisco Tello and addressed to Filipe I written in the aftermath of the executions. 
Tello tried extensively to put the Portuguese and the Ignatians in an unfavourable light, 
in order to lay on them the blame for the painful end met by the Spaniards in Japan and 
it is rather interesting the way he put it: 
‘Dizen estos Frayles que los Portuguezes vasallos de V. Magestad tienen dicho al Japon que 
tres rreyes ay en el mundo poderossos. El mayor dellos es el Japon y el segundo don Antonio 
y el tercero V. Magestad, que es el que el dizen ser menos poderosso y cossa me a parecido 
nueva para los Portuguezes tener la memoria y nombre de don Antonio aun en estas partes tan 
remotas’.170 
Such accusation was officially addressed by Bishop Martins in 1598. He denied that the 
cargo of the Spanish vessel was confiscated upon a conversation between Portuguese 
Jesuits and Hideyoshi. He denied also that in Hideyoshi’s presence a Portuguese 
claimed that the king of Spain was not the sovereign of Portugal. He felt rather sure 
about the last point, since the man who allegedly said that, António Garcês – ‘un 
portugues honrado y conoçido en Manilla’,171 had been commissioned to deliver to the 
Japanese court the gift from the Nao do trato of 1596, yet by the time the Spanish vessel 
had wrecked at Tosa’s Urado he was already back in Nagasaki.172  
By reporting such information, were the Franciscans and Tello just rubbing salt 
into the king’s wound due to António’s escape? Was this just a way to relieve Manila of 
responsibilities for the lost cargo? Be that as it may, only a month after his letter to the 
                                                 
169 Ibid. 
170 See Governor Francisco Tello to King Filipe I, Manila, 18 May 1597. AGI, Filipinas 18B, R. 7, N. 62. 
171 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 13 [II], f. 352. Garcês, probably the son of a Portuguese and an Asian, was one of 
the Portuguese merchants who were able to maintain a robust trade between Japan and the Philippines. In 
1600, for instance, only his ships and the ones belonging to another Portuguese, Vasco Dias, were 
allowed to make the voyage between the two archipelagos, since the new tyrant, Tokugawa Ieyasu, ‘tiene 
ordenado que ningun navio de Jappones vaya este año alla, y esto […] porque no quieren que os tien alla 
en sospecha, mandando Jappones ya que quedaron este año con tanta sospecha de ellos’. Ivi, f. 316v.  
172 See Certidão do Senhor Dom Pedro Bispo de Japão acerca do estado daquella nova Igreia:, BL/Add. 
9868, ff. 2v-3: ‘Certifico mais que he grandissima falsidade dizer que os Portuguezes forão causa da 
tomada da nao e que dizerão no Meaco que El Rey de Espanha não era Rei dos Portuguezeses e que os 
Espanhões vinhão a comquistar a terra e outras mentiras que Gemonoxo disse aos Espanhões em Urado 
[...], porque quando a Nao veo a Urado, ia António Garges e seus companheiros estavão em Nangasaqui, 
e não estavão emtão no Meaco [...]. Certifico mais que a causa e decasião [sic, decisão] da morte dos 
frades, alem do que está ditto, elles mesmos o derão pello modo com que procederão na conversão, e esta 
he a verdade’. 
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king, Tello sent another missive informing Spain that he had incarcerated Don Luis 
Perez das Mariñas and Don Matias de Landecho and started investigations 
(averiguaciones) about ‘el aver aprestado y aderezado mal este navio’. 173 Both the 
former governor and the captain, then, were held responsible only for technical mistakes, 
not the way the matter had been handled in Japan. 
 It is beyond the author’s intentions to justify the position of any of the two 
opposite parties, yet it would seem that there is less acrimony in Jesuits’ documents than 
what we found in the Franciscan ones. On 8 September 1597,174 in fact, Hideyoshi 
wrote again to Francisco Tello. It is an odd letter, completely different from the ones 
sent years before. In this one, which survives only in the Spanish translation, Hideyoshi 
first wrote a paragraph about the Shintoism and how the kami govern and affect nature 
and gave birth to the go-rin,175 the five fundamental relationships upon which is based 
the Confucianism. 176 He used this part as an introduction to the core of the letter, 
namely how the Franciscans came to Japan and spoiled such a perfect equilibrium. The 
taikō explained that he had been pushed to condemn the Friars to death by the way they 
kept defying his prohibition to promulgate the Christian faith. 177 There is no doubt 
about the authenticity of this document, since we have a summary of Hideyoshi’s letter 
in a general account on the state of the Spanish colony of Manila, written in July 1599 
by the Audiencia de Manila.178 In other words, then, Bishop Martins’s certification is to 
be credited.  
On the other hand, however, among the accusations made by the Minors there is 
also the reason why the Ignatians were spared by Hideyoshi. Following the execution of 
February 1597, in fact, Bishop Martins was forced to leave Japan for Macao by the 
Nagasaki Bugyō Terazawa Shima no Kami Hirotaka. At first Hideyoshi threatened to 
                                                 
173 See AGI, Filipinas 18B, R.7, N.64, f. 2. 
174 In the text we find the date according to the Japanese calendar: 2nd Keichō 慶長, 7th month, 27th day. 
175 五倫 
176 Relationship between lord and subject, husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother, father 
and son and between friends. The latter is the only one that involves equals, but it is mentioned the least.  
177 The Spanish translation of Hideyoshi’s letter is in APTCJ, Caja 102, n.° 45 and ARSI, Jap. Sin. 45 [I], 
ff. 207v-211v. Cf. Gil, op. cit., pp. 73-78 and Boxer, op. cit., pp. 168-169. 
178 See AGI, Filipinas 18B, R. 9, N. 122, f. 16: ‘Poco antes que Taycosama murese respondio por una 
carta suya al Governador destas yslas las caussas que abia tenido para crucificar los religiosos de S. 
Francisco que eran por aver predicado y hecho Christianos en su rreyno contra su leys y voluntad y pidio 
no le embiasen mas religiosos si querian durasse la paz entre estos reynos y el suyo’. In the same 
manuscript, we also find the answers noted down in the Spanish court. The answer to this point is quite 
interesting, since it shows that the Spanish monarchy was actually pushing Rome for the abrogation of the 
Jesuits’ monopoly established in 1585 by Pope Gregory XIII.  
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include all the missionaries in his condemnation, but he opted to expel ‘a todos os 
Padres da Companhia que estavão em Japão, exeptuando huns poucos que podia deixar 
em o mesmo porto de Nagasaqi, para terem conta com os Portugueses, e se continuar o 
comercio que elles tem em Japão’.179 Eventually, eleven Jesuits out of 112 left Japan in 
the soma of a Portuguese who traded with Cambodia.180 Yet, as cunningly confessed by 
Father Francisco Pires, the Ignatians managed to send to Macao those brethren who 
would be missed the less, namely two sick Fathers and nine Brothers.181 
Once again, then, the silk trade proved to be an indestructible shield for the 
missionaries of the Society of Jesus. Once again, however, Hideyoshi saw fit to destroy 
the Jesuits’ constructions in Kyūshū. In mid-1598, the same year of the taikō’s demise, 
Terazawa put into practice Hideyoshi’s orders and burned down the seminary at Arima, 
137 churches and numerous other buildings. 182  Hideyoshi, however, was mainly 
preoccupied by the progress of the second Korean expedition, which had begun early in 
1597, and so the Jesuits were left substantially in peace, whereas the Korean invasion 
ended not even one year later owing to the taikō’s death. Consequently the Japanese 
invasion armies were recalled home and a new phase both for Japan history and for the 
history of the Japan mission broke through with the ascent of Tokugawa Ieyasu. 
 
II. 3.    The Japanese Christianity and the foundation of the Tokugawa 
Bakufu 
 In September 1598 there was a rumour spreading through the streets of Nagasaki 
that Hideyoshi died in the first days of August, but out of caution his death was 
concealed. João Rodrigues, the main asset the fathers had in Hideyoshi’s headquarters, 
contradicted this news and wrote to his brethren that the taikō was only ill and he had 
asked him to transact the selling of 200 bales (fardos) of rice in order to buy a great deal 
                                                 
179 See Certidão do Bispo de Japão acerca do estado da christandade que nelle ha, RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 
37. See also BNCR/FGes. 1246, ff. 309-309v.  
180 In 1598 there were 46 fathers and 66 brothers in Japan, more other 20 who had been sent to Macao in 
order to complete their studies. See Annva de Jappão do Anno de 1598, BL/Add. 9859, ff. 21v-22. 
181 See Father Francisco Pires to General Acquaviva, Macao, 2 July 1598. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 13 [I], f. 139. 
182 See Cerqueira’s certificate signed on 21 February 1599 in BL/Add. 9860, f. 57. See also RAH/Cor. 
9/2665, f. 37. 
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of silk. A few days later, however, the rumour was confirmed, ‘Tayco era muerto y […] 
murio a 16 de Setembro de 1598’.183 
 In his last days, Hideyoshi was busy in preparing the ground for his succession. 
In 1593, in fact, a legitimate heir, Hideyori, was born. Only two years later, Hideyoshi 
maybe in order to avoid fratricidal disputes upon his inheritance accused his adopted 
son Hidetsugu of treason, had him imprisoned and eventually killed. Although now 
there was only one legitimate heir, however, when Hideyoshi passed away, Hideyori 
was only a five-year old infant. Hideyoshi wished that after his death Japan did not fall 
again in the anarchy of the past years and wanted also to secure the tenka for his son. 
Hence entrusted the chief power to a board of five elders (tairō184) chosen among the 
leading daimyō of the taikō’s circle: Tokugawa Ieyasu, Maeda Toshiie, Mōri Terumoto, 
Ukita Hideie and Uesugi Takekatsu. Moreover, Hideyoshi arranged a marriage between 
Hideyori and a niece of Ieyasu, who was also chosen to be protector of the infant 
Hideyori. To check on the five tairō, Hideyoshi chose amongst his own trusted officials 
five bugyō and had them cementing their connection with solemn oaths as well as a 
judicious distribution of offices and money.185  
Hideyoshi’s last decisions show clearly that one of the tairō stood up above the 
others. As wrote Valignano, he was a ‘Senhor Gentil llamado Iyeyasu, Rey de ocho 
Reynos, y el mas poderoso que aora ay en Japon’.186 As we touched on earlier, Ieyasu 
built his fortune from scratch. He was born in 1543 as Matsudaira Takechiyo, son of 
Matsudaira Hirotada (1526-1549), lord of the Mikawa Province. He became head of the 
Matsudaira family in 1555. In 1566 he petitioned the court to allow him to change his 
family name from Matsudaira to Tokugawa, that being the name of the area whence his 
family originated, and changed also his name to Ieyasu. The following year, he sought 
and sealed an alliance with Oda Nobunaga, with whom by May 1582 he jointly 
annihilated the Takeda army after a decade of war. Ieyasu had the Suruga domain added 
                                                 
183 See Vice-provincial Pero Gomez to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, September 1598. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
13 [I], ff. 143-144v. As would happen often in Jesuits’ letters, this letter was closed and picked up again 
several times. Since it could be sent only when the monsoon allowed to do so, the Fathers could update 
the information they had written down. In this case, the letter was written in three different occasions. 
184 大老 
185  Cf. Valignano, Lettera del P. Alessandro Valignano, Visitatore della Compagnia di GIESV nel 
Giappone e nella Cina, de’ 10 d’Ottobre del 1599 a Reuerendo P. Clavdio Aqvaviva Generale della 
medesima Compagnia, p. 4 and Valignano to the Father Provincial of Portugal, Nagasaki, 20 February 
1599. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, ff. 19-19v. See also Boxer, op. cit., pp. 178-180. 
186 See RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 19. 
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to his territory, which already comprised the Mikawa and the Tōtōmi provinces, and 
thus he became one of the prominent lords in Western Honshū. 
As we already saw, afterwards Ieyasu joined with Hideyoshi instead of fighting 
him. In 1590, they combined forces and moved northwards to take the province of 
Odawara from the Hōjō family. After the victorious campaign, Hideyoshi repaid Ieyasu 
by suggesting the exchange the eight Hōjō provinces in the Kantō area with Ieyasu’s 
territory. As a result, in 1590 Ieyasu became the lord of the fertile Kantō plains with an 
income of about 1’000’000 koku. He set up his new headquarters in a small fishing 
village that it was later called Edo and it is now known as Tōkyō. Hideyoshi’s death 
was the last step before Ieyasu could ascend to his maximum power. 
It was not long before Ieyasu gave the other tairō cause for complaint in making 
several political marriages for his sons and daughters, which had been strictly prohibited 
by Hideyoshi in the oath he had required from them. Moreover, only one year after 
Taicosama’s death, also Maeda Toshiie, Hideyori’s guardian, died and therefore Ieyasu 
took his place and went and stayed in the castle of Ōsaka.187  
As is well known, Ieyasu eventually seized the power after the battle of 
Sekigahara in October 1600 – ‘a Guerra dos Governadores’ 188  – which saw the 
opposition of the Western front in favour of Toyotomi Hideyori against the Eastern, 
pro-Tokugawa faction.189 For our purposes here, it is irrelevant to review the phases of 
the battle. Suffice it to say, that his victory was owed mainly to the treachery of generals 
who betrayed their cause and that Ieyasu’s punishments virtually limited to three 
executions, among which stands up that of Konishi Yukinaga Agostinho, who 
considered himself bound in honour to Toyotomi Hideyori and his late father.190 In 
addition to Agostinho, other Christian lords – Kobayakawa Hidekane at Chikugo, Oda 
Hidenobu at Mino and Kuroda Nagamasa at Buzen – were deprived of their lands and 
incomes.191 Fortunately for the Society of Jesus, however, not all kirishitan daimyō had 
sided with the losing faction. Both Ōmura Yoshiaki and Arima Harunobu, for instance, 
maintained a neutral posture during the conflict and their territories remained basically 
                                                 
187 With regard to Ieyasu’s early years, we followed the aforequoted bibliography. 
188 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 107v. 
189 For the battle of Sekigahara see Sadler, op. cit., pp. 135-146. 
190 According to Moran if Konishi Yukinaga had been powerful and able enough to rise above other 
contenders and make himself lord of the Tenka, it would have been possible to see the totality of Japan 
turned to Christianity. See Moran, The Japanese and the Jesuits, pp. 190-191. 
191 See RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 37v, Boxer, op. cit., pp. 180-181 and Costa, op. cit., pp. 306-307. 
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untouched,192 whereas four kirishitan daimyō were rewarded for their support to the 
Eastern faction. This appears to be a clear demonstration of the fact that for the 
kirishitan daimyō the Christian faith was never an element upon which creating a closed 
enclave among the Japanese lords. Despite the Japanese tyrants’ fear, the kirishitan 
daimyō shared only their belief, not the political aims.  
Although the news of Ieyasu’s victory was received not negatively by the 
Japanese Christendom,193 the fathers were conscious that the most favourable scenario 
for them was a country without a sole and undisputed ruler.194 In any case, however, the 
first years of Tokugawa’s rule allowed them to be slightly optimistic and to send good 
news to their confrères at Macao. 195  Ieyasu, in fact, was by no means similar to 
Hideyoshi and he soon demonstrated so in the way he dealt with affairs regarding 
adjacent countries and the foreigners in Japan. Nevertheless, he did follow Hideyoshi’s 
example in one occasion, when he sought the cooperation of the Ignatians of Nagasaki, 
through the service of João Rodrigues, in the management of the port. This display of 
benevolence towards the Society of Jesus encouraged Rodrigues to ask for the 
revocation of Hideyoshi’s anti-Christian edicts, but Ieyasu replied that it was too early 
to do something against the memory of a recent dead. 196  At any rate, as early as 
December 1599, Ieyasu wrote to Terazawa at Nagasaki that he granted freedom to the 
Christian believers to attend to Christian rites and to live in conformity with the 
Western faith. Moreover, the relief received by Ieyasu’s disposition gave new energy to 
the missionaries and the Japanese believers as well, since the flood of people to attend 
the mass in the Sundays was so abundant that the fathers petitioned the bugyō for the 
license to build a new and bigger church, whose construction was completed by the end 
                                                 
192  Notwithstanding Yoshiaki’s neutrality, Ieyasu expropriated his fief, handed it over to Terazawa 
Hirotaka and moved Ōmura to Amakusa. Following the intervention of other kirishitan daimyō, however, 
the change was undone and Amakusa went to Hirotaka. Nevertheless, Ōmura Yoshiaki was forced to 
abdicate in favour of his son, Sumiyori. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], ff. 73-73v and Costa, op. cit., p. 306.  
193 See Copia da carta escrita em Nangazaqui porto de Japam ao N. R. em Christo Padre em 25 de 8bro 
de 1600, BA/JÁ Cód. 49-IV-59, ff. 5-5v. 
194 See BPE, Cód. CXV/2-7, ff. 121-121v: ‘Queira Nosso Senhor que tudo redunde em bem desta sua 
Igreja, como esperamos que redundara polla experiencia que ha que quando ha guerras sempre os padres 
achão a colheyta el alguns senhores e assi nunca a christandade deixa de ir por diante, o que não he 
quando ha hum senhor absoluto, o qual se he auerso a ley de Deus, a toda a christandade da trabalho 
como se uio em Taycô’. 
195 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 149. 
196 See Boxer, op. cit., p. 180. Notwithstanding the measures took by Ieyasu in the early 1600s in favour 
of the Christian faith, in 1604 Father Francesco Pasio was sure that the edict would never be revoked, 
although he was more open-minded than Hideyoshi. See BL/Add. 9860 f. 89. ‘Por nenhum caso quer 
[Ieyasu] revocar o edito de Tayco em que prohibio que os Japoens se não convertam a nossa Sancta fé 
posto que por vezes tem dito de palavra, que como se não fizerem Christãos Senhores grandes, dos mais 
se lhe mando nada’. 
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of 1601.197 In 1602, moreover, it was established a new seminar in Arima, after the one 
founded by Valignano was destroyed upon Hideyoshi’s order. In Nagasaki, on the other 
hand, opened a smaller seminar dedicated to the teaching of the Western arts.198 To 
better understand the proportions of the Japan Vice-province, however, it would be 
useful to provide some numbers.  
In the year of the foundation of the Tokugawa bakufu, the Society of Jesus had 
in Japan 53 fathers and 66 brothers, for a total of 119 Jesuits. They maintained about 
900 persons,199 as well as two colleges, one in Nagasaki and the other in Arima, a 
probationary house in Todos os Santos near Nagasaki, the two seminars in Nagasaki and 
Arima, twenty-one residences200 and 190 churches scattered throughout Japan.201 By 
1609 the numbers were not that different. If, on the one hand, the Jesuits total number 
augmented up to 132 and the residences were now thirty, on the other hand the number 
of colleges and probationary house remained unaltered, whereas the small seminar in 
Nagasaki was closed.202 
In the first quarter of the 17th century, namely from 1600 to 1618, the number of 
the Japan Jesuit fluctuated from a minimum of 107 units in 1601 to a maximum of 138 
missionaries in 1607.203 With the exceptions of the two extremes, the number of the 
missionaries remained rather constant, although starting from 1609 it is evident a 
descending pattern that would culminate in 1614 with the departure for Macao and 
                                                 
197 See Annua do Jappão de 1600, BA/Add. 9859, ff. 97-100v. The church was financed also by the alms 
of local Christians. It was projected to be 45 meters long and 25 meters wide. The Jesuits churches in 
Japan from the 17th century onwards were designed to divide up the women and the men in two separate 
zones, which was a solution ‘muy bien recebida delos Jappones’. The Carta de Japão de fevereiro de 
1601 até Outubro do mesmo anno reads that the church ended to be bigger than expected, 
notwithstanding impediments due to Nagasaki’s geography: ‘alem de se acreçentar a traça que se 
escreveo trinta e quatro palmos de compridão por quatro, faltava lugar pela parte do mar pera se estender 
o edifficio por causa de hum precipicio que desse athe a praya foi necessario fazer huma grande fabrica 
de madeira groça com que se alevantasse o lugar athe ficar igual com o outro; he esta fabrica de tres 
sobrados sobre as quaes se edificou a capella mayor, e a sachristia de huma parte e da outra hum sala 
igual aella com duas tribunas ensima dellas com que ficou todo este edifficio pela parte de mar muy alto, 
e fermosos [...]. Em toda a obra deste templo derão sempre as sua custa os officiais e obreiros necessarios. 
E alem dos dous mil crusados que primero se aiuntarão derão alguns christãos deste povo mais de outros 
seis centos’. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 50, ff. 180v-181. 
198 See Annua do Jappão de 1602, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, ff. 77v-79v. 
199 See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Macao, 8 October 1603. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 131. 
200 The 1603-annual report reads nineteen residences. Cf. Pasio, Tre lettere Annve del Giappone de gli 
anni 1603, 1604, 1605 e parte del 1606 mandate dal P. Francesco Pasio V. Prouinciale di quelle parti al 
M. R. P. Claudio Acquauiua Generale della Compagnia di Giesv, p. 24. 
201 See RAH/Cor. 9/2665, ff. 38v-39. 
202 See Rodrigues Giram, Lettera Annva del Giappone del 1609 e 1610 scritta al M. R. P. Clavdio 
Acqvaviva Generale della Compagnia di Giesv dal P. Giovan Rodriguez Girano, p. 11. 
203 Be it noted that the highest recorder number of Jesuits presence in Japan is 142 in 1591. 
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Manila of seventy-three missionaries. (See Table 3 and Chart 2) It is remarkable that 
after the peak in 1607, the number kept dropping until the big rupture in 1614. This 
trend is most likely ascribable to the particular juncture of Japan and Asian history, like, 
for instance, the incident regarding André Pessoa in 1610, which will be coping with 
later. Such events not only carried with them important political consequences, but 
rebounded heavily also on the finances of the missions, thus causing its slowdown both 
in terms of growth and with respect to actual means of support. 
At any rate, the 1600s represented a positive decade for the mission. From the 
point of view of the Christendom, in fact, the missionaries felt the relief of Hideyoshi’s 
death. Although Taicosama did not enforce his decree in 1587, he sent to death twenty-
six believers only ten years later. He represented a constant menace and there was no 
chance whatsoever of achieving the dream of Japan as a Christian country with 
Hideyoshi holding the sceptre of power. It is almost certain that the Fathers had long 
abandoned such dream and Ieyasu’s rising did not summon it back, in particular after 
the establishment of the new bakufu in 1603.204 The Spanish Jesuit Pedro Morejón, in 
fact, in January 1603 blatantly wrote to the general that Ieyasu ‘aunque por sus 
interesses y por el provecho que a sus reinos viene de la comunicacion de estrangeros 
disimula con nuestras cosas y alas veçes muestra buen rostro y amistad mas en su 
interior es averso totalente por ser aficionado a sus sectas y por esta causa estima sus 
bonços y renueva los templos caidos con las guerras pasadas’205. At any rate, however, 
if the state of uncertainty they used to live in under Hideyoshi was not gone before 
1604, the events of that year made them ideally come back to the confident state of 
things of the early 1580s. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
204 See Copia da Carta pera Nosso Padre Geral em que se conta o succedido em Japão desde Janeiro de 
1603, athe Setembro do mesmo anno, e da conversão de mais de quatro mil Christãos de novo, BA/JÁ, 
Cód. 49-IV-59, ff. 115-115v. 
205 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 114. 
165 
 
 
 
Source: IHSJJ, pp. 324-327. 
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Chart 2: Trend of Jesuits presence in Japan  
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Table 3 
JESUITS IN JAPAN 1600-1618 
 FATHERS BROTHERS TOTAL 
1600 48 72 123 
1601 ? ? 107 
1602 53 76 129 
1603 53 66 119 
1604 63 60 123 
1605 61 60 121 
1606 63 61 124 
1607 63 75 138 
1608 63 76 139 
1609 63 71 134 
1610 69 69 138 
1611 64 63 127 
1612 62 60 122 
1613 64 54 118 
1614 64 52 116 
1615 18 9 27 
1616 24 9 33 
1617 24 7 31 
1618 25 8 33 
Sources: 1601 – IHSJJ, pp. 324-327 and pp. 348-350; BL/Add. 9859, ff. 97-97v; BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, f. 
77v, f. 288v and f. 390v; Tre lettere Annve del Giappone de gli anni 1603, 1604, 1605 e parte del 1606, p. 
24; Lettera Annva del Giappone del 1609 e 1610, p. 11; RAH/Cor. 9/2679, ff. 10-10v; ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, 
f. 104 and f. 177; ARSI, Jap. Sin. 17, f. 115 and ARSI, Jap. Sin. 35, f. 84. 
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Ieyasu had a keen interest for the foreign affairs. As wrote by Morejón, he 
showed a tolerant face towards Christianity due to his interest in the incomes from the 
silk trade with Macao. In order to keep the trato running smoothly, Daifusama206 opted 
to entrust his investment to Father João Rodrigues. The strict connection between the 
Ignatians and the silk trade may have not included the Christian faith within the 
religions sponsored by Japan, but it did lead Ieyasu to grant the fathers licenses to reside 
freely in Miyako, Ōsaka, Nagasaki, Takaku and Ōmura.207 In that year, Ieyasu received 
the dignity of sei-i tai-shōgun,208 by Go-Yōzei tennō and in the Jesuits’ chronicles he 
started to be called Cubo – kubō – or Cubo-sama.209  
Between 1603 and 1604, Father João Rodrigues often went to visit the Cubo at 
his residence at Fushimi in order to discuss matters inherent the trade. As we will see 
later, the involvement in the commerce with Macao, in fact, needed a lot of attention 
and carefulness. It had to be handled by a capable man who enjoiyed the trust of the 
Japanese, both the officers and traders. Between 1597 and 1608 that man was the 
Portuguese Rodrigues, commonly known by his nickname Tçuzu.210 In addition to all 
the literature against the involvement of the clergy in commercial activity, the 
participation in the trato da seda represented both a benediction and a danger for the 
Japan Jesuits. In the 1600s, however, it was mostly the former.  
In 1602, the year Spinola got to Japan, the pancada may not have been a very 
profitable one both for the Macanese merchants and for Japanese. The feitor, in fact, 
experienced great difficulty in disposing of the cargo of raw silk. On the one hand, the 
Japanese merchants at Nagasaki complained that the prices asked by the Portuguese 
were too high, whereas, as a consequence, the feitor complained that the market price 
was far too low. The merchants of Miyako brought the dispute to the notice of 
Tokugawa Ieyasu, accusing some of the Portuguese inhabitants of Nagasaki and did not 
                                                 
206 From the Japanese court title daifu 内府 which Ieyasu owned before becoming shōgun. The word 
daifu, also read naifu, is the abbreviation of naidaijin 内大臣, Minister of the Centre. 
207 Ivi, f. 114v. 
208 征夷大将軍, literally the general who subdued the barbarians. 
209 公方様. For the interpretation of the title by the Ignatians see BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, f. 113v and 
BL/Add. 9860, f. 87. 
210 The word Tçuzu is most likely the transliteration of the Japanese word tsūji 通辞, interpreter. During 
the Edo Jidai, this title was assigned in particular to those who carried out interpreting services between 
Japanese and foreign merchants at Hirado and Nagasaki. Rodrigues, in fact, was not the only tsūji. There 
was also the tō-tsūji 唐通辞, who handled bargains between Japanese and the Chinese community, and, 
further on in the 17th century, the oranda-tsūji オランダ通辞. 
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forget to include the Ignatians in their complaints. Ieyasu ordered an investigation to be 
made. Jesuits sources do not go much into the details of the matter, yet it would seem 
that thanks to João Rodrigues’ diplomatic skill and rhetoric everything was put to rest 
and the Jesuits came away from the meeting reinforced.211 Rodrigues, in fact, did not 
conduct the negotiations alone. He went to Fushimi with Murayama Tōan António, a 
leading Christian convert. 212 Through the combined activities of the Rodrigues and 
Murayama, Ieyasu decided to remove Terazawa Hirotaka from the office of Nagasaki 
bugyō and entrusted the municipal government of the port to a council of four headmen 
– ‘melhores Christãos que aqui ha’213 – under the chairmanship of Tōan as daikan.214 It 
would seem that Ieyasu invited the five of them that they sought the advice of the 
Fathers when facing matters of great importance.215 As part of the settlement, Ieyasu 
decreed that the leading merchants of Sakai, who were the principal purchasers of 
Chinese raw silk at this period, should buy up the raw silk and certain categories of 
woven silk in bulk at fixed prices, for subsequent re-sale and distribution to other 
Japanese silk merchants. This system (called by the Japanese ito-wappu seido216) was 
soon extended to include the Miyako and Nagasaki merchants and then successively to 
those of Edo and Ōsaka. Certain varieties of the best woven and patterned silks were to 
be reserved for purchase by the shōgun at his local representative’s valuation, at that 
time Father João Rodrigues. Although it was a great honour to represent Cubosama, in 
the 1610s dealing with the shōgun’s share of silver or silk turned out to be a liability too 
difficult to handle and was sanctioned by Acquaviva himself. Anyway, with the 
exception of better fabrics reserved for Ieyasu, the silk import trade now became the 
monopoly of the mercantile group operated by the leading silk merchants from the five 
shogunal cities of Edo, Kyōto, Ōsaka, Sakai and Nagasaki. These purchased the cargo 
in bulk from the Portuguese at Nagasaki and then divided the raw and manufactured 
silks among themselves and their associates.217  
                                                 
211 Cf. Cooper, Rodrigues, O Intérprete, pp. 206-207. 
212 Murayama Tōan was born at Nagoya of humble parents. He was baptized at Nagasaki, where he 
displayed commercial acumen and aptituted for European dishes.  
213 See BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, f. 118v. 
214 代官, commissioner or magistrate. 
215 See Vice-provincial Pasio to Viceroy Aires Saldanha, Nagasaki, 24 February 1604. BL/Add. 9860, f. 
87. 
216 糸割符制度 
217 See Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 57-59.  
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In any case, between 1603 and 1604 the Society of Jesus became once again 
officially influent in the government of Nagasaki. Yet, to the reinvigorated political 
influence did not correspond a factual improvement of the general conditions of the 
mission. This happened especially for two reasons, which shared a common ground: the 
scarcity of incomes and the foreign competition, both in commercial and religious 
terms.  
 
II. 4.    The end of the Padroado’s monopoly: religious and commercial 
competition in Japan 
As we saw, Ieyasu’s behaviour during the first years of his rule could not but 
inspire optimism in the Ignatians. As a matter of fact, they saw how their involvement 
in the silk trade with Macao held in check the Japanese rulers, who did not seem to 
notice that even without the fathers, Portuguese ships would have come to Japanese 
ports nonetheless. In the aftermath of the Nagasaki’s martyrdom, the fathers were of the 
opinion that using the annual voyage as leverage over Hideyoshi would be a way to 
regain his favour. The taikō was in need of funds in order to finance the second Korean 
War and to repair the damages delivered by the earthquakes. At the same time, he 
abruptly interrupted the negotiations with the Chinese envoys and leveled cutting 
remarks at the Spaniards in the Philippines. Consequently, the Ignatians thought that he 
could not afford to lose also the liaison with Macao, if not for economic reasons at least 
for his dominion over the country, because ‘se alevantara Japão contra elle se faltar a 
nao’.218  
It has been correctly stated, in fact, that if the Japanese would have realized 
sooner that they held in their hands the fate of the Portuguese settlement of Macao, the 
history of the Japan mission of the Society of Jesus would have been much shorter than 
a century. In the 1600s, however, things started to get worse owing to European 
competitors in Asia. 
 
 
                                                 
218 See Bishop Pedro Martins to the King’s Chaplain Major, Nagasaki, 23 February 1597. BL/Add. 9860, 
ff. 23-23v. 
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II. 4. 1.    Japan and the Philippines: commercial and religious exchanges 
Soon after Hideyoshi’s death, Ieyasu took up negotiations with Manila. In 1597, 
in fact, he sent a shuinsen to Manila in order to negotiate a commercial route between 
his fief and Nueva España. The envoy he sent, a Japanese called Gorōiemon, did not 
come back to Japan as he was supposed to, thus Ieyasu was forced to send another 
messenger in 1599 to seek out what happened to him.219 Yet, Ieyasu also wanted to 
intermediate with Manila about an annual voyage from the Philippines to the Japanese 
Eastern region of Kantō and about Ieyasu’s wishes to improve both Japanese 
shipbuilding and mining enginery. In exchange to a stable commercial route, Tokugawa 
Ieyasu stated he would tolerate the presence of the Franciscans.220 The envoy Ieyasu 
sent in search of Gorōiemon was, in fact, not Japanese. His name was Jerónimo de Jesus 
and he was a Lisbon-born Friar Minor.  
Fray Jerónimo de Jesus disembarked in Kuchinotsu in July 1598. After he 
managed to elude the Japanese authorities, he secretly moved to the island of Honshū, 
where Ieyasu got wind of his presence and sent for him. In addition to sending envoys 
to Manila, as a result of the meeting Ieyasu allowed the Friar to stay in Japan. On 30 
May 1599, a church was inaugurated at Edo and sometime later Jerónimo de Jesus 
embarked for Manila. 221 The Friar’s mission in the Philippines resulted to be quite 
succesfull. On 5 July, in fact, the Real Hacienda granted him ‘quatro cientos pesos […] 
para comprar ciertas cosas porque se acordó llevase al rreyno del Xapon para presentar 
al gobernador del y alos criados de cerca de su persona conforme ala orden pues se le 
dio’.222 Furthermore, on 15 May 1601, another 400 pesos were issued so that Fray 
Jerónimo may ‘tratar de asentar las pazes entre aquel Reyno y estas Islas’,223 something 
considered of extreme importance by the Spaniards. Both Manila and Edo, then, wanted 
peaceful and regular connections. To the improvement of the diplomatic contacts 
                                                 
219 See Treslado de hum cap. de huma carta que do Miaco escreveo a António Garçes huma pessoa 
daquella Corte, na qual vinha em substancia a carta que Daifu Sama manda aos Luções por frej 
Jerónjmo o teor da qual em letra de Japão he o seguinte, in ARSI, Jap. Sin. 45 [I], f. 213. 
220 Cf. Takase, 十七世紀初頭におけるわが国のスペイン貿易について, p. 10 and Arcos, “The 
Philippine Colonial Elite and the Evangelization of Japan”, p. 81. 
221 See Fujita, Japan’s Encounter with Christianity, p. 152 and RAH/Cor. 9/2679, ff. 1-1v. 
222 See AGI, Contaduria 1205, f. 265v. Cf. Gil, Hidalgos y Samurai, pp. 80-81. 
223 See AGI, Filipinas 19, R. 2, N. 21, f. 2. 
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corresponded the increase in Japanese trading vessels at Manila224 and the foundation of 
new Franciscan residences in Ieyasu’s territories. 
Of course, the news of Ieyasu’s interest in having the Spaniards in his land was 
not confined to his inner circle. In October 1598, in fact, Valignano wrote to the rector 
of the college of Manila, Juan de Ribera, that the whole idea of a trans-Pacific trade 
between the Kantō and New Spain was inspired by Fray Jerónimo de Jesus.225 Be that 
as it may, Ieyasu’s desire to open official commercial liaisons between the two countries 
was rather strong. He was worried that owing to the wakō’s incursions, he would not 
receive a positive answer from Manila. Hence, he followed Hideyoshi’s example and 
commissioned the Nagasaki Bugyō Terazawa and the daimyō of Higo and Amakusa, 
Dom Agostinho, to seize all the pirates they could find in their territories. Subsequently: 
‘[P]or orden de Terazauandono fueron embiados todos a Miaco presos y en llegando ay los 
mandaron crucificar a todos parte en la ciudad de Ozaca, parte en la ciudad de Fuximi. 
Mandando Dayfusama dizir a Fr. Jeronimo que fuesse ver la justicia que el mandava hazer 
delos cossarios y que lo escriviesse al governador delos Luçones. […] Y no contento, mando 
tambien Terazauandono un su criado pera que mandasse crucificar […] todas las […] 
mugeres y hijos delos que fueron crucificados en Fuximi y en Ozaca, que fueron quarenta y 
tantos y las mugeres y niños que se avian de justiciar en Nangassaqui eran sincoenta y tres’.226 
Although in the end innocent wives and sons were not executed along with their fathers, 
Valignano could not help but to reprimand Jerónimo de Jesus for his recklessness in 
promising such things to Ieyasu without considering all the consequences. It was 
predictable, in fact, that Ieyasu would embark on a campaign of cleansing the seas in 
order to lure Spanish vessels to his ports. As the entrepreneur that he was, Valignano 
was not only worried about the fate of innocent Japanese. He had to take care not only 
of the Christendom, but also of the missionaries who were able to keep on with the 
evangelization of Japan only through the incomes of the silk trade. The Italian Jesuit 
was sure that the Spanish competition against the Portuguese went to nobody’s 
advantage, because the Japanese mercantile community could and would not receive 
more than an established quantity of silk textiles. As the facts will demonstrate, in fact, 
                                                 
224 For the Real Hacienda’s accounts of 1599 see AGI, Contaduria 1205, ff. 91-92v. There are recorded 
four ships that paid the custom house duties (derechos de almojarifazgo) for a total of 74 pesos, 1 tomín 
and 11 granos of common gold. The fund had been thoroughly studied by Juan Gil. See Gil, op. cit., pp. 
81-107. 
225 See Visitor Valignano to Rector Juan de Ribera, Shiki, 22 October 1598. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 13 [II], f. 
351. 
226 Ibid. 
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the arrival of silk also from Manila had the only predictable result of inflating the 
selling prices.  
At any rate, Valignano stated that Japanese scarce demand for silk was the 
reason why in the last twelve years the Macanese had opted to deliver the ship only 
once every two years.227 As a matter of fact, between 1586 and 1598 the Great Ship 
finalized the voyage only in five occasions (1588, 1590, 1593, 1596 and 1598). The 
remaining eight voyages basically ended in two ways, either the Great Ship wintered in 
Japan twice, as happened in 1586 and 1591 due to Hideyoshi’s wars in Kyūshū and in 
Korea, or the annual voyage did not actually take place for several reasons (1587, 1589, 
1592, 1594, 1595 and 1597).228  
As can be noted, then, what stated by Valignano is not exactly true. He was right 
however in writing that the market was not as absorbent as to receive many carracks 
laden with textiles. The Macanese and the Jesuits had the confirmation of that when 
Hideyoshi confiscated the cargo of the San Felipe back in 1596. It would seem, in fact, 
that the Spanish vessel’s ‘hazienda era mucha, y la mesma que los Portugueses llevan a 
Jappon’,229 which led us ask whether it was really an accident or the vessel wrecked in 
Japan by design. Be that as it may, the confiscation had bad consequences for the 
Portuguese trade also for the immediate future: in 1596 there was a strong drop in sales, 
in 1597 there was no official voyage to Japan and for 1598 the predictions were not 
optimistic.230  
                                                 
227 Ibid: ‘Jappon no es capaz de dos naves, ni aun de una cada anno. Y assi vimos por experiencia que de 
doze annos a esta parte se dexaron de hazer seis viagens, o porque las naves quedaron invernando aqui 
por no poder despachar sus mercaderias, o porque aunque las despacharon, las vendieron tan mal y quedo 
Jappon tan falto dellas, que volviendo las naos a Macao, entendieron los de aquella Ciudad que se 
perderian se hiziessen luego otras viagens, y por esto dexaron de hazer seis, no veniendo mas que que de 
dos en dos annos nave’. 
228 In 1587 and 1597 the missing voyages were due to Hideyoshi’s military endeavor in Kyūshū and the 
execution of the 26 martyrs. In 1589, it was because of the death of the Captain Major Jerónimo Pereira 
and the decision about who was to substitute him was not made on time. In 1592, the cause was probably 
Hideyoshi’s Korean campaign. In 1594, the Captain Major Dom Francisco de Sá wrecked in Achem. 
Finally, the 1595 voyage failed for unknown reasons. Cf. Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 43-53. In order to 
obviate to the loss due to missing voyages, on 10 November 1610 an alvará was issued declaring that if a 
Captain Major wintered in Macao despite there were the conditions to make the voyage, he would be 
deprived of the patent for the voyage itself. See APO VI, pp. 848-849. 
229 See BNCR/FGes. 1246, f. 303.  
230 See Visitor Valignano to the Provincial of the Philippines Raimondo Prado, Macao, 19 November 
1597. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 62v: ‘Aqui [Macao] tambien se hallaron en harta necessidad porque los 
Portugueses como tuvieron tan grande baxa en sus haciendas el año passado [1596] con las haciendas que 
Taycosama tomo alos Castellanos y este año no pudieron hazer su viaje y para el año que viene [1598] 
conforme alas nuevas que vineron tambien no salira muy provechosa por las mesmas haciendas que la 
mesma nao llevava de que Japon quedo lleno’. 
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For the Spaniards, however, the situation was rather different. They were finally 
able to send their ships and their missionaries to Japan. Although European and papal 
laws prohibited this “invasion” into Portuguese territory, the Japanese were more 
willing to let them pass and exchange goods with them and between 1600 and 1602 an 
epistolary exchange took place between Japan and Manila.  
In October 1601, Terazawa Shima no Kami Hirotaka, who acted in Ieyasu’s 
stand, wrote to the Spanish governor in order to determine the number of mercantile 
vessels that could go back and forth between the two countries. The bugyō wanted also 
to know why Ieyasu’s request of opening the trans-Pacific trade was not dignified with 
an answer.231 Acuña, who came on duty in 1602, answered back in June. He wrote two 
letters, one to Terazawa and the other to Ieyasu himself. 232  Firstly he stated that, 
although he had just being appointed, he was eager to comply with everything Ieyasu 
might wish for. Nevertheless, he informed Ieyasu that although the viceroy in Mexico 
had already been informed of Ieyasu’s request, they were still waiting for an answer. On 
the other hand, however, he stated Manila’s decision of limiting the number of shuin-
sen to six, ‘tres en cada monçion’. He entrusted his letter along with ‘un regalillo de 
menudençias de Castilla’ (a mirror) to a group of fifteen fathers and begged Ieyasu to 
favor and treat them well.233 Eventually, then, the religious monopoly of the Society of 
Jesus in Japan was definitely infringed. Moreover, in 1604 arrived in Manila and in 
Japan the brief issued by Pope Clemens VIII, which allowed the mendicant orders to go 
to Japan, provided that they passed through the Portuguese India. The brief was 
immediately contested by the fathers belonging to the patroazgo, namely by the fathers 
superiors of the Friars Minors, the Predicators and the Augustinian, who claimed that 
the pontiff was misinformed and thus sent to Rome two procurators in order to provide 
Clemens VIII of all the information he lacked.234 Eventually, on 8 November 1608, 
Pope Paul V, also in consequence of how the Inquisition in Goa interfered with – and 
mistreated – non-Portuguese missionaries, granted permission to members of the 
                                                 
231 See AGI, Filipinas 19, R. 3, N. 36. 
232 Cf. Gil, op. cit., pp. 85-88. 
233 See AGI, Filipinas 19, R. 3, N. 35. 
234 Cf. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 41v. 
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mendicant orders to follow any route they chose to the Indies. 235 Two years later, 
Acquaviva wrote to Francesco Pasio in order to definitely close the matter: 
‘Como Sua Santidade tinha concedido, a instancia del Rei, que possão estes religiosos passar 
das Philipinas a Japão e estar nelle e Sua Magestade tenha metido a mão neste negocio, e 
procurado com tanta efficacia que o Papa revogasse o breve, alem disto que estes religiosos 
tenhão avido licença do Ogosho236 para residirem e fazerem casas em Japão, parece que N. 
Senhor se quer tambem servir delles nessas partes, e assi julgamos que nem cá nem lá se deva 
daqui em diante fazer officio nenhum em contrario’.237 
In any case, even before 1608 it was actually impossible for the Jesuits or the bishop to 
prevent the mendicants from coming to Japan, since now they enjoyed a sort of political 
protection, or at least, some of Japanese southern daimyō felt that they could exploit the 
mendicant orders in order to obtain shares of the brand new trade with Manila. 
Furthermore, Ieyasu’s attitude towards the Christian faith did not change because of the 
new missionaries. The Jesuits and the mendicant orders were essentially realist 
regarding this point.238 In 1603, Father Pasio wrote again that the shōgun ‘aunque no es 
nada affeçionado, antes averso a nuestra Santa ley, con todo esso no nos persigue, y con 
aver dicho que no quiere que la gente noble se haga christianas nunca hizo sobre esso 
examen, ni inquisiçion alguna’.239 Still, the general tone of the Italian Jesuit’s letter is 
rather optimistic one, with only an exception: the financial problems of the mission, 
which are strictly correlated with the topic of the next chapter. 
As a matter of fact, it was not only the religious monopoly of the Ignatians that 
fell in the first years of the 17th century. The turn of the century forms a turning point in 
the history of the Macao-Nagasaki trade in more than one aspect. Firstly, this is the year 
that saw Ieyasu emerging victorious from the struggle for supremacy at Sekigahara. 
Secondly, the Protestant made their first appearance in Japan with the arrival, on 1 
April, of the Dutch ship Liefde in Bungo.240 
                                                 
235 Cf. Dunne, Generation of Giants – The Story of the Jesuits in China in the Last Decades of the Ming 
Dynasty, p. 235. 
236 Ōgosho 大御所, retired shōgun, it is the titled assumed by Tokugawa Ieyasu after he abdicated to his 
son Hidetada in 1605. 
237 See General Acquaviva to Vice-provincial Pasio, Rome, 1 January 1610. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 3, f. 36. 
238 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 114v. 
239 See Vice-provincial Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 3 October 1604. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 
129. 
240 With regard to the Dutch’s fleet journey see Corr, Adams, The pilot. The Life and Times of Captain 
William Adams 1564-1620, pp. 23-37. 
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II. 4. 2.    Dutch and English in Japan 
The end of the 16th century witnessed two important developments in the history 
of Japan: the unification of the country by Hideyoshi and a significant expansion of 
Japanese activities, legitimate and otherwise, in Southeast Asia and the Philippines. 
Thanks to Hideyoshi’s unification, Japanese maritime commerce was now carried only 
in ships that received an official license by the ruler, therefore called go-shuin-sen. The 
shuin-sen system was inaugurated by Hideyoshi in 1592 and lasted for more than forty 
years, although until the first quarter of the 17th century it was not rare to see Japanese 
ships without the shuin-jō in foreign ports.241  
The shuin-jō system was established as a further way for Hideyoshi to keep track 
of the overseas commerce. As a matter of fact, it would seem that those who received 
the official license to trade abroad, were not pioneers of such voyages, but experience 
men who were part of an already established commerce.242 In October 1602, however, 
at the request of Don Lupo de Ulloa, the captain of the second Spanish vessel wrecked 
at Tosa heading for New Spain, Ieyasu issued a shuin-jō for the community of 
foreigners in Japan: 
‘Se algum navio de estrangeiros por causa de algum temporal vier a qualquer Reino ou porto 
de Japão, mandamos que de nenhuma qualidade lhe seja tomado nada das suas fazendas que 
trouxerem no Navio.  
Item, riguorosamente prohibimos que na compra e venda das fazendas, que em seu navio 
trouxerem não seja feita força alguma. E se lhes não vier bem estarem no porte, onde o navio 
entrou se poderão passar a qualquer otro onde quiserem os mercadores do dito navio, e ahi 
comrpar e vender livremente. 
Item en universal mandamos que os estrangeiros possão habitar em Japão em qualquer 
parte que elles quiserem, mas rigurosamente lhes prohibimos a promulgação de sua ley. Dado 
na nona luna no septimo anno era Queichó, helo vermelho real a Dom Pedro de Acunha’.243 
It is important to stress again Ieyasu’s posture toward Christianity, which in this case 
was no different from the one assumed by Hideyoshi back in 1587. It is probable, 
however, that Ieyasu included this item in the license in order to keep the number of 
                                                 
241 For a study with regard to the shuin-sen see Peri, “Essai sur les Relations du Japon et de l’Indochine 
aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles”, pp. 1-104.  
242 See Peri, op. cit., p. 4. 
243 See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 165. Another version in ARSI, Jap. Sin. 45 [I], f. 238. A Spanish translation 
in ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [I], f. 3. 
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missionaries to a minimum and to be sure nobody would misinterpret his small amount 
of tolerance for an actual opening to the foreign religion. 
 Another point of interest in the license is the fact that although issued upon 
request of the Spaniards, it was addressed to the foreigners in a broad sense. In April 
1600, in fact, the Dutch ship Liefde arrived at Bungo. The ship had left Rotterdam as 
part of a fleet of five ships in June 1598. The fleet attempted to reach Asia passing 
through the Strait of Magellan, which it managed to surpass only in September 1599 
and with several casualties. Only a ship, the Liefde, managed to enter the Pacific Ocean. 
When the vessel reached Japan months later, of the original 110 men of the crew only 
24 were still alive, though in really bad physical condition.244 Thus, the first Dutch ship 
in Japan was not the result of a well-conceived plan, rather a fortuitous event. In any 
case, however, it was good news neither for the Portuguese traders nor for the 
missionaries of the Padroado.  
Alessandro Valignano punctually expressed his preoccupation with regard to the 
Dutch and English progress in Orient. In particular, he was worried that the North 
Europeans could teach the Japanese use of artillery.245 Valignano could not possibly 
know, but in that very day, Ieyasu made use of the artillery seized from the Liefde at the 
battle of Sekigahara.246 Although there are some doubts about the truthfulness of this 
last information,247 Ieyasu actually seized both the weapons and other useful things he 
found aboard. Additionally, the reality of facts surpassed Valignano’s fear. It appears, in 
fact, that the Dutch not only taught the Japanese how to use artillery, but went even 
further. It is known that Tokugawa Ieyasu since his first contacts with the Spaniards had 
sought in Manila not only first-hand knowledge of direct navigation between Japan and 
New Spain, but also co-operation in the mining sector. In 1609, he asked the former 
Spanish Governor Don Rodrigo de Vivero, who was en route for Acapulco but 
suspiciously ended up in Japan, for fifty mining experts veterans of the Mexican 
deposits, ‘because they were unable to exploit many rich mines as they did not know 
                                                 
244 See Corr, op. cit., pp. 23-34, Totman, Tokugawa Ieyasu Shogun, pp. 14-16 and Informação sobre a 
entrada dos Olandezes em Iapam e sobre algumas cousas que depois socederão. Feita em Ianeiro de 
1615, ARSI, Jap. Sin. 45 [I], f. 220. 
245 See Visitor Valignano to the Assistant of Portugal João Álvares, Nagasaki, 20 October 1600. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 27. 
246 Cf. Diogo do Couto, Décadas da Ásia, XII-V-2, apud Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão, p. 302. 
247 See Costa, op. cit., p. 302, n. 101. 
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how to advantageously extract the metals from them’. 248 Years later, the Spaniards 
provided the bakufu of engineers in order to improve the Japanese ‘fabrica de navios 
d’alto bordo’ and offered also Spanish officers who could teach the Japanese how to 
fuse artillery.249 It appears that the bakufu forwarded similar request also to the Dutch, 
and presumably to the Portuguese, although according to Jesuits sources, the Lusitans 
always held back such knowledge in order to preserve their indispensability within the 
country. Be that as it may, by 1612 in Japan there were already foundries managed by 
Japanese but supervised by the Dutch. 250  It is clear that both the Dutch and the 
Spaniards decided to take advantage of this gap left by the Portuguese. They saw this as 
an opportunity to gain respect in the eyes of the Japanese to the detriment of the 
Portuguese, who were, therefore, giving up their economic and cultural monopoly.251 
 Anyway, when the Liefde arrived the situation was rather different. As we said, 
the vessel was not bound for Japan. After the news of its arrival reached Nagasaki, also 
Bishop Cerqueira wrote a letter to inform the Curia. He wrote Claudio Acquaviva that 
‘huma nao Olandesa de Vaçallos da Raynha de Inglaterra veo com quasi toda a gente 
morta aportar a Bungo. Mas Dayfu lhe tomou o fato e a mesma nao [...]. Trazia muitas 
munições e pretendia ir a Sunda ajuntar-se com outros que ali forão carregar de 
speciaria’. 252  This paragraph by Cerqueira is only apparently confused. Among the 
survivors of the crew, in fact, there was also William Adams, ‘piloto […], grande 
official e matematico e herege’,253 as Valentim Carvalho described him – most likely 
the best known English in early modern Japan. Since it was with him that Ieyasu had 
long inteviews, that seems to be the reason why Cerqueira wrote the ship belonged to 
England. At any rate, the castaways were allowed to settle in Japan and Adams would 
progressively rise in Ieyasu’s privança. 
 Despite the problems and the loss of influence within the shogunal court that the 
Ignatians would suffer owing to Adams and the Dutch in general, by the begin of the 
                                                 
248 Cf. Arcos, op. cit., pp. 84-85. Cf. Gil. Hidalgos y Samurai, p. 178 and pp. 186-188. 
249 Cf. Bishop Cerqueira to King Filipe II, Nagasaki, October 1613. RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 259v. 
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17th century the arrival of the Dutch in Asia created in particular economic problems, 
but to understand that we have to go back briefly to the European state of affairs. 
 For the Portuguese kingdom, being under the Habsburg Crown meant also being 
forced to abandon its policy of neutrality in European conflicts. Moreover, Portugal 
traditional allies, England and the Netherlands, suddenly became enemies. Starting from 
the 1580s, the ships of the Carreira da Índia began to be the target of English corsairs. 
In 1585, in fact, the last Tudor monarch, Elizabeth I and her ministers agreed on open 
war with Spain. They considered the Azores archipelago to be the point to pillage both 
Spanish and Portuguese vessels in their return route and the trend continued also in the 
1590s, as Carlo Spinola’s voyage proves. It is commonly accepted, in fact, that the end 
of the century is when began the crisis of the Carreira and that the direct and indirect 
consequences of English and Dutch privateering and competition were the main causes 
of that crisis.254  
The Netherlands, on their part, maintained an ambiguous attitude with respect to 
the Iberian crowns. In 1585, after the seizure of Antwerp, King Filipe I decided to place 
a (not so rigorous) embargo on Dutch ships and goods in Spain and Portugal in order to 
crush the rebels’ resistance, but he was forced to lift it in the 1590s due to provision 
difficulties.255 For the United Provinces that decade represented a time of economic 
growth and military expansion. In order to respond to the Iberian embargos, in fact, they 
were forced to seek direct routes for accessing colonial wealth. Whilst the first voyage 
to the Western African coast is recorded in 1593, the first steps in Asia were moved two 
years later with the expedition of Kornellis de Houtman.256  
 Although until the turn of the century the North-Western European were content 
to launch raids and piratical attacks against the Iberian vessels, the outcome of 
Houtman’s pioneering voyage arouse enthusiasm and led to the rig of five fleets 
bounded for Asia in 1598. Starting from this moment, the United Provinces sent fleets 
through the Cape route each year, hence broking the Portuguese monopoly of that route. 
                                                 
254 See for instance Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, vol. III, p. 43-79. 
255 A second embargo was placed by Filipe II in 1598 and had devastating effect on Dutch trade with a 
fall on voyages from the Iberian peninsula to the Baltic from 107 in that year to only two in the following 
year.  
256 With regard to the struggle for supremacy between the Iberian crowns and the North European powers 
we followed Butel, The Atlantic, pp. 62-129. As it can be expected, the bibliography about the Carreira 
da Índia is overwhelmingly abundant. We decided to follow Guinote, Frutuoso and António Lopes, 
Naufrágios e outras perdas da “Carreira da Índia” Séculos XVI e XVII, and Murteira, A Carreira da 
Índia e o Corso Neerlandês 1595-1625.  
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Broking the monopoly did not mean only to navigate along the same sea-path, 
but corresponded also to direct attacks to Portuguese and Spanish fundamental spots 
along the Carreira including Lisbon and also in this case Carlo Spinola was a witness of 
the North European privateering, since his departure from Lisbon in 1598 was delayed 
owing to English corsairs lying in ambush right outside the Tagus’ mouth. This 
proactive attitude was not officially shared by the Netherlands. Before the establishing 
of the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) in 1602, in fact, Dutch ships were 
forbidden to attack Iberian vessels but were instructed only to use force in self-defence. 
Nevertheless, there are records of attacks on Portuguese ships in the Atlantic Ocean as 
early as 1597.257 With respect to Asia, the Liefde was not the only ship to reach that 
region in 1600. In that very year, also the Spaniards of Manila had an encounter with the 
Hollanders, who were repelled. As a consequence, in December Pedro de Acuña while 
still in New Mexico informed Filipe II about the Dutch privateering in South East Asia 
and suggested to assemble warships at Manila, where everything could be carried out 
cheaply.258 Filipe sent his consent in April 1601 and thus the naval conflict between the 
Iberian Crowns and the ‘estados reveldes’ was moved also in Asia.  
In 1602, in order to eliminate violent struggles among Dutch merchants that led 
to prices’ increase, the large commercial firms that traded in Asia merged together in 
the VOC. The United Provinces granted the company the monopoly of maritime trade in 
Asia. Moreover, it soon appeared clearly that the VOC could also represent a valid 
weapon to use against the Habsburgs and their fleets in Asia. 259  As wrote by the 
Habsburg king, the Dutch were aiming to the Portuguese settlements along the South 
Eastern coast of China, in particular Macao. As early as 1601, among the Hollanders 
circulated the idea of an attack against the Portuguese port on the Pearl River. In 
October, three ships were sent to reconnoitre the harbour. Since the settlement was 
lacking in defensive structures and garrisons, they were promptly attacked by five 
Portuguese galleys commanded by the Captain Major Dom Paulo de Portugal and their 
crews were seized.260 Two years later, however, the battle ended differently. On 29 July 
1603, in fact, two VOC ships and a pataxo reached Macao and this time they took the 
                                                 
257 Cf. Murteira, op. cit., p. 24 and bibliography cited therein. 
258 See King Filipe II to Governor Pedro de Acuña, Valladolid, 6 April 1601. AGI, Filipinas 19, R.2, N. 
12: ‘[P]ara lo demas que se pudiese ofreçer armar algunas galeras en Manila pue se podria hazer a poca 
costa y especto de ser la tierra tan barata de todo con se podria asegurar aquello y estorbar alos enemigos 
que no pasen adelante con sus yntentos’. 
259 Cf. Murteira, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 
260 Cf. Boxer, Estudos para a História de Macau, pp. 21 and 208. 
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Macanese completely by surprise. Yet, the Dutch were not there to invade the port; their 
target was the Nao do trato and its rich cargo of silk and gold.261 The news and the 
description of the VOC’s looting arrived in Japan right the following month: 
‘Estavamos com os olhos longos esperando por ella [the carrack], e passandose já o tempo em 
que ordinariamente custumava chegar a muitos parecia que sem duvida envernaria este ano 
em Macao, por não poder negociar a quantidade das fazendas necessarias para fazer viagem, 
mas quis cognovit sensum domini, aut consiliarius ejus fuit?262 Hum pataxo, que aqui chegou 
aos trinta de Agosto, nos acabou de dar o dezengano de o que passava, por elle sabemos, que 
estando a nao surta no lugar onde foe tomar a carga, deram de repente nella duas naos 
Olandezas, e achandoa sem gente nem defeza, a vista de toda a Cidade a levaram com todo o 
recheyo, com grande mâgoa, e semtimento dos moradores vindo roubado o remedio seu, e de 
seus filhos’.263 
Valignano himself gave a description of the mishap. Apparently, both the ship’s officers 
and the soldiers went momentarily back to the city to bid their families goodbye and left 
the ship off guard, unmanned and disarmed. It was as easy for the Dutch to snatch both 
the ship and the cargo, ‘sem nenhum trabalho nem custo’,264 as it was distressing for the 
Macanese to see all their fortune and investment go away without even putting up a 
fight.265 Furthermore, in 1603 the Dutch struck a triple blow against the Portuguese of 
Macao. Around March, in fact, the Portuguese vessel Santa Catarina fell in the hands of 
the Netherlanders while crossing the Strait of Singapore. The Santa Catarina left Macao 
in February loaded with the proceeds of the previous year’s China and Japan voyages, a 
cargo of Chinese silks and porcelains worth more than 500’000 ducats.266 In December 
of the same year, the viceroy writing to the king, described the Santa Catarina as the 
richest and most powerful ship that ever left China, which was bringing the means of 
subsistence for the whole of India.267 However, if on the one hand for the city of Macao 
                                                 
261 Boxer calculated the loss in 1’400’000 florins, being a florin roughly the equivalent of a ducat. Cf. 
Boxer, op. cit., p. 22. Takase, however, basing his analysis on Jesuits’ sources – ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 
137 – and on a letter by Bishop Cequeira – RAH/Cor. 9/2566, f. 309 – argued that it is difficult to 
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million (conto) in gold. Cf. Takase, マカオ=長崎間貿易の総取引高・生糸取引量・生糸価格, pp. 54-
55. Moran, on his part, evaluated that the Portuguese lost more than 900’000 ducats. See Moran, op. cit., 
p. 124. 
262 Romans 11:34: ‘For who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been his counsellor?’ 
263 See BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, ff. 122-122v. 
264 See BL/Add. 9860, f. 88. 
265 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 137. 
266 See Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 59-60. 
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this was a disastrous year, we should focus mainly on what those losses meant for the 
Japan Jesuits. 
Valignano had left Japan also for economic reasons. He had to understand why 
the annual allowance the Japan Jesuits were supposed to receive in Madrid from the 
papal nuncio had not been paid during the last years. The missionaries complained that 
by 1602 the missing payments by the Holy See amounted to about 50’000 cruzados.268 
Due to Dutch raids, in 1603 the Japan Jesuits lost more than 15’000 ducats.269 This loss 
almost corresponded to the quantity of money the mission needed for its annual 
subsistence in the 1600s, 270  not considering subsidiary expenses such as travel 
allowances for the missionaries bounded for Japan or for the mission procurators, who 
were sent by the overseas provinces to Rome every six years in order to acquaint the 
general with the state of the mission.271 Summing up the major and supplementary 
expenses, the Japan mission’s expenses amounted to 18’000 ducats per year. As we 
already saw, in addition to the proceeds of the silk trade and the papal pension – 
provided that it was paid, the Fathers could rely only on the incomes from the aldeias in 
the Province of the North, on the 1’000 cruzados granted by D. Sebastião in 1574 and 
on another five-year pension of 1’000 cruzados donated by Cardinal Henrique in 1579 
and confirmed by Filipe I in 1585.272 On 2 August 1607, Filipe II established that it was 
not necessary to confirm the pension each five years, and added another 2’000 cruzados 
                                                 
268 See Vice-provincial Pasio to the Assistant of Portugal Álvares, Nagasaki, 5 December 1602. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 107v. Although in the first year of his pontificate, Pope Sixtus V raised to 6’000 
cruzados the alms granted by Gregory XIII, in 1586 he canceled the increase and reestablished the 
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payment. In 1590, on the other hand, after Sixtus’s death, two popes were elected – Urban VII and 
Gregory XIV – but died soon after being appointed and their deaths caused the block of the Holy See. Cf. 
Ivi, f. 131. 
269 Ivi, f. 137: ‘[T]res mil y mas, que le yvan de provimento para el gasto de sus casas, y otros doze mil 
que se mandavão en seda, y en otras pieças que era todo su caudal’. It has to be considered that only four 
years before, in 1599, another vessel sank with the consequent loss for the Japan mission of more than 
8’000 cruzados. The losses, then, were generally higher than the incomes. Ivi, f. 131v. 
270 See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Macao, 8 October 1603. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 131: 
‘El gasto que se haze pera sustentar esta cazas […] llega cada año ala soma de doze mil taeis, que es un 
pezo que corre en estas partes, y vale […] mas, o menos de quinze mil ducados, los quales aunque hazen 
contia grande, todavia considerado el numero de las cazas, y dela gente que Japon sustenta, y los grandes 
extraordinarios que tiene a su cargo, es cosa tam poca que parece increible poderse sustentar com tam 
poco gasto, y sin duda que muchas vezes me persuado que nos crece el dinero con el gasto’. 
271 Cf. Faria, “The Functions of Procurator in the Society of Jesus. Luís de Almeida, Procurator?”, p. 35. 
272 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 131. Cf. DI XI 1577-1580, p. 540, TCJ, p. 188 and Rodrigues, “Local 
Sources of Funding for the Japanese Mission”, p. 117. 
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per year ‘em quanto não tivessem no Japão outra renda equivalente’.273 Regardless of 
the difficulty of collecting those payments in Madrid and in Malacca, whose officers 
where known in the kingdom also for accounting fraud,274 the Jesuits had to calculate 
also the percentage they were going to lose, due to the 30% exchange rate in the Indian 
and the Malacca custom houses. Thus, to gather and invest the 15’000 ducats in the 
1603 Japan voyage, the Ignatians not only had to rally all their economical means left in 
Macao, but were forced also to borrow money, ‘por não termos de nosso tanto que nós 
bastasse’.275  
Obviously, the missionaries could not rely on any financial help from the 
Macanese, since they had just lost a great deal of their fortune. In Japan, however, the 
situation was a little more positive. Having heard the news of the fathers’ neediness, in 
fact, Dom João276 gave 300 taéis to the fathers in Nagasaki in order to keep the seminar 
open and 100 to the Jesuits in Arima and as many to those in Miyako. Other daimyō 
followed his example and handed over to the fathers alms in rice.277 There was also 
another source of income, which the fathers mentioned only in passing, namely the help 
given by Japanese believers. It is difficult to ascertain the exact value of this kind of 
contributions, since in the majority of cases the letters do not enter into details, but they 
were not small and inconclusive offerings.278 In 1596, for instance, Lourenço Mexia 
wrote that ‘faltando a Nao que vem cada anno da China em Jappão, derão os Christãos 
aos Padres da Companhia d’esmola myl e duzentos cruzados, que pera gente tão pobre 
he grande charidade, e outro tinha en nossa casa myl e quinhentos cruzados, os quaes 
emprestou ate a vinda da nao, e não vindo os dava’.279 The Southern lords and devotees 
were not the only ones to express their kindness towards the Ignatians. As we said 
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277 See BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, ff. 123-124. 
278 Cf. Rodrigues, “Local Sources of Funding for the Japanese Mission”, pp. 125-127. 
279 See Father Lourenço Mexia to General Acquaviva, Macao, 15 November 1596. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 13 [I], 
f. 29. 
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earlier, it was around that time that Ieyasu chose João Rodrigues as his representative 
regarding the trade with Macao. Consequently, Ieyasu was probably well informed 
about the terrible state of the mission finances. Pasio wrote to Acquaviva that the 
shōgun sympathized with them due to their loss and gave to Rodrigues 350 cruzados, 
‘cousa de que toda a Corte pasmou por não ser costume do Xôgun dar cousa alguma a 
ninguem’.280  
Despite the Spaniards from Manila and the arrival of the Dutch, in the first 
decade of the 17th century, the Society of Jesus had still various supporters, with the 
kubō in the front line. Whilst on the political side the situation was not bad at all, in 
particular if we consider that not even ten years earlier they were on the verge of the 
expulsion, economically speaking, as we saw, the situation was not half as good, one of 
the consequences of losing that huge amount of money consisting in the necessity of 
freeing the mission of all the disposable personnel and edifices.  
 
 II. 5.    The Society of Jesus and the involvement in negotia secularia  
 The 1580s was the decade when the debate around the Jesuits participation in the 
silk trade was born. Around that specific matter revolves all the discussion on the holy 
poverty and the Society of Jesus self-restraint. Both these topics were continuously 
addressed by the critics of the Ignatian order. In 1587, for instance, Acquaviva sent 
several letters to the Estado da Índia, in particular to Alessandro Valignano since he 
filled the leading role therein. In that year, both good and bad news had been dispatched 
to the general’s secretariat. On the one hand, Valignano told him that he had remedied 
to the excesses in their participation in the silk trade, which was a relief for the general, 
since he intended to postpone its definitive ban on their involvement in the trade due to 
Sixtus V’s reduction of the papal pension.281 On the other hand, however, he received 
also complaints about the missionaries’ extravagance with respect to the gift-offerings 
to the Japanese and to the way the fathers dressed or moved. Regarding these 
                                                 
280 See Vice-provincial Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 6 November 1604. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 
41. Also in BL/Add. 9860, f. 89. Cf. Cooper, op. cit., p. 208 
281 See General Acquaviva to Provincial of India Valignano, Rome, 28 December 1587. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
3, ff. 13-13v. 
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grievances, he entrusted his Italian fellow to get rid of superfluous wastes and to 
exercise the sobriety expected by members of the Society of Jesus.282  
Fifteen years later, Acquaviva’s recommendations had to be put into practice not 
out of respect for the Society’s Constitutions, rather out of pure necessity. In 1602, in 
fact, Valignano had already invited the vice-provincial in Japan, Father Francesco Pasio, 
to reduce the expenses of a half by doing the following:  
- close the two seminars and the press;  
- leave almost all of the residences;  
- dismiss 200 dōjuku out of the total of 300 and two-thirds of the servants (moços 
de serviço); 
- cutback in new buildings and presents ‘aunque fuessen necessarios’.283 
Pasio, however, had to face the impossibility of implementing Valignano’s orders. 
Whilst the seminar in Arima did not close thanks to the donation by D. João, with 
regard to the dismissal of dōjuku and servants, Pasio laid off no more than 70 of them, 
since he received the news of a pension of 10’000 ducats issued by Filipe II.284 Pasio 
was soon forced to recognize his mistake and convened a council to set it right. The 
fathers decided to limit the expenses for dresses – probably they saw fit to withdraw 
from using silk instead of the customary black robes – and food.285 However, those 
were just temporary measures that could not solve the general problem. As Pasio wrote 
to the viceroy, ‘senão formos socorridos, impossível he, não digo eu ir avante com a 
conversão, mas nem ainda conservar o que está feito’.286 Fortunately for the Ignatians, 
in 1604 the Great Ship sailed for Nagasaki in July with ‘bom remedio aos Padres de 
Japão e [...] N. S. ordenou que a Nao ahi tivesse muy grande, e bom despacho de suas 
fazendas, vendendo todas muyto bem, e tornandose para este Macao tres mezes antes do 
tempo acustumado, entrando neste porto aos 8 de dezembro’. 287  After years of 
                                                 
282 See General Acquaviva to Provincial of India Valignano, Rome, 27 January 1587. ARSI, Jap. Sin 3, f. 
13. 
283 See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Macao, 16 October 1603. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 137. 
284 Filipe II actually granted the 10’000 cruzados, yet the payment was supposed to be spread in three or 
four times. Cf. Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão, p. 635, n. 221. 
285 See BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, f. 122v: ‘E primeiramente começando pelos da Companhia, se poz taxa no 
vestir, e comer, e outras couzas semelhantes deminuindo alguma couza do ordinario’. 
286 See Vice-provincial Pasio to Viceroy Aires de Saldanha, Nagasaki, 24 February 1604. BL/Add. 9860, 
f. 88. 
287 See Visitor Valignano to the Assistant of Portugal Álvares, Macao, 25 January 1605. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
14 [II], ff. 186-186v. Cf. Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 60-61. 
184 
 
misfortune, then, between 1604 and 1605 the Great Ship managed to elude both the 
Dutch blockade off the Kyūshū’s coast and a huge typhoon which claimed the life of 
800 ships berthed at Nagasaki and Shimonoseki, included ‘huma fragata de Castelhanos 
que viera das Felippinas com mais de 50 mil cruzados’.288 The number of ships sank 
and the details reported in the Portuguese sources are probably inaccurate. In March 
1606, in fact, Bishop Cerqueira complained about Manila’s ships arrived in Japan with 
António Colaço, the procurator at court. Namely, he wrote that in 1605 the Spaniards 
brought a lot of silk and other goods (fazendas) that the Portuguese profits dropped and 
the ship was almost forced to winter at Nagasaki because the cargo was sold only with 
difficulty.289 Furthermore, although the Nao do Trato weathered the typhoon, the same 
could not be said for Jesuits buildings in Japan.290 The year 1606, on the other hand, 
was a fortunate year for Macao and the Japan Jesuits: the citizens of Macao arranged the 
voyage for the third year in a row, a thing that had not happened for twenty years. In 
that year, not only the earnings from the selling of silk were exceptionally high, but the 
Fathers received financial help both in China and in Japan.291 The storm the Society had 
to face in 1606, however, was not made of rain and strong winds.  
 
 II. 5. 1.    The consequences of power: João Rodrigues Tçuzu 
 As we saw earlier, in 1602 Tokugawa Ieyasu entrusted the government of 
Nagasaki to a council of four headmen with the Christian Murayama Tōan António as 
daikan. In the same time, the ito-wappu system was implemented and the procurator at 
Nagasaki, Father João Rodrigues Tçuzu, was chosen to manage Ieyasu’s affairs with 
Macao. The Ignatians, then, at once gained strong influence both within Japan busiest 
commercial port and inside the future shogunal court. Yet, as we saw earlier, the Bible, 
the patristic and the Constitutions forbade involvement in negotia secularia.  
                                                 
288 See Guerreiro, Relaçam Annal das Covsas qve fezeram os Padres da Companhia de IESVS nas partes 
da India Oriental, & em algumas outras da conquista deste reyno no anno de 606 & 607 & do processo 
da conuersão, & Christandade daquellas partes, book IV, f. 3v. See also Copia da carta escrita no 
discurso do dito anno, athe 20 de março de 1606, ao N. M. R. em Christo Padre, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, 
ff. 282-282v. Cf. Boxer, Ibid. and Costa, “A Route under Pressure”, p. 88. 
289 See Bishop Cerqueira to Procurator António Colaço, Nagasaki, 10 March 1606. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 
52. Be it noted that Cerqueira was one of the biggest opposers to the commerce between Japan and the 
Philippines. Generally speaking, his idea can be gathered by this early letter, but as the years passed he 
grew more specific and sent several letters to both Madrid and Rome. Cf. RAH/Cor. 9/2666, ff. 255-270. 
290 See Vice-provincial Pasio to Procurator Colaço, Nagasaki, 3 February 1606. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 57. 
291 See Rector of the College of Macao Valentim Carvalho to General Acquaviva, Macao, 1 November 
1606. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [II], f. 249. 
185 
 
Although the Constitutions presumably had in mind anything ordinarily or more 
properly done by laymen, such as the conduct of lawsuits and the management of 
finances, during his generalate Claudio Acquaviva persistently wrote as if the 
Constitutions forbade entanglements in negotia politica. In the Fifth General 
Congregation (1592-1593) it was declared that no one should meddle in matters 
regarding raison d’état or with political matters of any sort. The founder of the Society 
himself insisted that the Ignatians were to accept no place of honour, were not to enter 
the palaces of popes, princes, cardinals, or lords, and were to avoid ‘todas las cosas 
seglares’.292  
In 1607, General Acquaviva was particularly worried about the meddling in 
political and commercial matters of the Japan Jesuits and wanted Francesco Pasio to 
solve the situation, in particular the one regarding João Rodrigues, whose privança with 
Ieyasu was the topic of a previous letter Pasio sent to Rome. Acquaviva answered that: 
‘Escrevenos V. R. os favores que o Padre João Rodriguez recebeo do Cubo e de como deu o 
governo desta cidade a Christãos subordenando-os aos nossos, no que esperamos na prudencia 
de V.s R.s terão procedido ate agora com tal cautela e resguardo que não tenhão acontecido os 
desastres a que a tal subordenação he sojeita, e porque alongo andar não pode deixar de os 
aver, queremos que os nossos se desobriguem della, em modo que o que succeder não se 
possa atribuir a Companhia, fazendo-o saber ao Cubo na forma que melhor parecer, porque 
não podera deixar de se edificar vendo-nos tam alheos do que outros tanto estimão e buscão. 
E encomendamos muito a V. R. o effeito disto, porque cá onde estamos tememos que a esta 
hora nos tenhamos arrependido de o não ter feito mais cedo’.293 
Ironically, the worry showed in the last words – ‘tememos que a esta hora nos tenhamos 
arrependido de o não ter feito mais cedo’ – turned out to be true. The year before, in 
fact, Pasio received a letter from Dom Sancho Ōmura Yoshiaki, son of the late Dom 
Bartolomeu, who, in no uncertain terms, informed the Jesuit that the time when he 
would not favour the Fathers anymore had finally come. Although the daimyō wrote 
that he did not owe an explanation to Pasio, he gave him one notwithstanding. Yoshiaki 
ascribed his apostasy to an order issued by the bakufu¸ that obliged him to expel every 
Christian from his domain. He concluded his short missive with a sort of justification 
for his behaviour: ‘como V. R. muito bem sabe eu em particular ej de residir em pessoa 
na cidade de Yedo corte de Sua Alteza o que não fazem os demais Senhores; pello que 
                                                 
292 Cf. Höpfl, Jesuit Political Thought, pp. 56-59. 
293 See General Acquaviva to Vice-provincial Pasio, Rome, 1 May 1607. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 3, f. 33. 
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como isto assi seja não posso deixar de obedeçer, em tudo aquillo que Sua Alteza me 
mandar’.294 This statement needs an explication. 
During the campaign of Odawara, Hideyoshi offered Ieyasu the lordship of the 
eight provinces of the Kantō. Ieyasu soon saw the strategic position of the small 
settlement called Edo and elected it as his capital by mid-1590. No great change took 
place in Edo for some years, since Ieyasu was well occupied with other matters. After 
the foundation of the Tokugawa Bakufu, however, the situation had changed and Edo 
became the chief city of Japan. As a consequence, in July 1604 Ieyasu issued orders to 
all the daimyō to supply labour and materials to build the castle and reconstruct the city. 
For each 1’000 koku of their income they had to provide one man. In 1606, also the 
construction of the fortress started.295 Thus, the justification adduced by Yoshiaki had a 
kernel of truth.  
According to Jesuits’ sources, however, the reasons why Ōmura abandoned the 
Christian faith and expelled the Ignatians from his territory were quite different and it 
all began due to the growth of Nagasaki out its original bounds.  
The city of Nagasaki, as we know, was part of the bakufu’s domains and was 
administered by the local daikan, but periodically a visiting bugyō came to supervise the 
government. The town bordered with the Ōmura domain, where the bugyō and the 
daikan had obviously no jurisdiction. The city, however, grew so much that it ended 
overlapping with the neighbouring territory, a fact that led to constant disputes and 
quarrels. When the supervising Bugyō Ogasawara Ichian arrived in Nagasaki in 1605, 
the city’s officers complained to him of the anomalous situation. He reported such 
distressing news in Edo, proposing to the kubō that Ōmura’s land in and around 
Nagasaki should be incorporated within the city, whereas Yoshiaki should receive the 
district of Urakami in compensation. The arrangement left Yoshiaki with a bitter taste in 
his mouth, since ‘por o que lhe derão não ser equivalente no rendimento ao que lhe 
tomarão, como pello muito que elle por rezam da Nao estimava estas terras visinhas a 
                                                 
294 See Dom Sancho Ōmura Yoshiaki to Vice-provincial Pasio, Ōmura, 24 February 1606. RAH/Cor. 
9/2665, f. 420. The date is uncertain. The letter is a translation from the original Japanese and ended with 
‘Oye 18 do primero mes do año’. We think the date follows the Japanese calendar, thus the 18th day of the 
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p. 213. 
295 See Sadler, Shogun. The Life of Tokugawa Ieyasu, pp. 170-173. Cf. also RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 47. 
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este porto’.296 Apparently, knowing João Rodrigues’s great influence at court as well as 
the Father’s presence while the arrangement took place, Ōmura suspected him of having 
conceived the whole business. Consequently, he grew suspicious of all the Fathers of 
the Society and eventually expelled them from his domain.  
This is the information we found in the official certificate signed by Bishop 
Cerqueira in the aftermath of the expulsion from Ōmura. There are, however, other 
sources that mention details Cerqueira left out. The Spanish Jesuit Antonio Francisco 
Critana, for instance, wrote that after Ogasawara went to Nagasaki, Dom Sancho visited 
Ieyasu along with Rodrigues and the Nagasaki’s headmen. The party presented to 
Honda Kozuke no Suke Masazumi – ‘que aqui es como en España el Duque de 
Lerma’297 – a map of Nagasaki drawn by a retainer of Dom Sancho. It seems that 
Honda wanted to compare that map with another he had previously received by João 
Rodrigues, a thing that led Sancho to believe that the dice were loaded from the start 
and that Rodrigues was in cahoots with the municipal council of Nagasaki.298 Other 
sources, however, tell yet another story.  
We are referring to a collection of documents entitled Excellentes provas da 
inocentia do Padre João Rodriguez sobre o caso de Omuradono.299 It is a compilation 
of four documents, the Spanish translation from the original Japanese, written at the 
request of João Rodrigues by some of the people involved in this case. The first one, is a 
letter written by Ogasawara himself, who stated that ‘la Compañía no tiene culpa 
ninguna, ni intervino en este por ninguna via’ and that Ieyasu ordered the exchange of 
lands as a consequence of Ichian’s own report. 300 That Rodrigues was unrelated to 
                                                 
296 See Certidam do Bispo de Japam acerca do caso de Omuradono Dom Sancho Senhor de Omura, 
ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [II], ff. 236-237. Cf. Boxer, Christian Century, pp. 185-186. 
297 See RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 91v. 
298 See Father Antonio Francisco Critana to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 10 March 1606. ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 35, f. 147: ‘Pidio el Conzuquedono a su criado que le truxese la descripcion de Nangasaqui del P. 
procurador que antes tenia recebida, por lo qual entendio […] Omuradono que ya se avian anticipado el P. 
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299 In ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], ff. 152-153. It contains four items: 1. Traslado de una carta de Ogasauara 
Ychian que vino de parte de Daifusama por Governador de Nagasaqi y para el despacho dela nave delos 
Portuguezes y delos mas navios que vienen de otros reinos al dicho puerto de Nagasaqui; 2. Carta de 
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Christiano secretario, y oidor de Cozuqedono; 4. Carta de Omuradono para el Padre Viceprov. traslada 
del original escrito y firmado por su propria mano. 
300 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 152. 
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Ieyasu’s decision is confirmed also by Honda Cozuqedono and Okamoto Daihachi, 
Honda’s Christian secretary who we will get to know better later. The last document of 
the collection is a letter sent by Ōmura Yoshiaki to the Portuguese viceroy, which 
basically deals with the same topics as the letter sent to Pasio. 
The sequence of events presented in these documents is more or less the same 
told by Cerqueira in his Certidam. Both sources exclude that the fathers’ played a part 
against Yoshiaki. Then, how the Jesuits explained to Rome the apostasy of the Japanese 
lord?  
According to Pasio, who, be it noted, was the highest representative of the 
Society of Jesus in Japan, Yoshiaki was indebted by the lord of Higo, the anti-Christian 
Katō Kiyomasa, who helped Ōmura in covering the exorbitant expenses and the 
manpower for the edification of Edo’s fortress. 301  Kiyomasa, a former Toyotomi’s 
retainer who joined the Tokugawa, was a stern bushi and a follower of Nichiren, the 
branch of Buddhism to which Yoshiaki eventually turned to. 
Then, although it would seem that Rodrigues had really nothing to do with the 
exchange of lands in Kyūshū, Yoshiaki’s behaviour should have ring an alarm bell. The 
Southern daimyō, in fact, not only eradicated the Christianity from his domain,302 but it 
seems that he was planning also to get rid of João Rodrigues, owing to the role he 
played in the silk trade and his influence within the shogunal court. As early as 1603, 
Bishop Cerqueira warned Rome about the difficulties arising from Rodrigues’s secular 
duties, in particular with regard to his intervention in determining the pancada price 
when Japanese demand and Portuguese offer failed to meet.303 Cerqueira found himself 
in an awkward position, since he acknowledged the dangers and unsuitableness of those 
activities, yet he recognized also that it was not easy to refute appointments from the 
shōgun himself.304 It would seem that Valignano felt almost the same thing when in 
1591 he wrote that to avoid ‘muitas murmuraçoens que na China ha parecendolhes que 
os Padres são contra elles por amor dos Japoens, se não meterà o Procurador em dar a 
                                                 
301 See Vice-provincial Pasio to Father Gregorio López, Nagasaki, 2 February 1607. RAH/Cor. 9/2655, f. 
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304 See Bishop Cerqueira to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 1 March 1607. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 21, ff. 135-
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pancada da seda, ou outra couza semelhante, sem ordem geral ou particular do 
Superior’.305 The Japan Jesuits, at least part of them, were aware of the danger and 
opposed against it. In 1605, for instance, Diogo de Mesquita wrote that both Japanese 
and Portuguese were scandalized by the involvement of the fathers in the negotiation of 
the pancada and ‘en repartir la mesma seda por los mercadores y mas personas que nos 
parece’.306 Although later Francesco Pasio wrote in detraction of Mesquita that ‘muito 
pouco tem estudado’ and whose opinions were therefore unreliable,307 there were also 
other Jesuits who did not consider meddling in secular matters a positive thing. The 
Italian Organtino, among others, wrote to the general a letter that most likely had the 
effect of cementing Acquaviva’s ideas with respect to the negotia politica. Organtino 
recognized the perks that came from participating in the temporal jurisdiction of 
Nagasaki, yet he wrote that: 
‘[C]omo il governo, e giuriditione temporale difficilmente si compatiscono con l’instituto 
della Compagnia e costumi religiosi; e specialmente perche in Giapone queste cose danno 
occasione a molti, che ci tengano invidia e parlino male di noi, e ci diano molti travagli come 
sino adesso ci hanno datto; paremi nel Signore che V. P. doverebbe ordinare, e commandare 
rigorosamente che da qui avanti non solo li Nostri non se intermettessero in ninguna cosa 
pertenente alli negocij temporali di questa cità, ma ne di niuno altro luogo e terra di questo 
Giapone’.308 
According to Organtino, Yoshiaki wrote a treatise against the fathers of the Society to 
present to Ieyasu in the attempt of having Rodrigues exiled. It is easy to imagine what 
kind of effect these words may have had on Acquaviva, whose aforementioned letter 
was written in total unawareness of what was happening in Japan.  
 
 II. 5. 2.    André Pessoa and the sinking of the Nossa Senhora da Graça309
 Although that was not the first letter in which Acquaviva showed his concern 
towards his confrères meddling in temporal matters, the renewed invitation to abandon 
                                                 
305 See RPJ, f. 39. 
306 See Diogo de Mesquita to General Acquaviva [SOLI], Nagasaki, 21 March 1605. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, 
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307 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [II], f. 338. 
308 See Father Organtino Gnecchi Soldo to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 28 March 1607. ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 14 [II], f. 278v. 
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which is called in contemporaneous accounts. 
190 
 
such activities probably did not reach Japan before 1610. The lateness in the dispatch 
was not due only to the slowness of communication between Europe and Asia, but also 
to the Dutch, who were exerting a progressively higher pressure on Portuguese 
settlements in South-East China. In effect, both the annual voyages of 1607 and 1608 
did not take place due to Dutch blockades of Macao.310  
In 1607, however, since Macao could not reach Japan, the Japanese took a visit 
to the Portuguese entrepôt. Two Japanese ships, one of them belonging to Arima 
Harunobu, on the return voyage from Champa (today’s central Vietnam) harboured at 
Macao for the winter, although, as we know, the Japanese were forbidden to set foot in 
Chinese territory. Notwithstanding the long-standing prohibition, however, the Japanese 
walked freely through the town armed to the teeth creating distress and upsetting the 
Chinese officers, who went to complain with the Vereadores. The situation was 
extremely delicate for the Portuguese, since they could not afford to antagonize either 
party. Consequently, they requested the Japanese to moderate their insolence, but to no 
avail. On 30 November, then, a fight between Portuguese and Japanese broke out and 
led to the intervention of the Captain Major André Pessoa along with all the available 
armed men. The casualties were almost all Japanese: 40 dead and the rest imprisoned. 
When the prisoners were released, Pessoa compelled them to sign an affidavit admitting 
their responsibilities and thus absolving the Portuguese from all blame in order not to 
endanger Macao’s trade with Nagasaki. 
Owing to two missing voyages, the Nao that sailed for Nagasaki in 1609, the 
Nossa Senhora da Graça, was richly freighted, since it carried the overdue supply of 
two years for the Japanese market. The Hollanders tried to stop also this ship, but the 
vessel managed to escape and made it safely to Nagasaki by the end of July. The 
Captain Major was again André Pessoa, who took with him the affidavit signed by the 
Japanese.311 
 Since the last time the Nao do trato had reached the South-Western coast of 
Kyūshū, more than a thing had changed in Japan. In 1605, Ieyasu resigned the title of 
sei-i tai-shōgun by passing it onto his son Hidetada and thereby asserting the hereditary 
principle in shogunal succession. Ieyasu took the title of retired shogun – ōgosho – and 
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named the family castle at Sunpu as his official residence.312 Once Tokugawa’s control 
over Japan had been secured, Ieyasu coped with foreign affairs. In that very year, in 
fact, he allowed one of the survivors of the Liefde, Jacob Quackermaeck, to go to Patani 
to invite VOC’s vessels to trade in Japan.313 In addition to Manila, then, Ieyasu was 
looking for yet another commercial partner in order not to depend too much on 
Portuguese voyages from China. Furthermore, in 1606, he dismissed Ogasawara Ichian 
from his post of visiting bugyō, which was quite the blow on the Christian mission, 
since Ichian proved to be an accommodating, if not favourable, officer. On the contrary, 
his substitute, Hasegawa Sahyōei, well personified the new phase of trouble the Japan 
Christianity was inexorably getting close to.  
At any rate, still in 1607, Ieyasu did almost nothing against the papist 
missionaries in Japan. Although, in fact, he confirmed his prohibition against the 
conversion to Christianity of daimyō and nobles,314 in 1607 he invited Francesco Pasio 
as chief of the mission to his new residence at Sunpu. Pasio, along with João Rodrigues, 
Pedro Morejón and two Japanese brothers, were courteously received by the Vongoxo. 
They seized the opportunity to remind Ieyasu what Rodrigues asked in the aftermath of 
Hideyoshi’s death, to abrogate the kanpaku’s edict and give them back the freedom to 
proselytize to everyone.315 Despite Pasio did not write down Ieyasu’s answer to his 
proposal, we know that the freedom the Jesuits had enjoyed during the 1580s would 
never be equaled again. 
 In any case, as soon as André Pessoa arrived at the sight of Nagasaki’s harbour, 
a number of Japanese boats sent by Hasegawa came alongside the Great Ship to prevent 
any person or goods from going ashore without permission.316 Pessoa, however, refused 
to have the Japanese aboard his carrack and sent them back to the port. Hasegawa, then, 
proposed to have two inspectors to examine and appraise the ‘caixões e fardos hum per 
                                                 
312 Cf. Totman, Tokugawa Ieyasu Shogun, pp. 96-97, Asao and Jansen, “Shogun and Tennō”, pp. 259-
260, CHJ IV, pp. 145-146, RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 43 and BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-59, f. 280v. 
313 Cf. Totman, Tokugawa Ieyasu: Shogun, p. 104. 
314 Cf. Cooper, op. cit., p. 215. 
315 See Vice-provincial Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 14 October 1607. BL/Add. 9860, ff. 127v-
128. 
316 With regard to André Pessoa and the Nossa Senhora da Graça’s incident we followed the Relação da 
queima da nao Nossa Senhora da Graça, em que veyo por Capitam mòr da viagem Andre Pessoa no 
anno de 1609, in RAH/Cor. 9/2666, ff. 109-115 alongside with Alvarez, “Don Rodrigo de Vivero et la 
Destruction de la Nao “Madre de Deos” (1609 á 1610), pp. 479-511, and, with some limitations, Boxer, 
The Affair of the “Madre de Deus”, The Christian Century, pp. 271-274 and idem, O Grande Navio, pp. 
63-68. 
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hum para tomar o que milhor lhe parecesse para Daifu’.317 This demand was likewise 
rejected by Pessoa, who retorded that Hasegawa ‘em terra fizesse o que quizesse, mas 
não já dentro da sua nao, da qual elle hera Senhor e Capitão’!318 Eventually, Hasegawa 
agreed to limit his inspection of the cargo to a superficial examination and inventory of 
the goods as the Portuguese were safely landed. 
 André Pessoa was struck by the way the officers treated them. The Portuguese 
were normally received with courtesy, but the new bugyō clearly wanted to take care of 
things differently. According to the author of the Relação da queima da nao Nossa 
Senhora da Graça, the reason for this behaviour was that the Japanese had finally 
realized that there was more at stake in the Nagasaki-Macao trade than the contrary. In 
other words, they became conscious that the profits in Japanese silver from the selling 
of Chinese silks and gold were the reason Macao could keep on existing, whereas the 
Tokugawa bakufu had already found other partners capable of providing the textiles the 
Japanese craved for. 319  Furthermore, Hasegawa was not alone in his resolution. 
Murayama Tōan, in fact, supported him as he was progressively moving away from his 
support to the missionaries of the Society of Jesus.320  
After the Portuguese found accommodation in Nagasaki, Hasegawa and 
Murayama ordered a round of all the houses where the Portuguese were lodged and 
inspected all their wares, which were bought to a fixed price lower than what 
established by the Portuguese. Afterwards, Pessoa decided to relate to Hasegawa the 
way the Japanese behaved in Macao two years before and suggested to mention the 
facts to Ieyasu. Hasegawa, however, strongly advised him to keep Ieyasu out of it. The 
bugyō pointed out that the retired shōgun was well aware of his fellows’ behaviour in 
abroad and he was worried that it would be the cause for breaking the relationship with 
foreign countries. Moreover, he added that since the Japanese were guilty as charged, 
nobody would have risked informing Ieyasu about it. Both Captain Pessoa and the 
                                                 
317 See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 109v. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Notwithstanding the promises made by both Hollanders, Spaniards and later also by the English, only 
the Portuguese had legal access to the best quality Chinese silk, whereas the others had to rely on second-
hand textiles that never provided the same incomes as the silk sold by the Portuguese of Macao. 
320 Depending on what kind of sources one uses – Dominican or Jesuit – Murayama comes out either a 
good Christian or a really bad one. Be that as it may, it seems indisputable that when he received the 
office of daikan he started to behave differently, in particular towards João Rodrigues, the one who 
interceded for him with Ieyasu. After the decree of expulsion in 1614, however, Murayama changed again 
his attitude and went back to a strict Christian way of life, until he was killed by the bakufu in 1619 along 
with his son. 
193 
 
Fathers of the Society of Jesus acknowledged that Hasegawa had a point and followed 
his advice. Nevertheless, out of prudence they handed over copies of the affidavit to a 
bakufu officer well-disposed toward the Portuguese, the master of the mint Gotō 
Shōzaburō, and to a retainer of Honda Masazumi.  
 In the meanwhile, to the satisfaction of Ieyasu the two Dutch ships that failed to 
stop the Nossa Senhora da Graça arrived at Hirado with a letter by Maurice of Nassau 
to establish a commercial link with Japan, and soon received permission to set up a 
factory.321 Their appearance forced Pessoa to dissimulate with his outrage at the way 
Hasegawa was handling the Portuguese. Thus, through the good offices of the Jesuits 
and ‘huma grossa peita de dinheiro à conta da armação’,322 he persuaded the bugyō to 
send Macao’s envoy, Mateo Leitão, to meet Ieyasu together with a trustworthy 
subordinate of him, in the attempt of speaking with the ōgosho before the Dutch did. 
Notwithstanding their effort, however, the Hollanders were received first and Ieyasu 
allowed them to stay in Hirado. During the meeting, the Dutch, aware of the value of 
the Nagasaki-Macao trade, told Ieyasu that soon the Portuguese would not be able to 
bring Chinese silks to Japan owing to their military presence in the China Sea.323  
It would seem that in the same year, also Spaniards from Manila tried to 
persuade the Japanese to abandon the trade with the Portuguese, for they would take 
care of importing Chinese silks to Japan, ‘porque […] Sua Magestade Catolica hera de 
sua nação, e isto pretendia e os tinha a elles [the Spaniards] por filhos e aos portugueses 
por servos’.324 Ieyasu and the Shōgun Hidetada, however, were not trying to cut off the 
thread with the Portuguese; rather they yearned to establish contacts also with New 
Spain. In December 1609 and May 1610, in fact, they wrote a letter to Filipe II’s valido, 
the Duke of Lerma, opening Japanese ports to Spanish vessels coming from Mexico.325 
                                                 
321 Cf. Boxer, The Christian Century, p. 289, Corr, Adams. The Pilot, p. 111, Informação sobre a entrada 
dos Olandezes em Iapam e sobre algumas cousas que depois socederão, f. 220 and BL/Add. 9860, f. 204. 
322 See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 110v. 
323 This information was confirmed by Francesco Pasio in 1610. See Vice-provincial Pasio to General 
Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 15 March 1610. BL/Add. 9860, f. 204: ‘Aos Olandeses concedeo o Cubo feitoria 
no porto de Firando e que viessem ao dito porto por elles prometerem que virião todos os annos, e trarião 
muitas fazendas de sua terra, e tudo o que tras a Nao dos Portugueses, e se elles continuarem com este 
comercio, alem do perigo que corer aa nao dos Portugueses, arreceamos muito semeem em Japão herejia’. 
324 See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 111. 
325 Cf. Gil, Hidalgos y Samurai, pp. 256-258. In the same time, Japan trade with the Philippines continued 
properly. Between 1609 and 1610 eight shuin-sen arrived in Manila with a cargo of mixed goods, such as 
copper, hemp textiles, gunpowder and Japanese iron. Cf. AGI, Contaduria 1208, f. 109v and ff. 207-213. 
However, Bishop Cerqueira wrote that in 1610 the Japanese sent to Manila ‘seis navios muy arrezoados 
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Judging from Ieyasu’s attitude towards the foreigners, it is clear that he did not 
want to exclude the agents of the Portuguese padroado from Japan and substitute them 
with the Hollanders or the Spaniards. After his meeting with the Portuguese 
ambassador, in fact, Ieyasu issued a shuin-jō for the senate of Macao.326 The ōgosho 
was looking for several commercial partners that could link Japan with the outside 
world, as it is confirmed also by the author of the Relação da queima da nao Nossa 
Senhora da Graça, probably João Rodrigues Giram, who affirmed that Ieyasu said to 
the Portuguese that ‘elle já lhes [to the Dutch] tinha dado sua palavra, a qual não havia 
de quebrar, mas que assi huns como outros viessem a Japão, o qual hera franco pera 
todos, que em seus portos não haveria brigas, e que laa no mar cada hum se vigiasse’.327 
In those years, moreover, the attention and curiosity for European knowledge – artistic, 
scientific and engineering – was at its uppermost. The Society of Jesus in Miyako, as we 
saw, was currently implementing such knowledge in order to pull in the Japanese 
aristocracy. But, as is customary, when something reaches its climax, that is when it 
starts to be on the wane. 
 In spite of the agreement reached at Nagasaki between the Portuguese and the 
Japanese and in spite of Jesuits’ assurances, Pessoa was deeply suspicious of 
Hasegawa’s intentions and he consolidated his suspects when he saw how badly the 
bugyō received the news of the shuin-jō for the Portuguese. Thus, the Portuguese 
captain secretly prepared a formal complaint – ‘huma lista e apontamentos’328 –against 
the bugyō to be presented to Ieyasu. When the Jesuits heard of it, they did their best to 
dissuade Pessoa, but Hasegawa had already been informed about it and henceforth 
considered the Portuguese captain as his mortal enemy. The grudge between the two 
was eventually led in front of Ieyasu. To complicate matters even more the Japanese 
survivors of the Macao’s incident came back in Japan around that time. They soon 
disavowed their affidavits, since it has been extorted under menace, and along with 
Hasegawa accused Pessoa for his behaviour. Moreover, they emphasized to Ieyasu that 
the Japanese killed and imprisoned were part of a shuin-sen’s crew, hence official and 
legitimate ship. Although Ieyasu was much impressed by these arguments, he did not 
                                                                                                                                               
carregados de grande quantidade de prata, a mayor que nunca os Jappões depois que este commercio de 
Manilha com Jappão se tem aberto, têm mandado’. See Bishop Cerqueira to King Filipe II, Nagasaki, 12 
March 1611. RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 255. 
326 The shuin-jō was written by the Buddhist monk Enkoji Genkitsu on 19 August 1609 and was issued on 
24 August. See Alvarez, op. cit., pp. 482-483. A transcription in Boxer, The Christian Century, p. 272. 
327 See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 111v. 
328 Ivi, f. 112. 
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want to take drastic action, lest this should result in the loss of the trade with Macao, 
according to Boxer.329 Be that as it may, after some hesitation, Ieyasu finally decided to 
have Pessoa and the Portuguese all killed and to confiscate the vessel along with the 
cargo. Arima Harunobu, on his part, claimed that he had to avenge the death of his 
subordinates and added his forces to Ieyasu’s.330 
As soon as the news reached Nagasaki, Hasegawa started to claim that he would 
have Pessoa’s head cut off, whereas the Portuguese took to the ship, which he had 
armed and set to fight.331 Before the attack began, Hasegawa, Murayama and Arima 
tried again the diplomatic way and sent a joint message to the Jesuits, telling them that 
if the Portuguese handed over Pessoa, everything would be settled without fighting, but 
the missionaries answered that the Portuguese would never hand over their captain.332 
The time for talk was over and in the morning of 3 January 1610, the Japanese launched 
the attack. Owing to lack of wind, the Nossa Senhora da Graça was not able to set sail, 
yet during three days the Portuguese managed to repel the attacks. On 6 January, 
however, the Arima samurai succeeded in setting fire to the ship. It was soon obvious 
that it was impossible for the crew to extinguish it while fighting. Seeing that all was 
lost, Pessoa ‘tomou hum crucifix ou imagem e foi andando pelo meyo da nao e 
juntamente mandou dar fogo ao payol da polvora, pera que da parte contraria 
morressem mais ao arrebentar da nao e se não lograssem do recheo’.333 The ship blew 
up and the explosion could be heard from places far from Nagasaki. 
According to the Relação, along with the vessel, also the cargo worth ‘hum 
conto douro’ was lost. In addition to several crates of silver, in fact, also 3’000 picols of 
silk were aboard during the fight. Francesco Pasio wrote that the vice-province invested 
                                                 
329 See Boxer, op. cit., pp. 276-277.  
330 Charles Boxer attributed Ieyasu’s choice of punishing the Portuguese to a meeting between the tyrant 
and Don Rodrigo de Vivero y Velasco, a former governor of the Philippines. According to Boxer, when 
Ieyasu asked whether the Spaniards could supply the bulk of silk imports to Japan, in absence of the 
Portuguese carrack, Vivero allegedly replied that they would send not merely one, but two or three ships 
yearly. However, even in Vivero’s own accounts of the meeting with Ieyasu, there is no mention of this. 
For the transcriptions of Vivero’s accounts see Gil, Hidalgos y Samurai, pp. 140-206. At any rate, in the 
aftermath of the incident, Pasio wrote to Rome that ‘nunca o Cubo ouvera de se resolver a mandar tomar 
a Nao, e matar os Portugueses se não tivera este comercio de Manilha, por via do qual faz conta que lhe 
pode vir tudo o que lhe vinha de Macao, e os da Manilha ssi lho prometerão’. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [II], 
f. 335. It is not clear, then, whether Pasio was actually stating the truth or was he only trying to blame the 
Spaniards for what happened to the Portuguese. 
331 See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 113. 
332 In 1611, Honda Masazumi wrote a letter to the Portuguese authorities stating again that the Japanese 
intention was only to seize the captain, not to kill all the crew or to burn down the ship. Cf. Boxer, The 
Christian Century, Appendix V, pp. 428-429, 
333 Ivi, f. 114v. 
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between 12’000 and 13’000 ducats in the 1609-armação and lost between 20’000 and 
30’000 ducats ‘do que ouvera de render aquella seda que vendemos pollo preço de 
Japão por este anno aconteçer valer extraordinariamente cara’. 334 The Procurator of 
Japan in Macao, João Coelho, reported that they had lost a cargo of ‘cento e trinta 
quintaes de seda fina’.335 The Japan Jesuits, then, were actually facing the financial 
collapse: not only they had lost all the incomes from that year, but they lacked also the 
capital to extinguish the debts both in Japan and Macao.336 
But the worst part was that the Portuguese did not want to come back to Japan as 
long as Ieyasu was still breathing, ‘salvo se elle vendo a falta que a Nao lhe faz os 
convidassem com partidos honrosos, e liberdades de modo que pudessem tornar com 
honra e proveito’. Soon after the battle, on the contrary, Hasegawa sent for the Macao 
merchants who had survived and told them that if they wanted to continue trading, it 
would have to be on the Japanese terms, which were evidently too humiliating and 
disadvantageous, since the majority of the Portuguese at first refused to sign it.337 Yet, 
before they embarked for Macao, Hasegawa insisted with the Portuguese not to 
interrupt the trade with Japan.338 
 
II. 5. 3.    First of all and instead of them all: the expulsion of João 
Rodrigues Tçuzu 
With regard to the missionaries of the Society of Jesus, both Tokugawa Ieyasu 
and the Bugyō Hasegawa Sahyōei took an atypical decision. Whilst in the past, 
whatever incident regarding the Westerners led almost directly to threats of expulsion or 
actual persecutions, this time the Japanese aimed not at the Society of Jesus as a 
religious-political-commercial institution, rather to two particular men. In other words, 
the measures took by the bakufu in this occasion had nothing to do with religious 
antagonism, but are to be ascribed to the negotia politica or secularia Acquaviva wrote 
about. Unfortunately, only the Jesuit version of the facts survives, hence it is a biased 
                                                 
334 Pasio first wrote that ‘nesta Nao perdemos passante de vinta mil ducados’, yet further on in the letter 
he corrected the numbers and stated that they lost more than 30’000 ducats. Cf. Vice-provincial Pasio to 
Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 14 March 1610, ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [II], f. 333v 
and f. 335. 
335 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [I], f. 4. 
336 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [II], f. 333v. 
337 Cf. Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 68-69. 
338 See Boxer, The Christian Century, pp. 282-283. 
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vision which might (or might not) leave out important details.339 Anyway, it goes as 
follow. 
Francesco Pasio wrote to Rome in 1610 describing a plot against him and João 
Rodrigues devised by Hasegawa in collaboration with the Daikan Murayama. After 
some years of friendship with the Jesuits and with João Rodrigues, in fact, lately the 
daikan was showing signs of disaffection towards the papist missionaries. In particular, 
it seemed that he felt to be in contention with Rodrigues with respect to the duties 
assigned by Ieyasu in Nagasaki. Tōan started to change manifestly his attitude when 
Ogasawara Ichian was substitute by Hasegawa Sahyōei, who as we saw did not hide his 
hostility towards the Westerners, either merchants or missionaries. The bugyō and the 
daikan soon realized that, despite divided by faith, they could join forces and profit by 
the suppression of their common enemies, i.e. Rodrigues and the Society of Jesus. Thus, 
as soon as he was appointed governor of Nagasaki, Hasegawa wanted the Ignatians to 
act not only as translators for the Portuguese and Japanese merchants, but also as 
officials to be consulted whenever a dispute between merchants arouse. This duty put 
the fathers in an uncomfortable position, since it forced them to take side even if the 
matter did not regard them. Obviously, whenever the Fathers did not stand for the 
Japanese side, Hasegawa accused them of subversion and disrespect toward Japanese 
laws.340 All things considered, however, Hasegawa and Murayama wanted especially to 
expel Rodrigues and Pasio from Nagasaki, since the two Jesuits had always a saying in 
deciding the pancada price. According to Pasio, in order to have them expelled, 
Hasegawa and Murayama accused him and Rodrigues to have incited André Pessoa to 
file the formal complaint with the bakufu against the bugyō. As we saw, in the Relação 
it was stated the contrary and also Luís Cerqueira sworn that the ‘Padres da Companhia 
tem neste negocio da nao contribuido inteiramente com sua obrigação’.341 Be that as it 
may, neither Hasegawa nor Murayama seemed to have accepted the explications of the 
missionaries and would accept to settle the matter only at one condition:  
                                                 
339 The document is a letter Pasio wrote to Acquaviva on 19 March 1610. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [II], ff. 
338-339v. 
340 A case in particular angered Hasegawa against Cerqueira and the Jesuits, namely the dispute between 
Bernardo Funamoto, a Japanese Christian from Nagasaki, and Vicente Rodrigues, a Portuguese living in 
Nagasaki, on the property of the cargo of a ship from Macao. See Carvalho, Apologia do Japão, pp. 80-
82. Cf. Cooper, op. cit., pp. 269-270. 
341 See RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 105. 
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‘Procuramos de fazer as amisades, as quais elle [Hasegawa Sahyōei] não quis aceitar sem lhe 
prometer de mandar o Padre João Rodriguez para Macao, e que fosse de maneira que se não 
entendesse que elles o procuravão, se não que a Companhia de seu proprio motu o fazia assi 
como consta fazer muitas mudanças dos seus sogeitos, o qual resguardo procurava por se 
arreçear que sabendo o Cubó a verdade do que passava lho tomasse a mal, pois tinha amor, e 
bom conceito do Padre e o mesmo tenia dos outros privados da Corte’.342 
The fathers convened that it was advisable to content Hasegawa, provided that the 
bugyō changed his attitude towards the Christian faith and protected the missionaries in 
presence of Ieyasu. After the explosion of the Nao do trato, Sahyōei went to Suruga to 
brief Ieyasu on the incident. Ieyasu’s reaction was furious. He ordered the death of all 
the Portuguese survivors and the expulsion of all the missionaries. Yet, when a couple 
of months later Hasegawa came back to Nagasaki, he informed Pasio that eventually 
Ieyasu issued only an expulsion decree for João Rodrigues and that it was only thanks to 
his intercession that Pasio was allowed to stay. The vice-provincial, however, had 
already been informed about the meeting by Pedro Morejón who was at Suruga while 
Hasegawa was there and the two stories did not match. According to Morejón’s 
account, when Ieyasu ordered the executions of the Portuguese and the expulsion of the 
missionaries, Arima Harunobu objected that if they did that, it would be impossible to 
see another Portuguese vessel in Japan. Ieyasu, then, calmed down and declared a 
general pardon for the Ignatians acquitting them of any accuse. Then, our problem is 
basically to understand why, notwithstanding the general pardon, Rodrigues was forced 
to leave Japan and Pasio risked the same.  
Be it noted that the facts we are reporting are taken from discordant sources, 
namely the Relação of the Nossa Senhora da Graça and Pasio’s letter, hence we are 
forced to make some hypotheses. 
 First, we must underline that the missing information in the Relação can be 
attributed to the purpose of that text. In other words, it is likely that the Jesuits did not 
have to or want to divulge evidences that could have damaged the name of the Japan 
mission and clearly the expulsion of a member of the order owing to his excessive 
involvement in Ieyasu’s financial transactions was one of them.343 Pasio unintentionally 
confirm this point when he wrote that although Rodrigues was sent to Macao ‘nenhuma 
                                                 
342 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [II], f. 338v. 
343 A shortened version was published as an appendix of the 1610 annual report. Cf. Rodrigues Giram, 
Lettera Annua del Giappone del 1609 e 1610, pp. 136-141. 
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cousa perde de sua honra, pois todos sabem que foy porada de Safioye e Toan’.344 At 
any rate, the answer to our problem can probably be found in a letter Rodrigues himself 
wrote twelve years later from his Macanese exile. Writing to the sixth General of the 
Society of Jesus, Muzio Vitelleschi, Tçuzu wrote:  
‘Vim de Japam aqui desterrado pello Senhor da Tenca, primeiro que todos e em lugar de 
todos, com patente particular pera que ouvindo-se a morte do Senhor da Tenca que me 
mandou a instancia de huns meus adversarios seculares que teveram grandes intentos de 
destruir a lej de deos e christandade contra os quaes eu tinha mão com o favor divino’.345 
João Rodrigues’s letter is as interesting as it is reliable. We can easily put a name to the 
‘adversarios’ he was referring to: Hasegawa Sahyōei and Murayama Tōan. If we follow 
Tçuzu’s statement along with the other two sources we quoted, we can draw our 
conclusions. Instead of expelling all the missionaries from Japan, which most likely 
would have put an end to the trade or at least seriously hindered the link between Macao 
and Nagasaki, Hasegawa proposed to Ieyasu to strike one to educate one hundred. After 
all, although Ieyasu used to rely on Rodrigues for the matters regarding the trade with 
Macao, by that time he could rely also on William Adams, the Dutch at Hirado, the 
Spaniards of Manila and the promise of a trade with New Spain. Tçuzu was a disposable 
man for Ieyasu, but still represented a great loss for the Society of Jesus.  
It really seems that the bugyō thought everything through in order to obtain what 
he wanted without endangering his position. First, he had the Fathers agree on expelling 
Rodrigues as if it was their decision and then convinced Ieyasu that punishing Tçuzu 
was enough to hit the Society of Jesus, but not that hard of a blow to destabilize even 
more the relationship with Macao. Moreover, if it was not for Morejón who unveiled 
precious details of the meeting, the Ignatians might have thought that Hasegawa 
actually interceded in their favour with Ieyasu.  
To corroborate our conclusion, we have a description of João Rodrigues made 
by Visitor Francisco Vieira in 1619. He wrote that Rodrigues ‘[t]eve grande entrada 
com Taicosama e com este imperador [...]. Errou em entremeter-se em coisas seculares 
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345 See João Rodrigues Tçuzu to General Muzio Vitelleschi, Macao, 31 October 1622. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 18 
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e no governo de Nangasaqui. Tomou com isto alguma liberdade e criou muitos inimigos 
como Toan e Fasegaua. Estes perseguiram-no [...] e forçaram-no a sair do Japão’.346 
 
*   *   * 
In March 1610, then, João Rodrigues bid farewell to Japan, whereas Pasio was 
allowed to remain. As we saw, he had to face an actual crisis due to the sinking ship and 
piling debts. He had no other solution than to dismiss several dōjuku, close the seminar 
and some residences. As happened in the previous years, some Japanese gave to the 
missionaries an help commensurate to their own means, but ‘entre elles não há Senhores 
grandes, nem Christãos muito ricos, por a mayor parte destes terem acabado nas guerras 
passadas e outros mortos, e não se terem feitos outros de novo polla prohibição do 
Cubo’.347 In Macao the situation was not better. The loss of the cargo caused a general 
dearth of funds, which led the creditors of the Jesuits to knock at the college’s doors to 
solicit payments,348 yet a former coadjutor of the Society in Japan, Vicente Rodrigues, 
lent them 5’000 taéis.349  
Contrary to the secular realism showed by Pasio, Diogo de Mesquita, an 
orthodox religious who never concealed his opposition to the participation in the silk 
trade, wrote to Acquaviva words that, if on the one hand had a positive effect on the 
general, on the other hand hide beneath the satisfaction of a strict religiosity the 
disastrous financial situation of the vice-province and disregard for the debts ran up by 
the mission:  
‘[A] penuria tenho por abundancia e merce de Deos com que nos sostenta e livra de mil 
molestias e indecencias no proceder conforme al nosso Instituto, porque con a penuria cessão 
os faustos, cessão as fabricas impertinentes en terra tão instable, cessão os peditorios que nos 
fazem como a ricos e os prezentes grandes que de nos esperão e costumamos a fazer a gentios 
e cristãos no que se gasta muito. [...]. [P]elo que não tenha V. P. pena, porque esta 
Cristandade e corpo da Companhia que nela esta, não há de perecer por falta do necessario, 
antes da abundancia há muito que temer, e se devemos alguma cousa ha por onde pagar, nem 
                                                 
346 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 25, f. 107c. Apud Cooper, op. cit., p. 267. 
347 See Vice-provincial Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 15 March 1610. BL/Add. 9860, f. 204. 
348 See Father Diogo Pinto to General Acquaviva, Macao, 24 January 1611. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [I], f. 4. 
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são dividas que nos desenquietem, nem desacreditem, porque são de pessoas que emprestão 
em serta maneira rogando e pera pagar quando podermos’.350 
Despite his strong opposition to one of the leading features of the Society of Jesus in 
Japan, Mesquita was asked to go to Macao and negotiate the restoration of the 
commercial thread between Macao and Nagasaki, but eventually Father Rui Barreto was 
selected to go. The ship set off in April 1611, a calm year despite extemporary 
persecutions. 351 Although it was not an official voyage, 352 Mesquita stated that the 
Japanese invested a great sum of money in it,353 probably because neither Spanish ships 
nor Dutch ones arrived in Japan between 1610 and 1611.354 On the return voyage from 
Macao, however, the vessel wrecked in a storm off the Fujian coast and the survivors, 
Barreto included, were killed by the Chinese.355 Fortunately, the other envoy sent from 
Macao, Dom Nuno de Soutomaior, was aboard another vessel and arrived safely in 
Japan. He was received by Honda Masazumi and both parties agreed on the resumption 
of the trade on the basis it used to be carried on before André Pessoa, as testify the 
Japanese papers sent to the Captain Major Dom Diogo de Vasconcelos356 and to the 
authorities of Macao by Honda and Gotō Shōzaburō in August 1611.357 Judging from 
the surviving Portuguese documents, moreover, it would seem that from that moment it 
began to appear a separation between the interests of the negotia animarum and of the 
negotia secularum. Macao’s Vereadores, in fact, delivered to Ieyasu an official letter 
stating that ‘ainda que não queira ter Padre algum em seus reinos, ao menos naquella 
praya de Nangasaqi conceda à Nao que todos os annos ordinariamente vem, e aos 
Portugueses moradores de Nangasaqi huma terra, aqual seja dos Portugueses que vem 
comerciar como dos que residem e morão em Japão’.358  
Consequently, if on the one hand starting from 1612 the official annual voyage 
that linked Macao and Nagasaki was officially resumed with the Great Ship of Captain 
Pedro Martins Gaio, on the other hand for the Society of Jesus the years 1611 and 1612 
                                                 
350 See Diogo de Mesquita to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 24 March 1611. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 12v 
351 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 57, f. 132v. Cf. Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão, p. 369. 
352 Cf. RAH/Jes. Legajo 21, 9/7236 [I] f. 313. 
353 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 12v. 
354 Cf. Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 69-70. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Dom Diogo de Vasconcelos served as Captain Major of the surveillance fleet sent from Goa to protect 
Macao from the Dutch and to cooperate with Manila to expel the Hollanders from the Maluku Islands. Cf. 
Boxer, op. cit., p. 70. 
357  The Japanese documents regarding the resumption of the trade with Macao were translated and 
published by Boxer in The Christian Century, Appendix V, pp. 428-435. 
358 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [I], f. 1. 
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were a time of great changes both regarding internal management and their behaviour in 
in Japan. In the next chapter, firstly we are going to deal with issues inherent the 
relationship between members of the mission and then we shall see how the office of 
procurator evolved after João Rodrigues’s expulsion and how Carlo Spinola carried on 
his duties in Nagasaki. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
OMNE REGNUM IN SE DIVISUM DESOLABITUR: 
DISUNITY WITHIN THE JAPAN MISSION 
 
 Introduction 
As we briefly touched on earlier, during the 1610s several changes took place in 
the Japan mission of the Society of Jesus. As a matter of fact, juridically, the Vice-
province of Japan became a province on 9 December 1608. As a consequence, the office 
of vice-provincial lapsed and new appointments turned out to be necessary.  
Selecting a father for important roles such as visitor, provincial, vice-provincial 
or even rector depended not only on the qualities of the single members of the Society. 
Due to the incorporation of the Kingdom of Portugal into the Habsburg Crown, in 
South-East Asia, namely China, Japan and the Philippines, came into being situations 
difficult to handle from Europe. Matters of commerce overlapped continuously with 
missionary issues, leading to the constant opposition between agents of the Padroado 
and the Padroazgo. These rivalries sprout from the spectacular profits of the silk trade 
between China and Japan, but also from the appeal that the Chinese and Japanese 
missions had to the European people, both laymen and men of the cloth. To make 
oneself protagonist in territories so fascinating with abundant conversions or with a 
impressive death whose account would certainly ended up printed throughout Europe, 
represented a way to achieve immortal fame and to honour at once one’s family, one’s 
religious order and even one’s country.  
Accordingly, when the fifth Jesuit General Claudio Acquaviva made the 
selections for the brand new Province of Japan he knew he was dealing with a delicate 
matter. Acquaviva’s choices fell on an Italian and a Portuguese, namely Francesco Pasio 
passed to be vice-provincial to visitor, whereas Valentim Carvalho was appointed first 
provincial of Japan.359 The patents did not reach Japan until 31 July 1611, when the 
                                                 
359 Cf. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-55, p. 50. 
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change to province effectively took place. Yet, afterwards both elections were strongly 
contested and turned out to be unfortunate for different reasons. As for now, suffice it to 
say that, although it is noticeable that Acquaviva tended to favour his Italian 
countrymen, he was trying to maintain balance in the appointment of positions of 
power, since he was aware of what kind of criticisms and disunity such appointments 
arouse.  
To conclude this brief introduction to the chapter we selected a quote by Francis 
Bacon. The English philosopher and statesman described religion as the strongest bond 
of human society, which brings happiness to the community provided that religion itself 
is contained within the true bond of unity. Bacon thought that that unity could generate 
one fruit for the believers, namely: ‘peace; which containeth infinite blessings. It 
establisheth faith; it kindleth charity; the outward peace of the church, distilleth into 
peace of conscience; and it turneth the labors of writing, and reading of controversies, 
into treaties [sic, treatises] of mortification and devotion’.360 As we will see, disunity 
among the Japan Jesuits did not cause a war between the Ignatians, but it surely did not 
lead to peace of conscience or to treatises of devotion. On the contrary, a lot of paper 
was spent both to defend one’s country, with declarations born out of an emergent early 
nationalism, and to put the matter to rest for the good of the mission. Eventually, 
however, it was the Tokugawa Bakufu to eradicate definitely the issue from Japan. 
 
 III. 1.    A political matter: Portuguese Fathers VS Spanish Fathers 
“Estas dos fuertes naciones, 
que, por nueva union hermanas, 
la emulacion de sus glorias 
hacia parecer contrarias”. 
(Lope de Vega, El Brasil Restituido, 1625) 
According to a collection of documents – evidently assembled by a member of 
the Society of Jesus – entitled Testimonianze de’ Sommi Pontefici in favore della 
Compagnia di Gesù, Pope Gregory XIII used to say that ‘tre cose specialmente 
ammirava nella Compagnia [...]. Tanta umiltà e modestia con una così variata ed 
eccellente dottrina. Tanta unione, e cospirazione di voleri in tanta diversità di nazioni e 
                                                 
360 See Bacon, Essays, Civil and Moral, ‘Of Unity in Religion’.  
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d’ingegni. Tanta continenza in una sí verde, e sí vivace gioventù dà quei piaceri che 
molto anche attraggono l’uman corpo, ancorché debole e fiacco […]’.361 Although it is 
not specified when Gregory XIII pronounced such words, his pontificate (1572-1585) 
fits perfectly in the timeframe that saw first the appearance of disunity among the 
Ignatians in Europe or in the Estado da Índia. As a matter of fact, either the pontiff’s 
declaration is forged or he ignored completely what was going on between Portuguese 
and Spanish Jesuits. 
As it is well known, the rivalry between Portuguese and Spaniards was not a 
product of Portugal’ annexation to Spain in 1580. It has deeper historical reasons, but it 
is part of the human nature to gather in groups in order to seek protection and 
recognition and the belonging to the same region or country had always had a strong 
unifying effect. There are consequences, however, that come out of this categorizing 
attitude. One of these is to discriminate those belonging to another group.362 The hope 
that the Society of Jesus could prevail over national identity had been fostered since its 
early days. To this end the first general had given a Frenchman charge of the Collegio 
Romano, assigned the Paris college to a Spaniard, and the Perugian college to a 
Fleming.363 What Loyola had tried to do was smoothing down the acrimony amongst 
the Ignatians by forcing them to have continual contacts, instead of making Jesuits from 
different countries avoid each other by remaining in their own birthplaces. So instead of 
fueling a cycle of hostility bred by long-standing stereotypes, Loyola tried to reduce the 
disparity between stereotypes and reality through contact with – so he hoped – a 
corresponding reduction in hostility.  
Alessandro Valignano had to deal with the same issue even before he reached 
Goa. While in the college of São Roque in Lisbon, in fact, he explored the talents and 
character of each of the missionaries he was leading to Goa, to see how brethren 
composed of three nationalities (Portuguese, Spanish and Italian) fraternized with one 
another.364 He did his best to create union between them and, upon suggestion of the 
                                                 
361 See BNCR/FGes. 1139, f. 11v. 
362 Cf. Bodenhausen and Macrae, “Stereotype Activation and Inhibition”, p. 7. 
363 Cf. Clossey, Salvation and Globalization in the Early Jesuit Missions, p. 60. 
364 See Visitor Valignano to the Secretary of the Society of Jesus Antonio Possevino, Lisbon, January 
1574. ARSI, Lus. 66, ff. 42-43v. Cf. VMP I, pp. 77-78. 
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Portuguese, invited Italians and Spaniards to learn a little of Portuguese, also by visiting 
hospitals and prisons.365 
The visitor was the head of one of the larger number of missionaries – forty-one 
– which left Europe all at once. Before they set off, however, Valignano had to face the 
resistance of the Portuguese fathers of São Roque. As soon as he got to Lisbon, in fact, 
he wrote to Mercurian that those fathers ‘parlavano tanto risolutamente che non 
posseano ir tanti alla India, et che il Rè havrebbe pigliato a male che vi fussero andati 
tanti Spagnioli, et che bisognava prima provarli un anno qui in Portugallo, [and that] il 
Rè non havrebbe dato denari per tanti, né luogo nelle navi, et che era scandalo che 
andassero tanti’.366 It should also be noted that owing to the Padroado’s rights, starting 
with Mercurian, the Society had been trying to make relations between Rome and India 
more direct and independent exactly to avoid such political problems. The first step in 
this direction was the appointment of Valignano as visitor. The main purpose of this 
choice seems, in fact, to have been the freeing of the Indian province from an 
unwarranted tutelage on the part of the fathers in Portugal.367 In any case, eventually 
Valignano was able to handle the fathers in Lisbon and embarked for Goa.  
Almost two years later, in December 1575, after having thought about it for a 
long time, he resolved to brief Mercurian about the same problem but more in details, as 
he had the chance to observe the behaviour of his Portuguese, Spanish and Italian 
confrères in Cochim.368 With regard to the Portuguese Jesuits, he noticed that as soon as 
they set foot in the Indies, they assumed a haughty attitude, and no longer carried out 
the duties that were expected from them, because ‘si veggono tra questa gente negra 
tutti diventano gentil’huomini et segnori et non vogliono fare nessuno di quelli officii 
che facevano in Portogallo’.369  
On the other hand, the Spanish fathers, the Castilians in particular, were 
disconsolate and repentant of having come to India. Valignano probed into the roots that 
generated such feelings and declared that maybe the problem lay on the posture the 
                                                 
365 Cf. Sumario, p. 14*. 
366 See Visitor Valignano to General Mercurian, Lisbon, 28 January 1574. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 7 [III], f. 189. 
Cf. VMP I, p. 67, n. 86. 
367 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 7 [II], f. 194v and f. 195v. See also VMP I, p. 82. 
368 See Visitor Valignano to General Mercurian, Cochim-Goa, 4 December 1575. ARSI, Goa. 47, ff. 42-
58v. See also DI X 1575-1577, pp. 143-219. 
369 ARSI, Goa 47, f. 42v. On the racial attitude within the Portuguese Overseas Empire see Boxer, 
Relações raciais no Império Colonial Português 1415-182¸ Rio de Janeiro, 1967. 
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Portuguese assumed toward Spanish fellows. The Portuguese, in fact, ‘naturalmente 
poco si ammassano colli castigliani, o sia per le guerre passate, o perché si temono 
quelle che possono venire per essere in molti luoghi confini,370 o perché ciasched’uno di 
queste nationi pretende et di valere et di sapere più degli altri, sempre si pungono et si 
motteggiano’.371 In order to put a bridle on the effects of birthplaces on interpersonal 
behaviour, Valignano proposed three solutions. First, to send Italian fathers apt for 
leading roles, since Valignano noticed that the Italians not only were more welcomed by 
the Portuguese than the Spaniards but they were not influenced by political prejudices 
and thus ‘terranno più facilità et libertà di unire queste due nationi et insieme si pianterà 
in questa Provincia il modo soave di governare’.372 Valignano could not know back 
then, but this advice would eventually cause the Portuguese to shift their complaints 
exactly from the Spaniards to the Italians. Second, Valignano suggested to the general 
to select Spanish missionaries among those coming from Valencia or Aragon, instead of 
Castile. Finally, he proposed that both Italians and Spaniards passed at least one year in 
the college of Coimbra in order to learn Portuguese and get acquainted with the 
Portuguese way. 
Loyola and Valignano were implementing effective sociological practices, 
which now are studied and known topics, but back then were just product of experience 
and wits. In the case of intergroup hostility, in fact, the individual members of the 
category – Spain Jesuits – were recognized as being less negative than the category as a 
whole – the Spaniards, and it is assumed that the latter is adjusted in the direction of the 
former. Indeed, if cultural distance is not too large, as happens between Portugal and 
Spain, the more one group knows about the other group and particularly if members of 
each group know each other’s language, the more they perceive each other as similar, 
which can make contact rewarding, as hoped by Valignano.373 Perceived similarity, 
moreover, increases if there are common goals – the evangelization – or if one group 
cannot reach its goals without the help of the other group, which was the case of the 
Portuguese Assistancy. 
                                                 
370 Valignano was referring to both the situation in Asia, with the Philippines near China and Japan, and 
in South America, with Brazil and the confining Rio de la Plata’s region. 
371 ARSI, Goa 47, f. 42v. 
372 Ibid., f. 43. 
373 Cf. Triandis and Trafimow, “Culture and its Implications for Intergroup Behavior”, pp. 376-378. 
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The process of exclusion of Spanish Fathers from the Portuguese Assistancy, 
which, as we saw, was already underway with D. Sebastião and would not be stopped 
by D. Henrique,374 had led Valignano to limit the problem without causing any scandal 
or endangering anybody. Exactly one year later, also the Provincial of India Rui 
Vicente,375 urged Mercurian not to stop sending to Goa Jesuits from the most different 
countries. He confessed his discontent about the order of excluding Spaniards from the 
Asian mission and invited the general to do something about it. Both Vicente and 
Valignano, in fact, were conscious of the factual impossibility for a small country as 
Portugal to provide enough manpower for the gigantic Portuguese Assistancy or for the 
Province of India alone. 376 Valignano resumed the problem with just a few words: 
‘perché l’India non produce soggetti et consuma molti, et la Provincia di Portogallo non 
può pur in parte sopplire’.377 
If the problem was considered serious in the mid-1570s, the political union of 
the Iberian crowns took the debate to a whole new level. In Japan, for instance, when 
religious and commercial representatives from the Philippines made their appearance, 
Spanish fathers were caught between a rock and a hard place. Should they protect the 
mission or show loyalty to their country?378 Conscious of the problem, as early as 1574 
Valignano proposed to Mercurian to assign the Spanish missionaries bounded for Japan 
only to ‘lugares muito remotos e distantes dos portos do mar de onde não possam ter 
nenhum tipo de comunicação com os castelhanos’.379 The problem did not affect only 
the Ignatians. In effect, Spaniards belonging to other religious orders, such as 
                                                 
374  This prohibition obviously included also the Oriental regions. On 24 December 1578, in fact, 
Mercurian addressed a letter to Valignano informing the Italian that he was trying to convince D. 
Henrique to revoke the prohibition for Spanish Fathers to Japan. See DI XI 1577-1580, pp. 467-469. Cf. 
Costa, A Rivalidade luso-espanhola no Extremo Oriente, pp. 483-485. 
375 The Portuguese Rui Vicente (1523-1587) turned Jesuit in 1553 in Coimbra. He set off for India in 
1574 where he held the position of provincial from that year until 1583. 
376 See DI XI 1577-1580, pp. 34-35. 
377 See ARSI, Goa 47, f. 42v. 
378 Cf. Costa, op. cit., p. 485. Father Afonso de Lucena was particularly critic about this point with his 
Spanish colleagues. In 1598, for instance, wrote that the Spanish Jesuits ‘naturalmente falando fazem as 
partes de Castella e puxão quanto pode pollos seus reynos e isto sem falta e pecado nenhum a todos lhe 
parece bem que estejão qua frades por esta via dos Luções e lhe fazem os maiores agazalhados que pode 
ser [...]. E posto que o Padre V. Provincial [Pedro Gomez] he castelhano, não so tem aquela inclinação 
que tem os outros as cousas de Castella e se alguma cousa faz he por persuação dos outros e por ser 
homem muito brando’. See Father Lucena to Assistant of Portugal João Álvares, Ōmura, 20 October 
1596. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 13 [I], f. 12. Two years later, Pedro Gomez wrote a letter in his defence, where it 
appears clearly that the help he offered to his countrymen was only normal courtesy and that he was as 
critic towards Spaniards arrival in Japan as the Portuguese were. See Vice-provincial Pedro Gomez to 
General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 9 February 1598. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 13 [I], f. 123. 
379 See DI X 1575-1577, p. 674. 
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Augustinians and Friars Minors, complained about how they were treated in Portuguese 
dominions. For example, in 1587, a group of fathers belonging to the Spanish patronage 
wrote the king a complaining letter about the difficulty of carrying on their mission in a 
city – Macao – where every decision was taken according to the ‘mandato de su 
Visorrey […] y a la obediencia delos Padres Teatinos [i.e. the Jesuits]’. 380  In the 
meanwhile, in Europe Spanish Fathers complained that their Portuguese colleagues 
were deliberately seeking to remove them from the Province of Portugal because of 
their national origins.381 Five years later, Acquaviva directed a provincial inspector for 
the good of religion and the peace of the kingdom to punish any Jesuits in Portugal who 
affected nationalistic sentiments, an order he found it necessary to repeat the following 
year.382  
The conflict between Spaniards and Portuguese climaxed with the Fifth General 
Congregation (1593–94), when Spanish dissidents used the Congregation to 
decentralize the Society by shifting certain powers from the general to the provincial 
congregations, but eventually Acquaviva succeeded in overriding their will. 383 
Evidently, then, the matter was not confined in the lucrative Asiatic regions, but 
differently from Europe, in India, China, Japan and the Philippines, the clout of the 
curia or of the secular powers was much weaker and solving this problematic while 
Portugal was part of the Habsburg domains turned out to be impossible. In fact, still in 
1618, there were Jesuits stating that the Indies belonged to Portugal and consequently 
not only the Portuguese fathers should represent the governing body, but also the 
number of Portuguese missionaries should be higher than the other.384  
                                                 
380 See AGI, Filipinas, 79, N. 16, f. 1: ‘[…] mas aqui no le ay naydie que quiera, y si alguno quiere ni osa 
por miedos falsos, pues posponen todas las cosas al mandato de su Visorrey, ora sea el que fuere, y a la 
obediencia delos Padres Teatinos que en esto son todo para persuadir por aca, que solo lo que ellos haçen 
es lo que conviene, y no otra cossa.’ 
381 According to the Portuguese Father Afonso de Lucena (1551-1623), during the generalate of the fourth 
General, Everard Mercurian, due to lack of union the Spanish Jesuits in Italy and Portugal were all sent 
back to Spain and the Portuguese were, therefore, reassigned to Portugal. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [I], f. 
58v.  
382 See Alden, The Making of an Enterprise. The Society of Jesus in Portugal, Its Empire, and Beyond, 
1540-1750, p. 92. 
383 See Clossey, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 
384 See Visitor Francisco Vieira to the Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas [SOLI], Nagasaki, 3 
September 1618. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 17, f. 168v: ‘Sejão V.s R.s certos que em quanto estas Provincias da 
India não tiverem a maior parte de subjeitos Portugueses, nunca poderá aver perfeita união, assi como no 
corpo humano não pode aver concordia nos humores, da qual nace a saude, se não ouver hum humor 
predominante, da mesma maneira, como os estrangeiros forem muitos e tantos como os Portugueses, logo 
ha bandosinhos, e desinquietações. E por conseguinte nas Missões que se fizerem de Europa para a India 
sempre hão de ser mais os Portugueses que os estrangeiros, se V.s R.s querem cá paz e união’. 
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In November 1595, however, Alessandro Valignano wrote three letters in eight 
days to Acquaviva about the division that was affecting the Society of Jesus due to 
nationalistic rivalries.385 The visitor wanted Acquaviva to know that some Portuguese 
fathers gathered around the common idea that the Province of India was in no need of 
foreigners’ help and ‘que con solos los portugueses se podrá remediar’.386 According to 
Valignano, the Portuguese Jesuits tried to prevent foreign fathers from coming to the 
Indies by founding their plea upon economic matters (the fact that the Portuguese 
Crown was obliged to pay a viaticum of 110 ducats per person), although they were 
directing their complaints in particular towards their Spaniards fellows.  
Among the three letters, the third one is the most interesting, because it 
demonstrates that the Italian was actually justifying the position held by the Portuguese 
party, although he disagreed with the way the Lusitanian fathers advanced their 
requests:  
‘El principio desta desunión es quasi natural […], entre los castellanos y portugueses porque, 
como son naciones confines, tuvieron muchas vezes entre sí guerra; y como repartieron entre 
sí por concessión del Papa Alexandro 6º387 la conquista de todas las tierras incógnitas,388 en 
que tienen también sus controversias como apetitores de gloria y de tierras, 389  tuvieron 
siempre entre sí una cierta manera de emulación. Mas después que vinieron los estados de 
Portugal al Rei Don Felipe, creció mucho esta emulación y poca unión entre ellos. Y como 
las passiones y afectiones naturales que hay entre naciones fácilmente entran también en la 
Religión, se con la gracia del espíritu y con la diligencia de los superiores no se moderan, por 
esso también de algunos años a esta parte fue esta emulación y poca unión creciendo entre los 
nuestros’.390 
Acquaviva replied to Valignano on 28 March 1597. His letter shows particular concern 
towards the lack of unity between Portuguese and Spanish fathers. Namely, he wrote 
that ‘questa veramente è cosa che mi tocca il core […]; et se bene la radice principale 
                                                 
385 The three letters had been written on 10, 17, and 18 November. The manuscripts are in ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
12 [II], ff. 295-297v, ff. 307-308v, and ff. 309-310v, whereas the transcriptions in DI XVII 1595-1597, pp. 
120-135, pp. 179-191, and pp. 191-200. 
386 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 12 [II], f. 296.  
387 Rodrigo Borja (1431-1503). 
388 The Treaty of Tordesillas (June 1494) established a line of demarcation running north and south three 
hundred and seventy leagues west of Cape Verdes. This arrangement reserved for Portugal the discovery 
of Brazil, while it allowed Castilian ships to run across the Atlantic secure from the stronger Portuguese 
fleet. 
389 The pertinent territories were especially Japan, Moluccas, Brazil and the Rio de la Plata regions. Cf. 
DI XVII 1595-1597, p. 193.  
390 See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Goa, 18 November 1595. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 12 [II], f. 309. 
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nasce da principio quasi naturale, come V. R. dice, e cresce poi per gli interessi che 
hanno i secolari tra loro; non di meno lo Spirito, et vocatione della Compagnia deve 
prevalere’.391 The general insisted on Valignano disciplining those Jesuits who allowed 
such behaviour. He informed the visitor that he had already reprimanded the Portuguese 
with respect to their demand to exclude the Spaniards from the Indies to the Italians 
advantage, but ended the letter with a cautious ‘ma certo bisogna andar con molta scelta 
nel mandare’.392 
Valignano, however, did not blame solely the ingrained antipathy among 
neighbours for the disunity among his fellows. Instead, he believed that the union of the 
crowns caused the growth of a kind of emulación. Valignano’s use of the word has a 
clear Aristotelian reference. According to the Aristotelians, in fact, there are two types 
of emulation: the virtuous one, which seeks to imitate the good deeds of one’s 
acquaintances, and the vicious one, which cannot suffer the prosperity, fortune, honour 
and glory of others. The latter is born out of envy and it is usually found in those who 
share the same profession. Aristotle, indeed, made a distinction between envy and 
emulation, speaking of the latter as an honest mood, whereas the former is a despicable 
feeling for despicable people. Both of them are born out of a comparison between two 
subjects, but emulation allows people to gain something, to improve them; on the other 
hand, the emulation born out of envy is well resumed by the German utterance 
Schadenfreude, to experience joy at another’s misfortune or to lessen the amount of 
goodness in someone else.393  
Although in 1605, Valignano made indeed clear the Aristotelian difference by 
writing about ‘huma emulação não Santa, pera que lhe não chamem enveia’,394 in this 
letter he made another distinction outside Aristotle’s thought. The visitor first discerned 
between the natural passions (‘passiones que podemos llamar naturales’) and the 
vicious ones, the ones that are far apart from reason. He wrote that the Portuguese 
fathers are justified in their complaints, because blood once spilled for the conquering 
                                                 
391 General Claudio Acquaviva to Visitor Alessandro Valignano, Roma, 28 March 1597. ARSI, Lus. 32, 
ff. 76-76v. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Aristotle, Rhetoric, book II, chapters 10 and 11 and Salovey, The Psychology of Jealousy and Envy, 
pp. 9-12. 
394 See Visitor Valignano to the Archbishop of Goa, Macao, 7 October 1605. BL/Add. 9860, f. 99. 
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of Índia was Portuguese-red and the men who fought to death for it were Lusos,395 
consequently it was obvious for him that the honour and burden of governing the 
Estado da Índia should fall on their shoulders and that was as true for secular offices as 
it was for the religious ones. Moreover, it was not only a matter of fairness: ‘allende de 
lo que se debe a los trabajos que los portugueses passaron en la conquista y 
conservación de la India, la razón está mostrando que en los lugares que son de sus 
proprios naturales y adó el cuerpo de los nuestros es también de portugueses, mejor 
governarán ellos y harán mucho más fructo que otros de naciones estranjeras’.396 We 
concede that Valignano remained faithful to this principle until – at least – the year 
before his passing. In 1605, in fact, he wrote similar words to Acquaviva, declaring his 
gratitude to Portugal:  
‘Tenho grandes obrigações à naçam Portugueza que sempre me mostrou tanto amor e respeito assi 
os de casa como os de fora sofrendome de mais de trinta annos a esta parte neste governo, e no da 
India mais de 21 annos com que me tem posto hum ferrete para até morte os amar e servir […]; 
mas porque tambem me parece que […] seria enorme infidilidade e iniustiça que se usaria com 
ella e com a Coroa real de Portugal, e Naçam Portuguesa por instrumento seu para fazer tam 
abalizados cousas em seu serviço em todas estas partes Orientais defendendo e estendendo sua 
Santa Ley e fazendo tam grande converçam e christandade em todas as partes. E isto com grande 
espalhamento de seu sangre e nam menos trabalhos e gastos de suas fazendas e pessoas parece 
cousa impia, nam soo iniusta quererem vir outros agora pretender tomar a honra e o proveito 
ganhado com tanto costo.’397 
It is worth underlining that Valignano’s thought apparently was not received either in 
Rome or in Japan. In 1612, in fact, one of the Portuguese fathers who got involved the 
most in this issue, Afonso de Lucena, urged the Assistant of the Portuguese Province to 
send to Japan capable Portuguese fathers to be Superiors rather than skilled foreign 
fathers. And he added that ‘pera a união desta provincia convem que ordinariamente os 
Superiores sejão de Portugual. E saiba que inda que nosso Padre e V. R. tenhão outro 
conceito nunca avera união se assi não for’.398 Also Father Francisco Pires expressed 
similar ideas to those of Valignano. Differently from what stated by Lucena, who had in 
                                                 
395 Something really similar appears in the 11th chapter of the Capitvlos do Stado da Nobreza of the 
Cortes of Tomar. The Portuguese aristocracy wanted that the captaincies of ‘Mina, Santhome, Cabo 
Verde, Brasil, & as mais ilhas se provejão pelo modo antigo a fidalgos, pois ells as ganharão & 
defenderão’. See PMGP, f. 100. 
396 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 12 [II], f. 309. 
397 See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Macao, 18 January 1605. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [II], ff. 1-
1v. 
398 See Father Afonso de Lucena to Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas, Ōmura, 17 February 
1612. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [I], f. 103v. 
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mind the union amongst the Jesuits, Pires thought that the Superiors of the province 
should be Portuguese because of the trade between Macao and Nagasaki and the profits 
that came along.399 
The disunity between Portuguese and Spanish Jesuits, then, had mostly historical 
roots, which were evidently almost impossible to eradicate, as Alessandro Valignano 
was forced to admit in November 1593.400 Loyola and Valignano thought also that 
sharing a common goal might prompt sympathy and solidarity to the detriment of 
dividing feelings and they tried to smooth that dissent away by making foreign 
missionaries familiarize with the Portuguese language and way of life. As we saw, this 
strategy did not bear the wished fruits. In effect, it has been argued that contact does not 
always lead to favourable attitude change. Among the necessary conditions for 
favourable, contact-induced change, for instance, we find equal status and intergroup 
cooperation. Stereotypes, however, are unlikely to be changed by contact if the contact 
is perceived as consistent with the stereotype.401 Contact, in other words, may support 
rather than negate the stereotype, and that is indeed what happened in the Indies, where 
the Portuguese used to complain about the attitude adopted by the Spaniards. Moreover, 
with regard to equality in status, Valignano knew that the Portuguese in India would 
never accept to be commanded by a Spaniard and thus wrote to Acquaviva that ‘no 
conviene en ninguna manera hazerse en la Provincia de la India Provincial 
castellano’.402  
At any rate, with the turn of the century there was the gradual disappearance of 
Spanish fathers from the Chinese and Japanese missions, due in particular to missing 
replacement for the oldest and deceased fathers. 403 Along with the decrease of the 
                                                 
399 See Father Francisco Pires to Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 10 March 1612. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin. 15 [II], f. 214: ‘Como o remedio desta Provincia depende tanto deste contrato dos Portugueses, 
[...] nos podem dar de ganho dez, doze, e qinze mil cruzados, pera noso sustento, e pagarmos nosa 
dividas, convem que o Superior Universal seja Portugues, que lhes tome a benevolentia, como fazia o 
Padre Francisco Cabral, eo Padre Gaspar Coelho, porque ja dos Padres Estrangeiros, entendem que não 
olhas a honra del Rei, e proveito dos Purtugueses’. 
400 Cf. DI XVI 1592-1594, pp. 259-260: ‘[H]a V.P. de entender (como ya en parte sabrá) que entre 
portugueses y castellanos uvo siempre mucha emulación y discención por ser naciones confines y que 
tuvieron muchas guerras entre sí; y aunque agora están todos debaxo de hun mismo rey, todavía no sólo 
no cessó esta desunión, mas antes se acrescentó mucho, porque los portugueses con estar debaxo de la 
corona de Castilla y quedar sin rey proprio y natural, naturalmente quedaron mui sentidos, y hasta nuestro 
Señor lo remediar no podrá ser otra cosa’. 
401 Cf. Rothbart, “Category Dynamics and the Modification of Outgroup Stereotypes”, pp. 45-64. 
402 See DI XVI 1592-1594, p. 260. 
403 The last Spaniard to having reached the Estado da Índia was Diogo Pantoja, who was destined for the 
Chinese mission, where he worked from 1599 until his death in 1616. He was the first and only Spanish 
214 
 
Spaniards, the number of the Italians grew. This augmentation rebounded on the 
relationship between Portuguese and Italian Jesuits, which eventually affected also 
Spinola when he received the appointment to procurator. 
 
III. 2.    ‘Padre daimio e Padre tanda’: Portuguese Fathers VS Italian 
Fathers 
Differently from what happened with the Spanish Jesuits, when it came to deal 
with the Italians the heart of the matter was the role filled within the hierarchy of the 
Society of Jesus. As we saw, in 1595 Valignano wrote to Acquaviva that the Portuguese 
got along with their Italian confrères and thus it was advisable to send more Italians 
than Spaniards, as it actually happened. According to the proceedings of the Fourth 
Indian Provincial Congregation held in Goa at the end of October 1594,404 the Italians 
were so zealous in the promotion of the Christian faith that the Portuguese could not 
deny them a place in the Indies. In Valignano’s opinion, however, the Italians were 
exempted from the critics only because he and Acquaviva were both Italian.405 Yet, 
from an historical and sociological point of view, it seems fair to think that, at least at 
that time, the Portuguese would rather have Italians instead of Spaniards among them. 
We have a witness that can corroborate our view. It is a document written in the 1600s 
probably by the Assistant of Portugal, Father João Álvares, which faced directly the 
problems caused by nationalistic divisions.406  
The author began with the presentation of some facts which he considered 
certain and verified. He stated that the Estado da Índia was so big that it could not be 
looked after only by Portuguese Jesuits and added that the members of the Italian 
Province were the most apt to help the Portuguese in attending to the evangelization of 
the Estado, because ‘como a experiencia o tem mostrado por que de todas as nações a 
gente italiana, he a que mais se sabe acomodar aos nossos portugeses’.407 Valignano 
                                                                                                                                               
father who worked in the Chinese vice-province. For a thorough list of all the missionaries sent to the 
Indies see BPE, Cód. CXVI/2-11, n.º 44, ff. 3-22v. Cf. also Costa, A Rivalidade luso-espanhola no 
Extremo Oriente, pp. 494-495. 
404 See DI XVI 1592-1594, pp. 633-663. Acquaviva answered only in 1596, that is after Valignano sent 
his letter but before the General actually received it. 
405 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 12 [II], f. 296. 
406 See BNCR/FGes. 1255, File 46 - Exponuntur causae dissensionum, quae in Indiies oriri possunt inter 
Socios lusitanos et exteros. Suggeruntur remedia opportuna, ff. 238-243. 
407 Ivi, f. 238. 
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probably could not agree more. In 1605, in fact, he wrote to Álvares that the disunity he 
saw between Italians and Portuguese was innocuous, because it lacked the historical 
basis of the rivalry between Spaniards and Portuguese.408  
At any rate, it is likely that the opinions expressed by João Álvares were a 
product of political shrewdness and caution. Álvares’s occupation, in fact, was to aid 
the general about all the matters regarding the Portuguese Assistancy. But, differently to 
what was happening in the Indies, in Álvares’s case he was the foreigner. He was 
advising the Italian Acquaviva, while in Italy. Then, it is somehow expected that he 
found a little room to praise the Italians. Furthermore, in the attempt of justifying why 
he was suggesting to send less foreign missionaries to the Indies, he showed how those 
few Portuguese residing in the Roman college were loved and accepted, whereas ‘se 
agora no Collegio Romano ouvesse trinta ou quarenta portugeses, que fizessem corpo 
(poes naturalmente os da mesma nação, mais facilmente se ajuntão entre si, maxime 
quando se achão entre estrangeiros) claro esta, que avião de ser mais notados e não tam 
recebidos e amados’.409 To better describe how the Indies were such a complicated 
place he used a curious metaphor:  
‘Isto tudo presuposto como verdadeiro digo, que as nossas provincias da India são como huma 
arca de Noes em que se recolherão animais de varias castas assi os sogeitos de que se constão 
aquellas provincias são varios, huns nascidos na India; outros Europeos. E dos Europeos huns 
entrados na India, outros mandados de Europa.’410  
From these three groups, derived three types of disunion, the same outlined by 
Valignano in the 1595-triptych of letters to Acquaviva,411 but it is the third one that 
deserves more attention: the disunion that lures between Portuguese and Jesuits of other 
nationalities.  
He analysed the issue to provide a solution by stressing the flaws of each of the 
two groups starting from his fellows Portuguese. Among the various faults he 
enumerated, it is important to us to report a specific feeling – a bitterness – that affected 
those Lusitanian fathers who suffer in watching foreign Jesuits receive the higher ranks. 
                                                 
408 See Visitor Valignano to the Assitant of Portugal Álvares, Macao, 24 January 1605. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
14 [I], ff. 154-155. 
409 BNCR/FGes. 1255, f. 242v. 
410 Ivi, f. 240. 
411 The three types of disunion were: 1. between Portuguese fathers and those Jesuits born in the Indies 
(filhos da India); 2. between the Portuguese-born Jesuits who entered the Society in Europe and those 
who entered directly in India; 3. between Portuguese Fathers and foreign Fathers. 
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We will see shortly that also Valignano underlined this attitude and how he defined it, 
but for now suffice it to say that Portuguese’s complaints had a factual basis. Their 
critics, in fact, pointed also to the duration of the appointments, which often turned out 
to be long-life occupations, contrarily to the habit of the Society which contemplated 
substitutions each three or four years in every level of the hierarchy.412 Valignano, for 
example, was appointed visitor in 1573 and, except for the four-year hiatus of his 
provincialate, he remained in charge until his death. Also Francesco Pasio passed from 
the post of vice-provincial to that of visitor and died while filling it. At any rate, the 
solution provided by Álvares was to send to the Indies only virtuous and foreigners-
friendly Portuguese, in other words a kind of missionary who ‘não chejra a humor 
national’.413  
Regarding the foreigners, on the other hand, he deemed that the problem was 
quantitative in the first place. Sending together a lot of foreign missionaries gave them 
the opportunity and need to unite beneath the common feeling of being outsiders. 
Moreover, Álvares reported that foreign Ignatians used to complain about their 
destination, since the most of them wished to go to China and Japan, but were stuck in 
India instead.414 The assistant recommended that the foreigners bound for the Estado 
were provided of the necessary qualities; respectful of the provincial’s order and 
possibly that they had already finished all the academic courses.415 But there was a 
directive that the Portuguese considered too unfair, an order issued from Rome that 
forbade the provincial to expel foreign fathers without previous consultation with 
Rome.416 This meant that if the provincial found a missionary unworthy of the Society, 
he had to wait at least four or five years before he could actually dismiss him.417 No 
                                                 
412 Cf. Alden, The Making of an Enterprise, pp. 243-244, Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão, pp. 74-76 and 
Father Francisco Pires to the Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 26 January 1614. 
ARSI, Jap. Sin 16 [I], ff. 3-3v: ‘A 3.ª [topic] ou primeira por sua importancia he que Nosso Padre devia 
determinar que en Japão se muden os Superiores particularmente Universal cada 3 ou 4 anos, como nas 
demais partes de Europa por muitos inconvenientes que se seguem do contrario a Companhia, porque 
como Roma está tão longe primeiro que Nosso Padre seja avisado pera por remedio algumas cousas pasão 
primeiro quatro ou cinque anos, e as vezes mais antes de haver resposta’. Alden showed that between 
1546 and 1616, the Japanese mission was the one where the average length of provincial’s terms was the 
longest, 9.7 years, against the 9.0 of China, 6.6 of Brazil, 5.5 of Goa and 3.8 of Portugal, the only 
province which fully respected the Constitutions. 
413 See BNCR/FGes. 1255, f. 241. 
414 Ivi, ff. 240v-241. 
415 Ivi, f. 241v. 
416 Ibid.  
417 The case of Valentim Carvalho well illustrates how long it took for a father to be dismissed. He was 
appointed provincial in 1611; in 1612 the first criticisms against his rule were sent to Rome, but he was 
dismissed only in October 1617, when Vitelleschi’s dismissal letter reached Macao. 
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wonder that the Portuguese party felt compelled to protest about this point. Álvares 
suggested to revoke the order because ‘os Portugeses semtem muito esta exceição, e em 
quanto ella durar, sempre gemerão. Por onde convem pro bono pacis, e igualdade com 
todos, que o Provincial da India tenha entejra faculdade que dantes tinha dimittendi 
omnes non professos’.418  
Non professos were those Jesuits who still had not done the professione ad 
quatuor votorum, i.e. the vow circa missiones that distinguishes the Society of Jesus 
from the other missionary orders. It was the Jesuit higher ambition to be granted the 
ultimate profession, since only a few of them had the prerequisites to reach that grade. It 
was an achievement that glorified not only the Ignatian who received it, but also the 
country to which that Ignatian belonged. As we saw, Álvares reported the Spanish and 
Italian fathers used to complain about remaining in India while destined for China and 
Japan. This is a probing point, since this topic has always been approached from a 
different point of view. In 1601, Valignano explained to Acquaviva what he considered 
to be a long-standing issue, i.e. the habit of the Goa Jesuits to hold there literate 
Portuguese fathers and to send to China or Japan the foreigners. 419  This tendency 
affected the missions with a consequent lack of Portuguese professed fathers.420 Earlier 
in 1594, also Francesco Pasio wrote to Acquaviva about the same matter. The general 
wrote back that: 
‘[I]l rimedio che V. R. propone di mandar alcun numero di soggetti di bone parti et lettere de 
Portuguesi, et Italiani che in numero eccedessero, o avanzassero gli altri, è difficile, et molto 
piú il mandar da Portogallo soggetti eminenti perché veramente la Provincia è essausta; pure 
lo scrivo al P. Visitatore Valignano et a quello dell’India,421 oltre i soggetti che si son mandati 
col P. Gil de la Matta422 (de’ quali il P. è stato servito di levar il P. Giacomo Vicarii Italiano 
                                                 
418 BNCR, Ibid., f. 243. 
419 See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 3 March 1601. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 65. 
420 Valignano proposed the same issue two years later, when he complained again about this tendency of 
keeping missionaries bound for the Oriental missions in India. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], ff. 142-144. 
Bishop Luís Cerqueira expressed the same bewilderment to Acquaviva some years before, in 1598. Cf. 
ARSI, Jap. Sin. 13 [II], f. 204v. Nevertheless, the complaints were not limited to the interruption of the 
missionaries’ flow. In 1615, for example, Afonso de Lucena accused the Fathers in Goa to keep there 
books sent from Europe bound for Japan. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 [I], f. 143v, quoted in Costa, O 
Cristianismo no Japão, p. 611, note 133. 
421 Nicolau Pimenta. 
422 Father Gil da Mata (1547-1599) was sent to Rome as Procurator of the Japanese in mission in 1592.  
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soggetto d’ottimo spirito, et di rare parti)423 quel che si potrà fare per un paio di Portughesi di 
parti segnalate,424 che spero saranno per ogni cosa’.425  
Thus, the problem of having such a small number of notable Portuguese fathers beyond 
Goa was not only a consequence of keeping the better ones in India, but lay in an 
insufficiency belonging to Portugal itself. According to the catalogue of the Japanese 
Vice-province written up in October 1603,426 there was in Japan a total of 119 Jesuits, 
between fathers (53) and brothers (66); of these only 18 were professed fathers: six 
Portuguese,427 seven Spaniards,428 and five Italians.429 Only two years before, however, 
there was only a Portuguese professed father, Valentim Carvalho and he was about to 
leave for Macao.430 Accordingly, Valignano wrote that ‘aquí hai agora solamente ocho 
Padres Professos los quatro Italianos que son el Padre Francesco Pasio V. Provincial, el 
Padre Organtino Soldo, el Padre Celso Confalonerio y yo. Y otros tres son Castellanos, 
que son el Padre Francisco Calderon, el Padre Melchior de Mora, y el Padre Pero 
Ramon, y el octavo es el Padre Valentim Carvalho Portugues’. 431  The quantitative 
augmentation of Portuguese fathers in only two years is ascribable to Valignano’s 
resolutions. The Italian, in fact, decided to grant the final profession to two Portuguese 
out of six fathers, 432  although none of them did complete the four-year course of 
Theology, normally a prerequisite to take the ultimate vow.433 This is the umpteenth 
                                                 
423 Acquaviva did not know, but the Italian Father Giacomo de Vicariis who had sailed from Lisbon on 10 
April 1596 together with Carlo Spinola died en route for India on 27 July. 
424 Here we did not understand exactly what Acquaviva meant. The doubt is whether he was referring to 
the two Portuguese who travelled along with de Vicariis – Gaspar Afonso and Jorge Pereira – or he was 
talking about sending other Portuguese in future voyages. 
425 General Acquaviva to Father Francesco Pasio, Rome, 28 March 1597. ARSI, Lus. 32, ff. 77-77v. 
426 Catálogo das pessoas da Viceprovíncia da China e Jappão, com os graos e offícios que têm, de 
Outubro de 603. TCJ, pp. 441-455.  
427 Bishop Luís Cerqueira, João Rodrigues Tçuzu, Mattheus de Couros, Bartolomeu Gómes, Francisco de 
Paiva and Jerónimo Rodrígues. Bishop Cerqueira was included in this catalogue despite he was in charge 
of the bishopric of Japan and was not an actual member of the Jesuit mission. 
428 Belchior de Mora, Pedro da Cruz, Francisco Calderon, Garcia Garcés, Baltasar de Torres, Pedro 
Morejon and Pedro Ramón. 
429 Francesco Pasio, Celso Confalonieri, Carlo Spinola, Organtino Gnecchi Soldo and Pietro Paolo. To 
make a comparison, in China – i.e. Macao, Peking, Nanking, Nan Chang and Shao Zhou – there were 14 
professed fathers (nine Portuguese, two Spaniards and three Italians) out of a total of 75 Jesuits.  
430 Valentim Carvalho (1559-1630) left Japan in March 1601 and remained Rector of the College until 
1609. 
431 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 65. The scarcity of Portuguese Professed of the four vows was stressed also 
by Bishop Cerqueira in 1599. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 20 [II], f. 53v. 
432 Afonso de Lucena and Diogo de Mesquita. 
433 In 1616, Visitor Franscisco Vieira wrote to the new General Muzio Vitelleschi about the instructions 
the Acquaviva sent him along with the appointment as visitor. Vieira asked for clarification about the 
necessary requirements a father in China and Japan was supposed to have in order to be admitted ad 
professionem 4or votorum. Namely, he wrote that ‘ainda que não tenho visto as cartas do Geral pera os 
Visitadores passados, maxime pera o Padre Alexandre por estarem todos estes papeis em Japão, acho 
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time for Valignano to dispose of the rules of the Society in order to ameliorate the 
standards of the Japanese mission. The visitor, in fact, preferred to make use of Jesuits 
who could cope with Japanese language and customs rather than fathers graduated in 
Theology.434 Most likely, Valignano took this decision because he knew how valued the 
hierarchy was in the Japanese culture. This aspect is well underlined by the substantives 
sensei435 (teacher) or senpai436 (older colleague) which denote someone who was born, 
or was there, before (saki437), therefore someone who deserves respect and reverence 
because of his experience and better knowledge. In any case, even though Valignano 
did not actually break any of the rules set forth in the Constitutions,438 in December 
1602 Acquaviva impeded those promotions.439 
Acquaviva’s opposition notwithstanding, what really counts here is Valignano’s 
commitment to the Portuguese fathers. He logically summarized his conception of the 
matter by stating that ‘por ser esta Provincia de Portugueses, son los Professos 
                                                                                                                                               
comtudo informação do Padre Provincial Valentim Carvalho e de outros Padres Consultores, que 
concorrerão com o Padre Alexandre Valignano em consultas de promovendis ad gradus, que elle por 
particular declaração, ou dispensação, praticava e promovia ad professionem 4.or votorum alguns Padres 
com alguma cousa menos de saber, e d’estudo, do que a formula 3.ª de promovendis ad gradus, e o rigor 
das Constituções geralmente requerem: V. G. com tre anos de Theologia, tres anos e algums meses mais, 
ou tres anos e meyo e com exame que mostava saberem ultra mediocritatem absolute, ou hum pouco mais 
de mediocridate. E isto iulgando que bastaria este saber pera profissão de 4.or votos em Provincia que por 
rezão de suas missões importantissimas e urgentes occupações na Christandade, he forçada a lhes acudir 
mais depressa com operarios, e tambem emfaticada pareçe racionavel e bem fundada; mas comtudo como 
não vi in scriptis esta moderação, e deseio não sair hum ponto da vontade de V.P. humilmente peço me 
avise’. Visitor Francisco Vieira to General Muzio Vitelleschi, Macao, 7 December 1616. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
17, f. 26. 
434 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 65v: ‘[A]mbos tienen entre los nuestros, y los forasteros mui buena 
openion, y tienen partes para gobierno […]. Y con la lengoa y grande experiencia que tienen y ser tan 
conocidos y amados delos Iappones ayudan en esta V. Provincia mucho, parecia cosa estraña, y no tan 
justa alos ojos del pueblo ver que otros mas mançebos, y que no tienen ninguna experiencia de Jappon se 
hagan Professos y tengan su lugar en la Congregacion, y que estos que governaron siempre, se queden 
fuera se no se hallaren ser Reitores’. 
435 先生 
436 先輩 
437 先 
438 Cf. Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Latinæ Et Hispanicæ Cum Earum Declarationibus, Fifth Part - De lo 
que Toca al Admitir, ó Incorporar en la Compañía – Cap. II – De las Cualidades de los que Han de Ser 
Admitidos, p. 175: ‘Quien tuviese en el Derecho canónico doctrina suficiente, ó otras partes señaladas, de 
las cuales pudiese suplirse lo que falta al studio de Teología, podría sin ello admitirse á Profesion de tres 
Votos, y algunas personas señaladas tambien de cuatro, aunque esto no se debe estender’. The italic is 
ours. The otras partes señaladas in this case were the linguistic skill of the two fathers and their long field 
experience in Japan. 
439 Acquaviva’s prohibition was reported by Francesco Pasio in 1606. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [II], ff. 247-
248. 
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Portugueses mui pocos, y de razon parece que avia de ser más en numero de ellos que 
todos los mas’.440  
As a matter of fact, although Acquaviva would not approve the two promotions, 
in October 1601, Valignano wrote that seven new professed fathers were then in Japan, 
yet the Spaniards were still in the majority.441 Although the Portuguese professed were 
not as many as they wished to be, by the end of the following year there was harmony in 
the Asian missions. Valignano, in fact, wrote hopefully to the general assuring him that 
in Japan ‘se vive con mucha unión’.442 This was the first and last time that he let himself 
be optimistic about this issue.  
Alessandro Valignano eventually left Japan in January 1603. He wrote other 
letters regarding this subject from Macao right until his death (20 January 1606), but he 
did not live enough to see how worse the situation would. 
Before leaving Japan, in fact, Valignano took two decisions which did not win 
the approval of the whole Jesuit party in the Estado da Índia: he confirmed Francesco 
Pasio as the vice-provincial in Japan and appointed another Italian443 as the founder of 
the brand new Malabar Province.444 Pasio himself warned Rome about the perilous 
situation that was developing. Differently from the past, he was now as worried about 
the lack of Spanish Fathers as he was about the growing importance that the Italians 
were acquiring in the Japan Vice-province.  
Pasio was well aware that the reason why in Japan there were few Portuguese 
Jesuits was the amplitude of the Portuguese Assistancy. He was also aware that fathers 
                                                 
440 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 65v. Afterwards, Valignano explained how the foundation of the College of 
Macao was conceived precisely for this purpose. 
441 See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 24 October 1601. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 
83v: ‘Este ano tambien hizimos siete professos de quatro votos que fueron los Padres Francisco Rodriguez 
y Juan Rodriguez Portugueses, y los Padres Garcia Garces, Pero dela Cruz, Balthazar de Torres, y Pero 
Morejon Castellanos, y el P. Pietro Paulo Italiano, que eran todos hombres de mas de 20 anos dela 
Compañía, virtuosos e letrados y que merecian bien este grado y todos mui buenas lenguas de Japon.’  
442 See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Arima, 24 December 1602. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 
109. 
443 Alberto Laerzio (1557-1630). 
444 It has to be admitted that the complaints of the Portuguese fathers were not inconsistent. When Laerzio 
was appointed Provincial he brought back from Europe 31 Italians out of a contingent of 60 missionaries, 
and, to the chagrin of his Portuguese subjects, immediately assigned several Italians to administrative 
posts in the new Province, e.g. Nicola Spinola as Rector of Quilon. See Alden, op. cit., p. 268. 
Nonetheless, the Malabar Jesuits ‘could not do without him. From the Archbishop to the Novices, all 
loved him [...]. Yet exaggerated nationalism, and, perhaps, the petty feelings that small men are apt to 
nurse against giants, seriously threatened the peace of the Province’. See Ferroli, The Jesuits in Malabar, 
vol. 1, pp. 378-380. 
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of different nationalities were to be sent to Japan in order to compensate for this scarcity 
and here lay his anxiety and his plead to Acquaviva. It was necessary – Pasio put 
forward – that Spanish professed fathers should fill this lack in Japan because ‘si no 
vinieren Castillanos, an de venir muchos Italianos ansi como vinieron estes años, y si 
esto ansi fuere, la natural aversion que hasta agora los Portugueses an tenido alos 
Castillanos, convertenlaan contra los Italianos, principalmente si fueren personas de ser, 
y que tengan officios de emportança, porque pareçerà alos Portugueses que los Italianos 
lles vienen quitar lo que es suyo’.445 That is why – he glossed – the highest positions of 
the Society in the Estado da Índia should be granted to Portuguese fathers. We ignore 
whether it was a direct consequences of Pasio’s words, but in 1610 King Filipe II forbid 
the Italian missionaries to embark for the Indies and ordered the repatriation of those 
already in mission.446 The order, however, had no consequences. 
As we saw, in the early 17th century the Spaniards gradually disappeared from 
the China and Japan missions. Parallel to this decrease, the number of the Italians grew 
and this augmentation rebounded on the relationship with the Portuguese, as Pasio and 
Valignano feared. In effect, the former visitor had to cope with this problem in 1599, 
when he received a letter from Acquaviva, who recommended Valignano to substitute 
the old Spanish Vice-provincial Pedro Gomez with his companion Francesco Pasio. By 
that time, owing to Gomez’s advanced age, Pasio had already been acting as de facto 
vice-provincial. Nevertheless, Valignano wrote to Acquaviva that it was not a good 
decision. Firstly, because Gomez was in good terms with Terazawa Hirotaka, and 
second because ‘moralmente se entende que no se tomara bien ser nombrado por 
Viceprovincial, y que desconfiaran desso assi los Portugueses, como los Castellanos, 
porque parecera cosa dura ser governados de dos italianos, siendo el uno viceprovincial 
y el otro visitador’.447 Eventually, despite Valignano’s resolution, in 1600 Gomez died 
and Pasio replaced him as vice-provincial. 
The situation got even worse when the patents for the appointments of the brand 
new province arrived in Japan. Lusitanian Jesuits, in fact, concentrated their animosity 
towards the Italians in the figure of the new visitor, Francesco Pasio, who filled the post 
                                                 
445 See Vice-provincial Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 22 October 1606. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [II], 
ff. 247v-248.  
446 Cf. BPE, Cód. CXV/2-8, n.º 9, f. 16. 
447 See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 20 February 1599. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 13 [II], f. 
255. 
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of vice-provincial from 1600 to 1611 and then was appointed visitor. Although Italian 
Fathers like Organtino saw Pasio’s appointment as the perfect choice for the good of the 
mission,448 the Portuguese Francisco Pires left behind words that give us an idea of the 
Portuguese attitude: 
‘Tem fama o Padre Francesco Pasio que he pouco afeiçoado aos Portugueses, particularmente 
nos de partes, e polo contrario favoreçer, e autorizar en tudo aos Padres Italianos aos quais fez 
pasar logo a Japão acabados os estudos em Amacao. E aos Padres Portugueses deteve la con 
titulos de Reitor, mestres, ou Procuradores com que desouou esta Provincia dos bons sojeitos 
Portugueses, asi elle como o Padre Alexandre detendo huns que vinhão, e mandando outros de 
Japão pera a China quando estavão no melhor da lingoa pera sirvirem […].449 Con estarem 
quatorze Padres Italianos em Japão, os dez estão em residentias, e estas das melhores, bem 
providas cada hum per si corre ja annos hum modo de falar em Japão de Padre Daimio e Padre 
Tanda,450 que he Padres fidalgos e comus. Os Italianos geralmente são os que se querem tratar 
fidalgamento no modo de comer, e vestir etc.a esta conta pareçe disse o Padre Celso 
[Confalonieri] Italiano que escrevera a Europa a N. P. que era bom mandar Padres Italianos 
letrados pera estar nas residentias graves, e Padres Portugueses casoistas pera correr as aldeas por 
serem robustos […]. Ha entre os Japois uma pratica que quem quierem agradar ao Padre 
Francesco Pasio lhe não diga mal de Padre Italiano porque o ouve com muita pena, e toda a 
maneira de queixume, e polo contrario os ouve con facilidade quando he contra algum Padre 
Portugues’.451 
During the second decade of the 17th century, however, the nascent rivalry between 
Portuguese and Italians was inhibited by the misgovernment of Valentim Carvalho. In 
this specific case, there is no uncertainty about how badly Carvalho carried out his 
duties, since we can rely upon the testimonies left also by those Portuguese Jesuits who 
joined in the common criticism of the Father Provincial.452 A line by Visitor Francisco 
                                                 
448 In 1607, Organtino wrote to Acquaviva that the Japanese mission needed neutral Fathers Superiors in 
order to smooth disunity between Jesuits of different nations. Therefore, he thought that assigning Pasio 
to the visitor post was the best solution also because he was ‘persona di buone parti, e molto 
experimentato nelle cose di Giapone’. Cf. Father Organtino to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 28 March 
1607. ARSI, Ibid., f. 279. 
449 Most likely, this is a reference to Valentim Carvalho.  
450 The two Japanese words are daimyō 大名 – literally “great name” but it is roughly the same as feudal 
lord – and tada 唯 – which can be translated with “commoner” or “usual”. 
451 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [II], f. 213. 
452 Afonso de Lucena, probably the harshest critic of Carvalho, wrote that ‘a todos os Padres de Japão assi 
portugueses como estrangeiros tem desgostado e descontentado e até ao seu proprio companheiro 
[Gabriel de Matos] com quem elle pretende estar bem e contentallo’. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [II], f. 279. The 
other critics were: Francisco Pires, Mateus de Couros, Gabriel de Matos, Jerónimo Rodrigues, Diogo de 
Mesquita, Francisco Calderón, Celso Confalonieri, Francisco Pacheco, Baltasar de Torres, João Mateus 
Adami, Geronimo de Angelis, Juan Baptista Baeza, Manuel Barreto, Camillo Costanzo, Francisco 
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Vieira well describes the mood in which the Portuguese were when had to write such 
critics:  
‘Algumas cousas escrevo a N. P. [Muzio Vitelleschi] acerca do procedimento do Padre 
Provincial Valentim Carvalho, as quaes escrevo de muito mâ vontade, porque são faltas, e faltas 
de homem Portugues, de que eu secundum hominem folgàra muito de poder com verdade, e 
fidelidade dizer bens, e louvores, mas escrevo assi por me parecer necessario, pera bem desta 
Provincia et ut sim fidelis.’.453 
Indeed, a large number of Portuguese fathers,454 as soon as they noticed that the new 
superior was not doing any better than Francesco Pasio, put up opposition against the 
provincial, which included pleas for his dismissal.455 It is worth underlining how the 
Portuguese fathers doubled back and assumed an objective point of view, which was by 
no mean obvious. Initially, they all sympathized with Carvalho. They all shared 
optimistic confidence in him and the reforms he would make. However, after only a few 
months of government the real features of the Portuguese came to light and the earlier 
optimism was smothered by a feeling of regret for the Italian visitor to the point that 
someone started to desire Pasio’s return in order to discipline the provincial. Afonso de 
Lucena, amongst others, admitted that at first he did not want Pasio to come back to 
Japan ‘por amor do Padre Valentim Carvalho e por da nação dos Portugueses’,456 but by 
1613 he regretted these words.  
The Portuguese were so unhappy about Francesco Pasio that it was quite 
difficult for them to withdraw from the first impression and admit that a countryman 
was doing worse than an Italian. This is a classic example of idealization of group 
impressions, a process which is considerably stronger when referred to an outgroup 
(them), but sociological research has pointed out that stereotypes are not absent in the 
perceptions of the ingroup (us), although they are less extreme and more complex than 
the perceptions of the outgroup. Hence, here we see an example of changing ingroup 
stereotypes, which took place because Carvalho engaged in behaviour recognized as 
                                                                                                                                               
Boldrino, João Baptista Porro, Manuel Dias, João Baptista Zola, João Rodrigues Girão, Carlo Spinola and 
Pedro Marques. Cf. Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão, pp. 388-393. 
453 See Visitor Francisco Vieira to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Macao, 14 October 1616. 
ARSI, Jap. Sin. 17, ff. 16-16v, 
454 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 [I], f. 274v: ‘O Padre Manoel Dias não concorda com o Padre Provincial e com elle 
se unem o Padre Matteus de Couros, o Padre Lucena, et en parte o Padre Francisco Pacheco.’  
455 Cf. Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão, pp. 619-620. 
456 See Father Afonso de Lucena to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Ōmura, 13 July 1613. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin. 15 [II], f. 279v.  
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counter to the stereotypes as perceived by the Portuguese fathers themselves.457 It has 
been documented that there are many kinds of collectives, amongst which our own 
country represents a very important one. Patriotism can be considered as a subcategory 
of this collectivism and yet it can be subdivided into chauvinism (extravagant 
glorification of own country) and constructive patriotism (working hard for the benefit 
of the country). Here, with the acrimony of the Portuguese being smoothed away, it 
seems to witness a shift from the former, which is often associated with tensions in 
intergroup relations, to the latter, which, on the contrary, may be helpful to intergroup 
relations.458 
 However, also from the Italian side arrived to Rome criticisms towards the 
Portuguese. Carlo Spinola, for instance, wrote more than one letter to Rome describing 
thoroughly how different Italians and Spaniards were from the Portuguese in front of 
the Japanese believers. Valignano himself was well aware of the problem. Before 
setting out for the Estado da Índia, in fact, the visitor had to deal with the method of 
government of Jesuits in Portugal, who – according to him – agreed that to rule with 
severity, not with love, was the true Ignatian spirit. 459  Valignano did not consider 
harshness as the better way to evangelize and he strengthened his view after he came to 
know deeply the Japanese people. He took the general idea on the religious behaviour 
from the Regulae Modestiae written by Loyola in 1555. Those rules aimed to define the 
composure of the Ignatians and to conciliate spontaneity with the religious dignity.460 In 
the Cerimoniale, Valignano dedicates two chapters to the behaviour the fathers were 
supposed to keep in order to familiarize with the Japanese.461 He resumed his thought 
declaring that his confrères had to understand that ‘ham de ter muita paciencia e 
longanimidade com os Christãos, e hão de gastar muito tempo agasalhando-os e 
tratando com eles, mostrando-lhes que folgão muyto de os conversar, tratando-os 
domestica e familiarmente e não com sequedade e como foresteiros’.462 It would seem 
                                                 
457 Cf. Rothbart, “Category Dynamics and the Modification of Outgroup Stereotypes”, pp. 48-49. Pires, 
for instance, described Cabral as a man who treated himself ‘fidalgamente’. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [II], f. 
234. 
458 Cf. Triandis and Trafimow, op. cit., p. 370. 
459 See VMP, I, pp. 72-73. 
460 Cf. Memorial de lo que Nuestro Padre me responde acerca de las cosas de Casa, començado à 26 de 
Henero del año de 1555 in Memoriale P. Ludovici Consalvii de Camara in Monumenta Ignatiana, Series 
IV, Scripta de S. Ignatio, Tomo I, pp. 153-336. 
461 Cf. Valignano, Il Cerimoniale per i Missionari del Giappone, Cap. 1º - Do modo que se há de ter pera 
aquirir e conservar autoridade tratando com os Jappoens, pp. 130-148 and Cap. 2º - Do modo que se há de 
ter pera fazer familiares os Christãos, pp. 158-170. 
462 Cf. Valignano, op. cit., p. 158. 
225 
 
that Spinola followed the path showed by the visitor, since he criticized the Portuguese 
because they ruled the Japanese ‘in virga ferrea conforme a su naturaleza un poco 
rispida, y altiva’.463 The virga ferrea, the iron rod opposed to Valignano’s spirito suave, 
is the symbol of government and jurisdiction in the Old Testament. It was in the hands 
of Moses who returned to Egypt with it and used it to bring the plague to the country. 
The iron rod of Moses is therefore the inflexibilis justitia.464 In the light of this, how 
intriguing it is to link the virga ferrea to the naivety of the earlier Father Lucena who 
used to believe that Valentim Carvalho, the first Provincial of Japan, was the one ‘quod 
esset redempturus Israel?’465 
 
*   *   * 
 Since the first chapter of the present work, we tried to establish a thread that 
could link at once Europe, Asia, the respective kingdoms and the Society of Jesus. This 
thread was supposed to unite these domains on a consequential basis: each event played 
a role in the one that followed. Hence, the union of the Iberian crowns led to several 
consequences in the other side of the globe, which concerned commercial routes, 
religious monopolies and human behaviours. Regarding the last one, we have seen how 
political contrasts – both historical and administrative – slipped in the bonds that linked 
together the fathers of the Society of Jesus. The sense of belonging to a country did 
actually create strong divisions between the Ignatians, whereas the sharing of offices 
fostered this discrimination. Indeed, it was the desire to rule that triggered such 
passions. 466  The Portuguese missionaries could not stand watching Spaniards and 
                                                 
463 Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 18 March 1612. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 154. 
464 The rods were actually two. Moses had one, whereas the other – hold by Aaron – represented the 
spiritual or priestly government and jurisdiction and was preserved in the tabernacle and in the Ark of the 
Covenant. The second rod stands for the potestas sacerdotalis. Cf. Ullmann, “A Medieval Document on 
Papal Theories of Government”, pp. 195-196. References to the iron rod are scattered throughout the 
Bible from the Old Testament (Psalms 2, 9: ‘Thou shalt rule them with a rod of iron, and shalt break them 
in pieces like a potter's vessel’.) to the very end of the New (Revelation 2, 27: ‘And he shall rule them 
with a rod of iron, and as the vessel of a potter they shall be broken’.). Justifications of the coercive way 
of government are also in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X, 10, 1180a, 5-22. 
465 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [II], f. 279. The Latin is a quotation of Luke 24, 21: ‘But we hoped, that it was he 
that should have redeemed Israel: and now besides all this, to day is the third day since these things were 
done’. 
466 Be it noted that the disunity created by early nationalism was not the only one to divide the group of 
Ignatians in Japan. There were also other topics, such as the formation of native clergy and the missionary 
theories, that divide the fathers. Yet, in those cases, the disunity was not as clear as in the nationalistic 
passions. Hence, fathers that were opposed for their ideas on the native clergy could support each other 
with regard to evangelization practices. 
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Italians occupy the ruling positions of the Society in territories that were theirs by rights 
of conquest. The Spaniards, on the other hand, felt a kind of obligation towards their 
country and the Spanish patronage, a matter that exacerbated the already biased 
Portuguese behaviour. Finally, the Italians were not able to soothe the disunity between 
their Iberian fellows and the assignment of offices to Italians in order to rule peacefully 
was not as successful as it was wished. As a matter of fact, as we will see in the next 
chapter it was not only the appointment of Pasio as visitor to provoke scorn and rancour 
among the Portuguese.  
To conclude this part, however, it is unavoidable to notice that this disunity was 
a self-defeating attitude for the mission. As the Italian Jesuit Eugenio Francesco pointed 
out, it is ‘una verità infallibile, que Omne regnum in se divisum desolabitur’. 467 
Francesco quoted a passage from the gospel of Matthew: ‘[e]very kingdom divided 
against itself shall be made desolate: and every city or house divided against itself shall 
not stand’.468 In fact, these disunities had probably a side effect on the evangelization of 
Japan. The Ignatians had always been preoccupied not to be compared to a Buddhism 
sect and in order to do so they tried to prevent the mendicant orders from coming to 
Japan. The Society of Jesus knew that if the Japanese Christians saw that there were 
divisions also within the Roman church, they would probably start to have douts about 
the truth of the Western creed. As we saw, eventually the Jesuits’ efforts to maintain the 
monopoly of the evangelization in Japan were thwarted. Yet, owing to the disunities we 
have just analyzed, we might say that the first and most dangerous enemy of the Jesuits 
was the Jesuits themselves, since they let secular passions got the better of the mission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
467 Eugenio Francesco to General Vitelleschi [SOLI], Nagasaki, 5 October 1617. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 17, f. 
95.  
468 Cf. Matthew 12, 25. 
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Sources: 1593 – TCJ, pp. 306-325; March 1601 – ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], ff. 65-65v; October 1601 – ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
14 [I], f. 83v; 1603 – TCJ, pp. 441-445; 1613 –TCJ, pp. 552-558; 1614 –TCJ, pp. 593-609. 
 
 
 
Sources: 1593 – TCJ, pp. 306-325; 1603 –TCJ, pp. 441-445; 1613 – TCJ, pp. 552-558; 1614 – TCJ, pp. 593-609. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CARLO SPINOLA PROCURATOR OF JAPAN. PHILOSOPHICAL 
IMPLICATIONS AND COMPARISONS WITH  
OTHER PROCURATORS IN JAPAN 
 
IV. 1.    The assignment of the post of procurator of Japan 
 The Jesuit historian Michael Cooper in his biography of João Rodrigues 
erroneously stated that owing to the removal of Tçuzu from Japan, Carlo Spinola was 
chosen to be his substitute.469 We will soon prove him wrong, but first it is important to 
stress out the significance of Cooper’s mistake. Although Cooper did not find the sources 
that could have enabled him to determine the succession of the procurators of Japan in the 
first quarter of the 17th century, it is true that through his biography he had established the 
importance of that specific office for the mission. Nonetheless, Cooper failed to clarify 
that when Rodrigues left Japan, he had already been exempted to deal with the specific 
responsibilities of the procurator. The sources, in fact, tell us that Rodrigues filled that 
post in Japan from 1598 to 1606, that is to say that it was due to his proximity to 
Hideyoshi that he had been appointed procurator, not the other way around. He remained 
in charge during the first year of the Tokugawa Bakufu, but evidently the obligations 
towards Ieyasu were too overwhelming and went beyond the simple negotiation of high-
quality textiles from China. In 1606, in fact, Rodrigues was forced to resign as procurator 
and went to stay permanently in Honshū, probably moving between Miyako and Suruga. 
 In the catalogue of 1607, in fact, he is registered as: ‘Padre João Rodriguez que 
corre com a Corte’.470 Father Antonio Francisco Critana in 1606 called the Portuguese ‘el 
Padre Procurador General’,471 which makes us think that Francesco Pasio felt compelled 
to create this position ex novo around João Rodrigues and his appointments with the 
Japanese tyrants.  
                                                 
469 Cf. Cooper, Rodrigues, O Intérprete, p. 275. 
470 See BL/Add. 9860, f. 118. 
471 See Father Critana to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 10 March 1606. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 35, f. 147. 
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 Rodrigues filled the post of procurator also after having left Japan. Between 1623 
and 1627, in fact, he served the Japanese province as procurator but from the Chinese 
extremity. As it is known, Tçuzu embarked for the Estado da Índia in 1575, when he was 
only fourteen years old. He was a self-made man, who arrived in Japan during his youth 
and was admitted to the Society there in 1580, which, as we saw, was a circumstance that 
led to the discrimination of other fathers due to the fact that those who were admitted 
outside Europe did not have the same intellectual preparation as those who followed the 
basic curriculum studiorum in the European colleges. Rodrigues, however, made great 
use of the experience he gained in the field and became a key figure in the mission also 
thanks to his outstanding knowledge of the Japanese language. As early as 1591, in fact, 
we find his traces in Hideyoshi’s court and five years later he was ordained to the 
priesthood at Macao. When he was first appointed procurator in 1598, Rodrigues had not 
yet made his final profession. He was granted this honour on 4 June 1601472 by Valignano 
along with six fathers,473 ‘todos hombres de mas de 20 anos dela Compañía, virtuosos e 
letrados y que merecian bien este grado y todos mui buenas lenguas de Japon’.474 As 
correctly pointed out by Michael Cooper, in a normal situation Rodrigues would not have 
been granted the fourth vow.475 In fact, we saw that Afonso de Lucena and Diogo da 
Mesquita’s professions were rejected by General Acquaviva because they did not finish 
the four-year course of theology. According to Carlo Spinola, however, Rodrigues ‘fù 
fatto professo solo per essere insigne nella lengua Giapponica, et era interprete dei 
portughesi con l’Imperatore, trattando tutti i negotij della nave’.476 Spinola was being 
clearly polemic against a confrère who received the highest degree in the Society’s 
hierarchy only thanks to matters external to the religious domain. Commonly, in fact, the 
solemn profession was bestowed only on the most deserving fathers, in particular on those 
with intellectual gifts and high educational level, which, was not Rodrigues’s case. 
Similarly to Spinola, Cooper pointed out that within the Society of Jesus proficiency in 
                                                 
472 Original text in ARSI, Lus.3, f. 24. 
473 The Portuguese Francisco Rodrigues, the Spanish Garcias Garces, Pedro de la Cruz, Baltazar de Torres 
and Pedro Morejón and the Italian Pedro Paulo. 
474 See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 24 October 1601. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 
83v. 
475 Cf. Cooper, op. cit., p. 202. 
476 See Procurator Carlo Spinola to Father Bernardino Rossignoli, Nagasaki, 25 May 1612. ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 36, f. 156v. 
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foreign languages was considered a qualification for the final profession and in a country 
with such a complicated language this qualification was even more important.477 
 Furthermore, Cooper noted also that in the 1600s the main offices of the mission 
were held by Spaniards or Italians. Thus, he inferred that the lack of Portuguese influence 
in the management of the mission could be another reason for admitting Rodrigues to the 
final vow, because professed fathers were allowed to take part in the congregations.478 In 
the Constitutions, however, it is stated clearly that the procurators were allowed to 
participate in the congregations beside professed fathers, hence even if they were not 
professed of the fourth vow.479 In our opinion, it was in particular the role Rodrigues 
played within the Japanese court that led Valignano to propose Rodrigues’s profession. It 
is possible that Valignano felt compelled to rise Rodrigues in status in order to confer 
more authority to the Portuguese. This decision, in fact, worked in two ways: on the one 
hand, Rodrigues assumed an official role of preponderance within the mission; on the 
other this enhanced status of him might have had a positive influence also on the 
Japanese, who, as Valignano knew well, attached great importance to hierarchical status. 
 Without detracting the relevance of the reasons that led to Rodrigues’s profession, 
it is important also to stress the reasons why he could not have made his profession. The 
aforementioned brief quote by Spinola is part of a wider consideration of the Italian about 
the office of procurator. Namely, he referred to Rodrigues’s appointment as the first 
occasion in which a professed father was selected to fill that position. It was common 
within the Society, in fact, that the procurator was either a Brother or an external assistant. 
We already saw that in the Constitutions Loyola set that as far as possible the Ignatians 
should avoid mingling in secular matters, ‘no admitiendo tales cargos ni se ocupando en 
ellos por ruegos algunos’. However, he conceded that ‘si los hubiere de Colegios, ellos 
tengan Procurador que los trate y defienda su derecho. Si de las Casas de la Compañía, ó 
de todo el cuerpo della, para que pueda guardar ella su paz, el mesmo Procurador, ó algun 
otro Coadjutor, ó alguna persona de fuera de la Compañía, ó alguna familia, que tomase la 
                                                 
477 Cf. Cooper, op. cit., pp. 202-203. Similarly to the Japan mission, the Fathers of the Mexican Province 
in 1583 received an order from the general stating that ‘no se ordenem de Sacerdotes los nuestros sin 
saber alguna lengua delos naturales, ni se promuevan a mas altos estudios, scilicet ni los philosophos à la 
Theologia, ni los latinos ala philosophia, y aia maestros de lla’. Cf. BNCR/FGes. 1255, f. 32v. 
478 Ibid. 
479 Cf. Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Latinæ Et Hispanicæ Cum Earum Declarationibus, Eighth Part – 
Chapter III, Quiénes se han de congregar, p. 239. Cf. Faria, “The Functions of Procurator in the Society 
of Jesus. Luís de Almeida, Procurator?”, p. 32. 
232 
 
proteccion de la Casa, podría defender el derecho de la Compañía, á mayor gloria 
divina’.480 Thus, Loyola not only limited as much as possible Jesuits’ interference with 
secular matters, but, having recognized the factual impossibility to avoid such 
occupations, he ruled that at least professed fathers were dispensed from the office of 
procurator. As is obvious, however, between a written rule and its implementation there 
were the historical juncture and the actual conditions of each missions. In this respect, in 
1594 the Procurator of the Brazil Province, Father Ludovico da Fonseca, sent an 
interesting questionnaire on different topics to Acquaviva. When answering the question 
whether professed fathers should be given the office of procurator, the general 
categorically replied that ‘nec collegiorum, nec domorum probationis possunt ullo modo 
esse procuratores, et si qui sunt, amoveantur’.481 Japan and Brazil represent two different 
situations within the scope of the Society’s overseas missions, yet in both cases the office 
of procurator was commonly bestowed neither to laymen nor to Brothers. On the other 
hand, if we take a look to the Province of the Philippines, we see that in that case the post 
of procurator was commonly entrusted to hermanos, as happened between 1599 and 1602 
with Brother Lorenço Rodriguez,482 in 1607 with Brother Francisco Nieto483 and in 1620 
with Brother Sebastian Bertarelo.484 With all evidence, then, the matters with which the 
procurators had to deal in Japan or in Brazil turned out to be fundamental for the survival 
or the prosperity of the missions and therefore only reliable and distinguished fathers 
could be assigned to that post. Even so, Alessandro Valignano needed to keep up the 
appearances and therefore instructed that the procurator ‘nas compras e vendas que faz 
não haja nenhuma ocazião de escandalo, as não farà por sy mesmo, mas terà algumas 
pessoas fieis a sufficientes que fazem digo devotas nossas pellas quaes faça as compras e 
vendas que se houvem de fazer’.485 
 Back to Japan, by 1606 João Rodrigues Tçuzu had made another step within the 
ranks of the Society and was appointed ‘Procurador general’. In the Society of Jesus, 
the procurator general was appointed directly by the general and resided in Rome. He 
                                                 
480 See Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Latinæ Et Hispanicæ Cum Earum Declarationibus, Sixth Part – 
Cap. III, De las cosas, en que deben ocuparse, y en que no, los de la Compañía, p. 199. 
481 See Responsiones ad proposita a Patre Ludovico da Fonseca, procuratore Brasilia anno 1594, ARSI, 
Bras. 2, ff. 85-86. Basically the same is stated in the Epitome Instituti Societatis Iesu, Cap. IV, Sec. V – 
De Procuratore, p. 647: ‘Professi tamen quatuor Votorum ordinarie eo non fungantur’. 
482 See AGI, Contaduria 1205, f. 86. 
483 See AGI, Contaduria 1208, f. 26. 
484 See AGI, Contaduria 1210, ff. 341-341v. 
485 See RPJ, f. 37. 
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was the chief magistrate of the Society and represented its interests in the Papal Curia. 
He was supposed to be a prudent, faithful and well-mannered person, but not a 
professed member of the faith.486 It is difficult to ascertain whether Critana was just 
making use of a personal expression or he consciously called Rodrigues general 
procurator having in mind the taxonomy of the Society of Jesus. At any rate, the way 
the office of procurator had been carried out by Rodrigues is without parallel in the 
history of the Japan mission of the Society of Jesus. Nobody before or after him played 
such a decisive role and represented such an asset for the Jesuits in Japan. Yet, it was 
exactly for this that he was expelled.  
 When Rodrigues started to reside at Ieyasu’s court, the office of procurator was 
assigned to João Coelho.487 The Portuguese, however, remained in charge not even for 
three years. In 1608, in fact, took place an exchange of procurators between Macao and 
Nagasaki and thus Father Sebastião Vieira488 went to Nagasaki, whereas Coelho moved 
to Macao. According to Carlo Spinola, Vieira was transferred to Nagasaki owing to his 
bad behaviour towards the Macanese, who begged the missionaries to send him 
away.489 This change, however, proved to be advantageous neither for João Coelho nor 
for Sebastião Vieira. Probably as early as 1610, in fact, Coelho got ill and died because 
of the disease on 27 January 1611. The seriousness of the illness must have been clear 
right away, since a request to dismiss Coelho was sent to Pasio with the first ship 
available for Japan. The Italian soon sent for Spinola, who, as we know, in 1611 was at 
Miyako. It would seem that Pasio selected Spinola for two reasons: first, Spinola had 
already filled the post of procurator at Macao before and second because Spinola’s 
respected presence was needed also to help curtail the discontent the Macanese had 
been feeling towards the Ignatians since the Nossa Senhora da Graça incident. The 
Italian Jesuit, however, was not willing to return to Macao, for he abhorred in particular 
                                                 
486 Cf. Faria, op. cit., pp. 32-33. 
487 The Portuguese João Coelho (c. 1575-1612) turned Jesuit in 1593 and set off for the Indies in 1597. 
After a period in Goa, he passed to Macao in the early 1600s and thence to Japan. He first went to Arima 
and subsequently to Nagasaki to fill the post of procurator. Then, he went back to Macao in 1608 where 
he eventually died in January 1612, after a long-term illness while in charge of the post of procurator 
there. Cf. Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão, p. 767. 
488 Born in Portugal, Sebastião Vieira (1574-634) entered the Society of Jesus in February 1591. He sailed 
for the Indies in 1602 and in 1604 he was already in Japan. In 1606, however, was called back to Macao 
where he was appointed procurator of Japan. He came back to Nagasaki three years later and made his 
solemn profession in 1611, soon after he was dismissed as procurator. He stayed in Japan during the 
persecution, but in 1619 he was again in Macao. Afterwards, he was sent to Europe, where he remained 
between 1626 and 1629. He sailed again for the Indies in that year and in 1632 he arrived in Japan having 
sailed from Manila. He was caught by the bakufu and executed in 1634. Cf. Costa, op. cit., p. 812. 
489 See Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 18 March 1612. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 154. 
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the idea of being once more appointed procurator. Furthermore, he believed that 
Macao’s damp climate was bad for his health. 490  Apparently, these motives were 
enough for Father Francisco Pires. The Portuguese Jesuit, in fact, complained with 
António Mascarenhas in Rome that as soon as Spinola knew that he was chosen to 
substitute Coelho he accused the Portuguese fathers to plot against him in order to send 
him out of Japan, which according to Pires was enough to make Pasio change his mind 
as the order of sending him to Macao was revoked.491  
These words by Pires are in the same letter we quoted before, the one where he 
wrote about ‘Padre Daimio e Padre Tanda’. As discussed above, it is a letter strewed 
with criticism towards the Italian fellows, hence there might be a bit of an exaggeration 
in it. Be that as it may, Spinola could not avoid the duties of procurator much longer. In 
effect, also the procurator at Nagasaki, Sebastião Vieira, was about to be dismissed for 
he was ‘prejudiçial para a união, tinha condição insofrivel pera os de dentro e para os de 
fora, e alem disto o officio o consumia na saude corporal’, as declared Francesco 
Pasio.492  
The visitor considered the office of procurator as the second most important 
within the Province of Japan, owing to the fact that each missionary depended on him, 
more precisely on the provisions issued by the procuradoria. That is why – he stated – 
it was deemed necessary to choose the candidate amidst fathers blessed with the best 
qualities.493 Accordingly, in explaining the reasons why he was chosen to be procurator, 
Spinola wrote that for the province’s sake it was advisable to have next to the provincial 
‘alcuno, che tenesse esperientia de la Corte, et essendo italiano, nelle consulte 
temperasse gli humori di natione, et come procuratore soccorresse à tutti 
egualmente’.494 As discussed above, however, bestowing on Italian fathers important 
offices for the mission was the reason why the Portuguese, like the aforementioned 
                                                 
490 ARSI, Jap. Sin- 21 [II], ff. 227-227v. 
491 See Father Pires to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 10 March 1612. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
15 [II], f. 213.  
492 See Visitor Pasio to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 15 March 1612. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [I], f. 139. 
Also Carlo Spinola spent a few words on Sebastião Vieira. Namely, he described the Portuguese as a 
Jesuit ‘del qual no hay satisfacion en la provincia, mas antes es tenido por hombre muy colerico, y altivo 
assi con los de casa, come de fuera, tratando a todos con palabras asperas, y no nada religiosas’. See 
ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 154. 
493 Ibid.: ‘he esse officio em Japão de muita importancia de modo que o Procurador he a segunda pessoa 
da Provincia e todos dependem delle por todas as cosas se proverem desta Procuradoria e por isto he 
necessario que o Procurador seja pessoa de muitas partes’. 
494 See Procurator Spinola to Father Bernardino Rossignoli, Nagasaki, 25 May 1612. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, 
f. 156. 
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Francisco Pires, started to complain against Pasio and the Italians as a group. In effect, 
in another letter of him, Spinola coped again with this topic. In this case, he wrote that 
the Portuguese fathers ‘no quieren que se hagan superiores se no de los suyos, y quieren 
los mejores puestos, y mas honrosas missiones’.495 Despite his criticism, Spinola was 
conscious of the disproportion in the assignments of offices between fathers from 
different countries. In 1613, in fact, he wrote that ‘não ha duvida que pera estarmos todo 
em paz, e mais contentes, milhor he ser o superior portugues’.496 He resented, however, 
the decisional influence the Portuguese Jesuits exerted over the mission in Japan. In a 
letter to an Italian friend of him, Father Bernardino Rossignoli, Spinola accused the 
Portuguese to have plotted against him and had him removed from Miyako suspecting 
that Spinola aimed to become rector after Morejón.497  
Be that the truth or not, as a consequence of Spinola’s coming to Nagasaki, 
Sebastião Vieira took his place in the imperial city. However, before reaching Honshū, 
Pasio admitted Vieira to the final profession, to the great chagrin of Spinola, who wrote 
that ‘promover a grado quien es perturbador de la union, no sirve de mas, se no de darle 
fuerças para hazer mas mal que primero’.498 As we saw earlier, João Rodrigues was the 
first professed father to fill the post of procurator in Japan, although he made his 
profession when he was already procurator. In the same year of Rodrigues’s profession, 
Alessandro Valignano asked Acquaviva for permission to nominate professed father as 
procurators. More specifically, the visitor needed the consent to appoint Carlo Spinola 
to the Macao’s procuratorship. Evidently, Valignano sent different demands both from 
Nagasaki and from Macao, since in 1606 the general wrote him the following: 
‘Acerca dos procuradores de Macao e China, para que V. R. pede licença, que possão fazer 
este officio Professos de quatro votos polla importancia, e autoridade que mister tenhão os 
que nestas partes hão de executar este cargo. Já V. R. tera entendido nossa mente e conceito 
da resposta que lhe demos, quando os annos passados nos pedio a mesma licença para poder 
ser em Macao procurador o Padre Carlos Spinola, porque como então dissemos e V. R. muito 
bem sabe de nossas Constituições, claramente se collige que  o intento de Nosso B. Padre não 
he que se occupem os professos em semelhantes officios que concernem ao temporal, mas em 
nossos ministerios e bem das almas. Nem com dizer que ahi não ha demandas se satisfaz a 
                                                 
495 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 154. 
496 See Procurator Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 5 October 1613. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin. 36, f. 161v. 
497 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 156v. 
498 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 154. 
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este ponto, porque em fim sua occupação principal he attender ao temporal que he fora de seu 
estado, e não diz com a intenção de N. B. fundador. Porem, considerado a falta que la ha do 
sojeitos para este officio, permittimos que os procuradores que agora o fazem possão 
continuar ate V. R. achar pessoas que lhe possão socceder nessas procuratoras’.499 
Even though Acquaviva at first tried to compel his friend Valignano to remain true to 
the fundamental document of the Society, eventually he had to give his consent, despite 
his reluctance. We may think that notwithstanding Acquaviva’s answer to his demand, 
Valignano would have acted exactly as he did, since he did not wait for the answer to 
come and Spinola was appointed procurator in Macao between March and April 1601. 
Both in Macao and in Nagasaki, however, in the last resort Spinola’s 
appointment was decided by Father Valentim Carvalho. Also in 1611, in fact, it was the 
provincial who deemed Spinola worthy of the assignment and only afterwards Pasio 
bestowed the office on him. The visitor explained that Spinola was chosen because he 
could also be a valid help for Carvalho during the consultations and other offices due to 
his experience gained up in Miyako.500  
In addition to those stated by Pasio, moreover, there is also another reason why 
Spinola had been picked up twice to be procurator. According to the Epitome Instituti 
Societatis Iesu, those appointed procurators ‘priusquam officio fungi incipient, ab 
aliquot Oeconomiæ bene perìto instruantur; rudimenta Arithmeticæ condiscant, & quo 
pacto libri rationum tenendi’. 501  Dealing with economic matters, then, required the 
procurators to have at least a basic knowledge of mathematics, otherwise someone had 
to teach them. As we know, Spinola taught mathematics in Milan and he was the 
draughtsman of the project of São Paulo’s Church in Macao, therefore, if we exclude 
the fact that he was a professed of the fourth vow, he was the most suitable choice for 
the office nonetheless. 
 All those motives, however, meant a little for the Italian Jesuit, since he had to 
leave Miyako and the Christendom of central Japan much to his regret. We saw that in 
the capital he had been executing duties that required an uncommon scientific 
knowledge. Most likely, he was also involved in the artistic and architectural activities 
                                                 
499 Cf. General Claudio Acquaviva to Visitor Alessandro Valignano, Rome, 12 December 1606. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin.3, f. 48. 
500 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [I], f. 139:‘[...] serà de boa ajuda pera o Padre Provincial nas Consultas e mais 
negoçios por ser pessoa recta e polla experiencia que tem das partes do Cami’. 
501 See Epitome Instituti Societatis Iesu, p. 647. 
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of the Society, but by the end of 1611 he was called to Nagasaki ‘per occuparmi in 
officio, che qualsivoglia lo può fare’.502 Spinola filled the office from 1611 until his 
capture in December 1618. During these eight years he sent several letters first to 
Acquaviva and then to Vitelleschi begging to be dismissed. He started to complain 
about his appointment as soon as he received the charge. In 1612, in fact, he wrote that 
he opposed against the appointment adding ‘la grande repugnantia che sentiva à tal 
officio, per haverlo provato in Macâo molto distrattivo, ma non fui udito, et resto molto 
desconsolato, per vedere nel miglor tempo interrotto il corso delle mie occupationi [...]; 
che se ciò havesse potuto sospettare, che nel Giappone haveva d’essere procuratore, mi 
pare che non procurava di venirci’.503 Spinola justified his opposition (repugnantia) 
with words we should expect from a man of the cloth, in particular having in mind the 
words written by Acquaviva about assigning the post of procurator to a professed father: 
‘[S]i questo officio fusse come gl’altri d’Europa, saria più soffribile, ma qui il procuratore è 
universale, et particulare, poiche tutte le case, et persone provede, et riparte insino alle 
minutissime cose, che sono necessarie, si in casa, come ne i continuoi viaggi per mare; et oltre 
a questo comprare, et vendere, procurando di guadagnare, et acrescere il capitale, come si 
fosse qualche mercadante’.504 
The concept was stressed also by João Rodrigues in his memorandum for the procurator 
of Japan, when he wrote that ‘o officio de Procurador de Japão por ser hum puro 
negociador, he muito differente do das outras Provincias: tem muita necessidade de 
differente talento, differentes ordens, differente meneyo sob pena de padecer sempre 
muito esta Provincia que tanto depende do temporal’.505 With regard to the procurator in 
Portuguese colleges, we have an interesting document of the early 17th century entitled 
Varias Lembranças Pera hum Procurador,506 a notebook which discloses that the Évora 
procurator had to keep track of prevailing wage rates for all types of both skilled and 
unskilled workers that the college and its supporting estates required, as well as the 
                                                 
502 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 156v. 
503 Ivi, ff. 156-156v. 
504 Ibid. João Rodrigues Tçuzu corroborated Spinola’s words in a letter he wrote to Vitelleschi in 1624, 
the first year of his procuratorship in Macao. Namely, the Portuguese wrote that the procurator of Japan 
‘he officio diferente dos procuradores ordinario das Provincias, e ainda dos Collegios, por muitas 
particularidades que tem, que ao longe se não entendem bem quanto ao longe, se apontão cazos 
particulares, que são outra couza do que são’. Cf. Procurator Rodrigues to General Vitelleschi, Macao, 28 
January 1624. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-6, f. 153. The letter is published in Penalva and Rodrigues, Fontes Para 
a História de Macau no séc. XVII, p. 355-361. Another via of Rodrigues’s letter, although written on 25 
January, in RAH/Jes. Legajo 21 9/7236 (I), ff. 591-592v. 
505 Cf. Couzas que podem servir para os Procuradores. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-8, f. 635. 
506 In BNP/FG 4254, ff. 1-138v. 
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costs of all sorts of commodities (such as provisions, earthenware, pewter, paper, cloth 
and tanned leather) used by the college. The Évora procurator also needed to know the 
dates of the fourteen annual fairs in his region, the rising and setting of the sun 
according to the seasons, how to make conversions from Portuguese currencies to 
Castilian ones and so on. 507  Another important thing about this notebook is the 
importance attached to the yearly payments due by the provinces belonging to the 
Portuguese Assistancy both in the kingdom and overseas. Regarding our work, it is 
worth to report the paragraph about the papal pension issued in Madrid, with which the 
notebook ends: 
Dinheiro que a colectaria de Espanha paga ao Japão cadano 
Paga cadano para os seminarios e Igrejas de 
Japão 
Escudos 
 
quatro mil escudos de ouro em ouro como 
disem as bullas 4U000 
Estes quatro mil escudos de ouro se pagan 
a dose reales e meio por escudos que fazem 
soma ao todo de 50U000 reales  
50U000 reales 
Estes 50U000 reales fazem no dinheiro 
Portugues a 40 réis por real 
Dous contos 
2000U000 
Estes dous contos fazem crusados 
Portugueses a rezão de 400 réis por 
cada crusado 
Sinco mil cruzados 
5U000 
Estes mesmos 50U000 reales feitos 
em moeda castellana fazem maravedis508 
1700U000 maravedis 
Hum esta a setecentos maravedis 
1700U000 
E em ducados castelhanos a rezão 
de 374 maravedis por ducado 4U545 
e 170 maravedis 
 
 
4U545 E170 
   Source: BNP/FG 4254, f. 138. 
Unfortunately, a similar document for the Japan mission does not survive. When 
Spinola was captured by the Nagasaki Bugyō Hasegawa Gonroku all the documents, 
books and objects kept in the procuratoria, i.e. the premises where the procurator used 
to carry out his duty, were confiscated and subsequently burned publicly.509 Thus, we 
are not able to make a detailed comparison between the methodologies of the office in 
Portugal and Japan. Still, the main occupations of a procurator were everywhere the 
same: ‘1. Vt bona, ac jura Collegii conserventur. 2. Vt reditus non descrescant, sed 
potius augeantur. 3. Vt quæ Collegio debentur, summa diligentia exigantur; & omnia 
necessaria opportunem comparentur. 4 Vt res, & pecuniæ rectem dispensentur. 5. Vt 
                                                 
507 Cf. Alden, op. cit., p. 310. 
508 Maravedis or Morabetis was the most common currency in Castile. 
509 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 37, f. 237v. 
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dati, & accepti ratio semper constare possit’.510 With regard to the second point, the 
collector of the Epitome added that the college should have good farmers, that the 
buildings should be built following the advices of an expert and according to the custom 
of the country. Yet, he concluded declaring that ‘quæ speciem habent secularis 
negotiationis, sciat Nostris esse prohibita’.511  
Before entering into the details of Spinola’s procuratorship, we have to see upon 
what philosophical basis Father Carlo Spinola, as well as other Fathers who had 
experience with that office,512 founded their repugnantia towards the procuratorship. In 
other words, we are going to deal with the problematic relationship that linked almost 
indissolubly the Roman Church and economy and finally disclose why, according to 
Rome, men of the cloth ‘cannot serve God and mammon’.513  
 
 IV. 2.    Some considerations on Christian philosophy and negotia illicita 
 The first quarter of the 17th century witnessed a feverish legislative activity in 
Madrid and Rome with regard to the Japan Jesuits and their share in the armação. In 
1607, Filipe II doubled in value the royal pension of 2’000 cruzados in order for the 
Ignatians to stop their participation in the silk trade and granted them also half the 
proceeds of a Japan voyage. Accordingly, in January of the next year, he issued an 
alvará prohibiting all the missionaries in the Estado da Índia to take part in any trade 
whatsoever, an order that he reissued in February 1610. In July 1611, however, the king 
backtracked on this prohibition. He canceled the 1607 raise and allowed the Ignatians to 
keep on investing the annual pension of 2’000 cruzados and the papal subvention in 
picols of silk. With regard to half of the profits of a voyage, he put off his decision until 
further notice.514 As a consequence of this enactment, on 8 November 1611 General 
                                                 
510 See Epitome Instituti Societatis Iesu, p. 648. 
511 Ivi, p. 649. 
512 In 1618, for instance, Manoel Borges wrote to General Vitelleschi to make some modification with 
regard to the procurators’ obligation ‘pera que as almas [of the future procurators] não se embaraçem e os 
nossos não repugnem tal officio, pois não há quem nelle queira estar’. See Procurator Borges to General 
Vitelleschi, Macao, 20 November 1618. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 34, f. 146. 
513 Matthew 6:24. 
514 Cf. Alvarà del Rey Sobre a meia viagem suspendida por então, com dous mil cruzados de renda, que 
se tinhão concedidos, e se concede continuar com o emprego ordinario, Lisbon, 1 July 1611. BA/JÁ, 
Cód. 49-V-5, ff. 126v-127 and Alvarà de El Rey sobre a mesma viagem suspendida por então com dous 
mil cruzados de renda que se tinhão concedidos, e se concede continuando com o emprego ordinario, 
Lisbon, 6 February 1612. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7, ff- 47-49. Eventually, in 1613, Filipe granted those profits 
to the Society in order to extinguish their debts. The other half was used to fortify Malaka. Cf. Alvará 
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Acquaviva sent a formal prohibition for all the missionaries ‘in Provinciis Goana, 
Malabarica et Japonensi […] ut ab omni mercatura, et negotiation abstineant per se, vel 
per alium exercenda tam ad proprium Societatis, quam ad externorum 
emolumentum’.515 Acquaviva, however, specified that the Japan Jesuits involved in the 
silk trade were exempted from this order, but they were the only exception.516  
 In the late 16th century, however, the situation was definitely different. In 1596, 
in fact, Fray Martin de la Ascensión, one of the Franciscans crucified in Nagasaki, 
published a treatise in which he criticized the evangelization process carried out by the 
Society in Japan.517 This treatise spawned a sequel in 1615, when another Friar Minor, 
Fray Sebastião de São Pedro, signed his own anti-Jesuit essay in the wake of 
Tokugawa’s expulsion of all the missionaries from Japanese soil, blaming the 
missionaries of the Society of Jesus and their behaviour for the intolerant policy of the 
bakufu.518 The Ignatians obviously prepared responses for both treatises and quickly 
sent them to Rome. The first reply is the famous Apologia Valignano wrote in 1598,519 
while the second one was signed by Valentim Carvalho in May 1617.520 
This dispute is important because include two coexistent yet not contemporary 
Weltanshauungs. The Franciscans, in fact, relied on a system of thought strictly 
belonging to the medieval mentality, whereas the Jesuits’ responses drew on a newer 
mentality, more pragmatic and eager to compromises, born out of Renaissance and 
Humanism. Besides, through this dispute we are allowed to study the predominant 
conceptions about several fields, such as missionary methodology, international politics 
and the field we are interested in here: how the clergy was supposed to behave in 
relation to money and trade.  
                                                                                                                                               
sobre a Viagem da China que V. Magestade tem concedido aos Rellegiosos [sic] da Companhia de 
Jappão e forteficação de Malaqua para V. Magestade ver, Lisbon, 28 September 1613. ANTT/CJ Maço 
86, ff. 1-2v. 
515 See BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-56, f. 195. 
516 Cf. Ruiz-de-Medina, “«El Trato de la Seda» en Japón y los Jesuitas”, p. 315. 
517 See Tratado que os religiosos de S. Francisco espalharam em Goa em Baçaim no ano de 1598 contra 
os Padres da Companhia de Jesus que andam na conversão de Japão, Macao, 16 November 1597. 
BL/Add. 9858, ff. 61-80 and ARSI, Jap. Sin. 40. Cf. Correia, “A Apologia de Valignano e a Defesa do 
Padroado e dos Direitos da Coroa Portuguesa na Ásia Oriental”, pp. 171-172. 
518 Recopilação das causas, porque o Imperador de Japão desterrou de seus Reinos todos os Padres. Cf. 
Carvalho, Apologia do Japão, pp. 23-24. 
519 See Apologia en la qual se responde a diversas calumnias q se escrivieran contra los PP. da la 
Compañia de Japon, y de la China. Autor el Padre Alexandre Vilignano [sic] Visitador de la misma 
Compañía, in BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-58.  
520 See Apologia e resposta feita pelo Padre Valentim Carvalho da Companhia de Jesus, Provincial nesta 
Província de Japão e China […], BL/Add. 9856, ff. 1-114.  
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The Friars Minors, obviously, attacked the Society with regard to their 
participation in the armação contract, since they considered trading as something which 
went directly against the vows of poverty and, theologically speaking, it was considered 
unfit for a religious order to get involved in such practices. In addition to this point, 
which was shared also by the crown, they accused the Society of Jesus not only of 
breaking the vow, but also to be guilty of the sin of greed (avaritia) – one of the deadly 
sins – for the accumulation of huge amount of wealth and money. We have already 
discussed the expenditures of the Japan Jesuits in the silk trade and we have also 
ascertained the profits. Hence, we will not enter into details about this topic, yet we are 
going to look deeper into the mentality that generated them and in the one which 
refused them. 
 
IV. 2. 1.    Quod pro charitate introductum est, non debit contra charitatem 
militare  
The relationship with the economic world is a matter the Roman church had 
been dealing with since its early days. In the Bible, in the New Testament in 
particular,521 the church found a solid basis to criticize, condemn and correct wrong 
behaviours related to financial operations and the economy in general.522 The debate 
about money and enrichment started to become more pregnant when, from the 11th up to 
the 13th century, the poverty of Jesus Christ assumed a concrete social value.523 During 
this period, the European society used to consider the renunciation to a wealthy life as 
the prototype of Christian, hence civic, perfection.524  
                                                 
521 In addition to the already quoted Matthew 6:24, see Luke 12:15: ‘And he said to them: take heed and 
beware of all covetousness: for a man’s life doth not consist in the abundance of things which he 
possesseth’, or John 2:15-16: ‘And when he had made, as it were, a scourge of little cords, he drove them 
all out of the temple, the sheep also and the oxen: and the money of the changers he poured out, and the 
tables he overthrew. And to them that sold doves he said: Take these things hence, and make not the 
house of my father a house of traffic’.  
522 See Le Goff, Lo sterco del diavolo. Il denaro nel Medioevo, pp. XI-XIII. 
523 The definition of the poverty as virtue is ascribed to Bernard of Clairvaux, (1090–1153), a French 
abbot of the Cistercian Order, who considered exemplary those who experienced inner poverty in the first 
place and distance themselves to the enrichment of the Church. With the Franciscan Order, this 
conception of poverty was brought to a different level: if Bernard professed indifference to wealth and 
wellbeing, Francis understood poverty as detachment from economic goods, in order to control them 
through the understanding of their relative utility. Cf. Todeschini, I mercanti e il Tempio, pp. 107-109. 
524 Just like Jesus exchanged his transcendental being for a mortal body in order to donate the salvation of 
humanity, the spontaneous choice of a life of privation was considered as the way through which wealthy 
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The presence of money (pecunia) in theological literature is due mostly to the 
foundations of new religious orders – the Preachers and the Minors – that worked 
separately from the Episcopal control and were forced to match their own rule with the 
economic and social conditions of 13th-century Europe, where money had already began 
to circulate widely. The rule of the Franciscan Order, for instance, required two papal 
interventions before the final confirmation was submitted owing to the difficulty in 
applying the matter discussed in the fourth chapter – “That the brothers should not 
accept money”.525 Only in 1226, in fact, the pontiff promulgated the bull Ex parte 
vestra – addressed to both the Franciscans and the Dominicans – with which he relaxed 
the prohibition about pecunia, provided that the possession of money remained confined 
to small quantities and was due to honest necessity.526 Thus, also in the very rule of the 
Franciscan Order, beside the distinction between necessary and superfluous, it is 
detectable an instinct to adaptation, both for the rules and for the men.527  
The other side of the economic debate was represented by the definition and the 
integration of the merchant and the commercial exchanges within the ecclesiastical 
canons. Along with the foundations of religious orders, in fact, took place another 
development that took the debate about money to a deeper level: the increasing 
intellectual activities of the European universities, where discussions about the 
problems of a Christian way of life included the role played in it by money and 
economic exchanges.528  
The reason why these two events took place only after the 11th century is 
fundamentally sociological. During the Early Middle Ages, in fact, the European 
                                                                                                                                               
people could come into contact with poor and indigent people. Cf. Todeschini, Ricchezza francescana. 
Dalla povertà volontaria alla società di mercato, pp. 25-28. 
525 Cf. Esser, Gli Scritti di S. Francesco D’Assisi: nova edizione critica e versione italiana, Chapter IV - 
That the brothers should not accept money, pp. 462-469: ‘I firmly command all the friars that in no 
manner are they to receive coins or money (denarius vel pecuniam) through themselves or through an 
interposed person. However for the necessities of the infirm and for the clothing of the other friars, the 
ministers and even the custodes are to conduct a solicitous care, by means of spiritual friends, according 
to places and seasons and cold regions, as they see expedites necessity; with this always preserved, that, 
as has been said, they receive neither coins nor money’. 
526 Cf. Lambertini, “Pecunia, possessio, proprietas alle origini di Minori e Predicatori: osservazioni sul 
filo della terminologia”, p. 20. 
527 This point was stressed in particular by the Franciscan theologian Pierer de Jean Olieu (1248-1298), 
who wrote that if poverty was adopted as a conscious life-style and as an economic organization, then it 
could not be fixed once and for all. The meaning of poverty, according to him, depended on the 
circumstances, the people and the occasions. It must be remembered, though, that Olieu was condemned 
by the church and he is not to be considered as the representative of the Friars’s general opinion. Cf. 
Todeschini, op. cit., pp. 113-114 and Le Goff,  La borsa e la vita. Dall’usuraio al banchiere, pp. 96-99. 
528 Cf. Le Goff , Lo sterco del diavolo, pp. 21-22. 
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society was not as permeated with Christian belief as it would be two centuries later.529 
However, with the advent of feudalism between the 11th and 13th centuries the situation 
began to change. The economic recovery, whose most striking phenomena were the 
urban development and the resumption of commerce, produced a change both in life 
conditions and in the mentality of the Christendom. Thus, those trades that were 
considered as illicit (negotia illicita), due to the taboo on money and the contempt for 
the phenomenal world (contemptus mundi), started to demand esteem appropriate to 
their status.530 This mentality shift found its institutional basis and developer in the 
Scholasticism, whose scholars created a casuistry that disrupted the former 
classification of trades and professions, the notorious tripartite scheme, and changed it 
for a more flexible one that distinguished occupations illicit in themselves (de sui 
natura), which were condemned unconditionally, from those condemnable according to 
the case (ex occasione).531 Along with the growing attention toward new categories, 
propagated also a civic feeling in which the idea of the common good (publicum 
commodum) became predominant. 532  The terminology referred to the good of the 
community or the city (civitas, patria) and, then, thanks to the growing importance of 
the urban community, the merchants found the perfect tool to unhinge the door that 
trapped their trade within the uncomfortable realm of the negotia illicita de sui natura.  
It is possible to track down this process through the penitential handbooks, 
booklets composed by those members of the mendicant orders particularly active in the 
scholastic debates, where took place the (re)discovery of Aristotle and his economic 
thought. 533 According to Aristotle stated that there are two kinds of exchange: one 
natural and necessary, whose purpose is to satisfy need; the other blameworthy, because 
its purpose is to satisfy greed for gain, and emerged only when money made its 
appearance.534 Aristotle put the activity of merchants in the latter kind. Yet, although he 
                                                 
529 In the Early Middle Ages, the church demanded the strict observation of its rules only to the clergy, 
whereas laymen’s superficial belief was tolerated as long as the religious institution was respected. Cf. Le 
Goff, La borsa e la vita, pp. 59-60. 
530 Cf. Le Goff, Time, Work, & Culture in the Middle Ages, pp. 58-70. 
531 Ivi, p. 62 and pp. 111-112. 
532 See Todeschini, I Mercanti e il Tempio, p. 312. 
533 The penitential handbooks were manuals outlined for the confessors that became necessary after the 
Fourth Lateran Council (1215), which made annual confession obligatory for all Christians They are 
valuable as evidence in dealing with professional consciousness because they reflect the pressure brought 
to bear on the church by men engaged in given types of work. Cf. Le Goff, Time, Work, & Culture in the 
Middle Ages, p. 112. 
534  Aristotle, Politics, I, 3: 1257a-b. Thomas Aquinas related to Aristotle when writing about the 
lawfulness of commerce. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIa IIæ, article 77, corpus. 
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considered commerce as an unnatural occupation, nothing prevents gain from being 
directed to some necessary and even honourable end, and thus business becomes lawful. 
Aristotle conceived his economic thought as a way to acquire the necessary material 
goods needed for the sake of the good life in the polis.535 There is a lot of the Stagirite’s 
thought in the Ignatians attempts to justify their meddling in secular trades. They 
orientated their apologies towards the necessity of the Christendom, therefore 
interpreting the silk trade not as a commercial activity, but as ‘remedio para a conversão 
das almas’.536  
The first Scholasticism adopted part of the Stagirite’s philosophy on 
justifications to the merchants’ business. As we saw, in fact, along with the urban 
development, the need for merchants soon became evident.537 Therefore, although also 
in a fundamental compilation as the Decretum Gratiani 538  was reasserted that 
commerce was to be avoided because it lured sin,539 the needs of the Christendom 
influenced the Christian canons themselves, a fact that is readable in Raimundo de 
Peñafort’s Summa de Paenitentia (or Summa Raimundi),540 a manual for the confessors 
drafted around 1225 but published for the first time only in the 17th century. It is 
important to us because it presents one of the first analyses of the lawfulness of trade in 
general.541 Raimundo, in fact, first presented those activities dishonest by nature – such 
as simony and usury – that were forbidden to anyone, be it clerics or laymen.542 He, 
then, quoted the old adage that trade is a dubious activity in which it is difficult to avoid 
                                                 
535  Cf. Langholm, The Merchant in the Confessional – Trade and Price in the Pre-Reformation 
Penitential Handbooks, p. 56 and Baeck, op. cit., p. 4. 
536 See BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-56, f. 21. 
537 What a city lacked, in fact, some other settlement might have in abundance and a merchant could 
provide the transport to move those necessities. About the concept of publicum commodum and the utility 
of the merchants see Todeschini, op. cit., Chapter VII – Investire: Proteggere, pp. 311-392.  
538 A collection of nearly 3’800 texts touching on all areas of church discipline and regulation compiled 
by the 1140s. 
539 Cf. Decretum Gratiani Emendatvm et Notationibvs illvstratvm, Gregorii XIII Pont. Max. Ivssv editvm, 
pars II, causa XXXIII, quæstio III - De pœnitentia, distinctio V, 2, pp. 1680-1681: ‘[…] quia difficile est 
inter ementis vendentisque commercium non interuenire peccatum.’ See also Langholm, The Merchant in 
the Confessional, pp. 234-235. 
540 Raimundo de Peñafort was born near Vilafranca del Penedés in Catalonia and died at Barcelona in 
1275, at almost a hundred years. He was already a noted scholar when he entered the Dominican Order in 
1222. Pope Gregory IX called him to Rome in 1230 and commissioned him to put together the collection 
of Decretals that bears the name of that pope. He was canonized in 1601. See Langholm, op. cit., pp. 32-
33. 
541 See Peñafort, Svmma Santi Raymvndi de Peniafort Barcinonensis Ord. Praedicator de Pœnitentia, et 
matrimonio cvm glossis Ioannis de Fribvrgo, liber secvndvs, 8th part, De negotijs secularibus & utrum de 
illicite acquisitus possit fieri eleemosyna & de aleatoribys, pp. 244-256.  
542 Ivi, p. 244: ‘Ista omnibus sun prohibita indistincte, tam clericis, quam laicis, cuiuscumque sexus sint, 
vel conditionis, vel ætatis, dummodo sint doli capaces’. 
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sin,543 but he did not include it in the category of negotia prohibita de sui natura. Yet, 
he admitted, it may be easily rendered so, unless certain conditions were strictly 
observed as to why (ex causa), if it was motivated by avarice and not out of 
necessity;544 when (ex tempore), if it was conducted on holidays or in night-time;545 by 
whom (ex persona), if engaged in by the clergy;546 and where (ex loco), if conducted in 
holy places, such as a church, or suspect and solitary places.547  
This schema would be largely quoted throughout the centuries and, in fact, the 
Franciscans accused the Jesuits of violating three out of the four conditions 
conceptualized by Raimundo. Namely:  
- ex causa: since, the Franciscans promoted an evangelization based on poverty, 
they could not recognize the Society’s necessity to present themselves as high 
prelates, to move around in norimono,548 to give presents or to make use of 
dōjuku and other servants; 
- ex persona: meddling in secular occupations went not only against the 
fundamental theology but was at odds with the vow of holy poverty of the 
mendicant orders and of the Society itself;  
- ex loco: Franciscan theologians in their accusatory treatises compared the 
procuratoria of Macao and Nagasaki to the Casa de Contratación in Seville, the 
central trading house and procurement agency for Spain’s overseas empire. The 
first to use such expression was probably Fray Martin de la Ascención in 1597, 
but it was really catchy since it continued to appear at least until the 1620s. To 
be precise, the Friar wrote that ‘quando viene la nave, toda la mercaderia assi 
suya [of the Fathers], como agena, la atravessan y la llevan a su conviento de 
                                                 
543 Ivi, p. 248: ‘difficile est inter ementis vendentisque commercium non interuenire peccatum’. Cf. 
Langholm, op. cit., p. 40 and Decretum, ibid. 
544 Peñafort, op. cit., p. 244: ‘Ex causa sunt hæc inhonesta, quando fiunt cum intentione corrupta, videlicet 
propter cupiditatem, vel alium malum finem’. Regarding cupiditatem John of Freiburg wrote that it is the 
‘voluntas habendi diuitias temporales, non ad vsum necessarium, aut ad vtilitatem, sed ad curiositatem, vt 
scilicet animus delectet in talibus, sicut delectatur pica, vel cornicula in numis, quos repertos abscondit’. 
545 Ivi, pp. 244-245: ‘Ex tempore sunt hæc inhonesta, si fiant in tempore festiuo, & feriato, quia tunc non 
est vacandum, nisi oronibus, & diuinis officijs, & alijs operibus spiritualibus, & ab oi seruili opere est 
cellandum [...]. Item [...], si exerceantur in tenebris’. 
546 Ivi, p. 245: ‘Ex persona sunt haec inhonesta, quia clerici sunt, vel personæ religiosæ, qui exercent; 
talibus enim regulariter sunt prohibita talia negotia’. 
547 Ivi, pp. 246-247: ‘Ex loco dicuntur inhonesta, quia in lupanari, vel alio loco vili, vel inhonesto talia 
tractantur; & maxime si iudicia in talibus locis tractentur. Item quia locus est solitarius, uel aliter 
suspectus [...]. Item […], ipsius loci excellentiam, puta quia in ecclesia talia fiunt, quæ teste ueritate non 
debet esse domus negotiaionis, sed orationis’. Cf. Langholm, op. cit., pp. 37-40. 
548 乗り物, the Japanese palanquin. 
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manera que el Conviento de Nangasaqi, es como la caza de Aduana de Sevilla 
aonde se registan las mercaderias, que vienen delas Indias’.549 It would seem 
that although the Franciscans forged the reports on the incomes the Japan Jesuits 
received from the silk trade, 550  they had solid proof upon which base their 
critics. In 1603, Bishop Cerqueira, wrote from Nagasaki that ‘no colégio se 
fizerão muitas e muitas consultas dos mercadores sobre o dar da pancada; no 
colégio se fez a repartição da seda e entendimento por escrito, polos mercadores 
e Senhores Japoes’. 551  Soon after, however, the Nagasaki procuratoria was 
moved next to the arts seminar and the press.552 In Macao, on the other hand, the 
procuratoria was built in front of the church, hence within the confines of the 
college. Both the procuratorias, then, were not separated from the main 
structures of the mission, but were buildings dedicated solely to that purpose, 
probably both for practical and religious reasons. Valignano in 1598, Carvalho 
in 1617 and Francisco Vieira in 1618, in fact, made sure that this point was 
clear. 553  They knew that the procurator needed a space to bargain with 
Portuguese, Chinese and Japanese merchants and for the storage of the goods 
and the money of the province. These duties, however, required his whole 
attention.554 Hence, in order to facilitate his tasks, the procurator was exempted 
to eat at the established hours with his confrères and, while busy preparing the 
dispatches his superiors were not allowed to burden him with extrinsic duties. 
Furthermore, he was excused to take part in the common offices. The 
procuratoria, in fact, was built on consecrated ground and Valignano granted 
the possibility to provide it with a small chapel ‘para dizer nella Missa 
livremente quando lhe parecer’. 555  Therefore, also in this case the ex loco 
condition applied.  
Valignano’s shrewdness, however, was not enough to cancel the core of the matter, i.e. 
men of the cloth who acted as traders. As a matter of fact, Raimundo made this 
distinction clear. According to the Catalan, although commercial activities were granted 
                                                 
549 Cf. Apologia, ff. 89-89v.  
550 Fray De la Ascención accused the Jesuits of having a fixed capital in Japan of 160’000 ducats and that 
they earned between 50 and 60’000 ducats per year. Cf. Apologia, f. 90v. 
551 Apud Cooper, Rodrigues, O Intérprete, p. 259. 
552 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [II], f. 303v. 
553 Cf. Apologia, f. 89v, Carvalho, Apologia, pp-95-96 and ARSI, Jap. Sin. 17, ff. 154-154v.  
554 Cf. Couzas que podem servir para os Procuradores. § 2.º - Deve dar-se tudo ao officio deixando 
outras ocupaçoens, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-8, f. 635v. 
555 Cf. Regimento para o Procurador de Jappão que Reside na China, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, ff. 11v-12. 
247 
 
laymen, 556  the clerics should not get involved in regular business activities, unless 
between the buying and the selling a certain craftsmanship is included.557 We can see 
here how the revaluation of manual work pushed the clergy and the commerce together, 
yet the direct participation of clerics in business activities was still seen as inappropriate 
and to be avoided; a constant that would never change.558 
 It was in the first years of the 14th century, however, that the merchants found 
the definitive acknowledgment by the theologians. It was a Franciscan, John Duns 
Scotus, who took the ecclesiastical justification of the merchants to another level: they 
were no longer only useful tools to take goods from a place to another, rather they 
became the safeguards of the Christian community, since they were the only ones to 
know the real value of the merchandise and, thanks to their knowledge, they could 
assure equity in the exchanges and the consequent enrichment of the city. 559  Yet, 
despite the undeniable improvement of the social condition of the merchants, in the 
penitential handbooks on the eve of the Reformation, exchange activities were still 
exposed to the risk of being illicit and the circumstances by which they could be 
rendered so remained the same.  
*   *   * 
 In conclusion, we saw that after the breakdown of the tripartite scheme and the 
integration of the merchants within the main categories of the European society, in the 
1220s the circumstances that rendered trade illicit were established by Raimundo of 
Peñafort. The fact that, with only few differences they were still considered valid in the 
15th century, makes us think that they were established once and for all, the prohibition 
against the clergy, above all. Nevertheless, it appears clearly that the high social status 
reached by the merchants over the centuries entailed serious modification to the general 
attitude. As a matter of fact, except for the prohibition against the clergy, in the 
                                                 
556 See Peñafort, op. cit., p. 245: ‘Laici vero sunt ista concessa’. Cf. Langholm, op. cit., p. 38. 
557 Also in the Rule of Benedict (chapter 57) we see how this point was accepted, although with a 
restriction in order to prevent avarice to creep in: ‘If any of the work of the craftsmen [of the Order] is to 
be sold, those responsible for the sale must not dare to practice any fraud […]. And in the prices let not 
the sin of avarice creep in, but let the goods always be sold a little cheaper than they can be sold by 
people in the world’. See Todeschini, I Mercanti e il Tempio, pp. 36-38.  
558 This scheme substantially represents the theologians’ common attitude regarding commerce and it was 
drawn on also by Tommaso d’Aquino. Essentially, Tommaso d’Aquino affirmed that, as hard as it may 
be, it was possible to commerce without committing any sins, unless commercial activities were carried 
out by the clergy, during holidays and without fraud. Cf. Langholm, op. cit., p. 51. 
559 Cf. Todeschini, op. cit., pp. 351-358. 
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literature of the 15th and 16th centuries it is hard to find the same animosity and aversion 
against commercial practices.560 In the canons and decrees of Council of Trent (1542-
1563), for instance, we find only a brief mention to commerce. Namely, in the second 
chapter of the 21st session (July 1562) – we read that it is not suitable for ‘those who are 
enrolled in the divine ministry to beg or to exercise any sordid trade, to the disgrace of 
their order’. 561 
What was considered a strict prohibition during the Middle Ages, in the 16th 
century became an advice to prevent shame to fall on the religious body. Hence, also the 
theologians were slowly migrating towards less orthodox points of view. This mentality 
shift is even more evident if we take a look to the Society’s literature regarding the silk 
trade. Although the third and fourth general strongly opposed the participation in the 
armação,562 in 1582 Acquaviva wrote to Valignano a letter that exemplifies how the 
ecclesiastics’ attitude towards trade was versatile to the point of accepting such loathed 
activities: 
‘Quanto al trato dela seda con que se sustenta el temporal de Japon y la duda que en ello havia 
parte por su natural del trato, parte por la prohibicion de N. Padre Everardo de Santa 
Memoria, vimos aqui la larga informacion que V. R. nos dio del modo dela sustentacion delos 
nuestros, y nos hizimos muy bien capazes delas difficultades que en el ay por muchas partes, 
y aviendo muy bien cosiderado todas la cosas que V. R. nos escrive como testigo de vista, y 
consultando con estos Padres, jusgamos todos, ser uno de aquellos casos en el qual la 
necessidade dispensa sobre toda Ley, especialente pareciendo sin duda que en tal negocio aya 
lugar aquel axioma, quod pro charitate introductum est, non debit contra charitatem militare. 
Lo qual fuera si por falta dela sustentacion necessaria, para la qual no ay otro remedio, si 
ubiesse aora de dexar, o menguar una empresa tan provechosa y acepta a Dios’.563 
Similarly to what stated Valignano in 1579 with regard to ius politicum and ius 
naturalis, both Acquaviva and Pope Gregory XIII acknowledged the silk trade as 
necessary evil to be endured out of pure necessity and for a good cause. Valignano 
revisited the subject also in the 29th article of the Regimento for the procurator of Japan, 
where he stated that the silk trade ‘não he para mais se não para suprir a necessidade da 
                                                 
560 Cf. Tenenti, op. cit., pp. 213-214. 
561 ‘Those who have not wherewith to live, are excluded from sacred Orders’. See Waterworth, The 
canons and decrees of the sacred and oecumenical Council of Trent, pp. 140-152, in particular p. 145. 
562 Cf. BPE, Cód. CXVI/2-11, n.º 44, p. 7. 
563 See General Acquaviva to Visitor Valignano, Rome, 10 February 1582. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-56, ff. 
198-198v. 
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Companhia e Christandade destas partes, que não tem por agora outro remedio, se ha 
grandemente de guardar que nisto não se tome mais licença de que Sua Santidade e N. P. 
nos dão e pede a necessidade de Jappão’.564 General Acquaviva, of course, would not 
go as far as to allow excessive participation in the trade and illicit behaviours due to this 
meddling in secular activities. As we saw above, the Macao-Nagasaki trade was an 
exception within the missions of the Society of Jesus, yet even so it needed to be 
constantly controlled. The Iberian crowns, on their part, allowed the Jesuits to trade in 
silk and a new concession was issued just a few months after Spinola’s appointment as 
procurator.565 Finally, by 1620 the Jesuits’ participation in the trade was commonly 
accepted. In that year, in fact, a conference of the most important Fathers of the mission 
gathered in Macao, 566 and about their picols of silk in the armação wrote that ‘não ha 
que fallar, porque tambem ninguem falla, nem fallara nelles, e he trato ou contrato ja 
tam canonizado e com tantas licenças, e no modo com que se faz, que não ha nelle 
nenhum modo de indecencia, nem escandalo’.567 By that time, however, Spinola had 
already spent two years in captivity. His economical activity had already ended, yet he 
was every day close to end his life as a brilliant martyr of the Roman Church. 
 
IV. 3.    The Province of Japan in 1612: an economic spiral and the first 
signs of the persecution 
As we saw earlier, by the end of 1611 Carlo Spinola substituted Sebastião Vieira 
as procurator of Japan in Nagasaki. He was appointed by Visitor Francesco Pasio 
following Provincial Valentim Carvalho’s recommendation. Soon after, on 22 March 
1612, Pasio left Japan for Macao. Two reasons in particular led him to bid farewell to 
Japan. First, his appointment as visitor of China and Japan required his presence also in 
the Asian continent. Second, Tokugawa Ieyasu entrusted him with a chapa, an official 
patent, most likely a shuin-jō, to reestablish the commercial thread between Nagasaki 
and Macao.568 The first attempt to do that, in fact, sank along with Rui Barreto off the 
Fujian coast.  
                                                 
564 See RPJ, ff. 39v-40.  
565 The alvará was issued on 6 February 1612. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 45 [I], ff. 234-234v. 
566 Jerónimo Rodrigues, Celso Confaloneri, Valentim Carvalho, Manoel Dias, Gabriel de Matos, Manoel 
Lopes, Jerónimo Rodrigues Junior and Sebastião Vieira. 
567 See Informação do trato que temos da China Japão, ARSI, Jap. Sin. 45 [I], f. 235v.  
568 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [II], f. 178 and RAH/Cor. 9/2666, ff. 267v-268. According to Mateus de 
Couros, Hasegawa Sahyōei and Murayama Tōan plotted to obtain Ieyasu’s shuin-jō and to have it 
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Pasio arrived at Macao in April, but he could not accomplish personally his 
official mission. In July, in fact, he got sick and only a month later he died.569 A few 
days before Pasio’s death, in mid-July, Macao dispatched an official ship escorted by 
the ‘Galeão Almeirante’ or ‘Galion de Armada’ São Felipe e Santiago with Pedro 
Martins Gaio as Captain Major and Horatio Nerete, the 1600 Captain Major, as 
ambassador. Nerete went to visit Tokugawa Hidetada, who, although received him with 
courtesy, stated also that Japan was no longer reliant only Portuguese vessels, thanks to 
the established trade with Manila, the Hollanders and, although only from 1613 
onwards, the English. Nevertheless, the ambassador obtained the shuin-jō allowing the 
Great Ship to make the annual voyage and, thus, the Macao-Nagasaki trade was 
officially renewed by the end of summer of 1612.570  
 Spinola’s appointment as procurator, then, roughly corresponds with the 
resumption of the trade. Already in the first year of his procuratorship, however, he had 
to cope with the serious financial situation inherited from the past years. As discussed 
above, the sinking of André Pessoa’s carrack cost dearly to the Japanese Province. The 
Jesuits lost 30’000 cruzados in the ship and were overburden with 22’000 cruzados of 
debts.571 The reopening of the trade seemed to be the only solution to pay off those 
debts, yet the money needed to participate in the armação had to be borrowed and, even 
with the highest pancada price, it was almost impossible for the Japan Jesuits to escape 
from the vicious circle they were in. Carlo Spinola was not new to this situation. As we 
saw, he filled the office of procurator also in Macao from spring 1601 to July 1602. Of 
the several letters which he probably wrote during that time, only three of them survive: 
one written on 12 November 1601, and two copies of a second letter dating 25 and 27 
January 1602 respectively, sent in two viæ. 572 The copy dated 27 January is more 
interesting for our purposes, as in this letter the Italian Jesuit discussed for the first time 
his office and examined the role of the principal agents involved in the Macao-Nagasaki 
trade. 
                                                                                                                                               
entrusted to Pasio, in order to finally achieve the Italian’s expulsion. The Portuguese father, in fact, stated 
that Pasio was planning on leaving Japan only in March 1613. See Mateus de Couros to General 
Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 8 October 1612. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 35, f. 3. 
569 Cf. Ivi, f. 204. 
570 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [II], f. 191, Ibid., f. 204, RAH/Cor. 9/2679, f. 12v and Boxer, O Grande Navio, 
pp. 70-71. 
571 Cf. Cooper, Rodrigues, O Intérprete, pp. 272-273 and ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [II], ff. 333v-335. 
572 Back then, correspondence was usually dispatched in several copies, which were marked as “routed” 
by different ways (viæ). These ways were distributed among different ships to counter the risk of the mail 
being lost. 
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In this letter, Spinola mentioned his predecessor as procurator of Japan in 
Macao, Miguel Soares, the Padre Visitador Alessandro Valignano, who stipulated the 
armação contract, and the Capitão-mór, the fidalgo appointed by the crown or by the 
viceroy at Goa, who also acted as Governor ad interim of the city.573 In addition to the 
role played by these important figures, Spinola introduced the main problems 
characterizing the Jesuit mission in Japan: faulty expenses, debts, and lack of economic 
help from the Iberian crowns or the Vatican See: 
‘Escrevo a o Padre Geral sobre a falta que temos de dinheiro pera aviar Jappão, que por isso 
nos vamos endividando, e se não acodirem com huma boa pancada de dinheiro, forçadamente 
se ha de menguar o cabedal o coal està ja muy delgado; e a causa he porque neste Collegio se 
gasta muyto, a coal he perda dobrada, porque se perde o proprio, e os ganhos, e come este 
anno não houve viagem, o dinheiro ficou em mortorio, e se perderão mays de 7 mil cruzados 
de ganhos, e de Portugal nos acodirão este anno com 3300 cruzados,574 e de Jappão mandarão 
somente 6000, porque cuidavão que aqui estivessem ja da esmola do Papa mays de dez mil, 
de modo que este anno tudo he tomar emprestado, e se huma nao nos faltar, encomendar a 
Deos’.575  
In the early 1610s, the situation Spinola had to deal with differed more in 
quantitative terms, i.e. the amount of debts, than qualitative. According to Spinola, 
between 1610 and 1612, the capital of the province had been depleted by the debts the 
Society went into owing to the André Pessoa incident and to the sinking of the ship with 
Rui Barreto on board, which was carrying also money for the Japanese province. In 
October 1613, he quantified those debts 9’000 escudos only in Japan.576 Nevertheless, 
in 1612 Spinola had to keep on with the same methodology that caused the debts in the 
first place: the respondência bonds, i.e. the high interests on loans.577 As he confessed 
to Acquaviva, ‘ficamos sem a fazenda, e com obrigação de pagar o que tomamos 
                                                 
573 The Capitão-mor was governor ad interim of Macao from the foundation of the Portuguese trading 
post in 1555 until 1623, when the Viceroy of India, Dom Francisco da Gama, appointed Dom Francisco 
de Mascarenhas as the first Captain General of Macao. He was the only one with jurisdiction on military 
matters, but was allowed also to mingle in civil affairs. With the creation of this office, the captaincy of 
Macao was finally separated from the Japan voyages. Cf. Boxer, O Grande Navio, p. 94. 
574 The origins of these 3’300 cruzados are not clear. Most likely, Spinola was summing up the royal 
endowment of 2’000 cruzados to the revenue of the four communities in the Province of the North in 
India. 
575 See Procurator Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal João Álvares. Macao, 27 January 1602. ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 36, f. 149. 
576 See Procurator Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 5 October 1613. 
ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 161. The simple escudo was worth 470 réis, but there was also the escudo dobrado 
that was worth 940 réis.  
577 For this kind of contract see Oka, “A Great Merchant in Nagasaki in 17th century: Suetsugu Heizō II 
and the System of Respondência”, in BPJS 2, pp. 37-56. 
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emprestado; pera remediar esta falta, e por não termos outra prata, que mandar no junco, 
em que foy o Padre Visitador, tomamos muyto dinheiro a responder’.578 Fortunately, the 
province received also 5’000 cruzados without the high interests of a respondência 
bond by two Japanese lords and a Portuguese.  
Despite the borrowed and lent money, however, the Japan Jesuits could not rely 
upon the incomes of the silk trade as they had wished after two years of interruption. 
The lack of the official voyage from Macao, probably rekindled Chinese and Spanish 
initiative in Japan. Both the procurator and the bishop of Japan, in fact, reported to 
Rome that owing to the great quantity of silk imported by Chinese merchants and 
Spanish ships from Manila, the pancada price was lower than expected.579 Afterwards, 
Valentim Carvalho acknowledged that due to Spanish, Japanese and Chinese 
competition, the Portuguese had irretrievably lost their pre-eminence in front of the 
Japanese.580 Moreover, it must be stressed that Spanish competition was difficult to 
defeat. Although the Portuguese had access to the top quality silk sold at the Canton 
fair, in fact, the Spaniards were not bound by the pancada price and therefore were the 
ones who could actually inflate or deflate the value of the Chinese textiles.581  
In any case, the incomes for the province were sufficient to pay the 
respondências due in Japan, but not enough to sustain the mission for a whole year. 
Consequently, ‘foy necessario este anno tambem tomar prata a responder, para mandala 
a Macao a buscar provimento, e comprar a seda ordinaria’.582 Spinola was conscious 
that they were spinning in a spiral and that the only solution to pay off their debts was to 
receive a substantial economic aid from Europe. Having in mind all the ups and downs 
regarding the pensions granted by kings and popes, we can imagine that Spinola was 
                                                 
578 See Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 21 March 1613. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 159v. 
579 See Bishop Cerqueira to Filipe II, Nagasaki, 20 March 1613. RAH/Cor. 9/2666, ff. 257-257v: ‘O 
commercio da cidade de Macao com Jappão [...] ficou mediocremente entavolado de novo com a vinda da 
Nao do trato, a qual ia he tornada para a China deixando as fazendas vendidas em preço arrezoado, posto 
que a pancada da seda, que he a principal fazenda, foi mais baxa do que se deseiava e esperava, mas não 
foi possivel mais polla muita seda que alem da da nao tem esta monção passada vindo da Manilha’.  
580 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 45 [I], f. 221: ‘Ajuntase a todos estes inconvenientes a grande cantidade de 
fazendas que de todas as partes vão oje a Japão, que he a principal causa de os Japões não sentirem tanto 
a falta da nossa não, como sentião antigamente […]. Porque os anos de 1600 e de 1602, não navegavão 
ainda os Japões livremente, e só algumas somas de Portuguezes levavão farinhas a Manila, mas no anno 
de 1612 não levando a nossa nao mais que mil e trezentos picos de seda se ajuntarão em Nagasaqi 
melhoria de sinco mil afora outras muitas fazendas, que levarão as somas de Japões, que navegarão 
aquelle ano, e as embarcações que vierão de Manila e muitas somas de Chinas. E esta he a causa principal 
de não serem os portugueses estimados como dantes’. 
581 Cf. Takase, “十七世紀初頭におけるわが国のスペイン貿易について”, pp. 11-18. 
582 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 159v. 
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also aware that receiving such aid was a utopian dream. Moreover, the problems for the 
Japan Jesuits were not confined to their economy.  
In inverse proportion to the piling up of the debts, their political weight was 
fading. In the letter by Spinola we quoted before, in fact, a feeling of powerlessness 
towards the situation in Kyūshū, the Jesuits’ last stronghold, is patent: 
‘[O]s Tonos, que nos ajudavam, ou sam falecidos, ou ficaram desterrados nesta perseguição, 
com a qual perdemos todos os socorros, que davam os christãos de Arima, e as rendas que ahi 
tinhamos, que não heram poucas, e havemos de sostentar a mesma gente recolhida aqui em 
Nangasaqui, onde os mantenimentos valem hum terço mais, que em Arima, por se ajuntarem 
muytos navios, e pessoas de toda parte neste porto’583 
Although the Tokugawa persecution of Christianity actually broke out in 1614, as early 
as 1612 there had been an incident related to the Western faith that could be considered 
a symptom of what eventually happened in 1614, but was the direct cause of the 
situation described by Spinola. 
The procurator was referring to the capital execution of Arima Harunobu João, 
owing to the Okamoto Daihachi-incident in 1612, a court intrigue involving the 
Southern daimyō and Okamoto Paulo Daihachi, Honda Masazumi’s secretary. 
Harunobu, eager to obtain the restitution of some lands in Hizen, which his family lost 
in the chaos of the Sengoku Jidai, bribed Okamoto, who was supposed to forge some 
documents regarding those territories. The plot, however, was promptly revealed by 
Arima’s son, Naozumi, who was apparently in league with Hasegawa Sahyōei against 
the head of the family. Ieyasu was furious when the matter came to his knowledge, in 
particular because the culprits were all followers of the Western faith. Harunobu was 
promptly dispossessed of his fief in 1612, and executed the following year, whereas 
Okamoto was burned alive for forging Ieyasu’s letters.584 It is in this year that Ieyasu 
started to envisage the expulsion of the Christian faith from Japan. In effect, it would 
seem that during the visit of the Manila ambassador, Domingo Francisco de Leca, 
William Adams confided to the Spaniard that no Fathers would be left in Japan within 
                                                 
583 Ibid. 
584 Cf. Boxer, The Christian Century, pp. 314-315.  
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three years. 585  Although the Jesuits remained in Japan a little longer, Adams’s 
prediction turned out to be true. 
The Okamoto Daihachi-incident caused numerous problems to the Jesuit 
province, political, as we will see later, but for the most part economical: they not only 
lost a precious revenue, as well as housing and protection, but the gathering of 
Christians in Nagasaki caused simultaneously the increase of the general expenses of 
the province, because of the price difference between Arima and Nagasaki, ‘onde os 
mantenimentos valem hum terço mais […] por se ajuntarem muytos navios, e pessoas 
de toda parte’.586  
We can translate this situation into numbers. As we saw, in October 1613 the 
debts of the province in Japan already amounted to 9’000 escudos.587 Spinola estimated 
the loss in Arima to be as high as 12’000 cruzados,588 although this number might be 
intentionally exaggerated to provoke a determined reaction in the reader. The procurator, 
in fact, was complaining with Acquaviva about the attitude in Arima of squandering the 
province’s capital with pointless waste, an attitude that, Spinola stated, rebounded 
negatively on the image the Japanese had of the Ignatians, since ‘vendo que estamos 
cheos de dividas, e não nos podemos çafar dellas, e por outra parte nem diminuimos 
gente, nem moderamos os gastos, ficam pasmados, e nos notam de pouco avisados, e 
muytos tem para si que temos poços de prata, e a tomamos emprestada para 
encubrila’.589 Be that as it may, in 1613 there was no official voyage to Japan, hence 
there had been no income either.590 Although the arrival of the Great Ship – the Nossa 
Senhora da Vida – was only delayed until July 1614, it has to be noted that a missing 
voyage not only translated into a period of economic hardship, but also into 
augmentantion of debts, because the procurator based in Macao was still supposed to 
provide the Japanese colleges and residences with their needs and, since there was no 
income from selling the silk, he was forced to borrow.591 As we will see in the next 
paragraph, however, the Fathers had found another way to earn money in addition to 
                                                 
585 Cf. Carvalho, Apologia, p. 223, Boxer, O Grande Navio, p. 72, note 162 and Gil, Hidalgos y Samurai, 
p. 250. 
586 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 159v. 
587 See ARSI, Jap. Sin.36, f. 161.  
588 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 159v. 
589 Ibid. 
590 Cf. Frison, “«El officio de Procurador al qual aunque tengo particular repugnancia.» The Office of 
Procurator through the Letters of Carlo Spinola S.J.”, pp. 54-55 and Boxer, op. cit., pp. 71-72. 
591 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 159v. 
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their bague in the armação. Yet, this way excited strong critics both in Asia and in 
Rome, since it was a typology of trade which went directly against the armação and had 
not receive permission either by secular or temporal powers. In the next section, 
moreover, we will also look into details how the post of procurator of Japan was 
conceived and how different it was during Spinola’s procuratorship. 
 
IV. 3. 1.    An easier task to carry out: changes in the management of the 
procurator office 
Previously we stated that the equivalent of the Varias Lembranças Pera hum 
Procurador for the Japanese Province does not survive. There are other sources, 
however, that help us compensate for this lack. In Lisbon’s Biblioteca da Ajuda, for 
instance, it is possible to consult the 18th-century copy of the Regimento do Procurador 
que està em Jappão.592 This text, written by Valignano in 1591, includes 34 articles 
defining the tasks and duties of the procurator in Nagasaki. Since it was part of the 
visitor’s duties upon taking office to revise the rules and decrees left by his predecessor, 
Francesco Pasio reviewed Valignano’s text between 1611 and 1612 and so did Father 
Francisco Vieira in 1617. The Regimento was basically meant to define the work of the 
procurator in all of its aspects, such as how many records he had to keep; whether or not 
he could be assisted in his duties, by whom, to what extent and how; what to do when 
the annual ship from Macao arrived in Japan, and so forth.  
The main tasks of the procurator were essentially two: in the first place, he was 
responsible for collecting all the mail and goods (sacramental wine, clothes, crosses, 
books, glasses, etc.) shipped to Japan from Europe, Goa and Macao.593 In the second 
place, the procurator was responsible for supplying the missionaries, colleges, houses 
and seminars with all the things they needed, such as rosaries and veronicas but also 
more practical things, like sugar, vinegar and cheese.594 
                                                 
592 BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, ff. 37-41. Published in Frison, op. cit., Appendix G, pp. 61-68. The original 
manuscript is still available in the Roman archive of the Society of Jesus. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 2, ff. 114-
118v, yet the original does not comprehend later emendations.  
593 For a detailed list see Estas são as couzas que o P. Vizitador manda trazer cada anno de Goa para 
Japão, 1580, BA/JA, Cód. 49-IV-66, ff. 19-19v. 
594 See RPJ, f. 37: ‘O seo officio consiste principalmente em duas couzas a primeyra he com toda 
fidelidade, e diligencia arecadar quando os Navios da China [in the margin: chegarem] todas as couzas 
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Valignano composed the Regimento soon after the convening of the second 
general conference in Nagasaki, on 13 August 1590. As was customary, several matters 
were faced during the consultation. The 7.ª Pregunta helps us clarify the main duties of 
the procurator and, at the same time, shows that the decision taken by Valentim 
Carvalho and Francesco Pasio to appoint Spinola as procurator was probably rooted in 
the proceedings of this conference: 
‘O 2.º ponto em que tãobem concordarão todos, que tãobem açerca da união dos mesmos 
nossos assi Europeos como Iapoens avia em Japão mui frequentes occasioens pera padeçer 
detrimento e esfriarçe na charidade fraterna, pollas seguintes resoens. A 1.ª porque o modo de 
vida que tem nesta provincia quanto a sua sustentação he tão singular que por ventura em toda 
a Christandade não ha outro, porque todas as cazas e collegios, igrejas etc. hão de ser providos 
não somente de dinheiro mas de todas as miudezas e minimas cousas pollo procurador de 
Japão quee reside em Namgasaqe, conforme a ordem que lhe der o supremo superior de 
Japão, porque como os collegios e cazas não têm nenhuma renda em Japão, e todo o 
provimento assi de dinheiro como das mais couzas lhe ha de vir na nao que vem da China, e 
necessario que em Nangasaque aja hum monte commum pera delle se proverem todas as 
Cazas, as quaes como tãobem não tem sempre o mesmo numero de gente, mas hora cressem 
hora mingoão conforme as necessidades e ocasião que ha para isso, o mesmo ordenado e 
provimento se varia e muda a cada passo, e não pode ser serto, e assi alem do dinheiro que se 
manda a todas as cazas pera o gasto de Namgasaque lhe hão de mandar vinho, azeite, vinagre 
de Portugal, pano, cangarias, pessas pera proviento de suas igrejas, e athe o calsado, fio, 
agulhas, cadeados, candeas, e adubos, e finalmente todas as mais minimas meudezas, porque 
nos lugares aonde estão não se achão a comprar, e como no repartimento de tantas meudezas 
he impossivel contentar a tantos, daqui se azão facilmente occasioens de quexumes 
pareçendo-lhes que ou os Superiores não são iguaes no repartimento o tem mais affeição a 
hum lugar que a outro, ou se detem mais em huma caza que em outra, ou provem melhor de 
Padres a hum Senhorio que a outro, e das fabricas e cousas necessarias pera as cazas e Igreyas 
de suas terras, de que nascem tão bem agravos nos mesmos Senhores parecendo-lhes que o 
Superior quer mais a outros Senhores que a elles, e aiuda e provem milhor a Christandade de 
outras terras, que a sua, e folga de estar mais nas outras terras. A segunda rezão porque a 
mesma maneira extraordinaria de vida ha quasi em todos os particulares da Companhia pera 
com os Superiores das cazas sob cuya iurisdição estão, porque como os Padres e Irmãos 
andão como esta dito em huma continua peregrinação toda a vida, e hão de ser providos de 
                                                                                                                                               
que nellas vem da Companhia assim pertencentes a Provincia como a pessoas particulares della se fazer 
vender a seo tempo as couzas que hão de vender, e juntamente comprar o que faltar assim para o 
provimento da Provincia como para as Igrejas, e prezentes que se fazem. A 2ª couza he prover de todas as 
couzas, Collegios e Rezidincias, e Seminarios da Companhia que houver nessa Provincia conforme ao 
que pellos Superiores se ordenar’. For a complete list of the merchandises sent from Macao to Japan in 
1618 see BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7, ff. 187v-142, transcribed in: Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 163-168. 
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dinheiro e de todas as couzas meudas pollos superiores das mesmas casas, e fora com as 
condiçoens dos mesmos Superiores, e hora dos Padres que vivem debaxo delles, e hora por 
falta de não aver tanta abudancia das couzas, sempre se azão ocasioens de mil diferenças’.595 
The theoretical fundaments upon which the office of procurator was built reckoned on 
the equity of the Jesuit delegated to fill the office. In other words, the procurator was 
not supposed to be biased by nationalistic passions and had also to be able to provide 
each of the Society’s establishment throughout Japan with the same amount of 
furnishings. 596  A discriminatory distribution, in fact, was detrimental to the very 
Christendom, since it could create discontent among the common believers and the 
mighty patrons. As is known, the Jesuits’ research for sophisticated yet immediate 
systems of communication to attract the Japanese and to make accessible to them 
concepts otherwise difficult led the Society of Jesus to the implementation of different 
instruments.597 The application of liturgical aids and supplements was included at a 
lower level of the methodology of proselytization that involved the use of science and 
visual arts. In effect, Valignano conceived the first item of the Regimento as an 
admonition: ‘em todos os negocios que tratar de seo officio se lembre do institudo da 
Companhia que he buscando a gloria de Deos, trabalhar para ajudar as almas, e procure 
com palavras, e exemplo de edeficar a todos aquelles com quem tratar e de fazer, e 
conservar benevolos aquelles de quem tem necessidade’.598  
This point was accepted by Carlo Spinola himself. Although the Italian criticized 
the commercial implications of the office, he conceded that being a procurator was a 
huge undertaking and that providing all the houses of Japan meant working for the great 
goal of evangelization anyway.599 An apology of Spinola’s displacement from his high-
profile role in Miyako to the secular activities in Nagasaki was stressed by a later 
confrère of him, the Abbott François Besson: 
                                                 
595 See Segunda Consulta Geral feita pello Padre Alexandre Valignano Visitador da Companhia de Jesus 
em Jappão em 13 Agosto do anno de 1590, 7ª Pregunta - Do modo que se ha de ter pera se conservar a 
devida união, asi entre os nossos Padres e Irmãons, como entre os Senhores Christãos, ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
51, ff. 151v-152v. 
596 Cf. Sumario, pp. 309-310. 
597  Regarding the importance of the use of images in the church and the mission of the Counter-
Reformation see Maiorana, La Gloriosa Impresa, pp. 18-21. 
598 See RPJ, f. 37. 
599 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 154v: ‘Yo no recuso el trabajo de prover toda las casas de Japon, aunque es 
muy grande, que huelgo mucho de poder scriverles, pues con esto participo del fruto, que todos hazen’. 
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‘Ainsi les desseins du Seigneur s’accomplissaient encore quand, après sept ans passés dans le 
collége de Méaco, Spinola fut nommé procureur de la province du Japon. Le voilà sorti de 
l’obscurité et remis sur le chandelier. Il faut habiter Nangazaki, entretenir des relations avec 
tous les peuples européens, accueillir les missionnaires, pourvoir à leurs besoins, diriger leurs 
travaux, montrer partout cet esprit large, ce cœur magnanime, ce grand caractère, qui 
conçoivent, qui commencent et qui achèvent les nobles enterprises’.600 
We have also a detailed description of the duties of the procurator of Japan in Macao 
left by João Rodrigues Tçuzu, which informs us on the circulation of goods between 
Macao and Japan, the material necessities of the Japan Jesuits and shows how the scope 
of the job of the procurator in Macao was wider than that of the procurator in Japan: 
‘Direi aqui brevemente que couza seja este officio aqui, e quam differente dos Porcuradores 
ordinarios das Provincias, e collegios, porque na verdade he Procurador, e alem disso 
comprador, e despenseiro, e todos os mais officios tocantes ao temporal, e ainda mercador na 
forma concedida. Porque busca o comer, e sostento de toda a Provincia, com o que vem da 
India, com trato de Japão, e com emprestimos, e esmolas, avia para fora os que vão, e vem, e 
os prove de todo o necesario assim de suas pessoas, como de couzas espirituais para a 
Christandade de rosairos, nominias, imagens, ornamentos por cada sacerdote com que possa 
dizer missa que levão consigo, e avia a gente de serviço que levão. Aqui avia para Japão para 
os nossos roupa branca, camizas, calçoes brancos, frontas, lenços, panos da cabeça para 
provimento, calçado vestido, louças, conservas, vinho de passa para os doentes, […] azeite, 
candieiros, fechaduras, cadeados, agulhas, linhas, vinho das missas, e cera, que là não há. 
Nominas em comum, tres e quatro mil cada anno, rozarios de contas para os Christãos, 
veronicas, imagens estampadas, e livro de sua letra, e lingoa, para o que tem o Procurador 
aqui imprensa, e de Japão manda vir papel, manda sabam para roupa, que vem da India, toda a 
sorte de canga [and] de algodão para roupa, pretas, azuis, brancas, e todas as mais miudezas, 
que se podem imaginar para huma caza que là não há, alem de couzas accommodadas para 
prezentes, conforme ao costume da terra. Ornamentos, missaes, breviarios de provimento, e 
livros nossos, e para tudo isto tem aqui officiaes, ou os aluga de fora, ou em caza manda fazer 
tudo isto tem moços para o meneo de tudo isto, embarcar, e dezembarcar, e cozinha para elles 
particulares, e em caza fora alfayates, sirgueiros, sapateiros, carpinteiros, orivez e brosladores 
de ornamentos gente para imprensa, e officinas, e materias para ella. E como aqui he como 
centro da India, tem varias encomendas de ornamentos e vario provimento para Goa, do 
Collegio, e casa professa, Cochim, Malaca, athe de Maluco, Bengala e das Filippinas, que 
mandão buscar todo o genero de couzas de China ate retabulos dourados, e torcheiros grandes 
dourados para sus Igrejas, e este mesmo anno para todas estas partes aviou varias cousas, e 
                                                 
600 See Besson, Panégyrique du Bienheureux Charles Spinola, de la Compagnie de Jésus, p. 13. 
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outras está aviando para quando ouver navios. Tem obras de cazas, e boticas de aluguer que 
rendem para Japão. E finalmente como Pay da Provincia, no que toca a temporal, tudo porem 
com ordem da obediencia, e muy miuda conta ao Superior de todas as couzas miudas. E tudo 
o que digo não se pode escuzar, sob pena de padecerem as missões e os que nellas andão’.601 
We deem it relevant to underline Tçuzu’s last passage, specifically when he defined the 
procurator as the province’s father, ‘Pay da Provincia’. It would seem that Rodrigues 
borrowed this expression from the lexicon of the Spanish court. In the court, the 
monarch was not only the head of the household, but of several other organisms, such as 
the Conselhos, the court itself and, generally speaking, the whole monarchic body, 
which the king administrated as if they were his own home and he acted as a pai de 
família. In order to virtuously govern this many-sided home, the king was supposed to 
be both a good politician and a good ecónomo, since the two domains were not 
distinguished at all.602  
Similarly to the Spanish king, the procurator in Japan, in order to make the best 
out of his position of intermediary in financial operations, was forced also to handle 
silver or gold owned by laymen outside the Society, namely Japanese and Portuguese 
merchants and, as used to happen frequently, Japanese lords, mostly to obtain political 
favours and support. Obviously, the more powerful the daimyō, the stronger the 
patronage. This was an issue that affected the mission right since the first years after the 
admission in the armação. As early as 1585, in fact, information about a parallel trade 
carried out by single members of the Vice-province of Japan reached Rome. Claudio 
Acquaviva received such news in a moment when he was planning on terminating the 
participation in the silk trade, due to the increase of the papal pension to 6’000 cruzados 
per year. The general had been informed that some fathers sent other people’s silver to 
Macao to be invested in silk, thus he ordered Valignano ‘no permitta a nadie esto ni otro 
genero de trato por ningun titolo de necessidad de Iglesia, o otro qualquiera’.603 The 
previous year, the general wrote the instructions for the procurator of the Portuguese 
                                                 
601 See Procurator Rodrigues to General Vitelleschi, Macao, 28 January 1624. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-6, ff. 
156-157. We have also the list drew up by Procurator Manoel Borges in July 1618. The procurator of 
Japan in Macao enumerated all the goods sent to Japan as requested by Carlo Spinola. Cf. Fato da 
Companhia, que em Julho deste prezente anno vay embarcado para Japão, nas Galeotas da viagem todas 
seis que deste porto partem, e de que he capitão mor Antonio de Oliveira Moraes, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7, 
ff. 187v-192. Edited in Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 163-168. 
602 Cf. Arroyo, “A Função Integradora da Casa Real Portuguesa de João I a D. Filipe I (1385-1598)”, pp. 
23-24 and bibliography cited therein. 
603 General Acquaviva to Visitor Valignano, Rome, 25 November 1585. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 3, ff. 12-12v.  
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Assistancy in the Spanish Court. In more than some ways, it is similar to the guidelines 
Valignano left for the procurators of Japan in Macao and in Nagasaki, yet it is the 27th 
item of Acquaviva’s instructions that interests us. It reads:  
‘No se encargue de negocios de seglares sino en algun caso a juizo del Provincial de Castilla 
el qual no dara liçencia sino en caso que sin offension de persona de gran cuenta, no se pueda 
escusar, y que con decoro dela Compañía se pueda tratar, y por ningun caso tome diñeros de 
seglares ni aun delos nuestros para guardar sin licencia de sus superiores, ni pueda recebir 
de nadie nada como premio de su solicitud’.604  
In 1589, Valignano answered Acquaviva’s order, basically stating that for the Society it 
was very difficult to refuse to handle outsiders’ silver, in particular when such requests 
came from influential nobles, because the Jesuits needed to gain and to keep their 
favour.605 Having in mind Acquaviva’s words we have underlined, we suppose that this 
was a defense the general could not refuse. Evidently, however, Acquaviva was 
receiving complaints not only from clergymen, who saw the matter as another infraction 
of the sacred canons, but also from Portuguese officers, who were reporting protests by 
the Macanese community. The general, in fact, in 1593 reminded the Vice-provincial 
Pero Gomez that according to the armação charter, it was prohibited to introduce 
Japanese silver in China to buy the same merchandise exported by the Portuguese, since 
it would have inflated its value. Moreover, Acquaviva ordered Gomez to forbid ‘alos 
nuestros que de ningun modo embien diñeros de algunos Japones juntamente con los 
nuestros al Padre Procurador de Macan para los emplear, de que se sigue escandalos y 
murmuracion hechando nos la culpa de sus daños’. 606  Despite the justification, 
Valignano tried to at least limit the problem. Firstly, in the 12th article of the Regimento, 
he made sure that the procurator kept track of all the capitals received,607 then, in the 
16th, he followed Acquaviva’s example and established that eventual handling of 
                                                 
604 Cf. Instrucion para el Procurador de las Provincias de Portugal, Brasil, India oriental que reside en 
corte de Valladolid Catolica hecha en Enero de 1584, BNCR/FGes. 1255, f. 21v. The underlining is ours. 
605 Cf. Cooper, op. cit., p. 251 and ARSI, Jap. Sin.11, f. 140. Later, in 1612, also Valentim Carvalho and 
Francisco Pires wrote similar things. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [II], f. 148 and f. 215v. 
606 See General Acquaviva to Vice-provincial Gomez, Rome, 20 October 1593. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 3, f. 27. 
607 See RPJ, f. 38v: ‘12. Tera outro livro de lembranças, no qual [...] estarà o dinheiro que se recebe dos 
Tonos que mandão a China, e como vier a nao e se lhes entregar o dinheiro se borrara escrevendo o que 
lhes veyo a conta de sua prata’. 
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outsiders’ silver should first be confirmed by the Father Superior.608 Finally, in 1592, he 
gave more detailed information: 
‘Daimyos want to have their silver sent to Macao through the Fathers […] and to get it 
exchanged for raw silk or gold. In ordinary cases, they want only gold. The practice […] was 
carried out at first on a small case by [a certain Christian daimyo] […]. Later, as […] [their] 
number increased, […] [others] wanted to profit from this practice. When I visited Macao last 
year [1591], I was given permission by the municipality […] to send up to 6’000 ducats of 
silver to Macao to exchange […] for gold. But this […] is not sufficient to meet even half the 
demand for gold by the daimyo […] and I am afraid that it will increase day by day.’609 
The matter reached an even more delicate point during Rodrigues’s procuratorship, 
when those who wanted the Fathers to handle their silver were called Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu. Tçuzu’s involvement was harshly criticized by Bishop 
Luís Cerqueira, who pointed out that during the negotiations over the pancada price 
Rodrigues got too much involved in it, with a consequent as well as unsuitable loss of 
religious care and prudence.610 It was this point in particular that resulted unacceptable 
to Claudio Acquaviva.  
Whilst in other occasions, like the very silk trade, he passed from prohibition to 
permission after having being better informed, in this case he acted differently. He 
noticed that writing to Valignano was not always useful, since the visitor always found 
a justification and, even without one, eventually took the decisions he deemed 
preferable despite Acquaviva’s opposition. Hence, with regard to the Fathers’ handling 
of Japanese silver, he took the matter on his hands. In 1604, he wrote both to 
Alessandro Valignano and Francesco Pasio to remedy to the situation and stated that ‘de 
nenhuma maneira convinha que pessoa alguma da Compañía se meta em o dar da 
pancada da seda em Japão; nem se fação em nossa casa semelhantes contratações ou 
repartições da dita seda’. In the letter to Pasio, he warned the vice-provincial that ‘ainda 
que eu estou cuidando que dirão que fomos cá mal informados, e que querem propor 
suas rezões, todavia eu emcargo a V. R. que ponha em execução o que se lhe aqui 
                                                 
608 See RPJ, f. 39: ‘Não se encarregaranenhum dinheyro de fora,hora seja de Jappãos, hora seja de 
Portuguezes para mandar a China sem ordem do Superior e da mesma maneira não se encarregara de fato 
de fora, o qual venha da China, para elle o vender ca em Jappão nem recolherão emcaza dinheiro, ou fato 
depositado de pessoas de fora sem ordem particular,ou geral do Superior pellos muytos inconvenientes 
que dahy se seguem.’ 
609 Apud Alden, The Making of an Enterprise, p. 536. 
610 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 21, ff. 135-137v. 
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escreve e que não deixe de o comprir assi’. 611 Eventually, João Rodrigues himself 
acknowledged that getting so close to political matters and secular lords was too 
dangerous. In his personal memorandum on the procurator office, in fact, he firmly 
stated that a Jesuit should not take responsibility for the money of rulers in the course of 
trade.612 Opposition to the handling of laymen’s silver came also from Jesuits in Japan. 
One of them, Father Nicolao da Costa, severely criticized both Valignano and Pasio for 
allowing and fostering such practice.613  
Before leaving for Macao in March 1612, after having being reproached by the 
general, the bishop and by his confrères and after having experienced personally the 
consequences of getting too involved in the export of silver, Pasio compiled the 
Obediencias dos Visitadores feito para os Padres das Residencias e mais Padres de 
Iapam,614 where he declared: 
‘Guardese [...] em particular de não se encarregarem os nossos das fazendas alheas que os 
seculares de dentro ou de fora de Japão lhes encomendarem, pello que se manda em virtude 
de Santa Obediencia a todos os desta Provincia assi Padres como Irmaõs assi Europeos como 
Japoens ainda aos mesmos Superiores e Reitores, e ao Procurador da Provincia que se não 
encarreguem de nenhum fato alheyo para o vender ou feitorizar, nem por outros’.615 
Carlo Spinola was quite relieved when he came to know about this order in virtute de 
Sanctæ Obedientiæ. According to him, being dispensed from taking on laymen’s silver 
made the post of procurator ‘mais leve’.616 The procurator confided his relief both to 
Acquaviva and to António Mascarenhas and to the former revealed also that in 1612 
                                                 
611 General Acquaviva to Vice-provincial Pasio, Rome, 13 December 1604. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 3, f. 32v. 
Acquaviva ordered to stop the involvement in the pancada’s negotiations also on 9 December 1608. Cf. 
ARSI, Jap. Sin. 3, f. 35v. 
612 See Couzas que podem server par os Procuradores, § 35 – Convem que haja sempre a obbediencia 
contra a mercancia ainda para com o Tenca Dono, BA/JA, Cód. 49-V-8, ff. 646v-647. Cf. Oka, “A 
Memorandum by Tçuzu Rodrigues: The Office of Procurador and Trade by the Jesuits in Japan”, p. 87. 
613 Cf. Father Nicolao da Costa to the Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas, Japan, 26 February 
1612. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [I], ff. 118-122, in particular ff. 118v-119v. 
614 In RAH/Jes. Legajo 21, 9/7236 [I], ff. 40-54v. 
615 Cap. 13 – De algumas cousas que em comum se prohibem. Ivi, f. 48v. Probably not much later Pasio 
finished writing the Obediencias, Acquaviva sent another letter to the visitor inviting him to stop the 
involvement in the handling of Japanese silver. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 3, f. 41. Later in 1618, Visitor 
Francisco Vieira reported that even after Acquaviva’s prohibition had reached Japan, some of those who 
got involved in this forbidden trade found it quite difficult to abandon it. He referred in particular to 
Pasio, whom he accused to having taken with him to Macao more than 35’000 taéis of silver to be 
invested in China, and although Spinola warned him that it was something against Acquaviva’s order, 
Pasio allegedly answered ‘he verdade, mas isto he candea que se vai ja apagando e eu não soube negar 
isto a estas pessoas’. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 17, f. 154v. 
616 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 158v and f. 159. 
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they sent to Macao silver to the value of 18’000 cruzados belonging to laymen. Spinola 
described the amount of work he had to carry out when the ship came back in August: 
‘Quantas vezes dessejei que V. P. vira esta casa do procurador quando veu a nao o anno 
passado, e nella o retorno da prata dos Japões, [...] porque foy trabalho de muytas semanas o 
repartir a cada hum o seu, dandolhe diversas layas de peças; e foy tal o labirinto de contas, e 
occupação minha, e de muytas pessoas, que me pareçera exageração o que dixe hum Padre 
que o tinha provado, que os superiores não podiam obrigar, a feitorizar prata alhea, por ser 
cousa mera secular, depois esperimentando a difficuldade, que nisso ha, entendi que o dixera 
com grande fundamento, e casi toda a repugnancia, que algunos tiveram de aceitar este 
officio, foy esta’.617 
He used almost the same words in the letter to Mascarenhas,618 and was not alone in his 
appreciation of Acquaviva’s order. Geronimo de Angelis 619  and João Rodrigues 
Giram620 expressed similar ideas in 1613.  
In these letters, Spinola wrote about what used to happen when he distributed the 
results of the investment of Japanese silver. Yet, in 1612 he had to deal also with an 
investigation regarding two ‘paens douro de dez taeis cada pam’, which in 1606 a 
Portuguese merchant in Macao, Francisco Vaz, entrusted to the Procurator of Japan in 
Macao Manoel Gaspar to be sold in Japan.621 Basically, Francisco Vaz accused the 
Japan Jesuits of being guilty of losing his gold and demanded the repayment of the total 
sum. For the province’s defense, Spinola had to provide official documents for the 
investigation, which included the sworn statements of three Portuguese moradores of 
Nagasaki, and deliver them to the Captain Major Pedro Martins Gaio aboard the Nao S. 
Philippe e S. Tiago. According to these documents, when the Great Ship arrived in 
                                                 
617 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 159. 
618 See Procurator Carlo Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas [?], Nagasaki, Spring 
1612. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 158v: ‘[...] o Padre Visitador fez huma ordem in virtute obedientiæ, que não 
mandassemos prata de pessoas de fora a Macao, nem a feitorizassemos, mas porque o Padre se hia, e 
muytos lhe pidirão, que levasse sua prata, foy muyta em nosso nome, e credo ha de ter trabalho em 
negociala, e empregàla toda, e depois de vindo ca o emprego, não pode cuidar V. R. o trabalho, que tem o 
procurador, e as queixas, porque não se pode contentar a todos, e sempre vem muyta perda à Companhia, 
e basta homem correr com o nosso fato para estar demasiadamente occupado, sem feitorizar o alhes; pello 
que se houvera de fechar esta porta com obediencia de N. Padre, para que nos escusassemos de tantos 
enfadamentos bem alheos de nossa profissão, e assi esta carga ficaria mais leve, e os jappões 
entendericão, que de nos não hão de esperar se não o seu proveito espiritual’. 
619 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 34, f. 21. 
620 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [II], f. 235. 
621 The original official documents regarding this topic are in ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [I], ff. 159-161. Cf. also 
the letter that the fathers of the province sent to Acquaviva by way of explanation of the event on 29 
January 1616. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 [II], ff. 293-294v. 
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Japan in 1606, Hasegawa Sahyōei confiscated all the gold, sealed it and had it stored in 
the procuratoria, probably because it was a safe warehouse and only the procurator and 
the Father superior were in possess of the keys.622 Since the gold could not be invested 
or recovered, Francisco Vaz asked Procurator João Coelho to sell it whenever it was 
possible and ‘lhe ariscasem623 o proçedido do ouro da contenda [...] por sua concta na 
dita nao por modo licito, uzado e praticado comunmente nestas partes da India, entre 
mercadores e pessoas que tem com que ho possa pagar no lugar onde se manda dar o 
dinheiro ou levem fazendas sufisientez na mesma Nao em que se toma o risco pera com 
ellas pagar em cazo que lhe falte en terra’.624 Once Hasegawa finally released his seal, 
then, Coelho managed to sell all the gold and started to distribute the silver among the 
investors or their procurators. However, Francisco Vaz’s share was loaded onto André 
Pessoa’s Nossa Senhora da Graça, whose story has already being told.  
The Japan Jesuits conducted their defense by stating that they loaded Vaz’s gold 
in the ship according to the way other traders did and that the other merchants who lost 
their capital in the Nossa Senhora da Graça did not file any complaint against their 
procurators in Japan. Eventually, the matter was settled in favour of the Society of 
Jesus, yet although for the Japan Jesuits everything ended up positively, this case clearly 
shows that handling outsiders’ capital might have bad implications for the mission. 
Only during Spinola’s procuratorship, in fact, the prohibition was enforced again by 
Acquaviva on 25 March 1614 and at least three times by General Vitelleschi, in 1616, in 
1617 and in 1619.625 The last one was necessary in order to answer to Visitor Francisco 
                                                 
622 See RPJ, f. 37: ‘Sua Residencia serà em Nangasaque onde terà a curas, e gudoems [storehouses] 
sufficientes com suas chaves seguras, e bem guardadas para agazelhar todo o fato que arecada da Nao’, 
and f. 39, where it is specified that out of necessity and convenience the procurator had a crate which only 
he could open: ‘Terà o Procurador em sua cura dous ou trez caixoens da India em que estarà a prata, cada 
hum dos quaes terà duas chaves dos quaes huma terà-a elle, e outra o Superior da Caza, e dentro estarà 
hum livro em cada caixão em que se escreve a prata que se mete e a que se tira escrevendo o dia, e anno e 
porque serà muyto trabalho cada vez que o Procurador tiverà necessidades de prata ajuntar as chaves 
avera outro caixão ou escritorio onde estarà alguma somade prata para o gasto do qual o Procurador terà a 
chave’. 
623 The risk (rischio in Italian, risco in Portuguese, riesgo in Spanish, from the Latin risicum) started to be 
considered an object with an intrinsic and quantifiable value in particular from the 16th century onwards, 
although in the monastic area the debate over the topic can be traced back to the second half of the 13th 
century. The Dominican Domingo de Soto (1495-1560) was one of the first theologian-philosophers to 
postulate the idea that in the insurance contracts also the assumption of the risk in the transportation had 
to be paid. For a good historical analysis on the risicum from its inception until the 16th century refer to 
Ceccarelli, Il Gioco e il Peccato: Economia e Rischio nel Tardo Medioevo, pp. 20-36. 
624 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [I], ff. 159-159v. 
625 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 3, f. 44 for Acquaviva and f. 53v and f. 54v for Vitelleschi. 
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Vieira, who had asked Vitelleschi to cancel Acquaviva’s order, yet the general remained 
adamant.626  
By that time, however, the state of the Christendom had been already 
irremediably compromised by the latest occurrences in Japan. In 1613 the Tokugawa 
bakufu welcomed another European country on its territory – the English of the East 
India Company,627 and in 1615 had to face the last obstacle to an undisputed supremacy 
that would last until the second half of the 19th century – Toyotomi Hideyori and his 
retainers gathered at Ōsaka. Furthermore, between the two events, the bakufu issued the 
expulsion order for all the Roman missionaries. Almost all of the 114 Jesuits present in 
Japan left the country, yet 18 Fathers and nine Brothers were selected to remain in 
captivity.628 Among them, there was also Carlo Spinola, who had to thank his loathed 
office for that: 
‘Eu quando recusei este officio, não soubi o que fazia, e agora vejo que foy particular merçe 
de Deus, porque se não o tivera nesta conjunçam, como me faltão as partes que se requerem 
pera quem ha de andar entre tantos perigos, não me ouvera o Padre Provincial de deixar em 
Japam, o que fora pera mim de grande afliçam, porem como faço nisto algum serviço a 
Companhia, e procuro de ajudar os christãos, estou muy consolado, ate que Deus nos dee paz, 
e venha outro que o faça milhor’.629 
 
 IV. 4.    The procurator of Japan during the Tokugawa’s persecution of 
Christianity 
 February 1614 was a watershed in the history of the evangelization in early 
modern Japan. In that month, in fact, the abbot of Nanzenji, the Zen monk Ishin Sūden, 
                                                 
626 See General Vitelleschi to Visitor Vieira, Rome, 15 January 1619. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-56, ff. 199v-
200: ‘Considerey devagar o que V. R. me dis acerca da patente e preceito do Padre Claudio, e com assas 
dezejo dever se podia dar a V.R. alguma satisfação nesta parte, mas em nenhuma maneira posso 
alargarme nesta materia, pois o preceito se poz para dar satisfação assim a El Rey, como ao Papa das 
muitas queixas que havia de nos mercadejarmos’. 
627 The English ship Clove reached Hirado on 11 June 1613. After a friendly reception by the local 
daimyo Matsuura Shigenobu and a delay until Adams arrived, Saris went up to visit Tokugawa Ieyasu at 
Shizuoka and his son Hidetada at Edo. With the help of Adams the English obtained permission to settle 
at Edo and to trade throughout Japan. Regarding the English presence in Japan we followed in particular 
Farrington, The English Factory in Japan 1613-1623, 2 vols. 
628 Cf. Procurator Spinola to Cardinal Filippo Spinola, Nagasaki, 29 March 1615. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, ff. 
177-177v. 
629 Procurator Carlo Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal António Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 18 March 1616. 
ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 181v. 
266 
 
was summoned into Ieyasu’s presence at Edo castle and ordered to produce a statement 
on the expulsion of the Roman missionaries. From 1608 onwards, Sūden had been 
dealing with the drafting of the bakufu’s foreing correspondence, like the letter Ieyasu 
sent to the viceroy of New Spain in 1612, and other important documents, such as the 
Kinchū narabi ni Kugechū shohatto of July 1615.630 In the first days of February 1614, 
anyway, Sūden delivered the statement to Ieyasu and Hidetada. The text was issued 
over Hidetada’s shuin-jō and instructions were given to disseminate it throughout the 
country.631  
 The reasons that led Tokugawa Ieyasu to the issue of the anti-Christian edict are 
two in particular. The first one – the Okamoto Daihachi incident – has already been 
dealt with. The second one, on the other hand, regarded the Japanese Christianity and 
the worship of those punished by the Tokugawa’s laws. 632 Two cases in particular 
provoked Ieyasu’s indignation. As we saw, after Arima Harunobu’s attempt to recover 
the coveted territories was exposed, the daimyō was executed and the lordship passed to 
his son, Naozumi, a former Christian who soon turnerd out to be a persecutor of the 
Western faith. In effect, Naozumi, soon after having taken possession of the fief, 
condemned to death eight Japanese Christians. Arima Christians visited the execution 
site to pray for the martyrs and to collect relics, yet their actions were interpreted by the 
Japanese officers as acts defiant of Naozumi’s orders. 633  Only a month later, in 
November 1613, the bakufu ordered the crucifixion of six Japanese, among which there 
was a notorious counterfeiter from Nagasaki, a Christian named Jirobioye. The 
                                                 
630 禁中並びに公家中諸法度, the Code for the Imperial Court and Court Nobility was issued shortly 
after the Ōsaka campaigns against Hideyori along with the Buke Shohatto 武家諸法度. They were rules 
consolidating the bakufu’s power both over the bushi and the aristocracy. Although these instructions 
were not as restricting as historians had been claiming, in particular those regarding the court, it is a fact 
that the shōgun considered within his prerogatives to regulate and control both the domains of the military 
houses and the nobility. For a thorough analysis of Ieyasu’s regulations for the Imperial court see Butler, 
“Tokugawa Ieyasu’s Regulations for the Court: A Reappraisal”, pp. 525-538. Butler provides also an 
English translation of the text. Cf. also Asao and Jansen, “Shogun and Tennō”, p. 263 and De Palma, 
“L’interpretazione della sovranità giapponese da parte delle diplomazie occidentali nel XIX secolo”, pp. 
178-179.  
631 Cf. Elison, “The Evangelic Furnace: Japan’s First Encounter with the West”, pp. 148-149 and Boxer, 
The Christian Century, pp. 317-318. 
632 As summarized by Valentim Carvalho: ‘[A] ley dos Christãos era tal que ensinava e persuadia a adorar 
não só aos que seus Senhores mandavão matar por lhes não obedecerem, mas tambem aos malfeitores que 
erão iustiçados por quebrantarem as leis do reino’. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 [II], f. 44. 
633 See Father Gabriel de Matos to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 21 March 1614. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 [II], 
f. 56: ‘[R]everencião os Christãos aos que seus Senhores cortão, e quejmão, fundase no fervor, que 
mostrarão o Outubro passado os christãos de Arima, quando por ordem de Arimadono, e conselho do 
mesmo Safioye forãos assados vivos os oito martyres [...], porque não estavão seus corpos ainda 
quejmados de todo, quando alguns Christãos entrarão polo meyo do fogo aos tomar’. 
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counterfeiter was accused of having bought ‘prata fundida sem cunhos’,634 which was 
illegal, and having taken it to Nagasaki. Once again, Japanese Christians gathered in the 
execution site to pay their homages to the dead and the bakufu accused them of 
worshipping men punished by the law of the country. Valentim Carvalho, however, 
objected that those Christians who were at the execution ‘quando virão morrer o 
Christão que estava crucificado, com a lançada que se custuma dar a semelhantes, se 
poserão de joelhos e encomendarão a Deos sua alma, tomarão daqui os gentios occasião 
pera dizer que os Christãos adorão os malfeitores e isto forão contar a el Rei por cousa 
muito certa e verdadeira’.635  
João Rodrigues Giram and Carlo Spinola, however, thought that those were just 
pretexts and the real motive for the persecution was to be found elsewhere. As the 
Portuguese wrote to Claudio Acquaviva, the blame was to be put on the Spaniards, the 
Hollanders and the English: 
‘[A] principal causa, segundo corria entre nos e alguns christãos mais entendidos [...] foi 
rezam de estado; por vim em sospeitas vendo tantos Castelhanos assi religiosos como 
seculares vir a Japam por tantas vias, que pollo tempo multiplicandose mais os seculares 
europeos lhe viriam a não obedecer, e se alevantar contra elle, e ainda a tomar o reino. Estas 
sospeitas lhe fomentarão os Oladeses e Engrese hereges, que ca estam e vem quasi todos os 
annos dizendo-lhe que por via da dilataçam da nossa Santa Ley tomavamos os reinos, e terras, 
ao que se aiuntou o sondar dos portos do Capitam Castelhano636 que veo os annos atras da 
Nova Hespanha direito a este Japam, o qual lhe acrecentou mais estas sospeitas, confirmou 
mais nellas, e fez grandemente agastar contra nos, e nossa Santa Ley’.637   
Be that as it may, Ieyasu and Hidetada drew their own conclusions, which were by no 
means favourable for the Japanese Christendom. The ōgosho and the shōgun sent orders 
to the governors of Miyako, Fushimi, Ōsaka and Sakai to draw a list of all the papist 
missionaries (Fathers, Brothers, dōjuku and servants) in their zone. In the Miyako area, 
                                                 
634 Ibid. 
635 Provincial Valentim Carvalho to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 19 March 1614. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 
[II], f. 44. 
636 Sebastián Vizcaíno. 
637 Father João Rodrigues Giram to General Acquaviva, Macao, 23 December 1614. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 
[II], f. 122v. For Spinola’s opinion see ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 162.  
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the order was put into effect in mid-February, but the Jesuits had already been informed 
that something heinous was in motion by the Nagasaki bugyō in December 1613.638  
On 14 February, the Jesuits were expelled from the capital city and sent to 
Nagasaki.639 The persecution aimed not only to the Christians as a group, but also as a 
cultural establishment. The intransigence of the bakufu’s decree is evident also in the 
letters from the English factory at Hirado. Richard Cocks,640 the cape-merchant of the 
trading post, in March 1614 told that he was forced to remove the English flag they used 
to put out on Sunday because it had a cross in it, which although ‘was not made in 
forme of the crose of Christ but rather for a badge or toaken wherby the English nation 
was knowne from all others […]. Yet all would not serve, but downe it must […], 
[since] it was the Emperor’s will it should be soe, only we might put out any other mark 
we wold, a crose only excepted, & that ships cominge might beare a crose upon the 
water nut not on land’.641 
Only three days after the Jesuits expulsion from Miyako, Bishop Luís Cerqueira 
died. Consequently, it was necessary to designate a vicar and on 22 February Valentim 
Carvalho was chosen to fill the vacant post. 642  In October, Provincial Carvalho 
convened the first Provincial Conference of Japan in order to elect a provincial 
procurator destined for Europe to brief Paul V and the Hapsburg Crown on the new 
Japanese status quo. Having in mind what we have written about the division among the 
Fathers, it is important to stress that also after the bakufu had issued the edict of 
expulsion, there were still room for disunity in the mission. According to Spinola and 
another Italian, Giovanni Battista Zola, in fact, Carvalho delayed the call of the 
conference because he was afraid that the votes of Italians and Spaniards could result in 
the defeat of the Portuguese candidate. 643  However, Spinola wrote that he himself 
                                                 
638 See the translation of Hasegawa’s letter in the Petição, e mais papeis aprezentados Pelo Padre Carlos 
de Espinola Procurador da Companhia de JESUS da Provincia de Jappam, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-5, f. 533v. 
639 Provincial Carvalho to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, March 1614. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [II], ff. 323-
323v. 
640 Richard Cocks (c1565-1624) was an English man from Stafford. He was employed by the East India 
Company probably thanks to his knowledge of the cloth trade and the Spanish language. He was part of 
the crew that reached Japan in 1613 and was chosen as head of the new factory at Hirado. His first years 
at Hirado were spent in organizing the factory and its sub-agencies and in fitting out voyages for South-
East-Asia. However, as early as 1621, he was strongly advised to wind up the factory but he ignored the 
order. In May 1623 the Council at Batavia sent the Bull on a special voyage to close the factory. He 
reached Batavia on 27 January 1624 and died in March. Cf. Farrington, op. cit., p. 1550. 
641 Richard Cocks to Richard Wickham, Hirado, 7 March 1614. In Farrington, op. cit., p. 138.  
642 Cf. RAH/Jes. Legajo 22/9/7239 [I], f. 277. 
643 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 172 for Spinola and f. 249 for Zola. 
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reassured Carvalho that for the province’s sake the first choice should be a 
Portuguese.644 Thus, the procurator interceded on behalf of the whole mission in order 
to maintain peace and union at least during the first days of persecution, as Francesco 
Pasio wished when he appointed Spinola to the post.645  
It is important to stress how this early chauvinism seems to take almost no 
interest in the consequences the delay might have caused to the missionaries. Two days 
before the conference ended, on Sunday 26 October, the fathers started to pack up to 
leave Japan. Differently from what happened with Toyotomi Hideyoshi and his 
expulsion decree, in this case it was soon clear that the bakufu was posing a serious 
threat to their lives and to the Japanese Christianity. During the conference last day, in 
fact, the fathers were driven out of Nagasaki.646 Most fathers concentrated at Fukuda – 
‘duas legoas nossas de Nangasaqi’,647 whereas a small part remained in a quinta which 
belonged to the province near Nagasaki. During those days they were rigorously 
guarded from all contact with the Japanese Christians. They had to remain there only for 
a while, since on 6 November the Nao do Trato and a small ship set sail for Macao, 
whereas the small ship for Manila sailed on 19. Before November 1614, there were 116 
Jesuits in Japan between fathers and brothers, a month later only 27. As for the numbers 
of those who left, Provincial Carvalho wrote that ‘viemos de Japam desterrados a este 
Collegio de Macao treinta, e tres Padres, e vintanove Irmãos, os mais delles Japões [...], 
e sincoenta, e tres dojucos [...]. E por quanto no Collegio de Macao nem podia caber 
                                                 
644 See Procurator Carlo Spinola to General Acquaviva [SOLI], Nagasaki, 27 March 1615. ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 36, f. 172. ‘não havia de ser primeiro loco se não portugues, e com muytas rezões persuadi aos 
Padres Italianos, e Castelhanos que pro bono pacis [...] não convinha fazer procurador de outra nação que 
portuguesa, e assi os que tiverão mais votos forão portogueses’. Spinola’s intervention nonetheless, the 
election of the provincial procurator took a lot of time, since there was disagreement also among the 
Portuguese fathers. Giovanni Battista Porro, indeed, wrote Acquaviva that to elect the procurator nine 
ballots were necessary, because two Portuguese, Gabriel de Matos and Francisco Pacheco had received 
the same number of votes. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 [II], ff. 149-150. Eventually, Pacheco changed his vote 
because he saw that Valentim Carvalho was obstructing his election and Matos was chosen to go to 
Europe along with Pedro Morejón, the former through Macao and the latter through Manila. Cf. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin. 16 [II], ff. 95-95v.  
645 It has to be added that between Spinola and Carvalho there was a particular hostility. We can be pretty 
sure about that, since we have confirmations from other Jesuits, too. For example, we have an anonymous 
letter written to the Visitor of the Province, which states that ‘a paixão que o padre [Carvalho] tem em 
materia de naçõens, e a pouca união que tem com estrangeiros elles o digão, e se ha quem o não saiba; e 
ainda com alguns portugueses esteve mal por isso, e quebreu com elles; hum dos seus queixumes he que 
falo com o Padre Carlos, e com italianos; [...] nesta eleição de nosso Padre Geral [Muzio Vitelleschi] 
disse, que fora a meis não poder, e por o Papa o querer fazer, e que la levavão os italianos o general da 
Companhia, como o Papado da Igreia; com outras cousas bem desnecessarias’. Anonymous Father to 
Visitor Francisco Vieira, Nagasaki, 1617. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 5. 
646 See Vice-provincial Jerónimo Rodrigues to General Acquaviva, Japan, 4 November 1614. ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 16 [II], f. 103. Cf. Boxer, op. cit., pp. 326-327. 
647 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 [II], f. 103. 
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mais gente, e os Chinas tem grandes sospeitas dos Japões [...], mandei de Japam à 
Manila oito Padres, sinco delles Hespanhoes, hum Italiano e dous Portugueses’.648  
Despite the great number of Jesuits who left Japan, it must have been perfectly 
obvious to the Japanese officials that a considerable portion of missionaries had stayed. 
Those European missionaries who had remained camouflaged themselves as Iberian 
traders domiciled at Nagasaki, whereas the Japanese brothers and dōjuku had no 
problem in going unnoticed. Provincial Mateus de Couros in 1618 gave a detailed 
description of the disguising practices of the Fathers: 
‘E porque as feições dos Europeos são muy differentes das dos Japões, posto que de ordinario 
somos conhecidos, todavia com nos disfarçarmos e andarmos de noite, procuramos de acudir 
a nossos ministerios. De tres maneiras se disfarção os nossos Europeos. Aqui em Nangasaqui, 
como he porto aonde cada anno vem os navios de Macao, e das Philippinas, dous ou tres 
Padres e dous Irmãos andão em trajos de Portuguezes honestos. Dos demais Padres assi aqui, 
como nas outras partes de Japam, huns andão com a barba e cabeça rapada e com trajos 
compridos como andão em Japam os que ia professão vida quieta, deixadas as armas, ou a 
renda que possuhiam a seus filhos morgados. Outros andam com o cabello creçido e atado a 
uzo de Japam, com hum terçadinho na cinta como andam os seculares, conformandose cada 
hum aos lugares per onde descorre e a gente com quem trata. Dos Padres Irmãos Japões quasi 
todos andão ou como rapados ou como seculares. O trajo de todos he honesto e limpo, sem 
uzarem de seda, tirando os que aqui em Nangasaqui se vestem como Portuguezes, os quais 
trazem alguns vestidos de tafeta, que he os mesmos de que nestas partes uza a gente 
Portugueza. Os que tratão como Japoens comumente se vestem de algodão, porque que alguns 
por respeito dos lugares onde estam uzão de certo pano feito de borra de seda, chamado 
tçumugui649 de que se veste a gente honrada ordinaria. Em todos estes trajos não há cor certa, 
como tambem a não ha nos de Japam, posto que sempre os nossos uzam da mais honesta’.650 
This letter, however, was written only two months before Spinola was captured. By the 
end of 1614, in fact, the persecution had barely started, yet the missionaries had no 
more powerful daimyō to count on, the last of them being Takayama Ukon who went to 
                                                 
648 See Provincial Carvalho to General Acquaviva, Macao, 30 December 1614. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 [I], f. 
131. Differently from what stated by Carvalho with regard to the fathers sent to Macao, other sources 
affirm that the number of those sent to China was 73. Cf. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-55, p. 50 and p. 313. 
Another document, on the other hand, states that the Jesuits were actually 65. Cf. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-5, f. 
191.  
649 紬 tsumugi nowadays it translates “taffeta” into Japanese. 
650 See Provincial Mateus de Couros to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 8 October 1610. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
35, f. 84. 
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Manila together with the missionaries. 651  Furthermore, as reported by Valentim 
Carvalho and confirmed by the English, Japanese soldiers started to destroy Jesuits’ 
buildings in Nagasaki even before the missionaries set off for Macao.652 Before the final 
decision to leave Japan was taken, however, the Jesuits tried one last thing ‘para 
abrandar o Rey’, as Carvalho put it.  
 In 1614, in fact, Macao arranged to send the Nossa Senhora da Vida with 
Captain Major João Serrão da Cunha to Nagasaki. Since Ieyasu made it perfectly clear 
that his prohibition was aimed solely at the missionaries, and that the traders from 
Macao would continue to be warmly welcomed, provided that they confined their 
activities to commercial matters, the Japan Jesuits asked Serrão to plead personally with 
Ieyasu for the retention of one solitary church in Nagasaki for the use of the Portuguese, 
as had been implicitly permitted in Hideyoshi’s time. The Captain Major was willing to 
do what was asked of him, but the project was abandoned as Nagasaki bugyō refused to 
countenance it.653  
The missionaries in Japan had realized that the state of the country was changing 
for the worse even before Arima Naozumi sentenced the eight Christian to death. In 
March 1613, in fact, Luís Cerqueira gave to Claudio Acquaviva a concise account of the 
conditions of the Christian missions throughout Japan. Although he had no negative 
news to report, he ended the letter with a statement that foreshadowed the future 
persecution: ‘eu não estou com o curacao reposaudo’.654 Exactly one year later, that is a 
month later the Fathers were driven out of Miyako, Carvalho already described the 
forthcoming storm as ‘a mais brava perseguição que ategora ouve em Japão [...], agora 
                                                 
651 See Father Andrea Caro to General Acquaviva, Manila, 16 July 1615. ARSI, Philipp. 11, f. 69: ‘Vino 
con los nuestros [exiled] a esta Provincia el famoso Capitan Justo Ucondono desterrado con su mujer, 
hija, et cinco nietos. Fue recebido de todos, como merecia’. The Governor of the Philippines Juan de 
Silva granted to the group of Japanese who seek refuge in Manila 1’000 pesos per year. Cf. AGI, 
Contaduria 1210, f. 339v. 
652 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 [I], f. 131 and Farrington, op. cit., pp. 136-137.  
653 Cf. Boxer, O Grande Navio, p. 74 and ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 [I], ff. 131-131v. Carvalho specified that 
before asking the Captain-major, Macao’s embassador went to Ieyasu’s court in order to deliver ‘certos 
apontamentos, e petiçam que fizemos pera aprezentar a El Rey [...]; com tudo nada aproveitou, porque 
vendo os privados d’El Rey que estava muito indiniado contra os Christaos, nenhum delles ouzou a 
interceder por nôs por mais meyos, que pera isso buscou, e applicou o dito Embaixador’. ARSI, Ibid.   
654 See Bishop Cerqueira to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 20 March 1613. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 15 [II], f. 
264. 
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está tão asanhado o rey que determina não deixar pedra sobre pedra e arrancar de raiz o 
nome Christão e desterrar os pregadores do Evangelho’.655 
Although the shape of things to come had been clearly shown by the Arima 
martyrs in 1613 and the bakufu’s attitude in 1614, then, a temporary reprieve was 
granted to the Christendom by the outbreak of the Ōsaka campaign 656  and to the 
province by the arrival of the Nossa Senhora da Vida in summer. For the English at 
Hirado it was the first time they saw the Great Ship arriving at Nagasaki. Richard Cocks 
left some interesting words about it and how the silk price was inflated by its arrival:  
‘Ther came a great gallion or ship of Portingalls from Amacau in Chyna this year to 
Langasaque in Japan, very ritchly laden w’th silke and China stuffes. Shee brought but 300 
pecull raw silke, w’ch is butt little in respect other ships wear wont to bringe heartofore, and 
yett hath sould none of it to this hower. Silke was worth 270 taies the pecull before she came 
in, but now worth but 230, and yet no vent at that price for everyone keepeth ther mony by 
them by meanes of the brut of thease warrs till thay see what it will com unto; for other sortes 
Chyna stuffes, as velvets, sattines, damasks, taffaties and sucklike, thay ar sould accordineg to 
ther goodness, as thay ar w’th yow’.657 
We do not know whether in 1614 the pancada price met Portuguese expectations. Yet, 
even if it did and if we are to believe Richard Cocks, the amount of silk the Nossa 
Senhora da Vida took to Japan was too small to yield a great income.658 On his part, in 
the surviving letters from 1614 and 1615, Spinola did not spend a lot of words related to 
the silk trade. This was probably due to Acquaviva’s ordem in virtute Sanctæ 
Obedientiæ of abstaining from handling outsiders’ capital, which basically brought back 
the post of procurator to a normal state and reduced Spinola’s engagement in the silk 
trade. He limited to write to António Mascarenhas that he was unable to write earlier 
owing to the ‘muyta pressa que derão aos nossos em fazelos embarcar para Macao, e 
Luçon, e as muytas occupações que tivi em por em cobro o fato da Companhia, e aviar 
                                                 
655 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 [II], f. 44. 
656 In March 1615, Carlo Spinola wrote to his uncle Filippo that after the new persecutions in Arima that 
cost the life of 45 Christians, he was waiting for the same to happen in Nagasaki, yet ‘con la nuova che 
venne delle alterationi d’Ozaca, et guerra che cominciava tral figlo di Taicosama, el’Imperatore che 
perseguita li christiani; i capitani, et soldati deputati per il martyrio, si partirno di pressa, et restò questa 
città libera dal furore gentilico, et perciò non hebbi occasione di offerirme al martyrio’. See ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 36, f. 177. 
657 See Richard Cocks to John Jourdain, Hirado, 10 December 1614. In Farrington, op. cit., p. 247. 
658 Moreover, the Great Ship was forced to leave before all the return cargo had been taken aboard and 
consequently the Captain Major’s share was insufficient to discharge his load of debt, and he returned to 
India a bankrupt man. Cf. Boxer, op. cit., pp. 74-75. 
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os navios’.659 However, this substantial lack of first-hand data on the 1614 and 1615 
trade at Nagasaki660 gives us the chance to deal closely with the basic occupations of the 
procurator both when the Great Ship berthed at Nagasaki and when was about to set off. 
Valignano’s Regimento dedicated only an article – the 18th –to the duties of the 
procurator on the returning voyage. The Regimento stated that before the ship left, the 
procurator had to submit to the provincial the list of goods to be bought at Canton and 
the quantity of silver in the procurator’s possession, so that the provincial ‘ordene a 
cantidade da prata que poderà hir a China’.661 Although, then, the procurator was the 
one in charge with the management of the finance of the province, it was up to the 
provincial to establish the amount of silver to send to Macao. 
The departure of the Great Ship for Macao was placed halfway along the year of 
a procurator. The procurator of Japan, in fact, had his own calendar. His account books 
started with the arrival of the ship from Macao, usually in August, and ended by the 
time a new ship arrived. 662  Within two months from the arrival of the ship, the 
procurator was supposed to have finished compiling his books and presented them to his 
superior. The books were normally two. In the first one, in addition to the transcriptions 
of Valignano’s Regimento and the list of ‘todas as Rendas que Japão tem, assim em 
Espanha do Summo Pontifice, como na India, Malaca, e China, e em Jappão e 
juntamente o que costuma arendar cada couza destas’,663 the procurator had to compile 
the list of the provisions and goods shipped from Macao. Although Spinola’s version of 
the first book does not survive, in order to understand its meticulousness we can rely 
upon the book used and composed by João Coelho in 1609 entitled Narração Breve do 
Número das Casas, da Gente, da Renta, e Gastos da Companhia de Jappão.664 The 
former procurator divided the Narração into twelve títulos (sections), each one of them 
dedicated to the description of the possession and the expenses of the vice-province in 
Japan and Macao. Coelho’s Narração ends with schematic summaries of the total 
                                                 
659 See Procurator Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 25 March 1615. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin. 36, f. 170. 
660 Richard Cocks makes an exception. On 20 December 1615, he wrote to a colleague of him in Siam 
that the Great ship ‘brought som 900 picos of Canton silke, w’ch they have sould at 165 taeis the pico’. 
Cf. Farrington, op. cit., p. 361. If on the one hand the quantity of silk diminished compared to the Japan 
voyage of 1612, when the cargo of silk amounted to 1’300 picols, on the other hand it increased threefold 
with respect to 1614, when the price consequently decreased of 105 taéis per picol. 
661 Cf. RPJ, f. 39. 
662 Ivi, ff. 37v-38. 
663 Ivi, f. 37v. 
664 Edited in TCJ, pp. 515-539. 
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expenses of the vice-province as established by Valignano in the 6th and 7th articles of 
the Regimento.665  
Resume-se o número dos Collégios, Casas, Residências, Padres, Irmãos,  
collegiaes, moços, Christãos, e prata que se gasta, da Companhia de Jappão. 
# Tres Collégios, hum dos quais hé o de Macao 03 
# Huma casa de Noviciado 01 
# Hum Seminário 01 
# Oito Casas, das quais sam duas reitorais 08 
# Quinze Residências 15 
# Oytenta e tres Padres 83 
# Sento e sincoenta Irmãos 150 
# Quatrocentos e oitenta e sinco moços de serviço 485 
# Duzentos e vinte e dous mil Christãos 222 000 
# Gasta-çe nas casas ettcc. em prata, deixando outros gastos, de que abaixo 
farei menção, 15’670 cruzados de Portugal, que são taeis de prata da China 
14’494, 7 mazes, 5 condorins, os quais feitos em pardaos de realles vem a 
fazer 19’774, 4 mazes 19 774, 4 mazes, 0 
  
Receita da prata que tem Jappão das suas rendas 
# Tem que paga Sua Santidade na Coletaria de Madrid, seis mil Cruzados de 
Cámara, que são pardaos de reales a 773, como valem na China 06539-5-7 
# Tem em Salcete de Goa, que deu Sua Magestade, pardaos de reales 00886-5-5 
# Tem n’alfándega de Malaca, que deu Sua Magestade, pardaos de reales 00650-0-0 
# Tem na renda de Caranja e aldeas do norte da Índia, tyrados os gastos que nellas 
se fazem, pardaos 01000-0-0 
# Tem na cidade de Macao da China de alugares de casa, pardaos 00650-0-0 
 09726-3-2 
  
Despeza de todo o gasto que faz a Companhia de Jappão em hum anno 
# Pagão-sse de fretes e direitos na China aos Capitães das Naos da Índia e de 
Malaca de trazerem os 9000 pardaos a 7 por 100 00630-0-0 
# Faz-sse de gastos na Índia com os sogeitos que vêm do Reino pera Jappão, e com 
o Padre Procurador de Jappão que reside em Goa, hum anno por outro, pardaos 00700-0-0 
# Comforme ao que fica dito, gasta-çe com as Casas, Collégios, e Residências, 
pardaos 19 774-4-0 
# Gasta-sse com pobres e desterrados, hum anno por outro 800 Cruzados – são 
pardaos 01009-4-0 
# Monta o gasto comum da Viceprovíncia, hum anno por outro, pardaos 00650-0-0 
# Gasta-sse em presentes, quando se manda visitar o Emperador e outros senhores 
de Jappão, pardaos 01100-0-0 
# Gasta-sse em se fazer edifícios, e em algumas obras que se fazem de novo, hum 
anno por o outro, pardaos 01500-0-0 
# Gasta-sse com os homens que têm cuidado de vigiar e alimpar as igrejas, pardaos 00300-0-0 
# Gasta-sse em viáticos dos nossos que vão de huma parte pera a outra, e em 
correos, pardaos 00250-0-0 
 25 914-1-0 
                                                 
665 See RPJ, f. 37v. 
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Contas resumidas 
Tem Jappão de suas ordínarias 09 726-3-2 
Faz de gasto em hum anno 25 914-1-0 
Fica-lhe faltando, em que pasa a despeza pela receita 16 187-4-2 
Source: TCJ, pp. 537-538. 
In the second book, the procurator had to write the supplies bought in China 
thanks to the alms collected in Japan, the profits from their selling and the statement of 
expenses for the current year. This book was supposed to contain also the list of goods 
sent from Europe and the total amount of capital belonging to the Province of Japan 
both in coin and in silk.666  
After having fulfilled those notarial deeds, the procurator passed to deal with the 
principal tasks outlined by Valignano in the second article of the Regimento, in other 
words providing colleges, houses and residences of their needs. In this duty, the 
procurator was freed from the strict subordination to his superior. In order to quicken 
the distributive process, in fact, the procurator ‘terà licença de prover sem outra nova 
licença do Superior todas as cazas, e Residencias de Jappão’.667 With respect to the 
necessities of the single colleges, houses or residences, it is important to stress out that 
the goods provided by the procurators of Japan in Macao and Japan were not put on the 
province’s account. The procurators bought the merchandises in advance and then sold 
them to the fathers superiors ‘pello mesmo preço que vem da China computados os 
fretes, e direitos que se pagão dellas’.668 Consequently, the procurator had also to keep 
up to date about variations on the prices due to tax increment or decrease and it goes 
without saying that the fathers superior had their own capital to invest in order to 
purchase what they needed. Visitor Francisco Vieira wrote about this point to Muzio 
Vitelleschi while explaining the causes and consequences of handling laymen’s silver. 
Although his letter is marked with harsh criticism against the commercial customs of his 
confrères, it sheds some light upon the matter: 
‘[O]s mais dos Superiores de Japão, Reitores de Nangasaqui, e do Miyaco e outros alguns 
Padres Superiores das Residencias e Vigairos das Inacas669 (assi chamão cá as Igrejas que nas 
outras Christandades da Índia chamamos freguesias nas aldeas) mercadejavão, e chatinavão 
quanto podião, e tinhão todas estas casas seus particulares peculios negotiatione aquiridos, 
                                                 
666 Ivi, f. 38. 
667 Ibid. 
668 Ivi, f. 39v. 
669 田舎, inaka. 
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que cá se chamavão cabedais, Verbi Gratia cabedal do Collegio de Nangasaqui, da casa do 
Miyaco etc. de sorte que esta casa do Miyaco quando se desfez por rezão desta perseguição 
tinha mais de quatro mil taeis de seu cabedal [...]. Além destes cabedais avia cabedal para a 
casa dos Pintores, para os gastos da imprensa, até o Irmão Vicente Carruba torneiro tinha 
cabedal para a sua officina. E todos estes mercadeiavão não somente na terra, mas huns para 
Macao, outros para Philippinas, e outros para outras partes de Cochinchina, Cambodja etc. E 
estas mercancias se fazião com permissão dos Superiores maiores, e Superior maior ouve que 
encomendava aos nossos acrecentassem seus cabedais’.670 
If Vieira is to be trusted, we may infer that each house managed its own capital outside 
the armação in order to increase the purchasing power and to have no problem in 
paying the procurator when the merchandises were delivered. In effect, in 1616 Spinola 
wrote that more than some Fathers started to sell the supplies provided by the procurator 
in order to increase their capital and to buy things without the superiors’ knowledge.671 
In any case, both Spinola and Vieira’s letters referred to activities that had been 
interrupted by Acquaviva and Pasio years before.  
However, we should keep our focus on Vieira’s last words, namely ‘Superior 
maior ouve que encomendava aos nossos acrecentassem seus cabedais’. We cannot be 
certain, but it is highly probable that Vieira was referring to Alessandro Valignano, 
more specifically the last article of the Regimento, whose incipit reads: ‘[t]enha toda via 
summa diligencia de conservar, e acresentar este cabedal de Jappão, se fosse possível 
até contía de sincoenta mil taeis’.672 The same topic was coped with also during the 
Second General Conference in 1590. The fathers unanimously decreed that keeping a 
good capital in Japan was necessary to the point that ‘della depois de Deos depende a 
comservação da Companhia e Christandade de Japão’.673 In order to deal with potential 
emergences, such as missing voyages or military conflicts, the Japan Jesuits calculated 
minimum capital assets of 40’000 cruzados.674 João Coelho’s Narração ends with three 
brief statements, which represent his general considerations and advices in the light of 
                                                 
670 See Visitor Vieira to General Vitelleschi, Japan, 19 September 1618. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 17, ff. 154-154v. 
671 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 180. 
672 See RPJ, f. 40v. 
673 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 51, f. 150. 
674 Ivi, f 150v. In addition to this capital held in Japan, Valignano suggested to amass other 8 – 10’000 
cruzados to be held in Macao ‘assi pera se fazer a tempo e mais barato a compra das cousas que cada año 
se hão de mandar a Japão, antes de esperar o dinheiro que lhe vai na nao, como tambem porque 
perdendose a nao desta carreira a ida, ou a vinda, aja pera o ano seguinte na China cabedal pera se mandar 
o emprego ordinario a Japão, e não pareça a Companhia sem remedio gastando o que aqui lhe ficou, e da 
China não lhe vindo nada’. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 51, f. 173v. 
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the counts he had listed. In the third and last point he wrote that ‘a Companhia está 
emdividada de prezente em mais de vinte mil cruzados’.675 Coelho signed and closed 
the book on 12 November 1609, namely two months before André Pessoa drowned in 
Japanese waters along with the cargo of his ship, a fact that dramatically boosted the 
Society’s debts. In 1615, Procurator Spinola sent to Goa a summary of all the overdue 
debts the Japan Province accumulated only in the Estado da Índia, which means that 
debts the province had in Portugal and Spain were not included.676 Spinola declared that 
the debts amounted to ‘dezoito mil trezentos setenta, e hum taeis, dous mazes e tres 
condonins de prata de seda’. 677 Thus, it was objectively impossible for the procurator to 
maintain a capital devoured by amounts overdue, not to mention to increase it. The only 
solution he could possibly have was to reduce expenses and waste. 
  
 IV. 4. 1.    A solution to the problem: slimming the ranks 
As we said, in Spinola’s surviving letters from 1614 and 1615 there are only a 
few mentions to the silk trade. During that couple of years, in fact, Spinola was much 
more worried about the widespread waste that was affecting a mission already in 
danger. Spinola proposed several solutions to reduce expenses, first of all the need to be 
rid of useless brothers and dōjuku. 
 Generally speaking, the irmãos had been extremely useful elements for the 
evangelising process in particular during the first period of the mission, when the 
majority of Ignatians believed that the Japanese Christianity ought to be self-sufficient. 
But then the project of creating a native clergy stopped. Owing to this change in the 
programs of the Society, with the brothers who were no longer considered apt for the 
priesthood, there was an overlapping of positions, namely irmãos and dōjuku shared the 
same tasks, even though the former considered themselves more important than the 
                                                 
675 See TCJ, p. 539. 
676 Cf. Dividas que ao prezente está a dever a Provincia de Japão que necessariamente se han de pagar 
alem de outras que deve no Reyno, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7, ff. 95-95v. The debts of the Japan Jesuits in 
Lisbon were practically estinguished in 1616, when they owed only 54’700 réis, more or less 140 
cruzados. Yet, it should be noted that the sum was this low only because the debts had been paid with the 
papal pension in April 1616. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 17, f. 145. 
677 Ivi, f. 95v: ‘Ao todo montão as dividas que ao prezente está a dever a Provincia de Japão dezoito mil 
trezentos setenta, e hum taeis, dous mazes e tres condorins de prata de seda, que fazem pardaos Reales 
trinta e nove mil seis centos setenta e nove, e vinte cinco rez, que fazem patacas vinte e sinco mil e 
secenta 25060 pardaos de Realez’. 
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latter.678 According to Spinola, the problem with the Japanese brothers lay in their lack 
of humility and abnegation and in the fact that by being officially admitted in the 
Society ‘tem por baixeza fazer os officios de casa, tanto que nem ajudar huma Missa 
querem, e […] não fazem mais que hir a comer, e estar todo o dia ociosos’.679 On the 
contrary, the dōjuku ‘se contentão com menos no comer, e vistir, e […] fazem até os 
officios de moços [...], e [...] he cousa que espanta ver os dojicos mais zelosos das 
almas, e que nunca cansão de pregar, e trabalhar como bois de carga, e os Irmãos com 
huma pregação logo abafam’.680 Spinola added also that the teaching of Latin both to 
brothers and dōjuku should be erased for several reasons. As he explained to Acquaviva, 
that kind of study was quite demanding and took a lot of time, hence slowing down their 
preparation as workers for and in the Christendom. Even though Spinola conceded that 
in order to help the fathers out in their offices it was necessary that the Japanese were 
acquainted with Latin, he pointed out that ‘isto pouco latin requer, e com o uso se 
aprende mais que com o estudo’.681 Furthermore, differently from the first years of the 
mission, now there were a lot of Fathers fluent in Japanese and thus it was not necessary 
for the Japanese to learn Latin. The Italian Jesuit compared the study of Latin for the 
Japanese to the study of Theology for the Europeans. According to him, in fact, 
similarly to a European father who once had finished the Theology course demanded to 
pray and to become professed without applying anymore to confessions and similar 
tasks, the Japanese brothers ‘querem ser tratados como letrados […]; assi aos dojicos se 
que V. P. tirarlhes o aspirarem a ser Irmãos, e sacerdotes, ha mister tirarlhes o latim’.682 
Thus, Spinola concluded that it was detrimental and counter-productive to keep that 
kind of brothers, since they were just a great source of expense in a time when the 
procurator kept requesting the aid of the Divine Providence, since ‘estamos 
desemparados de todo humano socorro’.683 It would seem that eventually Acquaviva 
responded to Spinola’s plea, since in 1615, he wrote to Valentim Carvalho ordering him 
to stop teaching Latin to the dōjuku ‘por isso lhe servira de fomentar tentações’.684 
At any rate, Spinola thought that the situation could get even worse if the 
number of Japanese fathers increased. With respect to this point, in 1614 he wrote that 
                                                 
678 Cf. Costa, O Cristianismo no Japão, pp. 503-505. 
679 See Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 23 March 1614. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 165. 
680 Ibid. 
681 Ivi, f. 165v. 
682 Ibid. 
683 Ivi, f. 165v. 
684 See General Acquaviva to Provincial Carvalho, Rome, 1 February 1615. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 3, ff. 77v-78. 
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the very permanence of European missionaries was in danger if the Japanese clergy 
surpassed the European in number: 
‘[H]a mister pola conservação dos Europeos em Japam, que não haja muytos sacerdotes da 
Companhia, nem clerigos se não poucos aqui em Nangasaqui para ajuda dos officios 
pontificaes; porque [...] sem falta se hão de unir, e como forem muytos hão de querer serem 
superiores, e governar a seu modo, e com alguma occasião como esta de perseguição, 
facilmente alcançarão elles de ficar em Japam, e que todos nos vamos’.685  
Consequently, then, Spinola did not want them to take part in the general conferences of 
the province, when important matters were discussed. Although the expulsion had not 
yet started, in this letter Spinola showed all of his mistrust in the Japanese people, which 
he saw as a strongly cohesive group. Still, it must be said that there were several cases 
of Japanese believers who chose the Christian religion over their own country, then we 
cannot consider Spinola’s version as completely objective. 
 In a letter dated 25 March 1615 to Acquaviva,686 in which the general tone is 
definitely more worried about the finances, Spinola reinforced the point expressed the 
year before by adding some data quite interesting for us. He did not write the amount of 
debts as he did in the summary sent to Goa, but he summed up the situation with few 
but eloquent words: ‘esta provincia de Japam […] não somente não tem cabedal, mas 
antes muytas dividas sem modo pera pagalas’.687 Although we know that the main cause 
that led the province to get into debt was the necessity of buying supplies and the 
participation at all cost in the armação, Carlo Spinola blamed also the custom of the 
fathers superiors of Japan of not determining the expenses according to the incomes, 
which was also a topic Valignano dealt with in 1590.688  
Spinola also wrote something about his office, which takes us back to the 
Regimento’s 6th article, where Valignano suggested that the procurator ‘tera huma 
lembrança da qual por experiencia conhece que pode gastar cada anno de cangaria, e 
                                                 
685 Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 23 March 1614. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 165. 
686  The information on Acquaviva’s death and the election as sixth general of the Italian Muzio 
Vitelleschi reached Japan only in June 1616. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 17, f. 1. 
687 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 168. 
688 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 51, f. 173: ‘Tambem encomendo encarecidamente e encarrigo a consciencia da 
parte de N. Padre a qualquer que for supremo superior de Japão que [...] procure sempre de medir os 
gastos com a renda e ganhos que lhe vem cada ano na nao, de maneira que nunca gaste mais em quanto 
for possivel do que vier de renda aquele año’. 
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fato cada Padre, cada Irmão, cada Dojucu, cada Tonobara,689 cada mosso de casa’.690 As 
we have said, Spinola was aware of the surplus of brothers and dōjuku and that he 
considered their removal as the first move to turn around the economy of the province. 
However, he was also conscious that, differently from the dōjuku, they could not 
dismiss the brothers on account of the mission’s finances. Yet, they could not send 
Japanese to Macao either, due to the Chinese prohibitions. The situation was so serious 
that he arrived to the point of interpreting the persecution as a way God was trying to 
help them, since he had not the means to sustain the destroyed estates and the servants 
they were forced to dismiss.691 
Nevertheless, despite the impossibility of getting rid of all the unnecessary 
members, he had to keep track of the expenses of each one of his confrères anyway, as 
it was stated in the Regimento: 
‘[A]tè agora cada Padre tem hum dojucu, e hum moço particular, e alem destes ha mister 
outros pera os officios de caza, e os Irmaos que poderão servir em algunos officios, querem 
antes ser servidos, e estão de ordinario ociosos os que residem em cazas grandes; e assi ainda 
que hum Padre não gaste mais que 18 ducados cada anno em comer, e com o vestido, e outros 
gastos estraordinarios de hospedes, alfayas, concerto de casa etc. 25 ducados, toda via com o 
dojucu, a que cabem 14 e hum moço que gasta 9 ducados monta cada anno 48 ducados; que se 
estivessem os dojucus, e moços em comundade, muyto menor numero delles seria necessario 
pera huma caza, porque todos ajudarião nas officinas, e os dojucus acudirião aos ministerios, 
para os quaes alem dos que servem aos Padres, são necessarios outros, e com isto não queiro 
dizer que não aja em caza mais dojucus, dos que respoudem a cada Padre hum, pois 
forçadamente ha de aver algunos catequistas de mais, porem não serão necessarios tantos, 
quantos forão atè agora assinando a cada Padre hum, que não faça mais que servir a o seu 
Padre sem entender em outra cousa, e os Irmãos podem ser sãcristães, sotoministros, 
refeitoreiros, despenseiros etc. como o são nas outras partes da Companhia’.692 
In 1614, there were 63 fathers and 53 brothers in Japan,693 so if we suppose that they 
received the same amount of money from the procurator and we calculate the annual 
expenses for each of them at 48 ducats we have an annual expenditure of 5’568 ducats. 
                                                 
689  殿原 , tonobara were Japanese hired to carry out duties in the residences of the Society. The 
Vocabvlario defined a tonobara as a ‘homem escudeiro menos que fidalgo, e cavaleiro’. Cf. VLJ, ff. 510v-
511. 
690 See RPJ, f. 37v. 
691 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 168. 
692 Ivi, ff. 168-168v. 
693 Cf. TCJ, pp. 579-609. 
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Yet, when Spinola wrote this letter (March 1615), the most part of the missionary 
contingent had already left for Macao and Manila. Fortunately for the province’s 
coffers, only 18 fathers and nine brothers had been selected to stay in Japan,694 which 
meant an annual cost of almost 1’300 cruzados. Another thing that can be deduced by 
Spinola’s letter is that although the fathers had been expelled one year before, the 
situation in Nagasaki was still as quite as to let him taking care of personnel’s surplus, 
instead of focusing on the basic survival of the province. Furthermore, we can compare 
these expenditures with those of 1598, when Valignano informed that a father or a 
brother received no more than 20 taéis per year – i.e. 30 cruzados –for food and clothes, 
yet if there was no voyage they would receive only 16 taéis The dōjuku and the moços, 
on their part, received only four taéis and a half per year – roughly 7 cruzados.695 In 
1598 there were 43 fathers and 67 brothers, for a total annual expenditure of 3’330 
cruzados. By 1616, however, due to the persecution and cutbacks in the management of 
the mission, it was established that a father could not have more than one dōjuku and 
one moço.696 Accordingly, in October 1618, Mateus de Couros wrote that: 
‘Cada Padre traz consigo hum doiuco, que lhe aiuda a missa, e nos mais ministerios da 
Christandade com hum moço de serviço, que compra e faz o que se ha de comer, lava a roupa 
e entende nos demais officios desta sorte [...]. Para sustentação de cada Padre e do dojucu e 
moço que o acompanhão se dão cada anno cincoenta cruzados. Dam-se-lhe mais oito 
cruzados para alguns prezentesinhos que conforme ao estillo da terra sempre se dão ou aos 
cazeiros, ou a certas pessoas de obrigação’.697 
Until 1614, however, the Japan Jesuits had numerous churches and houses, 
colleges and seminars throughout Japan, which had required money to be built, like the 
7’000 cruzados for the church of Nagasaki, and kept requiring money to be kept in 
order. As an example we can quote what João Coelho wrote in 1609 about the Jesuits’ 
belongings in Nagasaki:  
 
 
                                                 
694 Cf. RAH/Cor. 9/2666, f. 163. 
695 Cf. Noticias  da Província de Japão da Companhia de JESUS, escritas pelo P. Visitador Alexandre 
Valignano no Japão em 1598 e remetidas a Roma, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, f. 100. 
696 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 179v. 
697 See Provincial Couros to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 8 October 1618. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 35, f. 84v. 
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for the college 3’200  cruzados per year 
alms for the exiled Japanese  800          ‘‘      ‘‘      ‘‘ 
for the novitiate  1’130          ‘‘      ‘‘      ‘‘ 
for the hospital  800          ‘‘      ‘‘      ‘‘ 
for the Santa Clara Residence  95          ‘‘      ‘‘      ‘‘ 
TOTAL 6’035          ‘‘      ‘‘      ‘‘ 
Source: TCJ, pp. 517-522. 
Only from this example it is easy to understand why and how Spinola, in his accountant 
capacity, was able to find the silver lining in the persecution. Yet, even during a time 
when Christian edifices were taken down everywhere in Japan, there was still someone 
who thought that keep building was not such a bad idea.  
In his personal considerations on the matters faced during the Kazusa’s 
conference in 1590, Valignano invited all the future superiors in Japan to keep looking 
for ways to save money and to avoid ‘de fazer fabricas e outros gastos extraordinarios, 
posto que lhe pareção de muito serviço de Deos, em quanto exederem ao que lhe vem 
de renda e ganhos cada año’.698 Father Valentim Carvalho apparently did not see fit to 
respect Valignano’s advice. In 1613, before the persecution officially broke out, yet in a 
year without ship from Macao and with several estates expropriated by Hasegawa, the 
father provincial ordered, against the opinion of the other fathers, to take down the 
rectorate in Todos os Santos and to join together the seminar and the college of 
Nagasaki. In order to do that, however, he ordered to build ‘hum lanço de dous ou 3 
sobrados pera agasalhar mais comodamente ao seminario, e mais gente que se ajunta de 
diferentes Residentias que se desfizerão’.699 Father Afonso de Lucena, who never held 
back critics against Carvalho, added that before he ordered that construction, he made 
also great improvements to his residence.700  
Carlo Spinola, on his part, criticized Carvalho also for another habit of him, 
namely the aptitude for wasting money. In 1615, he was chosen to be Carvalho’s 
consultor (admonitor). We know that obedience to the direct superior is one of the 
pillars of the Society and Valignano stressed that the procurator should always be 
                                                 
698 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 51, f. 173. 
699 See Father Pires to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 6 October 1613. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
15 [II], f. 312. See also the letter Diogo de Mesquita sent to Acquaviva on 6 October 1614 in ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 36, ff. 36-38. 
700 See Father Afonso de Lucena to General Acquaviva, Ōmura, 9 February 1614. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 16 [II], 
f. 11v: ‘Não falo na habitação, porque as casas e paços (que elle chamava quando era subdito) do Padre 
Francesco Pasio tem acrecentado muitas obras de dentro e lhe fez hum forro de pao precioso da terra e 
tem esteirado esteiras das melhores de Japão de que se servem os tonos principais’. 
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subject to the father superior of the residence where he resided, except for the duties 
belonging to his office.701 Spinola did abide by this order, but, as it was customary in 
the Society of Jesus, he did not hesitate to express his own opinion about the 
Portuguese, in particular regarding the fact that he had a reserved capital of his own:   
‘[T]utto quello che danno i secolari à i nostri s’intende dato alla Compagnia, et che non vi è 
superiore che gli vada alla mano, et finito il suo governo non vi è costume d’essere visitato 
dal socessore, et dare conta del dinaro administrato, il quale costume si s’introducesse, 
andariano li Provinciali più allerta, et non è dubbio che tenere il Padre Provinciale quando sta 
in Nangasachi borsa particolare, è causa di moltiplicarsi le spese, et quando il Procuratore 
vedesse che spende molto, avisaria l’admonitore, et i consultori’.702 
What clearly emerges from this passage is that the procurator was not in a position to 
interfere or to have a saying in how the provincial managed part of the funds reserved 
for the mission, but he could forward his complaints to Rome nonetheless. Owing to the 
Tokugawa’s decree of expulsion, from 1614 onwards the provincial of Japan moved to 
Macao, while the procurator served as his substitute in Kyūshū, to all extents and 
purposes becoming the highest position in the south of Japan. 703 This change gave 
Spinola the confidence to criticize more freely the provincial at Macao. He then urged 
Acquaviva to command Carvalho to dismiss superfluous dōjuku, since their sustenance 
was paid off the capital arrived from Europe, which was meant to be invested in silk and 
would yield revenue of at least 50%.704 Further on in this letter, Spinola wrote that when 
Carvalho embarked for Macao said to those who were abandoning Japan to leave all 
their properties with the procurator in order to be sold. Yet, without Spinola’s 
knowledge, Carvalho commanded to one of his dōjuku to:  
‘[D]epositare à diversi luoghi, non solo i suoi libri, scritti, et l’altre cose del vestito, et uso 
particulare, ma anche molti scrittorij, et cascie piene di corone, Agnus Dei coverti di seta, vasi 
de vetro, et cose curiose di varie sorti per dare di presente alli christiani, et alli Signori gentili 
in maggiore quantità di quelle che io teneva per provedere la Provincia tutta; ma ancora molti 
                                                 
701 Cf. RPJ, f. 37. 
702 See Procurator Spinola to General Claudio Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 18 March 1616. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, 
f. 180. 
703 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 174: ‘il Padre Provinciale mi lasciò per suo Vicario nel Scimo, che sono 
questi nove Regni di giù’. 
704 Ivi, f. 179v.  
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vasi di varie confettioni di zuccaro, barili di vino Europeo, et dell’India, et altre cose 
comestibili, che erano della sua dispensa particulare’.705 
Carvalho’s questionable behaviour leads us to a matter closer to the office of 
procurator in Japan, namely the habit of offering (expensive) presents to local lords and 
other personalities in accordance with the Japanese etiquette. In addition to his 
aforementioned distrust towards the Japanese people, Spinola felt quite uncomfortable 
also with their customs.706 Moreover, he belonged to that group of Jesuits who believed 
that the predicaments contained in Valignano’s Cerimoniale were not to be applied. In 
his code of conduct for the fathers in Japan, Valignano illustrated what kind of 
compromises the evangelical perfection had to make in order to gain Japanese favour. 
We do not know what Spinola used to think about the accomodatio before the 
procuratorship, but times had changed and already in 1615 he wrote to Acquaviva that: 
‘[O] que se gasta em prezentes, assi os que faz o Padre Provincial, como os que dão os outros 
superiores, e Padres particulares, os quaes nada luzem, e não servem se não de ternos por 
ricos, e nos somos bem pobres, e pois se vee que com darmos tanto atè agora não nos 
podemos conservar em Japam, creo que he vontade de Deos que mudemos modo, e 
procedamos como Religiosos pobres, e nesta occasião nos escusemos com dizer que não 
temos que dar; e pois que conforme a o costume de Japam não se pode deixar de dar alguma 
cousa, agora he tempo de nos por em bom foro, e fazer o que fazem os mesmos Bonzos 
graves, e que tem boas rendas em Japam, os quaes a os Tonos, e a Tencadono não offerecem 
mais que huma resma de papel, e hum abano, e os Religiosos de Filippinas humas candeas de 
cera branca, dizendo que são pobres; e me parece que he grande erro cuidamos que a 
Christandade se ha de fazer, e conservar com prezentes, mas antes com guardarmos nossa 
pobreça, e insituto, e confiarmos em Deos, que os Apostolos assi fazião, e atè que em Japam 
não percamos o nome de ricos, pouco avemos de medrar, porque tenho visto por esperiencia, 
que muytos se fazem christãos, e se chegão a nos, e nos chamão a suas terras, pera que os 
socorramos em suas necessidades, lhes emprestemos prata, e negociemos seda, e peças de 
laya nova quando vem a nao; isto bem entende o Padre Provincial, mas como esta posto em 
costume, he cousa dificultosa de se reformar, e não ha outro remedio que determinar V. P. que 
da qui por diante se tirem os prezentes que ate agora se costumarão, e somente se dem os que 
se costumão, e quando muyto ao Tencadono, e a os Tonos principaes se dee algum brinco, 
                                                 
705 Ivi, ff. 179v-180. 
706 See, for instance, the letter Father Mateus de Couros sent in the aftermath of Spinola’s seizure by the 
Nagasaki bugyō in ARSI, Jap. Sin. 35, f. 96: ‘[O] bom Padre [...] depois que veo a Japam sempre uzou de 
nossos comeres, e não se podia acomodar aos costumes e modo Japonico [...]. A verdade he que homens 
tam pezados e que não podem viver sem tantas commodidades não sam pera Japão neste tempo. Ate 
semente de funcho confeitada com asucar, que elle mesmo fazia por sua mão trazia consigo’. Cf. Pacheco, 
鈴田の囚人 カルロ・スピノラの書簡, pp. 15-16. 
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vinho, e doce feito chara Europa, porque em começando desta maneira, tudo serà facil, e Deos 
N. Senhor concorrera com nossa pobreza’.707 
Although it was Valignano who formalized the offering of gifts, the former visitor was 
conscious that they were a drain on the finance of the mission. For instance, when the 
Hollanders caught the Great Ship right in Macao’s harbour in 1603, Valignano sent 
orders to cut all the expenses in building and gifts-offering, so that the general 
expenditure could diminish from 12’000 ducats per year to 5-6’000.708  
Where Alessandro Valignano failed, however, Carlo Spinola succeeded, 
although in completely different conjunctures. His appeals, in fact, were pleasantly 
heard in Rome. In effect, his suggestion of limiting mission members to a number the 
finances could afford was welcomed and in 1618 the new rules issued by Vitelleschi in 
accordance with Spinola’s suggestions reached Japan.709 Yet, in 1616 the reality was 
still very hard to contemplate and, as we will see in the next paragraph, there was good 
news neither from the state of the Japanese country nor from the finances of the 
province. 
 
IV. 4. 2.    Pax Tokugawa and respondência bonds 
When, three years after the victorious battle of Sekigahara, Ieyasu assumed the 
title of first shōgun of the Tokugawa dynasty, he knew that he had still one last battle to 
fight before he could affirm with absolutely no doubts that he was the undisputed 
overlord of Japan. The last foe to take down, Toyotomi Hideyori, in 1603 was only ten 
years old, but by 1614 he had already passed the genpuku,710 he was then a grown man 
capable of gathering around him all the discontent against the bakufu.  
                                                 
707 See Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 25 March 1615. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, ff. 168-
168v. Cf. also f. 172. 
708 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14 [I], f. 137. 
709 See Procurator Spinola to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 8 October 1618. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 191: 
‘A ordem de não se fazerem mais cazas, nem sostentar mais gente do que abrange o nosso cabedal, he de 
grande importancia, e se viera muytos annos ha, não estaria esta Provincia carregada de tantas dividas, e 
porque o nosso cabedal não bastava pera sostentar a maquina que avia, e cada Padre queria ter a sua caza 
provida, se forão entroduzindo muyos abusos contra a Santa pobreça de cada hum vender, e comprar, e 
faze peculio com tratos indecentes, que estão ja de todo tirados’. 
710元服, this rite of passage represented the passage to adulthood. In the Tokugawa period, commoners 
came of age at fifteen but samurai at eleven. However, the ceremony of coming of age was generally held 
at the age of seventeen when those members of families entitled to a rank or title were invested in it. 
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After his ascent to military leader of Japan, Ieyasu granted to Hideyoshi’s heir 
an income of 650’000 koku and, in particular, he left him the impregnable fortress of 
Ōsaka, ‘the most famous Castle that the Emperor hath, or that is within the Empire; it is 
of an extraordinarie bignesse and compassed round with three severall walls’, as 
described by the English Arthur Hatch.711 Soon after Sekigahara, Ōsaka became the 
rendezvous for two parties in particular, namely those defeated or damaged by Ieyasu 
and the supporters of the tennō, who saw in Hideyori the last chance to bring back real 
power to the imperial court.  
Most likely, it was the stormy relationship between the Tokugawa and the tennō 
that led Ieyasu to organize the Ōsaka campaigns. As early as 1606, in fact, Ieyasu 
started to meddle in court affairs. In that year he not only forbid the kuge to accept the 
Christian faith, but presented also an order that hobbled the political movements of the 
tennō and weakened his influence. With this directive, the ōgosho prohibited the court 
from granting rank to warriors without bakufu recommendation. Ieyasu’s intent in 
issuing this was exactly to keep the court and daimyō from forming ties.712 Moreover, 
be it noted that in the 1600s Ieyasu was not the only one who could grant ranks or the 
status of samurai. He shared this prerogative with Toyotomi Hideyori, who had the 
same rank as the shōgun at court.713 In any case, the first open contrast between the 
bakufu and the court took place in 1609, when an affair involving five concubines of 
Go-Yōzei tennō ended with the emperor requesting the heads of all the people involved 
to the bakufu. The tennō, however, put forward his request without respecting the 
common law, a fact that caused Ieyasu’s refusal to issue a death sentence and limited 
the punishment to the banishment of both the concubines and their lovers. Ieyasu, 
moreover, seized the opportunity provided by the scandal to intrude into court affairs by 
placing the investigation in the hands of the shoshidai714 in Miyako.715 The last contrast 
between bakufu and tennō that lead to the Ōsaka battles took place in 1614, when the 
court ignored the verbal order passed by Ieyasu in 1606 and granted rank to a number of 
Toyotomi men, probably urged upon it by Hideyori’s retainers.716 Ieyasu’s response 
                                                 
711 Apud Cooper, They Came to Japan. An Anthology of European Reports on Japan, 1543-1640, p. 138. 
712 Cf. Butler, “Tokugawa Ieyasu’s Regulations for the Court: A Reappraisal”, p. 519. 
713 Cf. Asao and Jansen, “Shogun and Tennō”, p. 259. 
714  所司代 , it was the bakufu representative in Miyako with respect to matters regarding security, 
enforcement of the laws and the kuge. 
715 Cf. Ferretti, “La coscienza della sovranità negli Imperatori giapponesi del ‘600”, pp. 353-354 and 
Asao and Jansen, op. cit., p. 260. 
716 Cf. Butler, op. cit., p. 519. 
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was delivered by the end of autumn in the shape of the gathering of a large army of 
300’000 men, according to Richard Cocks,717 but probably did not exceed the 100’000 
units.  
The Ōsaka campaigns took place during winter 1614 and spring-summer 
1615.718 Hideyori’s fortress, in fact, was too strong to be taken only by force. Ieyasu’s 
delay in defeating the enemy gave some hope to the fathers in Nagasaki, who knew that 
among Toyotomi’s retainers there were also Christian captains,719 although they were 
aware that Hideyori had no intention of accepting the Christian faith.720 Yet, Spinola’s 
optimism was soon blew out by Ieyasu during the summer campaign, which led 
Hideyori and his inner circle to retreat first and then to commit suicide. With this 
victory the fate of the empire was definitely decided, since there was no opposition left, 
and all remnants of the Toyotomi’s cause were very thoroughly and systematically 
exterminated. 
 Still, the defeat of Hideyori did not lead to outright persecution. Ieyasu was a 73-
year old man and died soon after the seizure of the fortress. As soon as the news of 
Hideyori’s fall reached Nagasaki, however, the Jesuits were sure that Hasegawa would 
start a new and stronger persecution. As a matter of fact, if we exclude the destruction 
and expropriation of Christian buildings and estates, by March 1616 there had been 
executions of Christians only in the Takaku area, whereas in Nagasaki the situation was 
relatively quite.721 Spinola, then, could turn his attention to the finance of the province, 
whose situation kept worsening: 
                                                 
717 Cf. Farrington, op. cit., pp. 257-258. 
718 Cf. Totman, op. cit., pp. 164-178 and Sadler, op. cit., pp. 219-234. 
719 See Procurator Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 25 March 1615. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin. 36, f. 170: ‘Depois de partidos os navios em Novembro se ouvio a revolta de Vozaca, com a 
qual ficamos algum tanto mais desabafados, e ainda que socederão as pazes, entendese que Fideyorisama 
ficara com a Tenca, e nos deixarà viver quietos, pois hum dos cinco capitães principaes que o ajudarão 
nesta guerra [Akashi Kamon no Suke Morishige João], e o mais querido delle, he muyto bom, e devoto 
christão, e como Irmão da Companhia’. Spinola showed even more optimism in a letter he sent to the 
Assistant of Italy Muzio Vitelleschi. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 174: ‘Habbiamo adesso buone nove, che la 
guerra comincia di nuovo, et Findeyori figlo di Taicosama sarà Tencadono, o Imperatore, et che i Signori 
principali l’aggiutano quanto possono, per scuotere da se il governo tyrannico di Daifusama, che è odiato 
da tutti; et credo che di qui a due mesi, o prima staremo più liberi, et del tutto cessarà la persecutione, si 
bene adesso non ha Tono che dia molestia alli christiani’. 
720 Cf. RAH/Cor. 9/2665, f. 109: ‘Ainda que Findeyori Sama ficara de riba, por hora ficaramos livres, 
com tudo como elle e sua may forão sempre tão dados aos Camis e Fotoques sempre estes ouverão de ser 
venerados, como quem lhe dera a Tenca, e este era o conceito comum de todos, que esta guerra tocava 
aos Camis e Fotoques’. 
721 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 177 and f. 179. 
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‘Per non venire due anni adietro [1614] dinaro dall’India a Macao, et un’anno [1613] non 
venire la nave al Giapone, si è speso tutto quello che havevamo, et havemo piglato molte 
miglaia di ducati a cambio per havere con que comprare la seta, i quali essendosi spesi parte 
in sostentare i molti soggetti, et dogichi che adesso stanno nel Collegio di Macao, parte in 
provedere li padri della Missione della Cina, parte in cominciare la nuova missione di 
Cocincina, et parte in pagare i debbiti, che lasciò fatti il Padre Procuratore passato di Macao, 
mandò il Padre Procuratore722 l’anno passato à Giapone puoca seta, che non bastò a pagare i 
cambij, et perciò si sono moltiplicati li debbiti, i quali giongono già a deciottomila, et 
novecento ducati,723 nel quale numero entrano cinque mila del Vescovo di Giapone,724 senza i 
quali non so come havria io potuto rimediare le grandi spese, che si fecero gl’anni adietro’.725 
As we saw, the piling debts of the Province of Japan were due also to the necessity of 
borrowing money with the respondência bonds, whose interests oscillated between 40 
and 50%. Moreover, as Spinola explained, the incomes of the province were often used 
as start-up capital for new missions or to help confrères in other regions. The Japan 
Jesuits financed the China mission in more than one occasion, and by the end of 1615 
the China Jesuits owed to their brethren already 1’600 cruzados, which were to be 
repaid in instalments of 100 cruzados per year.726 Furthermore, Spinola had to provide 
also the money for those fathers, brothers and dōjuku who went to Manila in 1614, an 
expenditure that between 1615 and 1616 amounted to 700 cruzados.727 In order to curb 
this unstoppable outflow of capital, Spinola was forced to borrow 2’000 cruzados to be 
repaid in Portugal to write off some of their debts and managed to send more than 
11’000 cruzados in silver to Macao to buy silk. He borrowed six of these 11’000 
cruzados with a respondência bond hoping to earn enough capital in the next voyage to 
repay the interests.728 Yet, his plans were thwarted by the historical juncture. In 1615, in 
fact, the Macanese ‘não quiserão arriscar prata nas caravellas, as quaes nestes tempos de 
                                                 
722 Manuel Barreto. 
723 In another letter, he explained that these were the debts the province had only in Japan. Cf. ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 36, f. 181. 
724 In 1615, the Japanese Province owed to the bishop the sum of ‘1423 taeis quatro mazes, e quatro 
condinins’. Cf. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7, f. 95. 
725 See Procurator Spinola to General Acquaviva, Nagasaki, 18 March 1616. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 179v. 
726 See Procurator of China João da Costa to General Acquaviva, Macao, 8 December 1615. ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 34, f. 247. Either the instalments were not paid or the Vice-province of China borrowed more money 
than what it had been repaying, since in 1636 the debts amounte to 2471 cruzados and 142 réis. Cf. 
BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-11, f. 513. 
727 See Procurator Spinola to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 18 March 1616. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin. 36, f. 181v. 
728 Ivi, f. 181. 
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corsarios são mais seguras que as naos’.729 In any case, the silver Spinola managed to 
send in March 1615 was spent almost entirely to repay debts in Macao and, 
consequently, the investment in the silk trade was lower than other years. Spinola, in 
fact, wrote that ‘mandarão para Japam tam pouco emprego que depois de tudo vendido 
fiz nelle 4400 cruzados, e ouve de pagar mais de 5500 cruzados das respondencias, e 
ainda passei por letra outros 3400 que ficava devendo, pera que venhão de la 
empregados na viagem que vem’.730 He concluded that he would not send silver to 
Macao in that year firstly because he did not have any and secondly because he feared 
the Portuguese ship could fall in the hands of the North Europeans.  
Indeed, although it was not because of the Dutch or the English yet simply 
adverse meteorological conditions, in 1616 there was no official voyage from Macao,731 
a fact that was a tragedy for the Ignatians, 732  but a fortune for the English. 733 
Nevertheless, the Japan Jesuits received an unexpected help from two ships from New 
Spain bounded for Manila, which ended up in Japan due to a typhoon. In this ship, in 
fact, there were 800 pardaos de reales (around 1’000 cruzados) which Father Pedro 
Morejón collected in Acapulco ‘de certa esmola que deixou a esta Provincia hum 
Capitam Castelhano que os annos passados veyo a Japam, e morreu ali’.734 Still, the 
sum of debts found by Visitor Jerónimo Rodrigues in Macao in January 1617 was 
simply bewildering: 30’000 cruzados for an annual expense of around 10’000. 735 
Sympathy towards the financial situation of the Japan Jesuits arrived also from Goa, 
                                                 
729 Ibid. The menace brought by the Hollanders in the Estado da Índia’s seas, caused the Portuguese to 
change their shipping methodology. Previously, in fact, the Carreira da Índia and the Carreira do Japão 
were customarily served by galleons that reached the tonnage of 1’500 or 2’000. This huge tonnage was 
one of the principal causes for several wrecks. Those galleons, in fact, were difficult to manoeuvre and 
then were easy preys for pirates and privateers. The Dutch, in order to avoid such problem, instead of the 
great ships, opted to make use of smaller boats not surpassing the 500 tonne. Starting from 1615, the 
Portuguese decided to follow their examples, although the Great Ship for Japan made its last trip on 1617 
and was substituted by six galliots only from 1618 onwards. Cf. Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a 
Economia Mundial, pp. 288-289, Guinote, Frutuoso and Lopes, Naufrágios e outras perdas da “Carreira 
da Índia” Séculos XVI e XVII, pp. 47-48 and 152 and Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 82-83. 
730 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 181. 
731 Cf. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-3, ff. 15-15v: ‘Este mesmo anno não houve viagem a Japão porque veo da India 
Luiz de Souza pera a fazer com embargos que fez a João Serrão [da Cunha]. Vendeo-se e com prova 
Lopo de Sarmento não foi a Japão por falta do vento’. 
732 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 17, f. 12v: ‘Este anno não ouve viagem e a principal causa foi a muita cobiça e 
muitos odios inimizades e desavenças que ha nesta cidade e com a não aver ficamos nos mais perdidos 
mais que todos’. 
733  Cf. Farrington, op. cit., p. 499: ‘The Amacan ship is not yet come this yere & therefore past 
expectation, w’ch wilbe a meanes wee shall have the better sale for our marchantdize’. 
734 See Procurator Spinola to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 15 March 1617. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 186. 
735 See Vice-provincial Jerónimo Rodrigues to General Vitelleschi, Macao, 5 January 1617. ARSI, Jap. 
Sin. 17, f. 56.Cf. also f. 100 and f.125. 
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whence Father Bartolomeu de Siqueira wrote that ‘se com o meo sangue pudera 
remediar necessidade tam grande sempre teria as veas abertas’.736 
It was clear then and it is even clearer now, that the economy of the mission was 
gravitating ineluctably toward bankruptcy. The papal and royal pensions continued to 
be paid tardily and, even when they did arrive, they were curtailed by taxes and 
exchange rates. In Japan, the time for patronage by powerful lords had inexorably ended 
and every commercial activities external to the silk trade was interrupted for good.737 
The silk trade, on its part, was not as profitable as it was before. Although in 1617 the 
Portuguese sold goods for 400’000 cruzados738 and 600’000 in 1618,739 Jesuit sources 
tell us that the profits from the selling of Chinese textiles were getting lower every 
year.740  
Yet, it was exactly between 1617 and 1618 that Carlo Spinola started to show a 
little confidence about the proceeds of the trato da seda, maybe thanks to the arrival of 
the new Visitor Francisco Vieira. The Portuguese, in fact, managed to send to Japan a 
good quantity of silk in 1617, with which Spinola could write off 4’725 ducats of 
debts.741 In 1618, the bargains had been even better, but they could have been really 
remarkable if two of the six galleys dispatched by Macao would not have been lost. 
Spinola calculated that the silk loaded in those two ships, would have yielded an income 
of a total of 8’000 ducats, since in 1618 the silk was sold at ‘setenta ducados mais do 
preço ordinario’. 742  According to the procurator, if all the six galleys would have 
arrived safely to Nagasaki, he would have been able to extinguish all the debts the 
provinces had with people outside Japan. Nevertheless, he was still able to repay 2’000 
ducats.  
Spinola’s confidence in the silk trade, however, did not come from the earnings 
of those two years. In a long letter he wrote only two months before being arrested, he 
explained to Muzio Vitelleschi that actually there was a way of earning enough money 
                                                 
736 See Father Bartolomeu de Siqueira to Visitor Francisco Vieira, Goa, 3 May 1617. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-
5, f.. 222v. 
737 See Father Francisco Pacheco to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 5 March 1618. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 
114v. Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 34, f. 63. 
738 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 17, f. 101. 
739 Ivi, f. 242. 
740 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 34, f. 152 and Jap. Sin. 36, f. 113v. 
741 See Procurator Spinola to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 8 October 1618. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 191v. 
742 Ibid. 
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to both erase debts and sustain the whole mission, including the expensive College of 
Macao: 
‘Costumão os Portugueses que morão em Japam, e os Japões que ou não querem, ou não 
podem embarcarse pera Macao, e outras partes, pera terem ganhos certos dar a sua prata a 
ganhos de 30, 40, e 50 por 100 segundo os lugares para onde vão os navios, e conforme a o 
risco mayor, ou menor do mar, Olandeses etc., e tomando elles o risco, em tornando o navio a 
Japam a salvamento esta obrigado quem tomou a prata, a pagar o proprio, e ganhos, ou ganhe 
pouco, ou muito e porque as vezes não veyo dinheiro de Portugal, e na India não se pagarão 
as ordinarias, fomos forçados a tomar prata deste modo a ganhos, ou a responder que he o 
mesmo, e a achamos mais barata que os outros, por serem nossos devotos, e estar a prata mais 
segura em nossa mão, pera mandar a Macao a prata necessaria pera comprar a seda, e deste 
modo sem nosso risco ganhamos as vezes 40, e 50 por 100 mais dos ganhos que pagamos, e 
com esses nos remediamos muitas vezes, e este anno ganhamos 140 ducados por cento, e 
pagando o proprio com 40 de ganhos, nos ficarão cento de ganhos limpos, e este modo he 
milhor que tomar prata emprestada, porque perdendose o navio sempre ficamos obrigados a 
pagala, e a outra se perde por conta de quem a da, e assi nos não perdemos este anno mais de 
quinhentos ducados nossos que vinhão no navio que desapareçeu, e o demais perderão os 
donos da prata que nelle tomarão o risco, mas se viera, ouveramos de ganhar o que tenho dito 
a cima; e disto vera V. P. claramente quam enganados estão os que cuidão, e por ventura 
escrevem que o trato da seda pouco rende, e que com calquer ajuda que tiveremos, o podemos 
deixar,743 porque o menos que atè agora ganhamos na seda foy a 80 por cento, e em outros a 
cento por cento, e alguma vez como este anno, e outros a 140 por cento, de modo que quando 
meno ganhamos quatro mil, duzentos, e corenta taéis, e ordinariamente cincomil, e trezentos, 
e que cousa nos pode dar el Rey que renda tanto cada anno, e que não seja mais arriscado 
vindo da India atè Macao, e quem pode cuidar que se nos pague na India o que el Rey 
determinar em tanta contia, avendo tantos annos que se não nos paga a esmola ordinaria que 
he muito menos?’744 
We have already mentioned a few times the respondência bonds without entering into 
details. We shall try to explore this kind of contracts through Spinola’s words and other 
sources. The respondência bond was a type of contract very much alike the European 
commenda. In our case, the Japanese commendator delivered silver into the possession 
                                                 
743 Most likely this is a reference to Father Valentim Carvalho. In 1617, in fact, Mateus de Couros wrote 
that Carvalho ‘era de opinião [...] que largariamos os sincoenta picos de seda que podimos embarcar na 
Nao de Macao, se em troco disse el Rey nos confirmase as doações do Padre Brandão e de Dona Maria de 
Castro, mas achamos que de nenhum modo vem bem a esta Provincia largar por ora aquelles picos visto o 
estado em que ficamos, e os muitos riscos que ha de Portugal até a India, e da India até Japam. O Padre 
Carlo Spinola Procurador da Provincia informa a V. P. miudamente deste particular’. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 
35, f. 63. 
744 ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 191. 
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of the procurator who probably added silver of his own to invest in silk. As was 
customary in the commenda contract, the procurator bore no liability for loss of capital. 
In other words, as explained by Spinola, the risco was assumed entirely by the 
commendator, who decided to charge costs in accordance to the contingences of time 
and space. This was the main reason why Spinola deemed the respondência as the most 
secure way of earning capitals, since if the worst was to happen, the loss was kept 
down. The respondência was even more secure thanks to the substitution of the Great 
Ship with smaller galleys, which enabled the merchants to share out among the ships 
both merchandises and the risco, as demonstrated by the following contract: 
‘Digo eu Rodrigo Sanchez de Paredes cazado e morador em Macao que he verdade que eu 
tomei a responder ao Senhor Suyetçugu Sotucu morador em Facata sete mil e quinhentos taes 
de prata de barras por preço de trinta por cento, os quais vão correndo daqui pera Macao, o 
Risco no navio Capitania Nossa Senhora da Guia a metade, e a outra a metade no navio 
Conceição em que vai o feitor do povo repartido ygualmente e de Macao para esta cidade de 
nangasaque vira o risco repartido ygualmente em todos os navios em que se fizera viagem 
seginte que do porto de Macao partirem iuntos em hum dia, e lhe farei ou mandarei fazer 
pontual pagamento do proprio e respondencia’.745  
As said by Spinola, the Japan Jesuits had been forced to resort to take silver ‘a 
responder’ at times of shortage, when the official voyage from Macao did not come or 
when the missing payments piled up. It would seem that the ordem in virtute de Sanctæ 
Obedientiæ sent years before by Acquaviva of not handling outsiders’ silver was 
directed exactly against the respondência bonds and their great employments. In 1629, 
in fact, João Rodrigues, thanks to the experience acquired during his procuratorship in 
Japan, adviced the future procurators to not take ‘prata a responder para Macao, pelo 
pelo pouco proveito, que della tiramos, e ficamos sendo Feitores do homens de fora; e 
como nada empregamos por nos, nos arriscamos a perdas, como ja perdemos em 
algumas respondencias’. 746  We saw that Spinola received cheerily Acquaviva’s 
instruction and, in effect, in this letter he was not proposing to the new general to go 
back to negotiating others’ capital. He emphasized that they were forbidden to negotiate 
and to intervene in the pancada price, but there was a substantial difference with the 
past situation. Once again Spinola demonstrated to follow as best as he could 
                                                 
745 Apud Oka, “A Great Merchant in Nagasaki in 17th Century. Suetsugu Heizô II and the System of 
Respondência”, pp. 40-41. 
746 Cf. Couzas que podem servir para os Procuradores, § 5.º - Não hé bom tomar prata a responder. 
BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-8, ff. 637-637v. 
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Valignano’s Regimento, namely the 5th item, where it is suggested that in order to avoid 
scandal in the bargains, the procurator should rely on ‘pessoas […] devotas nossas 
pellas quaes faça as compras e vendas que se houvem de fazer’.747 Accordingly, Spinola 
wrote to Vitelleschi that he was not personally dealing with the respondência 
agreements, but he was only acting as a supervisor:  
‘[C]om a obediencia da boa memoria do Padre Claudio se tirou o negocearmos prata de 
Japões, e outros, e tambem por outras ordens nos esta prohibido metermonos na pancada da 
seda, e com isto cessarão os inconvenientes de concurso, e trafego em nossas cazas, e pera 
negocear só o nosso por pessoas de fora, só com a direição do Procurador se pode fazer 
facilmente, e onde eu estou nada se vende’.748 
The available sources do not allow us to go any further into the matter. The only piece 
of information we could gather about it comes from the Carregaçam de Macao para 
Japam no anno de 1617.749 From this source we learn that Spinola was implementing 
this practice from 1616 at least, which is probably the reason why Visitor Vieira wrote 
to Vitelleschi about considering the idea of restoring the handling of laymen’s silver,750 
and we also find the names and the goods of those who gave to him silver ‘a responder’ 
for Macao: 
‘Do procedido de toda a seda assima ditta, fina, e de Sipeo,751 se hão de pagar em Japam do 
proprio e respondencia a corenta por cento, tres mil e quinhentos setenta e nove, e sinco 
mazes e nove condorins de prata corrente que na ditta Nao forão daqui para Japam, deram a 
responder para Macao a ditta quantia de prata ao Padre Carlos Spinola, a qual elle lá gastou 
passando lettras para que de cá lhe mandassemos o emprego della; hindo correndo o risco 
para Japão por conta das pessoas que em Japam lhe derão a responder, que são as seguintes: 
por conta dos nettos de Minaminabo752: 2000 taeis. Por conta de Ruefaconjin: 1400 taeis. Por 
conta de Justa de Arima, e Luiza de Bungo, e pobres de Firando: 179 taeis, sinco mazes, e 
nove condorins’.753 
                                                 
747 See RPJ, ff. 37-37v. 
748 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 192. 
749 In BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7, ff. 108-109. Reproduced in Annex E. 
750 Cf. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-56, ff. 199v-200. 
751 We were not able to identify this word. According to Boxer, who transcribed it as sifeo, it is a mistake 
made by the copyist and most likely is the name of a Chinese city or district. Cf. Boxer, O Grande Navio, 
p. 164, n. 3. 
752 Takayama Ukon adopted the name Minaminobō 南坊 when, according to Japanese custom, he shaved 
his head in sign of retirement from public affairs. Cf. Laures, “Takayama Ukon. A Critical Essay”, p. 88. 
753 BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7, ff. 108v-109. 
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As we said, however, we do not have other sources that may lead us to a better 
understanding of Spinola’s use of respondência bonds. But it is not a lack due to 
missing documentation. The last quote by Spinola, in fact, is taken from one of the last 
letters he wrote as a free man. Certainly it is the last one dealing with economic matters 
and the duties of the procurator. Also in a letter dedicated to financial issues, we detect a 
feeling of uncertainty in Spinola’s words that leads us to almost believe he was 
foreseeing is forthcoming future. The Italian Jesuit, in fact, wrote that he wanted to fill 
the post until all the debts were extinguished and there was enough capital for the needs 
of the province, ‘e confio em Deos que em poucos annos, se tiver vida, o ajuntarei’.754 
God, however, had other plans for him.  
 
*   *   * 
 The second shōgun Tokugawa Hidetada, in fact, proved to be much more 
intolerant than his father toward the Christian faith. In comparison to Hidetada’s attitude 
with regard to the Western preachers, Ieyasu’s enactments were rather mild. As early as 
1617, in order to eradicate the fathers from his country, the second Tokugawa shōgun 
issued the death penalty not only against the missionaries but also against those who hid 
them and their closest neighbours.755 In May 1617, in Ōmura the first European Jesuit – 
João Baptista Machado – was executed along with his dōjuku, the Franciscan Pedro de 
Assunção, the Dominican Alonso Navarrete and the Augustinian Fernando Ayala.756 In 
that year, the Society of Jesus had 31 agents in Japan,757 a number that augmented to 33 
in 1618: 25 fathers (ten Portuguese, eight Italians, two Spaniards and five Japanese) and 
8 brothers. 758  Each and everyone of them carried on his duties ‘disfarçados, e 
escondidos de cazinha em cazinha dos pobres Christãos e nella de noite ensinando, 
convertendo, baptizando, sacramentando, e conservando na fé aos ditos Christãos’.759 In 
Nagasaki, in effect, the situation was not getting any better. In February, Hasegawa 
Sahyōei died and his place was taken by his nephew Gonroku, who, although frequently 
                                                 
754 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 192. 
755 Cf. Visitor Vieira to the Archbishop of Braga Dom Frey Aleiro de Menezes President of the Counsel 
of Portugal in Madrid, Macao, 10 December 1617. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-5, ff. 216-216v. 
756 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 35, f. 65. 
757 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 59, f. 47v. 
758 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 35, f. 84. 
759 See Visitor Vieira to Vice-roy Dom João Coutinho, Nagasaki, 22 October 1618. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-5, 
f. 267. 
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gave evidence of his desire to avoid bloodshed, was compelled to enact the bakufu’s 
directives. Gonroku’s leniency notwithstanding, there was still Murayama Tōan who 
was acting against the Ignatians. In effect, it would seem that he bribed a dōjuku and 
convinced him to reveal to the shogunal officers how many Jesuits were now in 
Nagasaki and their hiding places. Carlo Spinola was among those named by the apostate 
dōjuku.760 In order to track down the hidden missionaries, the bugyō ordered each street 
of Nagasaki to compile a thorough list of its inhabitants and monetary rewards were 
publicly offered for anyone who found a father.761 Sebastião Vieira used eloquent words 
to describe in what condition the Ignatians kept on with their work: ‘nos todos cada dia 
esperamos polla Catana, ou polla Cruz, que com ella se acabarão e nos acaberemos com 
tantas cruzes’.762 
In the night between 13 and 14 December, while in the house of the Portuguese 
Domingos Jorge, Carlo Spinola was seized by the guards of Gonroku together with his 
companion Ambrosio Fernandez and 600 cruzados belonging to the province. 
Apparently, Provincial Mateus de Couros warned Spinola that during that night there 
would be guards searching in that house, but he decided to stay there nonetheless. The 
father provincial later, in February 1619, revealed to Nuno Mascarenhas that Spinola 
decided to remain in Domingos Jorge’s house due to the fact that he never got used to 
Japanese food, whereas ‘tinha naquella casa todas as commodidades juntas, e afora a 
molher do Portuguez cazeiro, dous moços que servião ao mesmo Padre muito bons 
cozinheiros de nossos comeres’.763 Although we are unable to ascertain whether Spinola 
remained there only out of gluttony, Couros’s testimony is to be believed with regard to 
Spinola’s taste for European food. While in prison, in fact, he wrote to a Portuguese 
woman, Agnese Correa, that ‘se VS. havesse fatto azuccaro rosado, e me ne vuole 
mandar’ un poco, mi fora molto caro’.764 Be that as it may, whilst Ambrosio Fernandez 
died after two years of imprisonment, Spinola, as we saw, endured the prison two years 
                                                 
760 See Provincial Couros to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 20 February 1619. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 35, f. 94. 
761 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 35, ff. 94v-95 and RAH/Jes. Tomo 112, 9/3659, f. 206v. A symptom of the 
importance attached to the anti-Christian persecution is given by the fact that the reward for turning in a 
father was the same as for the pyromaniacs. In Japan, where buildings were traditionally made out of 
wood, the pyromaniacs were always exemplary punished and still today the death penalty is applied for 
this crime.  
762 See Father Vieira to General Vitelleschi, Nagasaki, 15 October 1618. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 38, f. 278. 
763 See Provincial Couros to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 23 February 1619. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin. 35, f. 96. 
764 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 200. 
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more and was eventually executed on 10 September 1622, twenty years after his arrival 
in Japan. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE PROCURATOR IN BRAZIL: 
A COMPARISON FOR A BETTER UNDESTANDING 
 
 Introduction 
 Although the present work is dedicated to the analysis and comprehension of the 
procurator of the Japanese Province of the Society of Jesus in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
it has been already showed that a comparative approach represents one of the more 
profitable ways to understand that particular office. As a matter of fact, even if 
comparisons are susceptible to subjective interpretations, it is undeniable that by 
comparing João Rodrigues’s procuratorship to those who followed him and, in 
particular, to Carlo Spinola’s own management, we were able to ascertain the duties, the 
tasks, the expectations, the shortcomings, the perks and the dangers of the procurator in 
Japan in a time when the Japanese country passed from being a jumble of battling fiefs 
to a unite empire that eventually expelled the Western preachers from its lands.  
 Nevertheless, even if the post of procurator in Japan by now should be clear in 
all of its aspects and endeavours, we have seen how Spinola and Rodrigues underlined 
the fact that their duties were extremely different from those carried out elsewhere in the 
world covered by the Society of Jesus. We have given a little space to the procurator in 
Évora, yet through the previous pages another province of the Society of Jesus had 
already peeped out: the Province of Brazil. 
 In this final chapter, we will evaluate the post of procurator in Brazil and the 
financial side of the Society of Jesus in Brazil in a period of time that basically begins 
with the appointment as provincial of Pêro Rodrigues765 and ends some years after the 
siege of Salvador da Baía de Todos os Santos – ‘cabeça de tudo o estado do Brasil’766 – 
                                                 
765 The Portuguese Pêro Rodrigues (1542-1628) filled the post of provincial from 1594 to 1603. 
766 Cf. ARSI, Bras. 15 [II], f. 473v. 
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by the Dutch in 1624, when a powerful West India Company fleet easily captured the 
Portuguese settlement. In order to offer a concise yet valuable outline of the procurator 
in Brazil, the chapter has to move from macro-analysis of the economic features of the 
Society in Brazil, since the beginning of the mission, to the micro-analysis of the 
Procurador da Companhia, because we are going to face an environment completely 
diverse from Japan in all aspects (Portuguese and missionary presence), and thus it 
would be meaningless to speak of the procurator without introducing the mission and 
vice versa. 
 
 V. 1.    The Portuguese and the Jesuits settled in Salvador da Baía de Todos 
os Santos 
 In the chapter dedicated to Carlo Spinola’s biography, we saw that in 1596 the 
ship he was travelling in, the São Francisco, broke the rudder near the Cape of Good 
Hope and was forced to pull back towards the Brazilian coast,767 although an alvará 
issued by the Portuguese Crown in 1565 expressly forbid Carreira’s ships to winter in 
Brazil (mostly for economic reasons), rather they were requested to go back to 
Lisbon.768 At any rate, Spinola and his fellows, in the early morning of 16 July 1596, 
entered in Salvador, where it was built the Collegio da Baya, namely the principal 
geographic site we are going to deal with, whose foundation went back almost fifty 
years. 
 In 1549, an expedition of 920 men leaded by the first Governor-General – the 
civil and military chief – Tomé de Sousa (1503-1579, Governorship 1549-1553), an 
experienced soldier from a great Portuguese house, was sent out to erect a large and 
strong town on the shore of the bay, as the capital of colonial Brazil and of the captaincy 
of Baía in particular, because it was the most convenient place in terms of accessibility 
and easiness of sending aids to other towns; however, it was also due to the fact that 
there was no previous proprietor there anxious to defend his privileges.769 Along with 
                                                 
767 Cf. Frison, ‘“La piu difficile, e la piu disastrosa via, che mai fino allora niun altro” - Carlo Spinola and 
His Attempts to Get to the Índias’, pp. 72-73. 
768 See “Provisão sobre as náos, que invernão, arriabbarem a esta cidade”, in Boletim do Conselho 
Ultramarino – Legislação Antiga, vol. I (1446-1754), pp. 169-170. 
769 Cf. Boxer, “Portuguese Society in the Tropics. The Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and 
Luanda, 1510-1800”, p. 72 and Schwarz, “Cities of Empire: Mexico and Bahia in the Sixteenth Century”, 
p. 630. 
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the Governor expedition was also the founder of the Brazil Jesuit mission, Father 
Manoel da Nóbrega. Four years later, in 1553, Brazil turned sui iuris an autonomous 
province of the Companhia and in the same year began the edification of the city of 
Salvador da Baía, as well as the work for the Igreja de Nossa Senhora da Ajuda.770 
Although the evangelization process started right away, Nóbrega was aware that the 
lack of incomings and sustentation was a deterrent to the mission; therefore in 1556 he 
wrote about this concern to his Superior in Portugal:  
‘Na Baía, se El-Rei ordena de fazer colégio da Companhia, deve-lhe de dar cousa certa e 
dotar-lho para sempre, que seja mantença, para certos estudantes da Companhia, e não deve 
aceitar V. P. dada de terras com escravos, que fação mantimentos para o colégio, senão cousa 
certa, ou dos dízimos, ou tanto cada ano de seu tesouro, salvo se lá acharem maneira com que 
nós em nada nos ocupemos nisso, o quel eu não sei como possa ser’.771 
As a consequence of Nóbrega’s letter, on 7 November 1564 Dom Sebastião issued the 
padrão for the foundation of the College of Salvador da Baía. The aim of the royal 
precept was ‘a conversão dos infieis e gentios e instrução dos novamente convertidos’, 
basing the royal subventions on the ‘redizima de todos os dizimos e dereitos, que tenho 
e me pertencem e ao diante pertencerem nas ditas partes do Brasil’,772 or a part to be 
taken from the royal sugar tithe. 
 Although this grant was officially issued by the King himself, the Fathers soon 
discovered that obtaining the padrão was not as difficult as collecting the money they 
were meant to receive. This way to acquire economic helps took the Jesuits so close to 
secular power both in the kingdom and in the colonies; there, in the ultramar, the 
Society had to deal with the public officials who were to pay the redizima. Similarly to 
what happened to the Japan mission, where, as we know, royal and papal alms arrived 
often tardily and, if so, curtailed by customs issues,773 in Brazil each Jesuit was granted 
20$000 réis per year, but initially they received not even 10’000.774 Moreover, again 
similarly to the Japan mission of the Society of Jesus, despite the redizima could cover 
the yearly expenses of the colleges, those missing payments caused the mission to pile 
                                                 
770 See HCJBI I, p. 47. We had to use both the first edition (Lisboa/Rio de Janeiro 1938-1945) and the 
second (São Paulo 2004), which in the footnotes are differentiate respectively by [I] and [II]. 
771 See HCJBII I, p. 42. 
772 See Padrão da fundação do Colégio da Baía por D. Sebastião, Rei de Portugal, in MB IV 1563-1568, 
pp. 94-99. See also Alvará da fundação Régia do Colégio da Baía, MB IV 1563-1568, pp. 100-106 
773 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 21 [II], ff. 227-227v. 
774 Cf. HCJBII I, p. 43. 
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up a lot of debts, from 5’000 cruzados in 1593 to 18’000 in 1601,775 and from the 1570s 
on, the Jesuits complained that the stipends derived from tithes were invariably paid 
tardily. 776  In response to Jesuits protests, D. Sebastião directed that Baía’s royal 
subvention be paid out of customs receipts instead of tithes, but his order provoked 
sharp protests from the Governor-General, who insisted that these revenues were needed 
for other purposes. In 1573, Sebastião issued another alvará in which he exempted the 
colleges from paying both income and expenditure fees. Eventually, in 1604, the crown 
adopted what would become the standard practice: each of the three colleges was 
authorized to collect its stipend in tithable sugar from plantations of its choice.777 
 With the 1564 alvará the Portuguese Crown assumed for itself the obligation to 
provide the necessary economic supply for three colleges in Brazil, namely Baía (1564), 
Rio de Janeiro (1568) and Olinda (1576).778 The redizima for the Society was to be 
given to a fixed number of Fathers (130 in total: 60 for Bahia, 50 for Rio and 20 for 
Olinda), but, as we might expect, the mission was growing fast and in 1600 the Jesuits 
in Brazil were already 172. 779  Furthermore, the problem was not confined to the 
contingent of Jesuits in Brazil. As the number of Ignatians grew, so did the cost of 
living and in the early 1580s ‘a renda que se deu pera 60, agora não basta mais que pera 
30, e isto para vestido e mantimento não entrando livros, obras e igreja e quebras de 
pagamentos mal e tarde’.780 As a consequence, it was necessary for the missionaries to 
find other ways to make a living. 
                                                 
775 See Provincial Pêro Rodrigues to General Acquaviva, Salvador da Baía, 24 April 1601. ARSI, Bras. 8 
[I], f. 30v: ‘Ha tres años que os officiaes da fazenda de S. Majestade não pagão a renda deste Collegio que 
são tres mil cruzados, pello que as dividas vão crescendo tão que chegão oje a dezoito mil cruzados’. See 
also 1598 Catalogus Provincia Brasiliæ - Collegium Bayense, ARSI, Bras. 51, f. 35: ‘[D]ebita huius 
Collegii sunt septem aut octo millia aureorum nec habet undesit solvendo’. Cf. HCJBII I, p. 47. 
776  It is true, however, that by getting custom fees exemption on goods throughout the Portuguese 
America, the Jesuits could receive whatever they needed from each side of the Portuguese Empire and, in 
particular, they could send their own goods with a lesser value, which makes them able to balance their 
finances. See Assunção, Negócios Jesuíticos: A Administração dos Bens Divinos, pp. 115-116. 
777  Cf. Alden, The Making of the Enterprise, p. 467. About the relationship between Jesuits and 
Governadores Gerais, in the 16th century the Society had problems in particular with the Governor 
Manuel Teles Barreto, who was the first to be appointed during the Philippine period. Barreto had been 
showing that he was not eager to accomplish his commitments towards the Society already when he was 
Vereador da Câmara in Lisbon. Once in Brazil, he did not change his behaviour and kept demonstrating 
his unwillingness to pay the Fathers. Cf. HCJBI II, p. 156. 
778 The royal subsidies were 1’200’000 réis for Baía, 1’000’000 for Rio de Janeiro and 400’000 for 
Olinda, which were to be paid on the first day of each year ‘em frujtos de açucares dos dizimos que a dita 
Capitania rende’. Cf. ANTT/CJ, Maço 86, ff. 1-3v. 
779 Cf. HCJBI I, pp. 578-584. 
780 See Memorial do Procurador do Brasil pera V. P., ARSI, Lus. 68, f. 416. Despite this memorandum 
does show neither a sign nor a date, Serafim Leite states that it was written in 1584 by Procurator António 
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 As early as June 1561, then before D. Sebastião’s alvará, Nóbrega, writing to 
Lisbon, outlined on what economic basis a college in Brazil should be founded. 
According to the founder of the Brazilian mission, the easiest way to survive was: 
‘[G]rande criação de vaquas, porque nesta terra custa pouco criá-las e multiplicão muito […]. 
Esta hé a milhor fazenda sem trabalho que cá há; e dam carnes e couros e leite e queijos que, 
sendo muitas, poderão abastar a muita gente. Se me a mim derem licença que tome a esmola 
d’El-Rey en gado, estes annos que se dará, ellas multiplicarão tamto que abaste a prover ho 
Collegio, ainda que não aja outra cousa d’El-Rey’.781 
As we already saw, despite this hint – alms in cattle782 – the redizima granted in 1564 
was a portion of the income that the Crown received from tithes paid in sugars in 
accordance with the padroado real agreements.783 In 16th and 17th-century Brazil, the 
local economy was still based on the commutatio rerum system and in this system cane 
sugar played the coin role.784 The plantation of sugar, introduced to Brazil perhaps as 
early as 1526, became that colony’s leading staple only in the 1550s.785 Cane sugar 
industry definitely flourished after 1570 and dominated European market until the 
middle of the 1600, but the Jesuits did not become directly involved in it until the start 
of the 17th century.786 The flourishing production of Brazilian sugar was due to features 
of the land, which allowed a better production, both in quantity and in quality, with 
respect to the sugar produced in Madeira and in particular allowed the producers to sell 
their sugar at a lower price than the competitors.787 We can have an idea of how fast this 
industry grew by comparing the number of the engenhos de açúcar (sugar mills) in 
1570 – 60 (of which 23 were in Pernambuco e 18 in Bahia) – and in 1629 when in the 
colony where working 346 engenhos: in less than 60 years an augmentation of 476%! 
                                                                                                                                               
Gomes. Actually, this text is one of the decrees of the Congregação da Provincia do Brasil of December 
1583. Before the Memorial, in fact, we find O que se pede na congregação da provincia do Brasil em 
dezembro de 83 and the Memorial do Padre Provincial, all three written by the same hand. Regarding 
who was the procurator at that time, it is almost certain that in 1583 was António Gomes, since the 
following year he wrote the Primus Catalogus Sociorum qui in Brasilia vaunt missus per Padrem 
Antonium Gomez Procuratorem. In ARSI, Bras. 5 [I], ff. 20-25v. 
781 Cf. MB III 1558-1563, pp. 347.348. 
782 In Salvador da Baía, Rio and Pernambuco cattle turned out to be a very profitable activity for the 
Jesuits, also if compared to cane sugar production. The reasons are quite simple: higher economic revenue 
with lesser capital investment and labour. Cf. Assunção, op. cit., pp. 263-264 
783 Cf. Alden, op. cit., p. 324. 
784 Also the manioc used to play a similar role, for the troops of the Governor General of Baía in 1684 
received part of the stipends in manioc flour. 
785 Although the constructions of sugar mills started in the mid-1540s, the first engenho appeared in 1553 
in the Ilha de S. Vicente, not far from nowadays Santos. Cf. Mauro, Portugal, o Brasil e o Atlântico 1570-
1670, p. 254. 
786 Cf. Alden, op. cit., p. 416. 
787 Cf. Mauro, op. cit., p. 254. 
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 Salvador da Baía Pernambuco 
1570 5 23 
1583 46 66 
1610 50 90 
1629 80 150 
                                  Source: Mauro, Portugal, o Brasil e o Atlântico 1570-1670, pp. 257-258. 
High demands from Europe made the prices of açúcar branco (white sugar) 
grow from 500 réis per arroba788 in 1570 to almost 1660 réis in 1613. Besides, the truce 
signed by Spain and the United Provinces after 1609 lead to a period of general 
prosperity and expansion in the Atlantic. The Brazilian economy, with sugar as its 
leading product, was a fast growing system with possibilities of high revenues, and then 
it goes without saying that also the Ignatians were aiming to get involved in the sugar 
industry, whether with lucre or not is still an open debate. The interesting part of their 
involvement is that they administrated their estates following the dynamics of the 
colonial economy: increase the productivity and gain better results from that.789 
 
V. 2.    The post of procurator in Brazil between engenhos and Portuguese 
officers 
In May 1587, Claudio Acquaviva addressed a letter to Provincial Rodrigues, in 
which the general shortly explained the main purposes and commitments of each capital 
figure of the Society’s hierarchy. Regarding the Rectores he wrote that: 
‘Por esto digo que el principal cuidado del Superior e nel qual conto da diligencia y solicitud, 
se ha de exercitar, deve ser que los nuestros se adelantem en las verdaderas y solidar virtudes, 
para lo qual es summamente necessario que attendam a su officio, dando de mano a todas las 
de mas cosas que lo pueden impedir; y que ni las visitas, ni el trato con el proximo ni aun el 
mismo predicar los tengan ocupados, y distraigan deste intento, y mucho menos el cuydado de 
las cosas temporales en las quales veo nuestros Rectores tan solicitos, y tan del tudo dados 
aellas que apenas pueden respirar. Bien veo que las necessidades delos collegios, su pobreza, 
y la moltitud delos subiectos, dela qual no se puede descargar es cauza de semeiante 
incomodidad, pero viendo tambien el gran daño que dello se sigue desseo grandemente que 
los Rectores sean proveidos de buenos procuradores que attiendan a lo temporal y los 
descarguen deste cuidado de manera que puedan attender a lo que mais importa, y quando los 
nuestros [...] hizieren lo que pueden, y deven assi en lo proprio aprovechamiento spiritual 
                                                 
788 1 arroba [@] corresponded to 14, 7 kg. 
789 Cf. Assunção, op. cit., p. 55. 
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como en la aiuda de los proximos podemos esperar que la divina providencia remediara estas 
necessidades’.790 
In addition to the emphasis on the obedience of the college procurator to the rector, 
which we already saw in Valignano’s Regimento, Acquaviva drew on a leitmotiv 
concerning the procurator presents also in the Constitutiones, which we have already 
saw earlier: ‘para que a Companhia possa mais exclusivamente dedicar-se às coisas 
espirituais a que está destinada, deve evitar, tanto quanto possível, todos os negócios 
seculares [...]. E se ocorrerem negócios destes relacionados com os Colégios, estes 
devem ter procurador que se ocupe deles e defenda os seus direitos’.791 Both in Japan 
and Brazil, in order to keep up appearances the Society of Jesus in its fundamental text 
decreed that the office of procurator was filled preferably by laymen fellows of the 
Society. This suggestion was drawn on throughout all the provinces of the Society 
between 16th and 17th century. In the previous chapters, we have shown that the Jesuits 
were torn between the vow of holy poverty and the need of tangling up with secular 
matters, which was the reason why the visitors were specifically committed to look after 
the economy of the missions and their financial means and this is also an evidence of 
how the capillary structure of the Companhia actually worked despite the distance it had 
to cover. Even the lexicon used by the Ignatians was similar, although they were 
separate by expanses of sea and waves of time.  
 In 1611, for instance, Francesco Pasio wrote that ‘para que este trato [the silk 
trade] que não se poda escuzar se faça com mayor modestia o respeito que puder ser 
procure emquanto for possivel de comprar por mão de outro, e não por sy mesmo’.792 
Some twenty years before, the Visitor of the Brazilian Province Cristóvão de Gouvêa 
wrote that ‘procure-se com toda a diligencia, que aja sempre hum feitor homem fiel, e 
de recado, que va fora de casa arrecadar açuquar, farinha e mais cousas, necessarias e 
                                                 
790 See General Acquaviva to Provincial Rodrigues, Rome, 19 May 1587. ARSI, Bras. 2, ff. 97-97v. Cf. 
also what is stated in Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Latinæ Et Hispanicæ Cum Earum Declarationibus, 
Ninth Part, Cap. VI, p. 275: ‘[T]ambém os Superiores Provinciais, Reitores de Colégios e Superiores 
particulares de Casas devem ter as suas ajudas, mais ou menos conforme a necessidade e importância das 
coisas que lhes são encomendadas’. 
791 Cf. Constitutiones Societatis Iesu Latinæ Et Hispanicæ Cum Earum Declarationibus, Sixth Part, Cap. 
III, p. 199. 
792 See Regimento para o Procurador de Jappão que Reside na China. Este deu aqui o P. Vizitador 
Francesco Passio quando veo de Jappão, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-IV-66, f. 10. The italic is ours. 
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não se mandem os nossos a isso quanto for possivel’.793 Additionally, there is also the 
aforementioned questionnaire sent by Father Ludovico da Fonseca to Acquaviva in 
1594, to which the general categorically answered to dismiss all professed Fathers in 
charge of the procuratorship of colleges or probationary houses.794 
 Despite this widespread feeling, we saw that the suggestion was difficult to be 
respected. According to Spinola’s last letter quoted, it would seem that he found a way 
to keep on financing the persecuted province without creating any scandal and, in 
particular, abiding by the Constitutions and Valignano’s Regimento. Nevertheless, we 
know that not only internal members of the Society took care of the office in Japan and 
China, but they were also professed Fathers. Also in Brazil the post of procurator was 
bestowed neither laymen nor to simple Brothers, rather to Fathers like Francisco de 
Lemos,795 who did not consider himself worthy to accept the third vow but eventually 
was granted the fourth too and climbed up the Society’s hierarchy in the Brazilian 
colony up the top.796 The case of Father de Lemos is quite meaningful, since it discloses 
that for the Society’s sake, provincials and rectors were almost obliged to rely on 
Fathers they really trusted, in particular when it came to cope with the delicate matters 
belonging to the post of procurator. Provincial Rodrigues himself explained that he 
removed ‘P. Manoel de Saa 797  do officio de procurador, não por erros da muito 
momento, mas para tirar materia do queixumes, pus em seu lugar ao P. Francisco de 
Lemos que trouxe de Pernambuco aonde era ministro’.798 The sources we just quoted 
                                                 
793 See O que pareceo ao Padre Visitador Christovão de Gouvea ordenar na visita destes Collegio da 
Baya – 1.º de Janeiro de 1589 veo confirmado pelo Padre Geral. ARSI, Bras. 2, f. 148v. The italic is 
ours. 
794 Cf. Responsiones ad proposita a Patre Ludovico da Fonseca, procuratore Brasilia anno 1594. ARSI, 
Bras. 2, f. 86. 
795 The Portuguese Francisco de Lemos (1563-1628) turned Jesuit on 1 February 1578. He was in the 
Armada da Conquista do Rio Grande do Norte in 1597 helping ‘ao exército com os acostumados 
exercícios da Companhia, com muita edificação de todos, prègando, confessando e fazendo amizades e 
não se negando a nenhuns trabalhos’. Then, he went back to Pernambuco and eventually reached Baía, 
where he was appointed college procurator. He taught grammar, Brazilian language and worked also in 
the villages. He passed away while he was serving as father superior in São Paulo. Cf. HCJBI I, p. 516 
796 See Provincial Rodrigues to General Acquaviva, Salvador da Bahia, 15 September 1602. ARSI, Bras. 
8 [I], f. 16v: ‘Tambem o Padre Francisco de Lemos teve ao principio grande repugnancia em aver de 
aceitar a profissão de tres votos, mas ainda que magoado finalmente a aceitou por se sojeitar à ordem de 
V. P. tem nesta provincia trabalhando com edificação, ouvio tres anos de Theologia, nas ocuparão no 
muitos anos em o officio de procurador deste collegio que oje faz. A resignação com que se venceo com 
outras razões ne obrigão a pedir a V. P. o admitta aos 4.º votos. E assi pareceo aos consultores da 
provincia’.  
797 Manuel de Sá (1552-1625) was born in Braga and entered the Society in December 1572. He was 
appointed procurator twice, in Baía first and then Pernambuco, where he eventually died.  
798 See Provincial Rodrigues to General Acquaviva, Salvador da Baía, 5 January 1600. ARSI, Bras. 3 [I], 
f. 169. 
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regarding the Province of Brazil were written six years away one from the other (1594 
and 1600), but they can still stand as examples of how, also in Brazil, the office of 
procurator was so important to bend the limitations imposed by the Curia Generalizia 
by being a substantial part of that bureaucratic instinct for survival, which Nicholas 
Cushner’s wrote about.799 
 As we know, the procurator in the Society of Jesus coped with the preservation 
of the mission or the college’s belongings and estates and with the conservation of the 
monetary capital. According to the texts of the Ignatian Order, each house should have 
one or more officials who were concerned with its internal management, with the 
purchase of commodities that it required, with the keeping of its fiscal and legal records, 
and with the representation of its interests before civil authorities. At the beginning, all 
these tasks were often carried out by one person but in larger institutions there were 
separate house managers (ministros or œconomi), buyers (compradores) and 
procurators. All three offices were derived from the old Benedictine office of cellarer or 
steward. According to the Benedictine Rule, his duty was to take care of everything but 
to undertake nothing without the consent of the abbot and, as we already saw, the same 
was true in the Society. The procurators bore primary responsibility for the receipt and 
expenditure of funds belonging to the house, as well as for the keeping of financial and 
legal records, including the texts of all bequests, royal licenses, decrees and instructions 
from the generals and congregations decrees. Whenever necessary, they utilized such 
materials in the preparation of documents they submitted to crown authorities in defence 
of their colleges’ property rights or directly to the crown, although in this case it was the 
duty of the mission procurator.800 In Brazil, copies of privileges, contracts, livros or rol 
de contas (registrations of estates’ transactions and the economic incomes of those 
sales) were to be sent to the college procurators, since they had also the responsibility of 
analysing that material and, again, save it for furthering documentation.801 Thanks to 
those papers, it was possible to verify all the operations accomplished, such as 
production of sugar, rice and tobacco, or to keep under control the quantity of slaves 
and animals belonging to the college. Yet, this analyse was important also because it 
                                                 
799 Cushner used this expression while dealing with Jesuits’ conception of slavery, but it seems a concept 
useful to describe the whole secular commitment of the Society of Jesus. See Cushner, Jesuit Ranches 
and the Agrarian Development of Colonial Argentina 1650-1767, p. 100. 
800 Cf. Alden, op. cit., pp. 308-309 and bibliography cited therein.  
801 See, for instance, the request for these papers made by the Procurator of the College of Rio de Janeiro 
Francisco da Costa in 1621 in ANTT/CJ, Maço 90, doc. n.º 96. 
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was a secure way to determine whether the colleges, houses and other estates were 
running well and without loss – both economic and religious – for the Society. In case 
of loss, obviously, the procurator was supposed to find a way to balance the budget. We 
saw how Carlo Spinola tried but could not accomplish his duty. He inherited a province 
that owed money in Japan, Macao and Portugal and still had to find incomes to maintain 
it. Father André de Gouvêa, the procurator of Lisbon’s college of Santo Antão in 
Salvador da Baía,802 expressed a similar concept to Spinola’s when he was appointed 
procurator in Nagasaki, yet he added a touch of spite Spinola’s words lack: 
‘Não tenho tempo para informar a V. R. do modo que achei estas cousas deste Collegio, nem 
he bem que se digão, porque não servira mais que dar a V. R. pena sem proveito [...]. 
Tratando de lançar este engenho azucar, o que não ouvera de fazer se eu não ficara, mas que 
animo que V. R. que eu tenha, ver-me com huma occupação tão trabalhosa em terra que eu 
não conheço ninguem e tão desbaratada [...], afligido com dividas Deus acuda que serto me he 
necessario paciençiar e V. R. na instrução que me deu, dis-me que lhe mande o dinheiro que 
eu qua achar. Se V. R. tivera a esperiencia que eu oje tenho, V. R. me dera la dinheiro, e não 
esperar fosse de qua, e a graça foi que vindo hum armada tão grande, senão embarcou para 
estes engenhos, hum vinte de fornecimento, e eu tenho agora necessidade de bons 3’000 
cruzados per acodir as cousas precisas deste engenho [...]. [E] assim confesso a V. R. que 
senão vira o desemparo que qua achei, me ouvera de voltar e quem emmarantou as cousas, as 
viesse desembaraçar’.803 
Gouvêa was appointed procurator during a particular time, i.e. after the Dutch invasion 
of Salvador and its recovery by the Portuguese in 1624. Consequently, his duties were 
even more urgent. In April 1627, in fact, he compiled a list of the people the college 
owed money to and, although the sum of debts was almost 3’500’000 réis, the 
procurator managed to diminish it by one million.804 Differently from the Japanese 
Province, which ran into debt in order to secure the participation in the silk trade, the 
Brazilian Province was a victim of circumstances. Gouvêa, in fact, found the engenho in 
terrible conditions due to the Dutch invasions, which caused also the production halt. 
Nevertheless, the problems of the engenho were not caused only by the invasion, but 
                                                 
802 The Portuguese André de Gouvea (1583-?) was born in S. João de Mondim (S. João de Tarouca) and 
entered the Society when he was 22 years old. He was first appointed procurator of the college of Terceira 
in the Azores and then, from 1625 to 1630 circa, he was sent to Baía as S. Antão’s procurator in the 
Engenho de Sergipe do Conde. Cf. HCJBI VIII, pp. 278-279 and Magalhães, “A Relação do Engenho de 
Sergipe do Conde em 1625”, pp. 237-238. 
803 See Procurator André de Gouvêa to Rector of the College of S. Antão Luís de Morais, Salvador da 
Baía, 25 July 1625. ANTT/CJ, Maço 69, f. 1 
804 Cf. Rol das dividas que achei feitas e a que pesoas se devião, ARSI, Bras. 11 [I], ff. 382-382v. The 
exact amount of debts was 3’473’094 réis. 
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were inscribed within a general crisis of the economia açucareira during the 1620s. 
Procurator Gouvêa wrote that ‘não vejo por qua Senhor de engenho rico, antes todos 
pobres’.805 It was not uncommon for senhores de engenho to get heavily into debt and 
to see their fortune turned out to nothing over a few safras owing, in particular, to 
administrative incapacity and to the increase in the slave prices.806  
In any case, at this point we can say that the college procurator was at the same 
time the accountant of the mission, who bore on his shoulders a heavy system of fiscal 
control, and its provider, who had to make sure there always was enough capital to keep 
the engine going.807 
 In order to outline the tasks of the procurator in Brazil, we can rely upon on 
primary and secondary sources, such as the procurators’ letters, official documents 
regarding purchasing and selling of engenhos and their receitas. Within the primary 
sources, however, falls also the Memorial somente do Procurador do Brasil pera V. P., 
a three-page text written in 1583 by the Procurator of the College of Baía António 
Gomes.808 In this text we find some of the commitments that grieved the procurators 
and the first one is the insufficiency of financial resources in relation to the number of 
missionaries residing in the College of Baía.809  
It is remarkable to find in Brazil almost exactly the same problems as the ones 
faced by Spinola in the other side of the world thirty years later. António Gomes, in 
fact, was not asking for an increase of the renda or for further aids from the kingdom, 
rather he considered a better solution to limit the number of the residents in the college 
to an affordable number proportionate to the incomes, which although might have been 
a negative solution for the mission in general, at least would grant sufficient means to 
the Ignatians who were already there. The idea of stopping the arrival of other 
missionaries, instead of earning much money, was as common as it was the awareness 
of how hard was to obtain financial support and, even harder, to collect it.810 As a 
                                                 
805 Apud Magalhães, op. cit., p. 245. 
806 Cf. Schwartz, Segredos Internos: Engenhos e Escravos na Sociedade Colonial, 1550-1835, p.228 and 
Magalhães, op. cit., pp. 245-246. 
807 Cf. Assunção, op. cit., pp. 52-54. 
808 António Gomes (ca. 1549-1589) was born near Braga, entered the Society in 1570 and was the 
Procurador do Colégio da Baía for seven years. He died in Salvador. 
809 See ARSI, Lus. 68, f. 416. 
810 Cf. Visitas dos Padres Visitadores depois de serem approvadas pelo Padre Geral – Franciscus de 
Borgia Societatis Iesu Prepositus Generalis, ARSI, Bras. 2, f. 143: ‘Parece que conviere no recebirse en 
la Provincia mas delos ciento, y treinta que estan ordenados en las fundaciones de los tres Collegios, en 
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matter of fact, we saw that Nóbrega, instead of wanting the king to take royal help to a 
higher economic level, asked to be allowed to receive the alms from other sources 
(cattle). 
 At any rate, further on in the Memorial we find the statement that the amount of 
work a college procurator had to handle in Brazil is not as much as in Portugal, but he 
was oppressed by his obligations nonetheless. Then, Gomes indirectly informs us about 
one of the principal tasks the procurator had to deal with: payments. As we have already 
seen, the debts of the mission, as well as daily expenditures, were ceaselessly growing 
and it was the Procurators’ job to extinguish them. According to Gomes, both the 
procurator of Rio de Janeiro and Baía used to sell cows and ‘farinha biscoutada’ to the 
Royal Fleet both to earn something but also to repay the armada for its service.811 
Although the college of Baía used to sell its goods at the ‘preço justo da terra’,812 this 
fact created some frictions between the Fathers and the Governor of Rio, and this goes 
against the 6th item of the Memorial: 
‘6. Taobem me parece mas importante que se avia de fazer todo o possivel por conservar a 
benevolencia do Bispo, Governador e mais pessoas do governo assi ecclesiastico, como 
secular, por que agora mais creem os do governo e conselho de Portugal, a huma carta destes, 
que a nossos papeis e instrumentos pubricos e sempre vi que nos ficamos com o trabalho, 
perda e desgosto e sem fundir nada, assi foi do Governador Luis de Brito na Baya, e com 
Antonio Çallema Governador no Rio de Janeiro813 e agora deste não sei como sera. E alem 
                                                                                                                                               
quanto las dotaciones no fueren mayores con que se puedan mejor sustentar, o no uviere otras nuevas 
residencias para las quales sera necessario aver mas subjectos. No se quita con esto porderse recebir 
algunos buenos coadiutores temporales siendo necessarios con orden del Padre Provincial con tanto que 
no passen mucho del dicho numero. Lo mismo se entender quando se offerecieren algunos para studiantes 
de mas de mediocres partes para la Companhia’. 
811 Cf. ARSI, Lus. 68, f. 416v: ‘9. O Collegio do Rio de Janeiro parece que vendeo algumas vacas e 
farinha biscoutada a esta armada que foy a Magalhaes, e bem creo que foi arrogo da mesma armada, mas 
contudo agora vindo dezião que muitas vacas e roças tinhão os padres pois vendião pera a armada de sua 
Magestade. 10. Ouvi que pagavão aos officiaes das obras algumas vezes em pano, vinho e azeite pello 
preço iusto da terra, mas alguns destes o tornão a revender pelo preço que querem, e day naceo que tendo 
nos differenças com o Governador Çallema, tirou devassa que nos vendera mas huma botija grande de 
vinho por 3 cruzados. E na Baya algumas vezes fizemos ja isto per falta de dinheiro digo dar pano, vinho 
e azeite aos officiaes e lavradores a quem devemos em pagamento’.  
812 The concept of justum pretium was strictly connected to that of usury for the Roman theologists and 
the scholasticism. The ecclesiastical authority, in fact, deemed to be the only one to have the instruments 
to recognize usury in commercial exchanges, since it was in its powers to establish the right price for any 
merchandise. Everything that did not respect the pretium as it was established by the Roman Church was 
accused of usury, thus the usurer was someone outside the ecclesial society of the believers. Cf. 
Todeschini, I Mercanti e il Tempio – La società cristiana e il circolo virtuoso della ricchezza fra 
Medioevo ed Età Moderna, pp. 100-101. 
813 Dom Luís Brito de Almeida was granted the title of fourth Governor General of Baía on 10 December 
1572 and held the title until 1578. It happened that, after Mem de Sá’s death, Brazil was divided in two 
separate jurisdictions: the north, with the governorship in Baía, was under the command of Luís Brito de 
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disso val nos mais la o mal destes, que os favores que ja não ha em Portugal, porque nunca se 
negão a Padre nem Irmão nosso [...] e comumente fazem aquillo em que por boa rezão são 
convencidos’.814 
Then, the procurator in Brazil not only had to take care of economic issues without 
creating scandals for the Society there in the colony and in the kingdom, a common trait 
within the Society of Jesus, as we know, but he had also to care about how the royal 
officers reacted to his way of handling the Society’s affairs. Playing a part in the 
economy of the captaincies, in fact, meant also to influence its trend, therefore the 
procurator had to act – and was perceived – as a common agent of the crown, although 
he dressed differently. However, critics always work on both directions. In 1628, in 
fact, Procurator Gouvêa complained that the economic competition with Governor 
Diogo Luís de Oliveira was a great deterrent for the college’s affairs: 
‘O engenho vay moendo com grandes esperanças de muito e bom asucar, que tanto me tem 
custado [...]. Se o Senhor Governador não fora mercador, tiveramos mais praças e o asucar 
valera muito mas tudo abergua e so seus creados comprão. Antes dis o povo que toma o 
dinheiro aos mestres com capa de pagamentos a soldados e que lhe pegara em asucares nem 
pode ser menos aos muitos que seus creados comprão e 2 ou 3 mil @ que agora vendo, nos dá 
de perder bons mil ducados [...]. E se elle não fora, ouvera de valer a 1100 e já a 800 o não 
querem seus creados, Deus nos libre deste homem’.815 
Differently from Japan, where for at least a dozen years the Ignatians kept the favour of 
the tyrants through their services as sales representatives, in Brazil there was 
competition with the authorities, despite the governor and the Society of Jesus were 
both agents of the Portuguese, then Iberian, Crown. In conclusion, then, in Brazil the 
procurators were religious ambassadors dressed as Portuguese merchants who had to 
forget temporarily about their pious background in order to serve their order in the 
hostile land of money and bureaucracy. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Almeida, whereas the other one, starting from Porto Seguro southward, was granted to António Salema, 
who controlled it from 1574 to 1577. Afterwards, with the governorship of the fifth Governor Lourenço 
da Veiga, the colony turned back to the old situation without divisions between north and south. 
814 See ARSI, Lus. 68, f. 416v. 
815 See Procurator Gouvêa to Father Simão Álvares, Salvador da Baía, 29 October 1628. ANTT/CJ, Maço 
68, doc. n.º 342, f. 1. 
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 V. 3.    Dueling with the devil: ‘um engenho é inferno e todos os senhores 
deles são perdidos’ 
 Besides the difference in goods they had to handle – silk and silver in Japan and 
sugar in Brazil – the absence/presence of a firm and therefore pre-eminent establishment 
of royal power appears to be one of the big differences between the office of procurator 
in Japan and in Brazil, even though not only the procurators but the entire Society had 
to deal with governors and royal officers. Actually, the Society of Jesus in Brazil 
presented another peculiarity, which we can trace back to Mem de Sá governorship, or 
better to his death and legacy. 
 When the third governor general died on 2 March 1572, he bequeathed to his 
heirs – Francisco and Filipa de Sá – all of his properties, among which there was the 
Engenho de Sergipe do Conde, one of the largest and certainly the most famous of the 
sugar plantations in colonial Brazil, founded by the same governor in the 1560s.816 
 In Mem de Sá’s will there was in particular a clause which refers to Sergipe. It 
stated that if his sons would die without heirs the part of the legacy which included the 
sugar mill should be split up in three parts: one should go to the College of Santo Antão, 
another to the Jesuit college in Baía and the third part to the Misericórdia da Cidade do 
Salvador da Baía (Charitable Brotherhood). This clause would eventually create a harsh 
dispute because of the following facts. Francisco de Sá died only eight months after his 
father (19 December 1572), consequently the whole inheritance passed to Filipa and 
became part of her dowry when she married Dom Fernando de Noronha, count of 
Linhares – reason why the mill was called Sergipe do Conde or Engenho do Conde –, 
again in 1572. Upon her death in 1612, the plantation became embroiled in a three-way 
lawsuit involving the aforementioned colleges and the Misericórdia. This dispute 
                                                 
816 Cf. ANTT/CJ, Maço 89, doc. n.º 12, f. 1: ‘Diz o Procurador da Misericordia pobres e orfãos da Cidade 
do Salvador Bahia de todos os Sanctos, que no testamento com que faleçeo mem de Sáa, que foy 
Governador do Estado do Brasil, cuja copia vay no Appontamento mayor a fol. 3 e no outro 
Appontamento a fol. 113, dispos na verba fol. 5 verso et fol. 155 despois de diser que tinha na Capitania 
da Bahia tres legoas e meya de costa, e quatro para o sertão com duas Ilhas em Cirigipe aonde fizer hum 
engenho de assucar que tinha alguns escravos, que tomava o dito engenho com todas suas terras e agoas 
em sua terça, e que a deixava a Francisco de Sáa seu filho, com tudo o mais que nella lhe coubesse 
vinculado por via de morgado para que elle o lograsse e possuisse em sua vida, e por sua morte ficasse a 
seu filho mayor legitimo e de legitimo matrimonio, e que não tendo filho varão legitimo, e de legitimo 
matrimonio veria a sua filha mayor de legitomo matrimonio, e que sendo caso que o dito seu filho 
faleçesse sem desçendentes verião os ditos bens a sua filha Donna Phelippa de Sáa ou a seus filhos sendo 
ella falecida’. The Engenho de Sergipe do Conde lay in the midst of the Baian recôncavo, the lands that 
encircled the bay (near present day Santo Amaro and São Francisco do Conde). This region, along with 
its counterpart in Pernambuco, formed the heart of the colonial sugar economy. 
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dragged through the courts until a final decision in August 1665, when ‘a dita Igreja 
[Santo Antão] tomou posse do dito engenho’817 and turned to be the only Peninsular 
college to own sugar estates in Brazil.818 
 We have already stated that the Society did not get involved into sugar 
plantation before 17th century, but before going back to that we have to notice that the 
Generals assumed different behaviours towards this involvement. Diego Laínez, the 
second General, sanctioned its dispatch in limited quantities; Borgia, on the other hand, 
ruled that ‘alguna cosa de las que se usan allá le pareciere derechamente contraria a 
nuestro Instituto’ should be quitted, in particular he told Visitor Inácio de Azevedo to 
note ‘si se occupan los nuestros en negocios seglares’.819 By 1584 the fifth General, 
Claudio Acquaviva, had been persuaded that neither the Constitutions nor the Institute 
would be violated if the Brazilian colleges should started growing sugar; hence, by 1590 
he authorized the College of Baía to plant canes, provided that two conditions were 
respected: ‘se puedan hazer canaveales, para que con el açucar se pueda ir desdevidando, 
y suplir a lo que la renta no basta, per adiurtasse, que esso se haga si inquietude de los 
nuestros ni ellos se entremetan a hazer lo açucar’.820 No anxiety for fathers and brothers 
and, in particular, no direct participation in the industry. 
 As we can assume by reading Acquaviva’s words, one of the main reasons that 
convinced him to allow Jesuits to plant canes was the disturbing reports of the colleges’ 
mounting debts. Additionally, we know that only few years before, the general received 
letters by Valignano in support of the silk trade. Then, we can say that the 1580s and 
early 1590s were years of pronounced tolerance of Acquaviva towards the economy of 
the Portuguese Assistancy, since he decided to allow both, although reluctantly. 
 Notwithstanding Acquaviva’s placet, we have letters written in 1601 in which 
we find again the same problems as in the previous decade. In April, Provincial 
Rodrigues wrote to Acquaviva that, despite he had accepted to plant cane on Jesuit 
lands as well as building a mill to rent,821 ‘nada disto tive effeito, porque em duas partes 
                                                 
817 Cf. ANTT/CJ, Maço 15, doc. n.º 13, f. 1v. 
818 Regarding the history of Sergipe do Conde see HCJBI V, pp. 243-251; Alden, op. cit., pp. 416-425 and 
Schwarz, “Free Labor in a Slave Economy: The Lavradores de Cana of Colonial Bahia”, pp. 149-150.  
819 Cf. Instrução do P. Francisco de Borja ao P. Inácio de Azevedo Visitador do Brasil, in MB IV 1563-
1568, pp. 322-329. 
820 Copia de outra [letter of General Claudio Acquaviva] de 28 de Julio de 1590. ARSI, Bras. 2, f. 61. 
821 We do not know the sugar mills rental prices, yet we know that the cost of an engenho in the early 17th 
century went from 8 to 10’000 cruzados, whereas in the end of the century the average value of a mill in 
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aonde temos terras achou se que não avia agoas acommodadas para isso. Pello que 
determino o P. Reitor [Enrique Gomes] deste Collegio usar da licença de V. P. e tomar 
hum partido de canas iunto a algum engenho’.822 However, it would seem that this 
resolution did not solve the main problem, for only seven months later he wrote once 
again to the general to inform him about a conference held with Enrique Gomes, 
Procurator Francisco de Lemos and other fathers: 
‘Por vezes tenho significado a V. P. o muito aperto de dividas em que estão os dous Collegios 
da Bahia e do Rio, por aver tres anos, que nemhuma cousa nos pagão os officiaes da real 
fazenda de S. Magestade não podendo cessar os gastos ordinarios. E assi foy necessario agora 
usar este Collegio de industria para se aiudar a sustentar. Tomou hum partido de canas em que 
pode fazer algum proveito, como fazem todos os homens que tem os taes partidos. E isto sem 
nemhuma desedificação, porque se faz com escravos de Guine, mandados pelos feitores, 
como tem em seus canaveaes os Padres do Carmo, e da S. Bento. E as pessoas a quem 
devemos se edificão de buscarmos remedio para lhes pagar’.823 
The partido de cana is a land which the lavrador de cana leased from the mill’s feitor-
mór with certain restrictions on its use and the disposal of the produce. These contracts 
varied from place to place over time, but, basically, mills’ owners favoured the partido 
de terço or partido de quarto in which the cane grower agreed to pay the engenho one-
third or one-fourth of his half of the sugar produced from cane. Provincial Rodrigues 
deemed it a profitable way to earn, and it was indeed. The partido de terço placed a 
heavy burden on the grower since in each harvest (safra) he would receive only one-
third of the sugar his cane produced.824 However, on the other hand, the distribution of 
sugar did not necessarily turn to the grower’s disadvantage, since his portion was made 
of the top quality sugar. In effect, Estevão Pereira, procurator of S. Antão, wrote that 
‘todos os assucares que hum engenho fas brancos e mascavados a metade são do 
engenho outra ametade do lavrador; o que não he nos nelles batidos, nem panelas, per 
que tudo isto he do engenho’.825 
                                                                                                                                               
Baía was about 15’000 cruzados, 18-20’000 including slaves. Cf. Schwarz, “A «Babilónia» colonial: A 
Economia Açucareira”, p. 222. 
822 See Provincial Rodrigues to General Acquaviva, Salvador da Baía, 24 April 1601. ARSI, Bras. 8 [I], f. 
30v. The underlining is the provincial’s. 
823 See Provincial Rodrigues to General Acquaviva, Salvador da Baía, 15 September 1601. ARSI, Bras. 8 
[I], f. 28v. 
824 Cf. Schwarz, “Free labor in a slave economy”, p. 154. 
825 Cf. ANTT/CJ, Maço 13, doc. n.º 20, f. 5v. 
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 Back to Rodrigues’s quote, we find him citing a fact the Jesuits in Brazil never 
got tired of pointing out when seeking some privilege or concessions. According to the 
Provincial of Brazil, Carmelites and Benedictines fathers were already growing sugar 
cane, so if they did that with no scandal for their orders, why could not the Jesuits? 
Furthermore, we know that it was not only Carmelites and Benedictines who turned 
already cane growers but also the Jesuits in New Spain turned to the production of 
sugar, almost a decade before their Brazilian colleagues.826  
It is curious to see how the Jesuits were always looking for reliable justifications 
for their behaviour and choices; they had been holding congregations and consults, 
sending several letters to generals, provincials, rectors and procurators to prove and 
convince they were not doing anything wrong. This way of handling these kinds of 
situations can be found especially in Jesuits’ apologetic historiography and it is well 
expressed in this passage of Serafim Leite: ‘permitimo-nos simplesmente observar que 
quando os factos constituem a defesa, esta defesa ainda é história. É mesmo a única 
história possível para restabelecer o equilíbrio perdido na confusão dos ataques’.827 
During the 17th century, the Ignatians acquired five sugar plantations in the 
captaincy of Baía. Three belonged to the local college, the remaining two to Santo 
Antão. This situation created the contemporary presence of, at least, two college 
procurators. From a quantitative point of view, we were able to consult more documents 
written by S. Antão’s procurators than Baía’s. In particular, in the Torre do Tombo in 
Lisbon survive many 17th-century documents written by those procurators, among who 
for the first half of the 1600 we find in particular the names of Estevão Pereira828 and 
Simão de Soutomayor.829  
Their documents are interesting for two reasons: firstly, because of their 
peculiarity, since, except for little details, it is quite difficult to tell they were written by 
                                                 
826 Cf. Alden, op. cit., p. 416. 
827 See HCJBI IV, p. 166. 
828 Father Estevão Pereira (1589-?) was born in S. Miguel das Marinhas, although in another catalogue we 
find Alvito. He entered the Society in 1606 and in 1614 he was in the College of Braga. In 1622, he was 
minister of the College of S. Miguel (Azores). As S. Antão’s procurator he was sent to Sergipe do Conde 
from 1629 to 1633 and then he came back to Lisbon where he eventually died in an indefinite year. Cf. 
Rodrigues, História da História do Brasil, I, p.390. 
829 Father Simão de Soutomayor (1585-?) was born in Lisbon and entered the Society of Jesus in Évora in 
1604. He spent a lot of years in Salvador da Baía as procurator of S. Antão, but he was in Brazil once 
before, for he was captured by the Dutch in 1624 and taken to Holland. Back in Brazil, he took an active 
part during the siege of Baía in 1638. He was still holding the office of procurator of S. Antão in 1652. 
Cf. HCJBI IX, p. 141. 
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men of the cloth. On the contrary, they are almost completely alike to papers written by 
fidalgos or senhores de engenhos. Secondly, because they are so thorough about their 
obligations that it is worth to enlist here the principal items of one of the most detailed 
record written by Estevão Pereira in 1635, namely Dase Rezão da fazenda que o 
Collegio De Santo Antão Tem no Brazil, e de seus Rendimentos.830 Pereira’s list starts 
with the lands belonging to the mill (Terras em Ceregipe), both the partidos and the 
sobejos (extra-parcels),831 with their corresponding values. Then, the procurator moves 
to other estate’s typology: stockyards (curraes) and farms (fazendas). After these 
records, which occupy 5 folios, begins a part directly involved with the harvest process, 
a part, then, that shows how deep the procurator’s knowledge of the sugar industry was 
supposed to be. Pereira writes about the earnings of the engenho coming from the sugar 
sales by describing the best scenario that could possibly happen: selling white sugar at 
800 réis per arroba. Then, he calculates all the prices (incomes and expenditures) basing 
his maths on that optimistic condition to show that, also with the white sugar at 800 
réis, ‘a gananza [is] tam pouca ou nenhuma’: 
Enserramento destas Contas: 
Inporta o que rende o Engenho em tempo que o assucar branco val 
a dous cruzados. 3.874U000 
Inporta a despeza feita em huma çafra, em o dito engenho pondo 
somente nella as couzas preisamente necessarias e os preços mui 
correntes, e ordinarios. 3.308U633 
Abatida a despeza da Receita restão quinhentos sessenta, e sinco 
mil tresentos e sesenta e sete réis. 0.565U367 
Source: ANTT/CJ, Maço 13, doc. n.º 20, f. 10. 
Afterwards, Pereira pointed out which counter-measures a procurator should take when 
the selling prices were not that high. First of all, it was not convenient to sell the sugar 
in Brazil, instead ‘embarcado para o Reino aonde sempre tem muita valia, e se ganha 
mais de cento per cento’. Still, the profit came not only from the prices difference. As 
we saw, one of the most enviable privilege enjoyed by the Society was the exemption of 
paying taxes and it was especially for this reason that ‘nos aproveita mais que os 
mercadores’.832 In accordance to what stated by Estevão Pereira in 1633, we have a the 
                                                 
830 The document in ANTT/CJ, Maço 13, doc. n.º 20, ff. 1-10v. 
831  ‘Afora as terras sobre ditas, há outras a que chamamos sobeios que são humas sobras, que os 
lavradores possuem de mao titulo sem pagarem dellas couza alguma’. See also Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 160-
161. 
832 Cf. ANTT/CJ, Maço 13, f. 10v. 
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receipt of Sergipe of 1608, which clearly shows that it was customary for the procurator 
back then to send half the sugar to Portugal and sell the other half in Brazil, yet also the 
exported sugar was previously sold in Brazil according to price of the colony, which 
was lower than in Portugal.833 
 As briefly pointed out before, we are forced to rely upon secondary sources in 
order to grasp the duties of the procurator in Brazil. An example of this situation is 
provided by the following quotation of Claudio Acquaviva. The general, writing to 
Provincial Rodrigues about some mishaps in the novitiates the provincial was supposed 
to set right. Among these mishaps ‘es una que los Novicios no vayan por conpanheiros 
del Procurador, y otros del Collegio a negociar pollas haziendas (y ingenios de asucar, 
ny tan poco a estar en las aldenas)’.834 Acquaviva, although briefly and while writing 
about the peregrination the novicios were supposed to do during the novitiate, pointed 
out one of the most demanding obligations of the procurator in Brazil. We have to 
concentrate, in particular, on the word ‘negociar’, since it is common to meet this verb 
and its derivatives when working on sources regarding the procurators of the Society. 
We saw before that João Rodrigues Tçuzu wrote that ‘o officio de Procurador de Japão 
por ser hum puro negociador, he muito differente do das outras Provincias’.835 It was 
indeed different from the procurator in Brazil. The different political situations obliged 
the procurators to develop along totally dissimilar paths. Whilst during Rodrigues’s 
procuratorship, the procurator was definitely a negotiator, both for the missionaries and 
for the rulers of Japan, in Brazil the procurator was more an administrator and an 
accountant. 
 Acquaviva’s passage joins in the already mentioned Visitor Cristóvão de 
Gouvêa’s subject, namely the effort to keep the fathers away from secular and 
commercial matters, which, evidently, was not a successful one.836 At the present state 
of the research, we did not find a document that defines what Acquaviva meant by 
‘negociar’, but in Lisbon’s Torre do Tombo is stored an interesting manuscript by 
Estevão Pereira that clarifies what kind of negotiations were to be accomplished by the 
                                                 
833 See Annex F – Receita do açuquar que fes o engenho de Sergipe o anno de 1608. 
834 See Alguns capitulos de huma do mesmo Padre [Acquaviva] pera o mesmo Padre [Rodrigues] de 15 
de fevereiro de 1595, ARSI, Bras. 2, f. 88. 
835 See BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-8, f. 635. 
836 Cf. HCJBII I, p. 53. 
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Procurator of S. Antão and also gives an idea of what kind of relationship there was 
between the Jesuits and laymen: 
‘O Padre Simão de Soto Maior meteo a este homem [Manoel Maciel Aranha] em humas terras 
desta fazenda, que tinha tirado a outra, para que as beneficiase (como fes plantando as de 
novo de cana, por que estavão perdidas, e cheas de mato). 837 Não lhe fes arrendamento, 
porque o homem o queria por mais largo tempo, do que o Padre lho queria, e podia faser. 
Pediuse lecença a nosso Reverendo Padre mandou a para se lhe faser por 9 annos. Foi avisado 
disto, e o Padre Gouvea se lhe offereceo para faser o arrendamento; com tanto que lhe pagase 
a renda dos 7 o 8 annos que esta na terra, sem pagar cousa alguma. Nunca ia ouve remedio 
querer chegar a conclusão. Cheguei eu fis lhe o mesmo offerecimento; disseme estava prestes 
para tudo o que eu quisese’.838 
We already saw how Acquaviva allowed the Brazil Jesuits to own estates, but he did not 
allow them to actually produce sugar. Thus, to exploit economically its own lands the 
Society, through the Procurador of the Igreja Nova of S. Antão Simão de Soutomayor, 
and by the present and future procurators of S. Antão in Sergipe,839 André de Gouvêa 
and Estevão Pereira, needed to lease them. In this case we see how the negócio did not 
come to an end because of disagreement about the leasing terms. Those agreements 
could extend for indefinite periods, lease in perpetuity not excluded. In 1600 Provincial 
Inácio Tolosa wrote: 
‘[E]l Padre Provincial com sus consultores, procurador del Collegio trató si se arrendavão en 
Emphiteosi unas tierras que tiene el Collegio em Paze siete legoas desta ciudad por mar para 
hazer, en ellas um ingenio, porque pera este effecto ninguno quiere agoas ni tierras sino 
afforadas in perpetuum, porque como la fabrica del ingenio es cosa grande, y gosta mucho 
dinero en hazerlo no querem tomallo de otra manera’.840 
The emphyteusis was profitable for both for the landowner and the tenant, but especially 
for the former. For him there were both social and economic advantages, but since the 
                                                 
837 In another letter, Pereira returns on this specific arguments writing how detrimental the bushes were 
for the harvest. See ANTT/CJ, Maço 13, doc. n.º 20, ff. 1v-2: ‘Todas estas terras dos partidos podem hoje 
valer em seu comum, e isto preço quarenta mil cruzados bem pagos em 3. ou 4 anos. Daqui em diante 
podem render os ditos partidos em cada hum anno quinhentos arrobas de assucar branco e 250 de 
mascavado. Digo daqui em diante, per que em meu tempo não chegarão a dita contia por alguns dos 
partidos starem em mato, do 4 p.º dos framengos, os quais fis reformar e plantar de novo’.  
838 See ANTT/CJ, Maço 71, doc. n.º 12, f. 1. 
839 We have a letter of Gouvêa dated 14 March 1628, in which the procurator begged the Rector of S. 
Antão, Father Simão Alvarez, to quickly send a substitute for his pos, because of his critical health 
conditions, which impeded him to carry on his duties. Cf. ANTT/CJ, Maço 68, doc. n.º 338, f. 1. 
840 See Provincial Inácio Tolosa to undisclosed recipient, Salvador da Baía, 5 September 1600. ARSI, 
Bras. 3 [I], f. 191. According to Tolosa, the emphyteusis was endorsed both by General Mercuriano and 
by Pope Gregory XIII with the brief issued on 23 August 1578. 
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Jesuits did not have to preserve their social status in the colonial society, we can focus 
on the economic side, which is quite simple. The Ignatians, in fact, although they were 
forbid to grow sugar cane, they were allowed to possess land and did not want to lose 
control and incomes of those lands. Then, the only possible solution, or compromise, 
turned out to be the lease in perpetuity, yet with restrictions based on land conditions. 
The owners found that some lands because of not excellent location could not be leased 
on the fraction basis of the partido. Tolosa expressly wrote that ‘la qualidad de las 
tierras del Brasil es gastarse en breve añnos y despues es menester dexallas descançar 
muchos años y por esto quedan sin provecho despues que las dexan los primeiros 
arrendadores; y ansi se allague a lo menos para ingenios es mas provechoso arrendallas 
in perpetuum com foro competente’.841 Tolosa’s words are a good way to show how the 
Jesuits – not only the procurators – moved in the colonial economy exactly as laymen 
did. This passage briefly demonstrates how the emphyteusis worked: the lavradores de 
cana could lease these lands for prices below their real value, with the perpetual 
obligation to provide cane to the engenho and a symbolic charge (foro competente) to 
symbolize the continuing attachment of the land to the engenho. In this way the 
cultivator acquired virtual ownership but the cane remained a perpetual “captive” of the 
mill.842 
 Back to the aforementioned passage regarding Manoel Aranha’s affair, we see 
that the procurator in Brazil had also to take care also of legal problems derived from 
those arrendamentos, a feature that reminds us of the paperwork about the gold lost in 
the sinking of the Nossa Senhora da Graça which Carlo Spinola had to deliver. In this 
specific case, Gouvêa and Pereira were trying to get rid of Aranha, who was not eager to 
lease the land on Jesuits terms, although he was already renting a land owned by the 
Society of Jesus. Estevão Pereira wrote that he went back to Baía along with Gouvêa 
looking for two judges (louvados) to legally determine the real value of the 
ameliorations (bemfeitorias) Maciel Aranha did and ‘para se lhe descuntarem dos 
rendimentos’. But, the two procurators had to face the resistance of the tenant: 
‘Elle agora pernea e da muitas resois para se lhe não averem de tirar as terras. E são as 
seguintes. 1.ª que foi movido das ditas terras com proposta de se lhe faser novo arrendamento, 
que se lhe não fes. Responde se que sua foi a culpa, pois se lhe offereces por veses, que elle 
                                                 
841 Ibid. Cf. also Alden, op. cit., pp. 403-406. 
842 Cf. Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 157-158. 
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não quis. 2.ª que elle deu muito proveito a fazenda, tomando a huma das boas que ha no 
Brazil, metendo muito cabedal &c. Respondeu que tem tirado muito, e bom proveito 
defrutandoa em todo este tempo sem nos vermos della nem hum real, ou pão d’assucar em 
tantos annos. Quanto mais que estamos prestes (feitas contas) a lhe pagar suas bemfeitorias, 
que nesta terra tem preços certo, trentas mil reis por tarefa de cana.843 3.ª que ha amigo da 
Companhia, parente de algun della [Father Manoel Fagundes], e tem bom cabedal para 
cultivar a dita fazenda’.844  
We should briefly focus on the second and third point, for they are examples of how the 
arrendamentos normally evolved. We do not know what kind of leasing was signed 
between the Society and Aranha before this one, but it seems that the tenant did not 
respect the terms of the agreement. Nevertheless, he was trying to stipulate a new one 
and it is important what he picked out in his third point. The mill owners usually rented 
their best lands in rather large parcels at the “third” rate. In Sergipe do Conde the lands 
along the bay or well-situated on rivers where the soil was good and transport easy were 
rented at the terço, whereas lands without access to water transport were leased at the 
quarto.845 Due to heavy rent obligations, only farmers of some substance accepted a 
large partido de terço. The mill owners encouraged this situation, because they wished 
to place their prime lands in the hands of those who could exploit them best. In fact, the 
records of Sergipe do Conde indicate a definite reluctance to conclude a “third” contract 
with poor cane growers. 846  We cannot ascertain from Pereira’s letter whether the 
procurator was about to stipulate a partido de terço or de quarto with Aranha, but it is 
worth to note that the Portuguese layman underlined the fact that he could easily get 
economic aid. Though Maciel Aranha presented good conditions to exploit the land at 
its best, then, what Pereira wrote afterward lets us infer that the negócio did not end 
well for the tenant: 
‘Tudo isto he verdade, mas tem contra si que he homem terribel, grandissimo demandão, 
trapasseiro de vantagem, misto que he demandas. He terribel de condição, e bellicoso. Sendo 
                                                 
843 One tarefa in Baía corresponded to 30 square braças, i.e. 4’352 metres (1 braça = 2,20 metres). 
844 See ANTT/CJ, Maço 71, doc. n.º 12, f. 1v. 
845 Cf. ANTT/CJ, Maço 13, doc. n.º 20, f. 1v: ‘Das terras que estão longo do mar ou de rios navegaves, se 
paga a fazenda de renda em cada hum anno a 3.a parte do assucar, que se faz da cana do tal partido, que 
pertença ao lavrador. Verbi g. Deu a cana do dito partido 600 arrobas de assucar destas são 300 do 
engenho onde se fez, as outras trezentos (que he a metade) pertencem ao lavrador. Destas tem a fazenda 
cem arrobas que he a 3.a parte. A estes chamão partidos de 3.º. Ha outros partidos de quarto, de que se 
paga so a quarta parte do assucar pertencente ao lavrador, e são os daquellas terras que ficão afastadas de 
pertos de mar, ou rios. Das quais per rezão da serventia mais trabalhosa, em se levar a cana a 
carregadouro, se abate a renda’.  
846 Cf. Schwarz, op. cit., p. 155. 
319 
 
como he obrigado a cortar cana para este engenho, elle dis que fara seu assucar aonde, e 
quando quiser. Melhor nos vem que os nossos Padres tenhão este partido, que em fim são 
nossos irmãos, e mui pobres. Tem mais fabrica, que o Maciel; devem ser mais bem avindos 
que elle, e moerão sua cana a tempo mais necessario, que he quando se acaba a cana dos mais 
lavradores. E se em algum tempo acharmos convem a esse Collegio meter fabrica sua na dita 
fazenda a largarão os Padres sem demanda, o que não fara o Maciel. Por tanto V.R. tenha 
mao. Não nos convem este homem por caseiro’.847 
S. Antão’s procurator, and probably Baía’s too, had to carry out a very demanding 
work. He not only had to look after the finances of the mill and to arrange agreements 
with lavradores de cana, but was directly responsible of the safra and of its succeeding. 
Obviously, what the procurator really did care about was the economic side of his 
appointment. In 1630, for example, Pereira wrote to Soutomayor that he could not 
properly dry the sugar because of lack of suitable instruments; moreover, not only he 
had to look after the whole safra, he also had to cover the expenses of the mill, which 
included several purchases, from the copper needed for the bottom of the kettles to the 
foodstuffs to feed the negros and the negros themselves.848 Furthermore, among all of 
these expenditures, Pereira could not help reminding that: 
‘Pois entenda V. R. que tudo quanto os engenhos vão rendendo não dão para os gastos delles 
(como vera das contas, que ey de mandar, e não vão agora, porque ainda não esta acabado de 
secar todo o assucar desta çafra. Pello que não posso dar inteira conta de toda a receita, nem 
despesa) so de cobres tenho comprado perto de mil, e quinhentos cruzados val cada arratel849 
hum cruzado. O ferro val a 8 e a des mil réis o quintal [...]. Comprei hum barril de aseite de 4 
em pipa por quinse mil réis. Os coadouros a seis vintei. Veja V. R. agora como se podem 
aturar tantos gastos? Eu não faço milagres, mas faço de mim pedaços por faser assucar’.850  
Basically, the outflows of the mills were higher than the revenues. We know that the 
sugar farm in Brazil grew around the production of white sugar (açúcar branco), which 
                                                 
847 Cf. ANTT/CJ, Maço 71, doc. n.º 12, f. 1v. 
848 Ivi, f. 7v: ‘De cobre são necessarios huma çafra per outra ou menos 3 fundos de caldeiras per raro he o 
fundo que fique de huma çafra, para poder servir em outra. E muitas vezes se furão em menos de hum 
mes, costuma a valer hum fundo o preço do aratel de cobre a 360 (que foi o mais ordinario em meu 
tempo) setenta pera oitenta mil réis montasse nos 3 fundos 220U000. São mais necessarios pello descurso 
do anno seis pastas de cobre, para reparar os panos das caldeiras remendar os fundos, e para pregos, com 
que se remenda os quais pezão asolibras cada huma a 280 84U000. De maõs de officiaes, em fazer do 
cobre velho fundos das tachas, ramenda caldeiras, e fazer todas as obras miudos ou menos 40U000’. 
849 1 arratel = 1 pound = 454 grams. 
850 Cf. Estevão Pereira ao Padre Simão de Soto Maior da Companhia de JESUS, procurador da Nova 
Igreja do Collegio de S. Antam; ou a quem seu cargo servir, Salvador da Baía, 24 September 1630. 
ANTT/CJ, Maço 71, doc. n.º 14, f. 1. 
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was the best both in quality and in value. 851  Nevertheless, low quality sugar, like 
panelas, was produced at the same time and from its molasses cachaça or geribita were 
distilled. The interesting thing about this is that the senhores de engenho used to state 
that during times of economic difficulties, sugar production sufficed only to cover the 
expenditures, whereas selling alcohol was the real source of incomes.852 
 To have a precise idea of which were the expenditures of a Brazilian mill in the 
17th century’s first half, we can take a look to an account drew up by Procurator André 
de Gouvêa in which he enlisted item by item all the mill’s expenses and makes also an 
interesting comparison between the prices of the goods in the kingdom and in Salvador 
da Baía. Let us quote some of the several items enlisted, because they are helpful to 
observe the price difference between the colony and the kingdom, but also to show us in 
what terms the procurator was supposed to take care of his bookkeeper duties: 
Preços no Reino  Preços na Bahia 
20’000 réis 40 mileiros de preguos para caixois 48’000 réis 
16’000 réis 
de azeite doce para tempera ho asucar  
guasto de caza e doentes, huma pipa 40’000 réis 
30’000 réis 
de vinho para os ofesiais hospedes e  
negros doentes e guastos de caza, 3 pipas 60’000 réis 
2’000 réis 
de sal para caza e negros so alqueires853  
chegou a valer este ano a tre palaquos 12’000 réis 
Source: Memoria dos guastos que fas todos os Annos ho Engenho de Seregippe mais 200 menos 200, ARSI, Bras. 11 
[I], f. 381. 
Although the document is not dated, it is likely that it was written by the end of the 
1620. Nevertheless, it was not the first time Gouvêa touched this topic. In a letter he 
sent to Lisbon in June 1626, in fact, first he complained about being appointed to be 
procurator, an office that he described as one ‘negra occupação’, then he wrote that ‘o 
bem desta fazenda está em vir dellá [from Lisbon] o forneçimento para o Engenho e de 
qua ir todo asucar, não avendo isto he melhor não moer, porque se a de consumir este 
                                                 
851 Açúcar branco was also more practical to produce, for it was not supposed to be refined afterwards. 
Nevertheless, Brazilian engenhos used to produce also açúcar mascavado, batidos brancos and panelas 
pintos, which did not share the same quality as the branco. The ratio of quality/price is expressed in 
another letter of Pereira in ANTT/CJ, Maço 13, doc. n.º 20, f. 5v: ‘O preço do assucar não he certo nem 
fixo no Brazil, mas varia, conforme a saca, que ha de assucares. De ordinario corre de oito tortois ate mil 
réis. Algumas vezes sobe ate mil e duzentos outras abaixa a quatro, e sinco tortois. Os mascavados 
correm a respeito dos brancos valendo huma @ de mascavado ametade menos, que a de branco, e ainda 
dessa ametade so lhe abate hum e dous vinteis. Meles batidos brancos valem como assuqares brancos 
somenos, e os mascavados como assucar mascavado somenos. Panellas como ametade do preço do 
assucar mascavado’. 
852 Cf. Schwarz, “A «Babilónia» Colonial”, p. 221. 
853 1 alqueire = 36,27 liters. 
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Collegio de dividas’.854 Gouvêa, then, expressed the same concept as the table above, 
namely goods in Brazil ‘valem qua 4 vezes mais que no Reino’.855 Gouvêa wrote this 
letter almost a year after his arrival in Salvador, yet it was already clear for him that 
being procurator demanded a lot of attention to the market and so, to his chagrin, he 
admitted his fellow in Lisbon that ‘se nos avemos de tratar de fazenda, he necessario por 
os olhos nestas cousas, e ver a renda que se segue’.856 
 With regard to expenditures, however, if we scroll down Gouvêa’s account we 
notice that the major expense of the mill was the combustible: woods. It is known that 
deforestation that today afflicts Brazil so much, it is a problem born with the 
development of the sugar industry during 16th and 17th century. At any rate, the 
Memoria ends with Gouvêa conveying to the addressee is basic idea of the engenhos:  
‘Por aqui julgue V. P. que couzas são engenhos o nome lhe baste o guasto he sempre serto e 
com tanto exsesos o interese mais duvidozo, ha risquado e basta meterce ho diabo na cabeça 
de hum negro para lançar a perder tudo ho asucar que se fas [...], nem pessoa alguma poderem 
avirtir no dano se não depois que não tem remedio deixo outras couzas muitas que não relato 
porque so Deus noso Senhor as pode remedear e não he posivel permanecerem engenhos 
porque he hum retrato do Inferno e não se guoarda neles a lei de Deus permita o Senhor 
livrarnos sedo deles’.857 
This passage of Gouvêa, a Jesuit who evidently loved to convey his feelings with vivid 
metaphors, needs to be read in relation with the words he used in another occasion: ‘um 
engenho é inferno e todos os senhores deles são perdidos’, 858  Jesuits, and their 
procurators in particular, not excluded. 
The production of sugar needed not only farm activity, but also a process close 
to the industry. Therefore, an engenho was at the same time a farm where to grow the 
cana-de-açúcar and a factory where to produce the sugar. Then, it looks clear that the 
whole process needed not only a previous capital investment and a large availability of 
                                                 
854 See Procurator Gouvêa to Father Manoel Fagundes, Salvador da Baía, 10 June 1626. ANTT/CJ, Maço 
68, doc. n.º 164, f. 1. 
855 Ibid. 
856 Ivi, f. 1v. 
857 ARSI, Bras. 11 [I], f. 381v. 
858 See Procurator Gouvêa to the Rector of S. Antão Simão Alvares, Salvador da Baía, 2 January 1628. 
ANTT/CJ, Maço 68, doc. nº 334, f. 1v. 
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workers but also a skilled supervisor.859 We just saw that the procurator was supposed 
to be a good and observant bookkeeper, but his duties did not end only with that: 
‘Vai-se ca fazendo muito, e bom assucar seia Deus louvado, ambos os engenhos vão moendo. 
Ja hoje V. B. tera suas mais de duas mil, e quinhentas arrobas; que he boa esmola. Vão 
começando a secar. Mas o mal he, que de presente não posso mandar muito, porque de 
necessidade ey de vender logo do primeiro alguas mil e quinhentas arrobas para me livrar de 
dous embargos, que achei feitos neste engenho quando vi aelle, ambos por contia de algum 3. 
mil cruzados afora, outras muitas dividas, a que de necessidade ey de acodir. E são as que o 
Padre Gouvea me deixou em rol de 4 contos, a fora muitas que vão saindo’.860 
The following year (1630), Pereira confirmed that he was still 11’000 cruzados in 
debts,861 and, although he stated that he had paid ‘boa cantidade de dividas, e destas as 
que mais ne apertavão’,862 extinguishing them all remained one of his most important 
tasks and, in order to accomplish that, he thought it would have been easier to start from 
decreasing expenditures, both the problem and the solution reminding us of Spinola in 
Japan. We know that on certain conditions selling sugar directly in the kingdom granted 
the Society an income as twice as if it would have been sold in Brazil. As a result, it was 
true as well that buying merchandise in Portugal was way cheaper than in Brazil, as 
Gouvêa’s list demonstrates, therefore Pereira, as did Gouvêa before him, wrote several 
times to Portugal to urge fathers to provide goods to the Brazilian mission: 
“E muito mais se de la nos aiudarem com mandar as cousas que tenho pedido, ainda que seia 
tomando dinheiro a cambio. Entenda V. R. que dusentos mil réis, que mandem empregados 
nas cousas do rol, nos rendem aqui mil cruzados e estes mandados em assucar, valem la dous 
mil ao menos. Podem se segurar em Castella, como muitos fazem, se se temem os perigos do 
mar”.863 
We already know what Pereira was asking to be send – ‘ferro, cobres, lona, azeite, 
sardinhas, sal &c.’,864 then we should focus on the last statement by linking it to the 
following: 
                                                 
859 See Schwarz, “A «Babilónia» Colonial”, p. 213. 
860 See ANTT/CJ, Maço 71, doc. n.º 12, ff. 1v-2. 
861 Pereira complained with Simão de Soutomayor that it was impossible for him to balance the accounts 
of the engenho if he was not provided from the kingdom of the necessary goods, such as iron, copper, oil, 
sardines, salt and so on. If he was forced to buy such products in Brazil, ‘tudo quanto os engenhos vão 
rendendo não dá para os gastos delles’. Cf. ANTT/CJ, Maço 71, doc. n.º 14, ff. 1-1v. 
862 Ibid. 
863 See ANTT/CJ, Maço 71, doc. n.º 12, f. 2. 
864 See ANTT/CJ, Maço 71, doc. n.º 14, f. 1. 
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‘Confesso a VR tenho todo este tempo, padecido as mores angustias, e afflicção, que em toda 
minha vida. Daqui me nasceo por não aver outro remedio passar la algumas letras, advirtindo 
porem em cada huma dellas, que não desse molestia a VR. E assi não sei com que rezão VR. 
se queixa de que eu passo muitas letras; sendo que por nenhuma podem avexar a VR. Agora 
vai huma de 600U- outra de cento, estes ande ficar na mão de VR […]. Aquelles, se não ouver 
ordem de paga, tambem ficarão a VR na forma de carta de aviso. Mas doulhe por nova para 
que cobre animo, que ja daqui em diante vou tomando algum folego, e alento. […] Ja agora 
poderei ir mandando assuquares, para que VR la se desendivide’.865 
In order to pay Society’s debts Pereira felt obliged to send to Soutomayor ‘algumas 
letras’ and to understand what kind of letters they were it is enough to go back to the 
previous Pereira’s quotation when he proposes to take up money at interest.866 The part 
we should highlight is the following: ‘[p]odem se segurar em Castella, como muitos 
fazem, se se temem os perigos do mar’. If we link this passage to the letras he sent to 
Soutomayor we can understand that they were bills of exchange, means of transferring 
funds and making payments over long distances without physically moving bulky 
quantities of precious metals. Bills of exchange circulated as money substitutes, 
partially playing the role of paper money, and economizing on the need to move specie 
between countries. As the college procurator, Pereira needed to be aware of what were 
the cheapest ways to save the finances of his enterprise, but it appears clearly from his 
words that back in Europe Fathers using bills of exchange so lightly were still 
considered shameful. 
 To conclude, we shall finally let the procurator describe how a safra was 
supposed to develop: 
‘Costuma o engenho a moer em cada çafra 9 mezes. A saber de dia de S. Tiago a 25 de Julho, 
ate 20 ou 25 d’Abril, no qual tempo se moe huma tarefa de cana em cada 24 horas, de dias de 
trabalho; e nalgumas semanas solteiras, se entremete mais huma tarefa, de modo que se moem 
nella sete tarefas: o que não he sempre. Nesta forma vem a moer o engenho em huma çafra ate 
220 tarefas pouco mais ou menos. Pera se fazer o assucar de huma tarefa de cana são 
necessarios quanto menos da lenda (per que dado que ate meada çafra em que a cana esta 
                                                 
865 Ivi, f. 1v. 
866 After signing the present letter, there is a further paragraph in which Pereira wrote he was finally 
repaid by the rector of the Baía. Ivi, f. 2: ‘[D]epois de ter esta feita, acabei com o Padre Reitor deste 
Collegio me pagare 2’000 cruzados que devia a Igreja nova, quisendo moverlhe o coração, a que mos 
entregase hoje tenho feito muitos pagamentos de dividas, e com isso libertado muitos assuquares, que 
estavão sentenceados a queima, para pagamento das ditas dividas. Ja nestes navios que ficão a carga 
poderei mandar ate 50 caixas’.  
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mais sazonada, se gaste menos das duas tarefas; no fim da çafra, que a cana esta enchar cada 
em agora não bastão duas. Aconteceo-me mandar a tarefa a lenda que gastou huma so tarefa 
de cana, e passou de quatro tarefas, e assim vem a ser 480 tarefas [...])’.867 
 
*   *   * 
In conclusion, this last quote adds yet another feature to the procurator of the 
Society of Jesus in Brazil. In addition to those facets that he shared with the procurator 
of Japan, such as bookkeeper and supplier, here we see that he was supposed to have 
also the requirements of a harvest supervisor. Differently from the procurators of Japan 
both in Macao and Nagasaki, who were extremely busy in particular during the dispatch 
and reception of the Great Ship, it is evident that the duties of the procurator in Brazil, 
as harvest supervisor, were much more demanding, at least from the point of view of 
working-time. In any case, although Spinola complained about the amount of work 
embraced with the post, it was the moral implications to disturb him and others who had 
experience years as procurators. In Brazil, on the other hand, it would seem that also the 
quantity of work caused several complaints. The father who more dramatically than 
anyone explained his loath for the post was without doubt André de Gouvêa. In 1626, 
one year after his appointment, he wrote that ‘eu não me ei de matar como tenho feito 
ategora, e poucos ainda que tivessem o talento, que V.s R.s la achão nesses seus 
mimosos, ouverão de sufrir o que eu tenho sufrido’.868 In the same way as Gouvêa, 
Estevão Pereira wrote almost as a justification that ‘[e]u não faço milagres, mas faço de 
mim pedaços por faser açucar’.869 Similar pragmatic words have been written also by 
Alessandro Valignano when he was trying to convince Claudio Acquaviva to allow the 
visitor’s own way of handling the mission, the accomodatio: ‘Dio Nostro Signore non 
concorre già con miracoli et doni di profetie, et quelle genti si muovono tanto con 
queste cose esteriori, e necessario accomodarsi loro et entrar con la loro per uscir poi 
                                                 
867 See ANTT/CJ, Maço 13, doc. n.º 20, f. 7. For a thorough and comprehensive description of an 
engenho in 17th century Brazil, including schedule, costs and distribution of the product see Mauro, op. 
cit., pp. 279-317. Cf. also Ferlini, “Os Negócios do Açúcar: Rotas, Mercados e Mercadores (Bahia, século 
XVII)”, p. 241-270. 
868 See Procurator Gouvêa to Father António de Morais, Salvador da Baía, 27 October 1626. ANTT/CJ, 
Maço 69, f. 2. 
869 See ANTT/CJ, Maço 71, doc. n.º 14, f. 1. 
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con la nostra’.870 In other words, the time to rely on God had ended and it came the 
moment to turn the attention to those material things which really could help.  
However, the procurators in Brazil had no reason to complain about the moral 
implications of their office. It is true that through the management of an engenho they 
were not spreading the Gospel, but at least they were not breaking any dogma, as their 
confrères in Japan. As we saw, the critics of the mendicant orders against the Ignatians’ 
participation in the armação were based on solid theology. Yet, they did not apply to 
Brazil. The Brazil Jesuits, in fact, were involved in an activity that verged only 
marginally towards trade. The Roman Church, in fact, allowed men of the cloth to buy 
and sell a product for a dearer price, provided that they improved it somehow. In other 
words, the improvement, the handicraft, was deemed worthy to be paid for. 871 
Accordingly, the historian of the Society of Jesus in Brazil, Father Serafim Leite, wrote: 
‘Só uma coisa está vedada ao Jesuíta, e em geral a todo o eclesiástico, por menos decoroso ao 
seu estado: é o comércio propriamente dito. Já dissemos o que se entende por mercatura ou 
comércio: comprar objectos para os tornar a vender. Com lucro, naturalmente. Não é 
comércio vender o produto do próprio trabalho ou das próprias terras. Não há Instituição, nem 
Ordem, que o não tivesse feito ou faça ainda, quando a caridade alheia não basta para 
sustentar os religiosos e suas obras’.872 
Yet, although theologians and philosophers could not condemn the Brazil Jesuits and 
their involvement in the production and selling of sugar, Procurator André de Gouvêa 
felt his duty as a punishment and begged to be dismissed, since in comparison to all the 
procurators in Portugal, none of them ‘sofre a albarda como eu’.873 The pack-saddle 
(albarda) in the religious domain was used as a metaphor of penance and was 
associated to someone who sinned. Thus, even if Gouvêa or Soutomayor were carrying 
out duties accepted both by pontiff and their general, they still felt to be meddling in a 
forbidden domain. In any case, it seems that although the Jesuits in the Portuguese 
Assistancy, specifically in the provinces of Japan and Brazil, embraced materialism, it 
was only to fuel the evangelization and keep the provinces alive. Moreover, they had 
not only evangelical duties, but also civic ones. Not only they had to repay debts, but 
they also aided their flock through alms and donations.  
                                                 
870 Apud Prosperi, “Il Missionario”, p. 198. 
871 Cf. Langholm, The Merchant in the Confessional, pp. 39-40. 
872 See HCJBI IV, pp. 165-166. 
873 Cf. ANTT/CJ, Maço 69, doc. n.º 38, f. 2v. 
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Finally, we saw that the office of procurator was the bond that linked the Society 
of Jesus with the remaining agents of the Portuguese/Iberian Crow. It is most likely that 
the office of procurator was one of the most flexible positions within the ranks of the 
Ignatian Order. As a matter of fact, the tasks of the procurator and the way he was 
supposed to handle them changed in accordance with the dynamics of the Portuguese 
expansion. Hence, in Brazil, where the Portuguese became the actual owners and 
administrators of the territory, the Ignatians and their procurators became involved in 
what was soon considered as a promising business, the industria açucareira. In China 
and Japan, however, the Portuguese had to play according to the rules of the Asiatic 
empires and became part of pre-existent yet inefficient commercial routes, as the one 
between China and Japan. Consequently, even though the Society of Jesus gathered 
incomes also from the territory (the aldeias in India and the ryōchi in Japan), the office 
of procurator of Japan developed entirely around the silk trade and its timing. The 
unreliability of the kingdom’s economical resources in financing the Christian mission 
forced the Society of Jesus to search for further aids elsewhere and the procurator 
needed to act in accordance with the situation that showed up.  
In the end, to conclude this chapter, and with it the whole work, we have 
borrowed Dauril Alden’s interpretation of Jesuits economic involvement: ‘the notion 
that Jesuits in this assistancy fled from the embraces of the virtuous Lady Poverty to the 
seductive arms of that vile, base slut called Materialism is unsupported by any available 
evidence. To the best of their abilities, the Jesuits served only one master. It was not the 
devil’. The duel was won.874  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
874 See Alden, op. cit., p. 650. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Around five years ago, when we visited Nagasaki, we were naïvely surprised by 
the lack of Christian icons and Portuguese memorabilia in the local shops. The 
gadgetries were overwhelmingly Dutch-fashioned, whereas one of the main honours 
paid to the South-European cultural presence in Japan before the Meiji Restoration was 
undoubtedly the monument and the museum dedicated to the 26 Martyrs of Nagasaki. 
Differently from the Hollanders, who were eventually confined on the artificial island 
Deshima, 25 years after the anti-Christian decree, also the Portuguese merchants were 
eventually expelled from Japan. Yet, even if the Tokugawa Bakufu actually attained the 
expulsion of the Iberians from the Japanese country,1 it could not erase the cultural 
seeds Portuguese, Spaniards and Italians had been planting since the mid-16th century.  
 During the first decades following the expulsion, in fact, the Japanese 
Christendom managed to survive almost completely on its own. Pursuing the goal of 
purging Japan of Christians, in 1640, the third Tokugawa shōgun Iemitsu, established 
the Shūmon Aratame Yaku, 2  a sort of inquisition. In the 1660s more than 2’000 
Christians were discovered and imprisoned. Nevertheless, communities of people who 
considered themselves Christian and were willing to suffer for their beliefs remained in 
existence in remote regions of Kyūshū, namely the Gotō archipelago, Amakusa and in 
Urakami. 3 They were called kakure kirishitan, 4 the crypto-Christians, and were still 
there as the anti-Tokugawa activists overthrew the bakufu in 1867. Few years after the 
Meiji Restoration, the new Japanese government adopted new measures with regard to 
“foreign” beliefs in its ground. In 1873, the prohibition of Christianity ended and the 
following year also the period of iconoclastic aggression against Buddhism sects called 
haibutsu kishaku,5 was put to an end. Today, the Japanese Christians are a tiny minority, 
only 2% out of an estimated population of around 127’000’000 people.6 Though small, 
                                                 
1 The Spaniards were officially forbidden the country in 1624, whereas the Portuguese in 1639, two years 
after the Shimabara Rebellion, a large-scale disturbance that reinforced in the bakufu the conviction that 
Christianity was a subversive faith. 
2 宗門改役 
3 Cf. CHJ IV, pp. 368-370 and Boxer, The Christian Century, pp. 368-374. 
4 隠れ切支丹 
5廃仏毀釈, abolish Buddhism, destroy Shakyamuni 
6 Estimation made in July 2013. The other religions’s percentages are: Shintoism 83.9%, Buddhism 
71.4% and other 7.8%. The total of adherents exceeds 100% because many people belong to both 
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this number testifies how the first evangelization of Japan reached the depths of the 
Japanese people. The Christendom that found its own ways to survive without its 
shepherds and politically relevant figures like Takayama Ukon, who abandoned his 
country instead of his faith, are elements that have to be taken into account in the 
general evaluation of the Japan’s encounter with the Roman faith and the Society of 
Jesus. 
 Could the Japan Jesuits have reached such results without their bague in the 
armação? The outcomes of the Society’s undertaking would have been the same even in 
the absence of the trato da seda? We think it could have been hardly so. During the 
early stage of the evangelization, the participation in the trade turned out to be profitable 
both economically and politically, due to the Southerner daimyō’s desire of harbouring 
the kurofune. Nevertheless, we saw that in a second stage, in particular from the 1560s 
onwards, once the Jesuits had secured their situation, they started to look for other 
sources of revenue, such as royal and papal pensions, the aldeias in the Province of the 
North, alms from wealthy merchants and of course the coveted patronage from local 
daimyō. Still, with the just a few exceptions, abandoning the silk trade was never an 
option.  
The fathers assembled in the First Provincial Conference in 1614, in fact, 
submitted to the Curia a proposal to allow ‘ad Christianæ rei emolumentum’ to trade 
also in gold amber and musk, in addition to silk.7 The answer from Rome, however, 
urged the Japan Jesuits to limit their trade to the customary Chinese textiles.8 In 1620, 
another conference of fathers in Macao went back to this topic and expanded upon the 
practical and religious reasons why it was advisable to trade also in gold. Yet, also in 
this year, the fathers decreed that the armação was not to be abandoned, even though it 
was a risky and unpredictable venture.9 What specifically matters to us is that, between 
                                                                                                                                               
Shintoism and Buddhism. Cf. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ja.html#People consulted on 6 December 2013. 
7 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 45 [I], f. 234. 
8 Ibid.: ‘Totum id genus mercatura quod Pontifices & Reges permisere ad sublemandum eius inopiam 
admittimus, reliqua neque admittere possumus, neque Societatem decere arbitramur, tum tanto pere ejus 
bono nemini officiat’. 
9 Ivi, f. 235v: ‘E he tão limbo [sic, limpo] este trato que dizia huma pessoa bem intelligente que se os 
Anjos neste mundo tratassem e fizessem mercancia, a farião em ouro e seda [...]. Porque o que aqui 
chamão pão de ouro, tem doze onças e meya de nosso pezo, e hum destes paes custa aqui na China 
setenta cruzados, as vezes oitenta e oitenta e cinco, de modo que o seu preço he entre sesenta e noventa 
cruzados, porque ha nelle abaixar e alevantar, como nas mais cousas de mercadoria. E conforme ao que se 
vende em Japão, se ganhara no ouro a cincoenta ou sesenta por cento, pouco mais ou menos. E assi os 
ganhos do ouro poderão ser como os da seda, e tem outros bens mayores, porque avulta muito pouco, e 
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1614 and 1620, the Japan Jesuits were still relying on the same system of procurement, 
the commercial thread between Macao and Nagasaki, in which, as we now know, the 
procurators of Japan represented the obligatory terminuses.  
In 1618, the last year of Spinola’s procuratorship, the Jesuits embarked silk and 
textile piece goods to a total value of 11’573 taéis: 
‘Por todas seis Galeotas da viagem em titulo da Companhia. E com a marca a margem 
assinada vão embarcados oitenta, e seis sestos com trez cayxoens mais por cincoenta e dous 
picos vinte, e oito cates toda seda boa, e fina. Vinte e cinco picos, e onze cates, e meyo desta 
seda acima forão comprados nesta feira de Japão a rezão de cento, e dezasseis taeis, sette 
mazes o pico, com fretes, e direitos, dous picos, e dezasette cates na mesma feira a rezão de 
cento, e dezassette taeis, cinco mazes, como os mesmos fretes, e direitos. Oitenta, e cinco que 
restão forão dantes comprados na feira da India com fretes, e direitos cento, e trez taeis hum 
maz o pico. Monta toda a seda da Companhia acima, cinco mil sette centos sessenta, e dous 
taeis, nove mazes, nove condorins, cinco cayxas’.10 
As we know, Spinola had to spend almost all of the 1618 revenue in writing off debts, 
but it is important to note that even four years after the burst of the persecution, the 
Japan Jesuits were still investing their average yearly share in the trade. That year, 
moreover, was a rather prosperous one both for the city of Macao and the Jesuits there, 
since the proceeds of the pancada amounted to more than 600’000 cruzados, ‘com que 
esta terra [Macao] ficou muito restaurada das muitas perdas passadas, e assi derão a este 
Colegio boas esmolas, homem ouve que deu duzentos taeis, outros cento, outros a 
cincoenta e dahi para baixo’.11 Although Carlo Spinola was the one who ordered and 
received this opulent cargo, he was no longer in charge of the procuratoria when the 
ships sailed back to Macao. As we saw, he was caught by Hasegawa Gonroku’s guards 
and took to prison. 
 After him, the role of procurator was assumed by Father Christovão Ferreira, 
later known as Sawano Chūan, undoubtedly one of the most controversial figures in the 
                                                                                                                                               
em pouco se emprega muita prata, pois com cincomil cruzados se comprão sesenta pães douro, e as vezes 
mais, e estes se mettem em hum escritorio bem pequeno, tanto que se se comparasse com a seda ou com 
as peças, no lugar que occupão cem cruzados empregados em seda ou peças, se podem metter largamente 
vinte mil cruzados empregados em ouro. Como este ouro occupa tão pouco lugar, he facil de meneyar 
com pressa, vende-se, embarcar-se desembarcar-se quasi sem ser sentido’. 
10 See Fato da Companhia, que em Julho deste prezente anno vay embarcado para Japão nas galeotas da 
Viagem todas seis, que deste porto partem, e de que he Capitão Mor Antonio de Oliveira Moraes. Em 
Julho de 1618, BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7, f. 187v. Cf. also Boxer, O Grande Navio, p. 163 and idem, The 
Christian Century, pp. 366-367. 
11 See Father Francisco Pires to the Assistant of Portugal Nuno Mascarenhas, Macao, 2 April 1619. ARSI, 
Jap. Sin. 17, f. 242. 
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history of Jesuit mission work in Japan.12 In the late 1610s, Ferreira was serving as 
secretary of the Provincial Mateus de Couros, but due to lack of reliable fathers, he was 
burdened with the management of the province’s finance nonetheless. 13 On 12 October 
1620, he wrote to Nuno Mascarenhas that the College of Macao represented the main 
financial expenditure of the Japanese Province and that had been asked to Mercurian to 
ascribe the college to the Chinese Vice-province. The China Jesuits, moreover, still 
owed 5’000 cruzados (3’000 borrowed in Macao and 2’000 in Lisbon) to Japan and 
were unwilling to pay back.14 All issues that were well known to Spinola. Not even two 
months later, on 30 November 1620, a great fire destroyed six districts of Nagasaki 
along with the fathers’ principal storehouse, mishap that cost dearly to the hidden 
fathers.15 The heydays of the Japan enterprise, however, had already passed and would 
never come back. 
*   *   * 
Carlo Spinola was a many-sided missionary who had the intellectual preparation 
that enabled him to fill possibly every role within the mission, provided that he 
controlled his bad-temper.16 He helped the evangelization in many and different ways: 
he designed the plan of Macao’s church, he took advantage of his scientific knowledge 
to approach the Japanese aristocracy and finally he served as accountant, bookkeeper, 
treasurer and provider, i.e. as procurator of the province both in Macao and Nagasaki. 
Consequently, in our view, he deserves to be included among the giants of the nanban 
century. 
With regard to the financial context of the mission, we think that the fact that 
Spinola took on the office of procurator in a time of great changes in the Japanese status 
quo represents the perfect circumstance to elect him to be the hub around which several 
                                                 
12 The Portuguese Ferreira (1580ca-1650) is famous in particular for his apostasy in 1633 which shocked 
Catholic Europe and Jesuits from many provinces volunteered to sail to Japan and die there in expiation. 
Cf. Cieslik, “The Case of Christovão Ferreira”, p. 1. 
13 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 37, f. 202 and Cieslik, op. cit., p. 8. 
14 See Procurator Christovão Ferreira to the Assistant of Portugal Mascarenhas, Nagasaki, 12 October 
1620. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 17, ff. 263-263v. 
15 Cf. Cieslik, ibid. 
16 This concept was expressed by Father Pedro Morejón, who knew Spinola well, in a catalogue drew a 
couple of years after Spinola was appointed procurator in Nagasaki. See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 25, f. 107 ‘P. 
Carlos Spinola Professo ano de 1598. Fue seis anos ministro en Miaco Procurador dela Provincia em 
Macao y Japon. Mediocres letras buen predicador, buena lengua de Japon, y zelo dela conversion, y buen 
trato. Es colerico y no sta accepto, de algunos por esto. Si tuviere mas madureça y spiritu blando podra 
hazer qualquier officio de superior, entiende bien las cosas de Japon no parece por agora para superior 
mayor aunque si tuviere lo que digo lo podia ser bien que tiene buenos partes’. 
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terms of comparison gravitate. Trying to remain true to the principle that a unique 
experience is powerless to discriminate its constituent factors and to give its own 
interpretation,17 we analysed the office through time, space and situations. We saw that 
Spinola personified all the contradictions of his post: he was not only a man of the cloth 
taking care of secular matters – at once financial and political, but he was also a father 
professed of the fourth vow, which should have exempted him from being appointed, 
yet the necessity of the enterprise won repeatedly over the laws of the men. As a matter 
of fact, that one of the last procurators – Christovão Ferreira18 – would later apostatize 
tragically personifies the image of the procurator we have depicted in our work: a 
religious man who had to cope with sinful activities in order to provide for his 
confrères. Carlo Spinola, in fact, turned Jesuit to follow his faith but also to flee from 
the dirty commercial world.19 Yet, ironically, it was that very world that allowed him to 
remain in Japan after 1614 and to die as a martyr eight years later.  
To conclude, then, we can say that Spinola was the last and the first procurator. 
The last to carry out his duties while the Tokugawa Bakufu was still showing its tolerant 
face and the first who acted under overt hostility. By then, however, the situation was 
compromised and the province’s physical and organizational structures had already 
collapsed under the blows and the fires of the Tokugawa persecution. 
                                                 
17 Cf. Bloch, Apologia della Storia o Mestiere di storico, pp. 35-36. 
18 According to our sources, Christovão Ferreira filled the office probably until 1621 or 1622. After him, 
we know that the office was assumed by Manuel Borges in 1626 but after that we did not find any other 
information, therefore we cannot ascertain when the last procurator actually left Japan, although it is 
probably that the last Jesuit to fill the office was Borges. 
19 Cf. ARSI, Jap. Sin. 36, f. 154v: ‘Yo no recuso el trabajo de prover toda las casas de Japon, aunque es 
muy grande, que huelgo mucho de poder scriverles, pues con esto participo del fruto, que todos hazen; 
solo lo que siento es haver de ser mercader, y procurar de acrecentar el cabedal con continuos tratos, y 
cuydados de buscar dinero, que es la cosa, que nunca en mi vida hize, y por huyr della entre en Religion’. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Alvará - (Port.) 
A decree issued by either king, viceroy or government official and valid for a term of 
one year without royal confirmation. 
Assistancy 
It was an administrative unit within the Society based generally upon national 
considerations and consisting of provinces and vice-provinces. The assistancies were 
organized along linguistic lines. By 1558 there were four: Italiae, Lusitaniae, Hispaniae 
and Germaniae. Galliae (The French assistancy) was added in 1608 and Poloniae in 
1755. The Portuguese assistancy included the provinces of Portugal, Brazil, Goa, 
Cochin and Japan and the vice-provinces of China and Maranhão.1  
Assistant - (also assistant general) 
It was a Father elected by the General Congregation to advice the general. He was in 
charge of taking care of one assistancy*, upon which he have not a jurisdiction, but just 
a remarkable influence with regard to the decisions the general wished to make. His 
mandate lasted as long as the general lived. Whenever replacements were necessary, the 
general was empowered to name them with the concurrence of a majority of the 
provincials of the affected assistancy*. According to the Constitutions the assistants 
should be persons of discretion and zeal for the good of the Society. Although there was 
no constitutional requirement that assistants be natives of the assistancy* they served, 
all but two of the Portuguese assistants identified were of Lusitanian origin, reflecting 
the Society’s deference to the Portuguese crown’s nationalistic sensibilities.2 
Bakufu - (幕府 Jap.) 
Literally tent government, it is the name given to the military dictatorships headed by 
the Minamoto, Ashikaga and Tokugawa families which ruled Japan from the end of the 
12th until the 19th century. The b. as a parallel and actual form of government was 
established when Minamoto Yoritomo gained military hegemony over Japan in 1185 
and, seven years later, he assumed the title of shōgun. After the collapse of the 
                                                 
1 See Provincie Nostre, e sotto qvali Assistenze, in BNCR/FGes. 1114, f. 3v. 
2 See Alden, The Making of an Enterprise, pp. 234-235. 
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Kamakura shogunate in 1333, Ashikaga Takauji established a second line of shogunal 
succession that ruled much of Japan from 1338 until the mid-16th century, although 
there was no effective power in Japan the 1470s. The last b. government was 
established by Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1603 and lasted until 1867, when the last shōgun, 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu, was forced to yield the administration of civil and military 
affairs to the tennō* during a period rightly called bakumatsu 幕末, the end of the 
bakufu. 
Kamakura Bakufu 1192-1333 
Ashikaga Bakufu 1338-1573 
Tokugawa Bakufu 1603-1867 
Bakuhan Taisei - (幕藩体制 Jap.)  
The bakuhan system, it is a term coined by historians to refer to the Tokugawa system 
so called since it allowed the han* to survive alongside the bakufu*, permitted the 
daimyō to rule their own domains so long as they observed fundamental laws of the 
shogunate. 
Baque (also bague) - (Port.)  
The share of silk allotted to each person in the armação* contract. Also, tickets or 
certificates of ownership, which might be held by one person only or by several 
conjointly. The distribution of the b. was organized by the Senate of Macao until the 
system was abolished in 1784. 
Bugyō - (奉行 Jap.)  
A Japanese administrative official (literally ‘bringer of gifts’) appointed either by a 
daimyō within his own territory or by the shogunate. The Tokugawa appointed machi-
bugyō or ‘city commissioners’ to exercise direct control over the leading commercial 
centres of Nagasaki, Ōsaka and Sakai. The Vocabvlario of 1603 defined it as 
‘Vqetamauari, voconô. O que preside, ou tem cuidado de alguma cousa. Item, Offiçial 
del rei, ou de outro senhor’.3 
Buke - (武家 Jap.) 
The warrior estate. 
                                                 
3 VLJ, f. 48. 
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Carrack – (Eng., Kraak in Dutch) 
The large, round sailing vessels that evolved during the 16th century from late medieval 
merchant vessel (cogs). Carracks were broad-beamed and heavily constructed with 
square and lateen sails and had as many as five decks at the stern and a prominent 
forecastle. The Portuguese version (nau da Índia or nao do trato) was the largest vessel 
of the 16th and 17th centuries. 
Casado - (Port.) 
Married settlers. 
Cate - (kāti Mal.) 
Wieght unit used in China and Malesia equaled to 625 grams. 12 taéis* made for 1 c. 
and it was the hundredth part of the picol*. 
Daijō Daijin - (太政大臣 Jap.) 
Grand Chancellor of State, the highest ministerial rank in the imperial hierarchy. 
Daimyō - (大名 Jap.) 
Regional military lord. During the Sengoku Jidai, this name was often applied to shugo*, 
and then to the families who supplanted them. After the establishment of the Tokugawa 
bakufu*, the termwas applied to those lords whose domains were assessed at 10’000 
koku* or more. 
Dōjuku - (同宿 Jap.) 
Nowadays pronounced dōshuku, literally means ‘lodge in the same place’. It is a word 
used in Buddhism to denote the youngsters who worked for the monks in the temples. 
Feitor - (Port.) 
Translated factor in English, was the person in charge of a trading establishment or 
agency in an Asian port. 
Haidao Fushi - (海道副使 Chi.) 
It was the deputy maritime envoy with jurisdiction over the foreigners. It was also 
called simply Haidao. 
Kami - (上 Jap.) 
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Kami literally means “above”, “superior” but in the 16th and 17th century, the Jesuits 
used this word as a metonymy to indicate the Kyōto, Ōsaka and Nagoya region, 
nowadays Kinki 近畿. 
Kangō Bōeki - (勘合貿易 Jap., Kanghe Maoyi in Chinese) 
The tally trade was the licensed trade between Ming China and Japan from the early 15th 
century until mid-1500. Kangō (tallies) held by Japanese merchants certified them to 
Chinese officials as licensed merchants or as official Japanese tribune missions, 
distinguishing them, therefore, from wakō*. 
Kanpaku - (関白 Jap.)  
Imperial regent who exercised the ruling power for a tennō* who had reached 
adulthood. The k. assisted the tennō* in the fulfillment of general government 
obligations. This title was created in 882 jointly with the one of sesshō 摂政, regent 
during the sovereign’s minority. The k. yielded his power over the dajōkan 太政官, the 
Great Counsel of State. The k. was supposed to counsel the tennō, but, differently from 
the sesshō, he could not act in the tennō’s stand. Initially, both titles were privilege of 
the Fujiwara family. The bestowing on Hideyoshi of the title in 1585 meant the 
legitimation of Toyotomi’s military and civil powers over Japan. With Hideyoshi the 
title of k. reached the zenith, since with him the k. could reign in the tennō’s stand and 
had also the final decision about the assignments of courts titles and dignities. 
Koku - (石 Jap.) 
A Japanese measure of capacity used for rice but also for other grains, sake or salt. Now 
corresponds to 180,4 litres. 
Kokujin - (國人 Jap.) 
Provincial warrior, subordinate to a shugo* as a bakufu* vassal. More common in 
central Japan than eastern Japan, it was a lord with strong ties to the local area. A k. was 
a factual proprietor with tax rights to part of a village, an entire village, or a group of 
villages. Some banded into leagues whose leaders emerged as daimyō*. Others built 
slowly from their bases, destroying weaker peers to form sizeable domains and might 
become shugo*. They were also called kokushu 国衆. 
Kuge - (公家 Jap.) 
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Court aristocrats resident in the capital city. 
Kurofune - (黒船 Jap.) 
Literally blackship. 
Miudezas 
A heterogeneous grouping consisting of special items of furniture and accessories. 
Shipments of such items were common in the Cape trade and usually were bound up in 
bundles called trouxa. These m. mainly included rolls of taffeta, satin and damask. 
Nanbokuchō Jidai - (南北朝時代 Jap.) 
Literally, the Era of the North and South Courts, spanning from 1336 to 1392, was a 
period that occurred during the early years of the Ashikaga bakufu. During this period, 
there existed a North Imperial Court, established by Ashikaga Takauji in nowadays’ 
Kyōto, and the South Imperial Court, established by Go-Daigo tennō in Yoshino. The 
two courts fought for 50 years, with the South giving up to the North in 1392.  
Picol 
Weight unit normally equaled to 100 cates* or to 1600 taéis*. João Rodrigues Tçuzu, 
however, wrote that the ships from Macao were loaded with p. of 1’500 táeis.4 In 1620, 
a gathering of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus wrote that a p. ‘tem cento e vinte 
arrates5 de Portugal’,6 i.e. 55,2kg. In the decimal system, however, one p. normally 
amounts to 61,199kg. 
Sengoku Jidai - (戦國時代 Jap.) 
Japan at the time of Javier's visit was a land that had fallen to the nadir of gekokujo, a 
seemingly anarchical condition in which those below endeavored, with considerable 
success, to overthrow the ones who were above them. 
Shimo - (下 Jap.) 
Literally “under, below, bottom”. Father Gaspar Coelho defined s. as ‘toda a parte de 
Japão que contem como esta dito nove reinos, toda via nos outros chamamos Ximo as 
                                                 
4 Cf. Rodrigues, Arte da lingoa de Iapam composta pello Padre Ioão Rodriguez Portugues da Companhia 
de Iesu, f. 219. 
5 1 arratél = 459 grams. 
6 See ARSI, Jap. Sin. 45 [I], f. 235. 
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partes adonde vem a nao a differença de Bungo, e asi contem o Reino de Figem, e as 
Ilhas de Amacussa e alguns outros lugares’.7 
Shugo - (守護 Jap.) 
Province-level military governors of the Kamakura and Muromachi bakufu who 
succeeded in gaining control of a region during the late 14th and early 15th centuries by 
adding to their landholdings and attracting local warriors as their direct vassals. In the 
latter sense they are referred to as s. daimyō, a retroactive definition created by 
contemporary historians. 
Tael - (tahil or tail Mal.)  
According to Alessandro Valignano one tael ‘val aqui pelo menos pela moeda de Goa 
onze tangas, que são seis centos e cesenta reis de Portugal. De maneira que mil taeis são 
seis centos mil e seis centos reis e assi vem hum tael a ser mais de hum cruzado e meio, 
de maneira que o gasto de Japão quando he oito mil taeis são mais de doze mil cruzados 
de Portugal, quando he de dez mil são mais de quinze mil’.8 João Rodrigues wrote that 
one t. Corresponded to the cruzado of 400 réis. 
Wakō (Wokou in Chinese) - (倭寇 Chi.) 
The wakō were raiders, pirates, or smugglers active in East Asian waters between the 
Kamakura and early Edo periods, the phenomenon peaking in the 16th century. The 
Chinese term dates back from the 4th or 5th century and although it was sometimes 
equated with the Japanese per se – wa [倭] was the ancient Chinese character used to 
denote Japan – the majority of all wakō were Chinese. 
Yakata - (屋形 Jap.) 
Originally referred to the residence of an official of shugo* rank (during Muromachi 
era). Came to refer to the shugo* or lord himself 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Cf. Carta annua de Japão do anno de 80 pera nosso padre geral em Roma, ANTT/AJ, Livro 28, f. 123. 
8 See Visitor Valignano to General Acquaviva, Macao, 2 July 1598. BPE, Cód. CXV/2-7, n.º 4, f. 51v. 
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ANNEX A 
PROCURATORS OF JAPAN AT NAGASAKI AND MACAO 
1580-1636 
 
 AT MACAO AT NAGASAKI 
1580 André Pinto ? 
1581 André Pinto ? 
1582 André Pinto ? 
1583 André Pinto João de Castro 
1584 André Pinto João de Castro 
1585 André Pinto João de Castro 
1586 André Pinto João de Castro 
1587 André Pinto João de Castro 
1588 
André Pinto / Miguel 
Soares 
João de Castro 
1589 Miguel Soares João de Castro 
1590 Miguel Soares João de Castro 
1591 Miguel Soares João de Castro 
1592 Miguel Soares João de Castro 
1593 Miguel Soares João de Castro 
1594 Miguel Soares ? 
1595 Miguel Soares Bartolomeu de Siqueira 
1596 Miguel Soares ? 
1597 Miguel Soares Rui Barreto 
1598 Miguel Soares 
Rui Barreto/João 
Rodrigues 
1599 Miguel Soares João Rodrigues 
1600 Manoel Dias João Rodrigues 
1601 Manuel Dias / Spinola João Rodrigues 
1602 Carlo Spinola João Rodrigues 
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1603 
João Coelho 
[companion: André 
Kusano] 
João Rodrigues 
1604 Manuel Gaspar João Rodrigues 
1605 Manuel Gaspar João Rodrigues 
1606 Manuel Gaspar 
João Rodrigues / João 
Coelho 
1607 Manuel Gaspar João Coelho 
1608 
Manuel Gaspar / 
Sebastião Vieira 
João Coelho 
1609 João Coelho Sebastião Vieira 
1610 João Coelho Sebastião Vieira 
1611 
João Coelho / Manuel 
Barreto 
Sebastião Vieira / Carlo 
Spinola [companion 
Ambrosio Fernandez] 
1612 Manuel Barreto Carlo Spinola 
1613 Manuel Barreto Carlo Spinola 
1614 Manuel Barreto Carlo Spinola 
1615 Manuel Barreto Carlo Spinola 
1616 
Manuel Barreto / 
Manuel Borges 
Carlo Spinola 
1617 Manuel Borges Carlo Spinola 
1618 Manuel Borges 
Carlo Spinola / 
Christovão Ferreira 
1619 Manuel Borges Christovão Ferreira 
1620 ? Christovão Ferreira 
1621 Sebastião Vieira Christovão Ferreira 
1622 Sebastião Vieira ? 
1623 
António Leite / João 
Rodrigues 
? 
1624 João Rodrigues ? 
1625 João Rodrigues ? 
1626 João Rodrigues Manoel Borges 
1627 João Rodrigues ? 
1628 João Rodrigues ? 
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1629 
João Rodrigues / João 
Baptista Bonelli 
? 
1630 João Baptista Bonelli ? 
1631 João Baptista Bonelli ? 
1632 João Baptista Bonelli ? 
1633 João Baptista Bonelli ? 
1634 João Baptista Bonelli ? 
1635 João Baptista Bonelli ? 
1636 João Baptista Bonelli ? 
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ANNEX C – JAPANESE ANTHROPONIMS 
 
Akechi Mitsuhide 明智 光秀 Oda Nobukatsu 織田 信勝 
Arima Harunobu 有馬 晴信 Oda Nobunaga 織田 信長 
Arima Naozumi 有馬 直純 Ogasawara Ichian 小笠原 壱案 
Arima Yoshisada 有馬 義貞 Ōgimachi tennō 正親町 天皇 
Ashikaga Yoshiaki 足利 義昭 Ōmura Sumitada 大村 純忠 
Gamō Ujisato 蒲生 氏郷 Ōtomo Yoshiaki 大友 良鑑 
Gotō Shōzaburō 後藤 庄三郎 Ōtomo Yoshimune 大友 義統 
Go-Yōzei tennō 後 陽成 天皇 
Ōtomo Yoshishige 
Sōrin 
大友 義鎮 宗麟 
Fujiwara 藤原 Ryūzōji Takanobu 竜造寺 隆信 
Harada Magoshichirō 原田 孫七郎 Sawano Chūan 沢野 忠庵 
Hasegawa Gonroku 長谷川 権六 Shimazu Takahisa 島津 貴久 
Hasegawa Sahyōei 長谷川 佐兵衛 Shimazu Yoshihisa 島津 義久 
Honda Masazumi 本田 正純 Takayama Ukon 高山 右近 
Ichijō Kanesada 一条 兼定 Terazawa Hiromasa 寺沢 広正 
Ishin Sūden 以心 崇伝 Terazawa Hirotaka 寺沢 広高 
Katō Kiyomasa 加藤 清正 Tokugawa Hidetada 徳川 秀忠 
Kobayakawa Hidekane 小早川 秀包 Tokugawa Iemitsu 徳川 家光 
Konishi Yukinaga 小西 行長 Tokugawa Ieyasu 徳川 家康 
Maeda Toshiie 前田 利家 
Tokugawa 
Yoshimune 
徳川 吉宗 
Matsudaira Hirotada 松平 広忠 Tomonaga Tsushima 朝長 対馬 
Matsudaira Takechiyo 松平 竹千代 Toyotomi Hidetsugu 豊臣 秀次 
Matsuura Takanobu 松浦 隆信 Toyotomi Hideyori 豊臣 秀頼 
Mōri Terumoto 毛利 輝元 Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣 秀吉 
Murayama Tōan 村山 答案 Uesugi Takekatsu 上杉 景勝 
Nagasaki Jinzaemon 
Sumikage 
長崎 甚左衛門 純景 Ukita Hideie 宇喜多秀家 
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ANNEX D – ASIATIC TOPONYMS 
 
 
Amakusa 天草 Isahaya 諫早 Saga 佐賀 
Arie 有家 Kami 上 Sakai 堺 
Bungo 豊後 Kazusa 上総 Sanchuan 上川 
Pusan 부산 Kinai 畿内 Satsuma 佐津間 
Buzen 豊前 Kinki 近畿 Sekigahara 関ヶ原 
Chikugo 筑後 Kuchinotsu 口之津 Seoul 서울 
Chikuzen 筑前 Kyūshū 九州 Shikoku 四国 
Edo 江戸 Lampacau 浪白窟 Shimabara 島原 
Ezo 蝦夷 Mikawa 三河 Shimo 下 
Fukuda 福田 Miyako 都 Sunpu 駿府 
Funai 府内 Mogi 茂木 Suō 周防 
Fushimi 伏見 Nagasaki 長崎 Takaku 高久 
Gotō Rettō 五島列島 Nagashino 長篠 Tanegashima 種子島 
Guangdong 廣東 Nagato 長門 Tosa 土佐 
Guangzhou 廣州 Negoro 根来 Tōtōmi 遠江 
Hakata 博多 Ningpo 宁波 Urado 浦戸 
Higo 肥後 Ōmi 近江 Urakami 浦上 
Hirado 平戸 Ōmura 大村 Yamaguchi 山口 
Hizen 肥前 Ōsaka 大阪 Yokoseura 横瀬裏 
Honshū 本州 Ōsumi 大隅 Zhaoqing 肇庆 
Hyūga 日向 Owari 尾張 Zhejiang 浙江 
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ANNEX E – Carregaçam de Macao para Japam no anno de 16179 
This is the list of the merchandises loaded in the 1617 Great Ship drew by the Procurator of 
Japan in Macao Manoel Borges. This unpublished text precedes chronologically a similar list yet 
richer in details already published by Charles Boxer.10 We decided to include it in the annexes, 
because, although it is not as detailed as the list edited by Boxer, it contains types of data that fit 
correctly within our work. Here we can see the kinds of Chinese textiles the Japan Jesuits used to 
sell in the late 1610s, their purchasing and marketing prices and the goods the missionaries needed in 
their daily life. Moreover, differently from the 1618 list, here we find interesting details with regard 
to the respondência bonds concluded by Spinola in Japan. 
 
‘[f. 108] Por emprego e mais couzas de provimento que neste anno de 1617 
embarcamos da Companhia pera Japam em nosso titulo e com nossa marca na nao 
Nossa Senhora da Vida, na qual foi por Capitam fazer sua viagem Lopo Sarmento de 
Carvalho, he o seguinte. 
Sincoenta cestos de seda fina, que tinhão pello pezo de Cantão trinta e seis picos, 
e trinta e tres cates e meyo, e assim amis tres caixoens tambem de seda fina, nos quaes 
huma pello pezo de Cantam dous picos e oitenta e oito cates; em hum dos quaes 
caixoens hião mais oito cates de seda batida de cores, e oito caixões de retros11 tambem 
de cores. 
Mais corenta fardos de seda grosse de Sipeo,12 que pezarão pello pezo de Cantão 
dezanove picos e secenta cates, a secenta e dous taeis o pico. 
A seda fina custou a noventa e quatro taeis o pico, afora os fretes, e direitos de 
Cantão. 
Mais quinze fardos de Cangas13 em que hião 614 Cangas sorteadas entre pretas, 
brancas e a Luis. 
                                                 
9 The original in BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-7, ff. 108-109. 
10 Fato da Companhia que em Julho deste prezente anno vay embarcado para Japão nas galeotas da 
viagem todas seis que deste porto partem, e de que he Capitão Mor Antonio de Oliveira Moraes em Julho 
de 1618. Cf. Boxer, O Grande Navio, pp. 163-168. 
11 ‘Seda que é fiada e transformada em fio, que os portugueses chama retrós’, as explained by Jan 
Huyghen van Linschoten. Apud Boxer, O Grande Navio, p. 164, n. 4. Cf. also Bluteau, Vocabulario 
Portuguez & Latino, vol. 7, p. 310: ‘Retrôz. Fios de seda torcidos. Pluribus filis, ou liciis intortum 
sericum’. 
12 We were not able to identify this word. According to Boxer, who transcribed it as sifeo, it is a mistake 
made by the copyist and most likely is the name of a Chinese city or district. Cf. Boxer, op. cit., p. 164, n. 
3. 
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Mais hum caixão de agulhas, seis cestos de asucar, hum fardinho com meyo pico 
de pimenta. Quatro jarras de vinho de missas, huma jarra de passas da China. 
Doze, ou quinze picos de pao de China, posto que já velho do anno passado. 
Dous fardos, em hum delles cem camizas, e no outro, cem calçoens brancos. 
Mais outro fardo com algumas camizas, e calçoens, lenços, carapuças, e toalhas 
&cetera. 
Hum caixão com couzas de buticas para doentes. 
Hum fardo de alcasûs, e hum pouco de ruibeiro. 
[f. 108v] Oito caixas de peradas, quatro buyoens grandes de persolana de 
conserva. 
Mais quatro buyoens amarelhos de conserva de gengibres. 
Huma jarra de mangas de achar, e dous buyoens. 
Huma quantidade de sapatos achar secular, chinelas de curtiça. 
Hum caixão pequeno cheyo de contas, nominas e outras para os Christaons. 
Hum buyãozinho de almiscar, que de câ tinha hido, e o Padre Carlos tornou a 
mandar per ser roim. 
No Junco do filho de Toan,14 onde foi embarcado para Japão o Padre Manoel 
Barreto embarcamos oito paens e meyo de ouro entregues ao Padre Manoel Barreto, 
para em Japão os entregar ao Padre Carlos Spinola, dos quaes hé hum pão e meyo do 
Padre Vizitador. 
O preço que se comprou foi a setenta e tres e a setenta e sinco. 
No Navio de António Ferreira,15 que deste porto partio para Japão alguns dias 
depois da Nao, embarcamos setenta e sinco sayas, das quaes as secenta e sinco eram 
                                                                                                                                               
13 Cf. Glossário Luso-Asiático, vol. I, p. 421: ‘Tecido de algodão mui conhecido, que vem da Asia e de lá 
trouxe o nome’. 
14 It is not clear to whom Father Manoel Borges was referring. We know of the third son of Murayama, 
Francisco, who was baptized in 1601 and took care of one of Nagasaki’s parishes, but was exiled in 1614. 
Yet, thanks to his father’s intervention, he was brought back to Nagasaki where he remained hidden for a 
while but eventually died in the siege of Ōsaka. Another son of Tōan, was entrusted with the command of 
a ship sent to Formosa by Murayama on the bakufu’s order in 1616. Most likely, it is the same son who 
went to Macao the following year. Cf. Peri, Essai sur les relations du Japon et de l’Indochine, p. 57. 
15 A Portuguese merchant living in Macao, precisely in the freguesia da Sé, which includes him in the 
circle of influence of the Society of Jesus. In 1620, he took part in Macao’s council meeting as part of the 
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carmizin, scilicet que custaram a tres pardaos a cada huma, e des de cores que custou 
cada huma a hum tael e seis mazes, e foram entregues ao Capitam no mesmo navio por 
nome Pero Correa Craveiro, de que passou conhecimento que mandei a Japão no 
mesmo navio. 
Do procedido de toda a seda assima ditta, fina, e de Sipeo, se hão de pagar em 
Japam do proprio e respondencia a corenta por cento, tres mil e quinhentos setenta e 
nove, e sinco mazes e nove condorins de prata corrente que na ditta Nao forão daqui 
para Japam, deram a responder para Macao a ditta quantia de prata ao Padre Carlos 
Spinola, a qual elle lá gastou passando lettras para que de cá lhe mandassemos o 
emprego della; hindo correndo o risco para Japão por conta das pessoas que em Japam 
lhe derão a responder, que são as seguintes: por conta dos nettos de Minaminabo:16 
2000 taeis. Por conta de Ruefaconjin: 1400 taeis. Por conta de Justa de Arima, e Luiza 
[f. 109] de Bungo, e pobres de Firando: 179 taeis, sinco mazes, e nove condorins. E 
assim mais se hão de pagar em Japam do procedido da sobre ditta seda, nove centos, 
corenta e dous taeis de prata corrente às Capellanias dos Clerigos de Japão que se hão 
de pagar por conta da fazenda do Senhor Bispo de Japão e nos havemos de descontar 
esta ditta quantia nas dividas que aqui em Macao estamos à dever ao Successor do ditto 
Senhor Bispo, por quanto ja de aqui para Japam foi esta ditta quantia de prata das 
Capellanias correndo risco por conta das memsas Capellanias na Nao Nossa Senhora da 
Vida, que partio deste porto para Japão este anno de 1617. 
[signature] Manoel Borgez’. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                               
Povo (the people). Cf. BA/JÁ, Cód. 49-V-4, f. 22v. He is included in the Lista de la gente Efetiua que Ay 
Em esta Ciudade Assy, Vesinos Como Estrauagantes forasteros e gente De lla tierra, BPE, Cód. CXVI/2-
5, f. 226v. See also Penalva and Rodrigues, Fontes para a História de Macau no Século XVII, p. 176 and 
p. 344. 
16 Takayama Ukon adopted the name Minaminobō 南坊 when, according to Japanese custom, he shaved 
his head in sign of retirement from public affairs. Cf. Laures, Takayama Ukon. A Critical Essay, p. 88. 
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ANNEX F – Receita do açuquar que fes o engenho de Sergipe o anno de 
160817 
 Similarly to the ANNEX E, this receipt was drawn by the procurator of Sergipe. It discloses 
the annual production of different qualities of sugar, their prices in Brazil and in the kingdom, the 
revenues and the resultant balance quantified through expenditures and selling. As for the ANNEX 
E, it is yet unpublished. 
 
‘[f. 1] # fes o engenho a sua parte neste dito anno de branco tres mil duzentas e sete @ 
# de mascavado a parte do engenho veo coatro centas e noventa e huma @ 
# de batido brancos cento e sincoenta e coatro @ 
# de panelas pretas cento e oitenta e coatro @ 
 
Soma todo este açuquer que veo a parte do engenho coatro mil e trinta e seis @ 
 
# deste açuquer caregou para o reino de branco mil e oito centos e vintesete @ que 
valem a dinheiro a rezão de mil e oitenta réis @ preço que este anno valia no Brazil 
hum conto novecentos setenta e tres mil sete centos réis. 
# carregue mais coatro centas e sinco @ de mascavado a seis centos e corenta @ preço 
do Brazil que naquele anno valeo enporta duzentos e sincoenta e nove mil e duzentos 
réis. 
# carregue mais de panela preta sincoenta e coatro @ que a trezentos e oitenta réis que 
foi o preço que valeo aquele anno no Brazil, monta vinte mil quinhentos e vinte réis. 
# de maneira que enportou todo o açuquer caregado este anno para o Reino duas mil 
duzentas oitenta e seis @ que redozidas a dinheiro pelos preços do Brazil monta dous 
contos, duzentos e sincoenta e três mil coatro centos e vinte réis. 
[f. 1v] # açuquer que vendeo neste dito anno de 1608 no Brazil 
# de branco, mil e cento e oitenta @ e nelas fes a dinheiro hum conto duzentos e oitenta 
e coatro mil e trinta réis. 
# vendeo sincoenta e duas @ de mascavado e nelas fes a dinheiro trinta e tres mil 
duzentos e oitenta réis 
# vendeo cento e coatro @ de batidos e neles fes a dinheiro oitenta e tres mil seis centos 
réis 
                                                 
17 The original in ANTT/CJ, Maço 14, doc. n.º 53, ff. 1-2v. 
xxviii 
 
# vendeo centro e trinta e sinco @ de panelas e nelas fes a dinheiro sincoenta e hum mil 
e trezentos réis 
# vendeo mais trinta e sinco pipas de meles e nelas fes a dinheiro corenta e dous mil 
réis. 
De maneira que enportou o açuquer que se vendeo este anno no Brazil mil e coatro 
centos e setenta e huma @ e nelas fes a dinheiro hum conto, coatro centos noventa e 
coatro mil duzentos e des réis. 
 
# Val o que despendeo tres contos, cento e noventa e coatro mil, centro e trinta réis 
entrando nestes fastos huma divida que pagou do Conde que está en gloria, de cento e 
trinta e coatro mil réis e gastou nos escrávos que se forão buscar a Pernambuco que 
tãobem entrarão na dita contia coatrocentos corenta e sete mil trezentos réis, entrou 
tãobem nesta dita contia oito peças que dis que conprou e custarão duzentos sesenta e 
tres mil e quinhentos réis [f. 2] de modo que tirando hum conto, coatro centos e noventa 
e coatro mil duzentos e des réis que fes a dinheiro nos açuqueres que vendeo no Brazil, 
fica-lhe a dever segundo ele dis por seu libro hum conto seiscentos noventa e nove mil 
nove centos e vinte réis’. 
